Midnight, May 16th, 1968. The Marines are supposed to be gone. Instead, a column of silhouettes slips back across Liberty Bridge without a word. Rifles low, radios quiet. At first light, they will crack open a walled hamlet named Fuong. To understand why they are walking into that fire, wind the clock back one week, early May.

 Daang is the biggest Allied hub in the North, and rockets are already walking onto the runways. Recon reports say regular North Vietnamese units are filtering south again, aiming for a place the Marines know too well. Goi, it is not an island. It is a flat grid of rice patties cut by rivers with hedges, trenches, and tunnels stitched around every hamlet.

For years, it has been a sanctuary, a safe workshop where the enemy stocks rice, hides headquarters, and recruits locals. Hit the Nang from the shadows. You stage here first. At 05 on May 4th, a Marine battalion crosses Liberty Bridge and pushes east toward the railroad. Tanks grind forward, riflemen fan out, and the first day looks clean.

Light contact, civilians pulled out of harm’s way, a sense that the enemy is scattered. The fields are open and the lines of fire are long, but every green wall hides a crawl space, and every footpath can be wired. The locals know the ground inch by inch. The Marines do not.

 May 9th near Schwan Dai, the war stops pretending. Small arms, machine guns, and mortars snap the column in place. The Marines step back, stack artillery and air, then drive in. 30 minutes later, the hamlet is theirs. Ditches choked with bodies. A recon team spots a larger group slipping away and calls more fire. Secondary explosions bloom.

 Confidence rises, but the pattern is ugly and clear. The enemy is close, disciplined, and using the terrain like a weapon. For a few days after Schwandai, the shooting thins out. Intelligence says most of these fighters look like local guerillas with a few infiltrators, not full North Vietnamese battalions. Tempting read. Wrong read. Command shifts the axis west to net anything heavier trying to reenter the sanctuary.

 One company drops by helicopter to block along the Bahin River. The board goes quiet. Units begin to rotate. Then under darkness, the Marines reverse course and cross back into Goi. They think they are hunting a headquarters. They are about to kick the nest. On the 15th at 2:00 in the afternoon, the second battalion along with all four Marine companies and tanks returned to Liberty Bridge.

 During their reverse march, the Marines faced familiar challenges. They encountered small arms fire, mortar attacks, and fluid guerilla tactics that had been present throughout the operation. Operation Allen Brookke seemed to be concluding. This is at least what the Marines wanted the enemy to believe. At 6:00 in the evening on the 15th, Marine helicopters transported Company E and the command group of the second battalion, Seventh Marines, out of the area. Lieutenant Colonel Roger H.

Barnard, the commander of the third battalion, Seventh Marines, then took charge of the remaining forces in Allen Brookke. To maintain the element of surprise, he ordered the units still present to cross Liberty Bridge as if they were wrapping up their operations. Shortly after midnight on the 16th, the command group of the third battalion along with companies A from the first battalion and G from the second battalion, seventh marines plus company ones from the third battalion, 27th Marines, recrossed the Thuubon River.

They moved in single file under the cover of darkness for safety. Ironically, the third battalion did not have any of its own companies involved as they reached their starting point about 2,500 meters northeast of Liberty Bridge just north of the target area a few hours before dawn. Barnard noted that Colonel Hall, who had been monitoring the radio communications, was thrilled with the success of the plan to return to Goi.

Lieutenant Colonel Barnard recalled that his objective was to investigate a suspected North Vietnamese Army installation. They believed the enemy was unaware of their presence. He planned to attack south, tasked with searching for, fixing, and destroying the enemy. As the Marines advanced, they prepared for their mission.

 Two companies were positioned on the front line while one remained in reserve. They aimed to execute a major surprise attack. However, both sides ended up surprising each other. Around 9:00 on the morning of the 16th, the third battalion met an enemy battalion in the hamlet of Fuong, located about 4,000 m west of Schwandai, the site of the most recent intense fighting.

 According to Barnard, they had hit a hornet’s nest. Two of his companies came under fierce machine gun fire. The battalion commander likened the scene to being at the rifle range. The Marine Battalion attempted to flank the enemy position. However, Barnard noted they needed more resources than they had available. He remembered that even the maximum artillery and mortar fire could not penetrate the North Vietnamese army’s army defenses.

 Ultimately, after extensive close air support, which included over 50 air strikes, the Marines were successful. By early evening, the Marine infantry, enduring the relentless heat throughout the day, managed to push the enemy out of their trenches and bunkers. Fearing encirclement, the enemy retreated, leaving behind more than 130 dead in the hamlet.

