November 1939, the British War Office approved a new bayonet design for the number four rifle. It wouldn’t reach soldiers hands in large numbers until 1941, but when it did, the reaction was universal disbelief. Where Germany issued proper fighting knives and America began the war with long sword bayonets.
Britain handed its soldiers a crude steel rod. No edge, no point you could whittle with nothing but 8 in of a round spike that couldn’t cut bread, couldn’t open a tin, almost useless as a field tool. Soldiers took one look at it and called it the pig sticker. They meant it as an insult. What they didn’t understand was that British engineers had deliberately built an ancient weapon for a modern war.
And when the ammunition ran out across the Mediterranean and North African theaters, cold steel would prove that the psychology of the bayonet mattered more than its shape. The decision to arm British soldiers with what appeared to be a medieval weapon requires understanding the problem Britain faced in 1939. The country was preparing for total war against Germany, and the numbers simply didn’t work.
The Royal Small Arms Factory could produce rifles. It could manufacture machine guns. What it could not do was simultaneously forge millions of the patent 1907 sword bayonets that had served in the Great War. Those bayonets featured 17-in blades requiring skilled craftsman, specialized equipment, and manufacturing capacity that no longer existed.
Every arsenal was already at maximum output. Every skilled toolmaker was needed elsewhere. Something had to give. The scale of the problem becomes clear when you examine what modern bayonet production demanded. A proper knife bayonet required forging, grinding, heat treatment, and careful finishing.
The blade needed to hold an edge. The handle required fitting. The locking mechanism demanded precision machining. Each step required trained workers and specialized machinery. Germany could manage this because their industrial base hadn’t been disrupted. America could manage it because their factories weren’t under threat of bombing.
Britain faced a different reality entirely. The patent 1907 had been a magnificent weapon in its day. With its 17in blade and 22in overall length, it gave the British soldier 5’2 in of combined reach when mounted on his rifle. Staff officers had insisted on this length after the short magazine Lee Enfield’s barrel was reduced, worrying that British troops would lose bayonet jewels against French and German infantry with longer weapons.
The solution was a modified Japanese design that extended reach at the cost of weight. Nearly 5 million of these sword bayonets served in the trenches of the Western Front. But the Great War taught a brutal lesson about bayonet combat. In most wartime medical breakdowns, bayonet wounds were a tiny fraction of casualties, often well under 1% and sometimes not even tabulated separately.
The weapon that training manuals devoted endless hours to the weapon that transformed civilian recruits into soldiers through aggressive drills, barely registered in casualty statistics. Wounds from bayonets were so uncommon they were frequently lumped into miscellaneous casualties alongside falls and equipment malfunctions.
The long sword bayonet that officers had insisted upon proved too unwieldy in the cramped quarters of trench warfare. Soldiers preferred shorter weapons, entrenching tools, improvised clubs, anything that gave them maneuverability in confined spaces. The statistics told only part of the story. What the numbers couldn’t capture was the psychological transformation that bayonet training produced.
Recruits who had never harmed another person learned to thrust steel into straw dummies while screaming. Mildmannered Clarks became aggressive fighters through repetitive drill. The bayonet wasn’t primarily a killing tool. It was a psychological conditioning device that prepared men for the reality of close combat. This insight would shape everything that followed.
The search for a replacement began immediately after the armistice. 20 years of trials and evaluations followed. British designers tested folding bayonets, knife types, and various crucifform blade configurations. They studied Swiss socket bayonets with their elegant simplicity. They consulted manufacturing engineers about production costs and scalability.
By 1939, the conclusion was clear. Britain would adopt a spike type bayonet that prioritized one thing above all others. Not combat effectiveness, not soldier preference, manufacturing simplicity. The genius of the number four spike bayonet lay not in what it could do, but in who could make it. The first production contract went to Singer Manufacturing Company of Clyde Bank, Scotland, a firm that normally produced sewing machines.
Singer had never made weapons before. They didn’t need to have done. The spike design was so simple that textile machinery companies could produce it. Prince Smith and Stells, makers of woolen machinery, received contracts. Howard and Bulo, specialists in cotton spinning equipment, began forging bayonets. On a bombedout site in South London, a company called Lewisham Engineering was founded for the sole purpose of manufacturing these crude steel spikes.
The weapon itself measured 253 mm overall, roughly 10 in, with an 8-in spike weighing approximately 220 g. That’s half the weight of the patent 1907 it replaced. The muzzle ring fitted over the protruding barrel of the Lee Enfield number four rifle, and a spring-loaded latch locked the bayonet in place. Four variants were produced, each crudder and cheaper than the last.
The MK1 featured a beautifully machined crucifform spike with four flutes running its length. Production reached 75,000 before cost pressures demanded simplification. The MK2 eliminated the expensive milling entirely, replacing the crucifform blade with a simple round spike. Over 3.
3 million of these rolled off production lines. The MK2 Star separated the blade and socket into two parts that were welded together, creating a visible stepped joint where the pieces met. Another 1.4 million were produced this way. Finally, the Mark III abandoned forging altogether. Joseph Lucas Limited, an automotive components company, stamped these bayonets from seven pieces of sheet steel welded together with no attempt to smooth the joints.