 The Marines also suffered heavy losses with 25 dead and 38 wounded. Second Lieutenant Paul F. Cobb, a platoon leader with Company A, and Navy Hospital Corman Robert M. Casey with Company G both received the Navy Cross postumously for their courageous actions in the battle for Fuong. Despite these losses, Colonel Hall, the commander of the Seventh Marines, viewed the operation as a success.

Barnard’s unit had uncovered North Vietnamese units in the Goi area and struck before they could concentrate their forces. Lieutenant Colonel Barnard later wrote that when enemy resistance ended and the dust settled, it was evident that they had achieved a significant victory. The suspected North Vietnamese Army installation turned out to be a regimental headquarters with considerable security and a major supply staging area.

 The battalion commander recalled that the enemy’s supplies were so vast they could not be evacuated. However, Marine helicopters managed to transport the casualties, and the battalion received a resupply of water and ammunition. Colonel Hall instructed Barnard to proceed with his southward advance the following morning.

 After a quiet night, during which the battalion moved twice, they set out at dawn from a line of departure located just north of the hamlet of Lebach. As they advanced southward, the battalion formed a column of companies. Company one of the 27th Marines led the way, followed by companies A and G from the seventh Marines along with the battalion command group.

 Lieutenant Colonel Barnard recalled that they were in open country without a specific objective. He planned to use Company A as a maneuver unit and keep company G in reserve if Company 1 made contact. However, the Marine Battalion encountered even stronger resistance than on the previous day. That morning, when Company 1 reached a dry riverbed with a dense treeine on the northern bank near the village of Lenam, they were ambushed by the North Vietnamese from well-prepared defenses.

 The strong enemy resistance and the difficult terrain made it hard for Lieutenant Colonel Barnard to assist his belleaguered company. Upon learning of the situation and the strength of the enemy’s defenses, he ordered company A to try flanking the enemy from the west. While the terrain was flat, it was covered with tall grass which slowed their movement.

 Meanwhile, as the reports from Company 1’s were alarming, Barnard directed Company G to join the battle. Unfortunately, the enemy resistance was too fierce, preventing Company G from moving forward. Frustrated, the battalion commander called for artillery and air support. He remembered that as his command group and company A struggled through the tall grass, his artillery and air officers were relentlessly coordinating missions.

The situation for company 1’s became increasingly dire when Colonel Hall, the commander of the seventh marines, radioed Barnard. He informed him that the third battalion, 27th Marines, would conduct a helicopter assault to the south to relieve pressure on Barnard’s battalion. Lieutenant Colonel Tullus J.

 Woodham Jr., the commanding officer of the Third Battalion, 27th Marines, recalled that his unit had been on alert for Alan Brookke to relieve the third battalion, 7th Marines. The 27th Marines, under Colonel Adolf G. Schwank Jr. were slated to take over operations from the Seventh Marines later that day.

 Early on the morning of the 17th, Lieutenant Colonel Woodham received orders to transport his battalion to Liberty Bridge. They were then to cross the bridge on foot for the planned relief. At that moment, Woodham had only two of his companies with him, companies K and L. Company M was responsible for security at the Denang Air Base, while Company 1 was attached to Barnard’s battalion.

 After understanding the situation with Company 1, Woodham consulted with Schwank. They agreed to proceed with a helicopter assault. For now, Woodham’s battalion would operate under the command of the seventh Marines. Some delays occurred in the arrival of the helicopters and in coordinating air support for the landing area.

 Finally, around 3:00 in the afternoon on the 17th, Marine helicopters brought the battalion to Antam, about 1,000 m southeast of Lenam. As the battalion landed, they came under mortar and long range fire. Despite this, the two marine companies quickly pushed north to connect with the third battalion, Seventh Marines. With air and artillery backing, Company K 27th Marines broke through the enemy defenses in Lenam and joined Company once around 7:30 that evening.

 According to Lieutenant Colonel Woodham, as night fell, the North Vietnamese resistance ended and they began to pull back from the area. The intense fighting at Lenam resulted in 39 Marines dead and 105 wounded while 81 North Vietnamese were killed. Company I faced particularly heavy losses with 15 killed and 50 wounded.

 Among the fallen were Captain Thomas H. Ralph and two of his platoon leaders. The casualties might have been higher if not for the bravery of Private First Class Robert C. Burke. He was a machine gunner in Company 1 who quickly grabbed his weapon and launched several one-man assaults against enemy positions. His covering fire allowed other members of Company 1 to evacuate the wounded from their exposed locations.

 He continued to advance and suppress enemy fire until he was mortally wounded. He received the Medal of Honor postumously. During the night of May 17th to 18th, the two Marine battalions, the third battalion 7th Marines and the third battalion 27th Marines stayed in separate locations but kept in radio contact.

 Lieutenant Colonel Barnard moved to a night position near Kuban about 1,000 meters northwest of Linam. Lieutenant Colonel Woodham kept his command group at Onam. Around 7 in the evening, Lieutenant Colonel Barnard handed over control of Company 1’s to Woodham and began preparations to depart at dawn on the 18th for Liberty Bridge.

 Operation Allenbrook was essentially finished for the third battalion, Seventh Marines. They planned to leave the next day, replaced by the third battalion, Fifth Marines. By then the 27th Marines under Colonel Schwank took charge of operation Allen Brookke which would continue in the goi. On the morning of the 18th Lieutenant Colonel Woodham started to expand his perimeter around Lenam.

 Around 9:30 the third battalion 27th Marines came under sniper fire from Lebach about 300 m to the north. Lieutenant Colonel Woodham quickly sent company’s K&L to eliminate what he believed were only a few snipers. However, those few turned out to be a significant North Vietnamese force, halting the Marine advance. With the fire being described as exceedingly heavy, the lead elements of both companies 1 and K found themselves isolated and unable to shift positions.

Woodham requested artillery and air support, but its effectiveness was limited due to the close proximity of the Marines to the enemy. Both companies, especially Company K, suffered multiple casualties, and the extreme heat was as much a concern as the enemy fire. At 3:00 that afternoon, Marine helicopters delivered Company M, which had been notified to replace the combat weakened Company 1.

 As Company 1 boarded the helicopters for their return to Daang, Woodham sent the newly arrived Company M into the fighting at Labac. With the reinforcements, Company K, which had endured the most losses, could withdraw, and Woodham put them in reserve. The combat continued into the night when the North Vietnamese army pulled back.

The Marine Companies retreated to Lenam and Woodham called in air and artillery support against the previous enemy positions. The battalion suffered significant losses. 15 Marines were killed, 35 were injured, and 94 troops fell victim to the heat. Around the abandoned enemy position, 20 dead North Vietnamese soldiers lay.

 Operation Allen Brookke would keep focusing on the Kuban, Fuong, and other areas through May 27th. Labac village complexes beginning with the actions of the 16th, the 7th, and later the 27th Marines. These forces engaged in a conventional battle. They faced well dug in, fresh and well-trained North Vietnamese regulars. Colonel Schwank, the commander of the 27th Marines, noted that the enemy did not start offensive actions.

 However, they fought back fiercely from hidden positions in the treetops and villages. To counter the Marine advantage in supporting arms, the North Vietnamese Army allowed the leading units to advance and then targeted the main body with intense small arms fire and mortars. At such close range, the Marine Command could only make limited use of artillery and air support.

 To address this tactic, the 27th Marines utilized heavy preparatory fire from US Navy gunfire ships offshore and artillery, working alongside air strikes. This was done to blast the enemy out of their bunkers and trenches before moving into an area. If a Marine unit encountered heavy small arms fire, they would either hold their position or retreat.

 This allowed supporting arms to be used as effectively as possible. Colonel Schwank observed that tanks with their 90 mm guns were particularly effective in these situations. They used high explosive rounds to breach enemy fortifications and canister rounds against exposed troops. Schwank commented that once the tanks were deployed, the enemy would often break contact almost immediately.

However, the tanks had a disadvantage. The terrain often restricted their movement, making them vulnerable to rocket propelled grenade fire and mines. On May 24, two Marines from the third battalion, 27th Marines, received the Navy Cross for their bravery that day in Labac. Corporal Richard W. Buchanan from Company M and Private Firstclass Charles R.

 Yordy from Company K were recognized for their actions about 800 meters northwest of Labac. The fight for Labac lasted until the 27th and involved some of the heaviest combat of the campaign, ending only when a torrential rainstorm halted the fighting. Lieutenant Colonel Donald N. Rexro, the commander of the third battalion, fifth marines, recalled that near the end of the month, his battalion overran what appeared to be an NVA regimental command post.

 Casualties had been significant on both sides. Throughout the operation until the end of May, the Marines reported killing over 600 enemy combatants. They suffered 138 killed and 686 wounded with 576 of those serious enough to require evacuation. Additionally, there were 283 non- battle casualties that also needed evacuation.