Black paint covered the crude finish. Production reached 196,000. The spike was designed to be drastically cheaper than any blade bayonet. When British factories ran at capacity, production moved overseas. Long branch in Canada produced 910,000 units. Savage Arms in America manufactured 1.25 million under Len lease. This geographic spread across multiple countries protected the bayonet supply against disruption.
By war’s end, nearly 5 million number four spike bayonets had been produced across three countries. Every single one looked the same. Every single one performed identically. That uniformity was the entire point. When your manufacturing base includes sewing machine factories and cotton spinning companies, you don’t design for excellence. You design for consistency.
Now, before we see what happened when this primitive weapon met the enemy, if you’re finding this interesting, consider subscribing. We’re building something here for people who actually care about the technical details behind British military history. It takes a second and helps the channel grow. Now, let’s get into the combat record.
The psychological dimension of the bayonet mattered more than its physical characteristics. Colonel Ronald Campbell, instructor at the British Physical Training and Bayonet School, stated this plainly. He said that even by 1914, the bayonet was obsolete. The number of men actually killed by the bayonet on the Western Front was very small.
But he added that it was superb as a morale booster. Get the bayonet into the hands of despondent troops and you can make them tigers within hours. British training manuals codified this understanding. Smallarms training pamphlet number 12 published in 1937 stated that the use of the bayonet or the threat of it will often enable infantry to drive the enemy from his position or cause him to surrender.
Note the phrasing, the threat of the bayonet. The objective wasn’t necessarily to wound with the blade. It was to make the enemy flee or surrender before contact ever occurred. This worked both ways. Research by Lieutenant Colonel Dave Grossman established that humans have a far greater aversion to killing someone with a bayonet or knife than at distance.
That primal reluctance to kill at arms length exists in the defender, too. Facing a bayonet charge triggered fear responses that bullets somehow didn’t. Academic research published in the Journal of Military and Strategic Studies confirms that during the war, Germans were known to be particularly afraid of Allied units that had the reputation for reliance upon the bayonet and other melee weapons.
German forces particularly feared Canadian divisions for their propensity and skill for trench raiding and assaults. The Battle of 42nd Street in Cree demonstrated what Cold Steel could still accomplish, whatever shape the Bayonet took. May 27, 1941. The New Zealand 28th Maui Battalion had been retreating for 7 days alongside Australian forces.
German Mountain troops of the 141st Regiment blocked their escape route. Ammunition was running low. Many soldiers had fired their last rounds. Evacuation ships waited at Svakia on the southern coast, but the Germans stood between the Allied forces in Salvation. The situation appeared hopeless.
What followed became the most effective counterattack undertaken by Allied forces on Cree. According to participant accounts, the charge was sparked when a Maui soldier picked up a Bren gun and began performing a haka. The traditional war dance of New Zealand’s indigenous people. Other soldiers joined. The ancient chant echoed across the Mediterranean hillside.
Then they fixed bayonets and walked towards the German positions. Battalion commander Fred Baker recorded what happened next. He wrote that they walked all the way, jumped into the German first positions, bayonetted or Tommy gunned them, then walked onto the next line. His men behaved as if they were on parade. After they reached the German second line, the enemy started to crack and run.
The charge drove German forces back over 1500 m. Approximately 280 German casualties resulted from the action. The 121 dead Germans from first battalion, 141st mountain regiment were found bayoneted and clubbed. This single action facilitated the evacuation of over 16,000 Allied troops from Cree. Cold steel had done its job.
The Minka breakout in June 1942 proved the pattern held in North Africa. The second New Zealand division found itself surrounded by RML’s Africa Corps. Ammunition was nearly exhausted. The only way out was through German lines, and the only weapons left were fixed bayonets. Lieutenant Kuruaka described going straight through Jerry’s groups of slit trenches.
Those who were not accounted for were left for the remainder of the battalion, who by now were following with the usual Mauy roar and battlecry. Captain Charles Uppam’s actions during this breakout contributed to his second Victoria Cross, making him one of only three people in history to receive that honor twice.
At Elamin later that year, multiple Victoria Cross awards recognized bayonet actions. Private Stanley Gurnie charged three machine gun positions successively, killing the crews with bayonet and grenades before being killed himself. Private Percy Gratwick won his Victoria Cross postumously for charging an enemy strong point with grenades and bayonet.
These weren’t ceremonial weapons gathering dust in scabbards. They were tools of last resort that saved lives when everything else failed. The comparison with enemy and Allied equivalents reveals Britain’s unique choice. Germany equipped its soldiers with the S84 Stroke 983, a 9.9 in knife bayonet with practical grips that could serve as a standalone fighting knife.
German manufacturers included Durkop, makers of motor vehicles, and Mundos, another sewing machine company. Even while dispersing production across civilian factories, Germany maintained the knife blade design. The reasoning was clear. German soldiers expected a bayonet that worked as a tool.