The number of heat related non-battle casualties increased towards the end due to extremely high temperatures averaging nearly 110° along with the physical exertion from the firefights. In many engagements, heat casualties matched or exceeded the number of Marines killed and wounded. During Operation Allen Brookke, the Marines believed they had thwarted an enemy attack plan aimed at Daang.

Colonel Hall of the Seventh Marines later noted that his third battalion’s return to the Goi undercover of darkness on May 16th disrupted the enemy’s plans, which had started to set up their forces. Hall reported that the North Vietnamese unit involved was from the 36th Regiment, 308th North Vietnamese Army Division.

A North Vietnamese prisoner from the second battalion of that regiment stated that his unit had left North Vietnam in February and reached the Goi the night of the 15th with orders to attack Allied positions north of the Thubon and Kailam rivers. The 27th Marines engaged both the second and third battalions of the 36th during the fighting in the Kuban and Labac complex.

The arrival of the 36th regiment in the Goi raised concerns for Marine command. The third marine amphibious force and the first marine division had expected to encounter elements of the second North Vietnamese Army Division which had previously operated in the area during the Ted offensive. This was the first indication that any unit of the 308th North Vietnamese Army Division had moved this far south.

 There were signs that the North Vietnamese had increased their regular forces in the Daang area. From May 16th to May 25th, just east of the Marine units in Goi, the 51st Army of the Republic of Vietnam Regiment, supported by two Ranger battalions, engaged about two enemy battalions in a series of ongoing clashes.

 While suffering 53 dead and 144 wounded, the Army of the Republic of Vietnam claimed to have killed 284 enemy soldiers during this time. By midMay, it was clear that the enemy buildup in the Goi sector was part of the long anticipated second phase of the enemy’s Tet offensive. Outside the violent clashes in Saigon and the intense fighting in the eastern demilitarized zone near Dorgha, the renewed conflicts in other areas were much less impactful compared to the first Tet.

This second enemy offensive known as Miniet by the Allies mainly involved rocket and mortar strikes along with minor ground probes against key bases and attacks on the more vulnerable special forces camps near the Laian border. However, Minet was not something to dismiss lightly at Daang. The marine offensive into the Goi likely prevented a renewed ground assault on either the airfield or the city.

 Enemy infantry units could not breach the marine defenses. However, North Vietnamese Army rocket units increased their attacks throughout the first core region. From May 5th to May 29th, enemy rockets struck major installations in Daang, including Marble Mountain, the main airfield, and the third Marine Amphibious Force headquarters on 12 separate occasions with the highest number of incidents occurring on the first day of attacks.

The seventh Marines reported 77 mortar incidents in the Daang tactical area of responsibility compared to only 15 in April. The presence of the second North Vietnamese Army Division was also concerning. During Minet from May 10th to 12th, this division successfully overran the special forces camps at Nog Tavak and Kduk in western Quangtin province approximately 60 mi southwest of Daang.

Worrying about the buildup of enemy forces in Goi and westward near the special forces camp at Tuang Duck, General Kushman found himself with few troops to aid in the relief of the two camps. With support from generals Abrams and West Morland, Kushman ordered the evacuation of K Duck. Before the abandonment of Nog Tavak and K Duck, Kushman had already planned an operation in the western highlands, including the area near Thuong Duck.

 On May 9th, the third marine amphibious force directed Major General Robertson, the commander of the first marine division to carry out a spoiling attack into the valley region west of Daang, which was eventually cenamed Mamaluke Thrust. While Alan Brookke and Goi delayed the start of this new operation, the threat from the North Vietnamese army that had overrun the Southern Special Forces camp remained a concern.

The possibility of taking Tuang Duck was always on the minds of commanders. This led to the seventh Marines battalions being replaced by the 27th Marines in the Goi region. The mission of the First Marine Division for Operation Mamaluke Thrust was to conduct offensive operations to locate, fix, and destroy enemy forces in the designated tactical area.

The North Vietnamese Army units believed to be present included the 31st regiment, the 341st division, the 368B rocket regiment, two unidentified battalions, the headquarters of military region 5, and possibly command elements of Group 44. The operation was expected to last 21 days. On May 19th, the First Marine Division launched its attack.

Colonel Hall’s seventh Marines alongside its first battalion advanced west along the Song Vua toward Tuang Duk. To the north, Colonel Bruce F. Meyer’s 26th Marines had quickly deployed south to Daang from Kuang Tree the day before. They sent their third battalion into the hills overlooking the eastern part of the Song Lo Dong Valley, an area known to the Marines as Happy Valley.

The first reconnaissance battalion provided stingray patrols under the control of the two regiments to support the operation. As the attack moved westward, the artillery units of Lieutenant Colonel Clayton V. Hendrick’s 11th Marines pushed their firing batteries forward to keep pace with the ground forces.

 By the end of May, Lieutenant Colonel William S. Fagan’s first battalion. Seventh Marines had cleared the hills along both sides of the Songv Vujia and its tributary, the Song Khan, extending four kilometers beyond Tuang Duck before returning to their starting point at the valley’s eastern end. Meanwhile, Lieutenant Colonel John C.

 Stut’s third battalion, 26th Marines, was deep in the jungleclad hills south of Happy Valley. Although neither unit encountered significant enemy forces, both discovered large supply caches. The much discussed enemy Mini Tet offensive seemed to have dissipated, at least in the Daang area. Despite this, the First Division chose to continue both operations Allen Brookke and Mamaluke Thrust, pushing the fight back to the enemy’s former strongholds.

 During the last four days of May, the First Marine Division began rotating fresh units into the Allen Brook operational area. Lieutenant Colonel Frederick J. Mchuan’s first battalion, 26th Marines, included veterans of earlier battles. The defense of Kesan took a significant turn. On the 26th, Lieutenant Colonel John E.

 Greenwood’s first battalion, 27th Marines, stepped in to relieve Lieutenant Colonel Woodham’s third battalion. 27th Marines just two days later. By the end of May, the third battalion, fifth marines, left goi island and joined the reserve for the first marine division. After that, the third marine amphibious force kept at least two battalions active in operation Allen Brookke.

 At the start of June, both the first battalion, 26th Marines, and the first battalion, 27th Marines, were involved under the command of the 27th Marines headquarters. The first marine division widened the operational area to include the 27th Marines forward command post at Liberty Bridge and about 35 square kilometers of rice farming land southwest of Goi Island.

 The regiment received orders for a search and clear operation. This term referred to the painstaking task of carefully searching for enemy personnel, facilities, supplies, and equipment. When executed thoroughly, this operation was slow and sometimes cumbersome. The extreme heat faced during Operation Allen Brookke, along with dense elephant grass and a hostile local community, made the search and clear mission much tougher than its name suggested.

On the morning of June 1st, a flight of nine Lockheed C130 Hercules aircraft conducted a mission known as Inferno. They dropped over 31,000 gallons of fuel in 55gallon drums with igniters attached. Although the goal was to burn away much of the island’s foliage, the mission did not succeed as planned due to the widespread dispersion of the fuel and a heavy thunderstorm that followed.

Following this setback, the two battalions of Marines began physically searching for signs of the enemy. They marched steadily across the island from west to east and then back again. Brief but intense exchanges occurred as enemy troops fired from hidden positions, prompting the Marines to return fire and request supporting artillery.

 When the Marines overran the shooting locations, they often found little or nothing. Occasionally, they triggered mines. Booby traps, often disguised as soft drink cans, tea bags, or even leaflets, posed a constant danger. At night with the Marines in defensive positions, the enemy would fire at their listening posts from a close distance.

 They also used mortars to harass the main perimeters. These actions led to more casualties and increased frustration for the Marines who struggled to respond effectively. By June 3rd, the 27th Marines had found little sign of the enemy. This prompted the first marine division to conclude that the recent lack of contact indicated that enemy forces had left the Alenbrook area of operations.

Consequently, the division scaled back operation Allenbrook. They ordered the first battalion 26th Marines to leave Goi Island for other operations and reduce the Allen Brook area of operations. It would now only cover the portion of Goi Island that lay west of the National Railroad along with a small area on the north bank of the Song Bon across from the island.

The 27th Marines instructed the First Battalion, 26th Marines, to head west along route 537 as they departed from the island, continuing their search and clear efforts. At the same time, the first battalion, 27th Marines, also moved westward, positioned to the right of the first battalion, 26th Marines. By midm morning on June 5th, both battalions had approached their final objectives.

 They had suffered four dead and 26 wounded from sniper fire and mines during their advance. As Company D of the 26th Marines, led by First Lieutenant Daniel El McGravy, approached the hamlet of Kuban, North Vietnamese troops in a trench and bunkers to the south opened fire on the first platoon. The Marines maneuvered to one side, trying to surround the enemy while communist mortars joined the battle.