American troops began the war with the long M and 1905 bayonet, then shifted to shorter patterns better suited to modern combat. Approximately 1 million of the long bayonets were recalled and cut down. Crucially, the knife style blade was maintained throughout. American soldiers retained utility function even as overall length was reduced.
Both nations understood that soldiers needed their bayonets for tasks beyond combat. Britain wasn’t alone in choosing spike designs. France’s MAS-36 rifle also used a spike bayonet stored beneath the barrel, and the Soviet Union fielded crucifform spikes on their Moseneagant rifles. The Soviet M1891 Stroke 30 featured a 17in crucifform spike, the closest parallel to the British approach.
Soviet doctrine mandated that bayonets remain fixed at all times during combat. Rifles were zeroed with bayonets attached. The M44 carbine integrated a permanently attached folding spike that could not be removed at all. In Soviet thinking, the bayonet was not an accessory. It was part of the weapon system. The German bayonet could open rations. It could cut wire.
It could whittle wood and perform a 100 field tasks that soldiers needed daily. The British spike could do none of this. Troops complained bitterly that their bayonet’s most important task during deployment was opening ration tins, and the pig sticker couldn’t manage even that. One collector’s description captured the sentiment perfectly, calling the number four little more than a screwdriver blade welded onto a boss.
Yet, photographs tell an interesting story. Unlike American or German soldiers, who rarely appear with bayonets fixed in wartime images, British troops are almost always pictured with their spikes mounted. Doctrine demanded it. The psychological effect on both the soldier carrying the weapon and the enemy facing it outweighed practical concerns about utility.
A persistent myth claims the Geneva Convention banned spike or triangular bayonets because the wounds they created couldn’t be sutured. This is false. No such prohibition exists in any international humanitarian law. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 don’t mention triangular or spike bayonets. Some serrated edges drew controversy and allegations of unlawful wounding, but spike designs were never restricted.
The British number four spike remained in service through the 1960s, which would have been impossible if internationally banned. The medical claims are partially true, but exaggerated. Triangular wounds do present challenges for suturing because traditional techniques rely on clean, even edges.
Historical records confirm crucifform blades created wounds that were difficult to close. But difficult does not mean impossible. Civil War medical records document successful treatment of bayonet wounds. A 2018 Chinese medical study established effective three-dimensional suturing techniques for triangular wounds. Bayonet wounds carried higher infection risk due to deep penetration, but the weapon was not designed to create untreatable injuries.
The war ended and Britain immediately began work on a replacement. The number 9 Mark1 knife bayonet combined a proper blade with the number four’s socket mounting, essentially admitting the spike had been a wartime expedient rather than a preferred solution. Over 566,000 number bayonets were produced by 1956. The military establishment knew soldiers hated the pig sticker.
As one researcher noted, they couldn’t get rid of the number four spike soon enough. Yet, the weapon served far longer than its unpopularity suggested. The Lee Enfield wasn’t officially replaced until 1957, and number four rifles persisted in cadet force stores into the mid 1980s. The L42, a one sniper variant using the number four platform served into the 1990s.
For decades after the war, British soldiers trained with the spike their grandfathers had carried at Elmagne. The number four spike bayonet represented a brutal calculation. Britain needed millions of bayonets. Proper knife bayonets required skilled labor and specialized equipment that didn’t exist in sufficient quantity. The spike could be made by sewing machine factories, by textile machinery companies, by anyone with basic metal working capability.
Soldiers would complain about losing their utility tool. Officers would note the reduced reach compared to the patent 1907. None of that mattered because the weapon’s true purpose was psychological and psychology didn’t require an edge. The calculus was simple. A soldier without a bayonet was just a rifleman. A soldier with a bayonet, even a crude spike that couldn’t cut butter, was something more.
He was a threat at any range. He had a weapon that worked when ammunition ran out. He carried a piece of steel that connected him to centuries of military tradition. The spike didn’t need to be perfect. It needed to exist in sufficient numbers to equip every rifleman in the British Army and its Commonwealth allies.
When ammunition ran out in Cree, when the Africa Corps surrounded the New Zealand division at Minkaim, when Private Gurnie charged three machine gun positions at Elamagne, cold steel performed exactly as military psychology predicted. Fixed bayonets transformed desperate men into attacking forces.
They made enemies flee rather than face the blade. These actions proved that in the chaos of close combat, the ancient terror of edged weapons outweighed every rational calculation about firepower and modern warfare. The specific shape of the bayonet mattered far less than its presence. German soldiers facing British bayonet charges didn’t calculate the manufacturing cost of the weapon coming towards them.
They saw death at arms length held by men who had nothing left to lose. That fear was the point. The crude spike that soldiers mocked worked because bayonet combat was never really about the bayonet. It was about psychology. And psychology didn’t require an edge. British engineering solved the bayonet problem not by building a better weapon, but by building the right weapon for the industrial reality of total war.
5 million pig stickers armed the force that liberated Europe. The soldiers who carried them hated the design. The Germans who faced them feared it. That was the point all along.