 Meanwhile, 500 meters to the east, Company B of the 26th Marines, commanded by Captain James H. Champion, also came under heavy fire. A platoon found itself caught in the open and unable to move. The Marines called for mortars, artillery, and air support to help suppress the enemy fire. In response, Lieutenant Colonel Greenwood in command of the First Battalion, 27th Marines, sent Company C, led by Captain Martin T.

 Farmer, to assist the struggling First Battalion, 26th Marines. Company Cly moved south and made contact with the northernmost part of Company B. The Marines then shifted west and launched an attack on nearby communist positions. Almost right away, Captain Farmer and his second in command were injured by mortar fire. Without a proper base of fire and without enough time to adequately scout the enemy positions, Company C, as Lieutenant Colonel Greenwood later remarked, lost momentum and came to a halt. Company D, 26th Marines, was

heavily engaged near Kuban. Meanwhile, both Company B, 26th Marines, and Company C, 27th Marines, were pinned down by enemy fire meters east of the hamlet. The communists, fighting from well-conceeded positions, maintained heavy fire using rifles, machine guns, and mortars. The Marines, used to having fire superiority, were unable to effectively use their support arms in such close quarters without risking friendly troops.

 As casualties increased, helicopters landed under fire to evacuate the wounded. Two Sakorski UH34 Seahorse helicopters were hit during this operation, but neither was lost. In the middle of the afternoon, while the fight raged on, Company A, 27th Marines, three tanks in tow, left Liberty Bridge to join the battle. Backed by the tanks and carefully coordinating artillery and air support, the Marines attacked and defeated the enemy positions.

 In this hard-fought but chaotic action, the Marines suffered seven killed and 55 wounded. They found 30 North Vietnamese dead. A machine gunner from Company C, First Battalion, 27th Marines, described the encounter from an infantrymen’s perspective, saying they had a fierce firefight that lasted a while before they moved on.

 Even though the Marines had finally established solid contact with the enemy, the decision to reduce the Operation Allen Brookke commitment to a single battalion still stood. On June 6th, the first battalion, 26th Marines, left the area and elements of the first engineer battalion, arrived with the heavy equipment required for the new tasks assigned to Operation Allen Brookke forces, the virtual destruction of Goi Island.

 This new mission involved the 27th Marines providing support and protection for an engineering effort aimed at systematically eliminating all fortifications, dwellings, harbor sites, and hedge in the area of operations. The first area set to be cleared was Kuban. The clearing project faced many challenges.

 Goi Island was heavily fortified with enemy bunkers. The typical bunker there consisted of a deep hole with overhead protection made from rails and ties from the nearby National Railroad. Some of these bunkers even included concrete. They were covered with earth and blended in so well that they were hard to spot from the air and only slightly visible from the ground.

In certain areas, farmers had cleared the soil around bamboo groves for so long that these groves seemed to sit on raised mounds of hard earth. The communists dug beneath these groves to create hidden bunkers with firing slits at ground level. The hamlets also had bunkers built by local residents for family protection.

These bunkers were made from materials salvaged from the National Railroad and featured sloped roofs designed to deflect bombs and artillery. They were so strong that some remained intact even when 2,000 lb bombs exploded 50 ft away. As the engineers worked to destroy bunkers and fill in trench lines, Lieutenant Colonel Greenwood ensured their security and led aggressive patrols with his four companies.

Encounters with the enemy were occasional. As before the battle at Kuban, the enemy engaged in sniping, attacks on listening posts, and harassing mortar fire on night positions. The worry of mines and booby traps was increasing. Marines also struggled with the heat. Daily temperatures reached an average of 100° with humidity over 80%.

In this still, thick air, heat casualties sometimes reached 10%. This compelled commanders to restrict troop movements to early morning and late afternoon. While on the move, Marines carried minimal gear, even leaving behind their flack jackets. To make things worse, the enemy contaminated the local water wells with oil and dead animals.

 The water from the river proved resistant to purification attempts with halazone tablets. The battalion continued its search and clear routine. The mission continued without significant contact until June 15th. At 3:30 that morning, behind a barrage of rockets and heavy gunfire, Communist troops attacked Company B’s night position near the National Railroad.

 The Marines responded with all available weapons, from rifles to anti-tank rockets, and called for artillery support. Faced with Company B’s strong defense, the North Vietnamese broke off their attack and tried to escape. However, Company B Marines chased the retreating enemy into the night, effectively ending the confrontation.

The next day, the Marines counted 21 North Vietnamese dead from the failed attack. Company B had only three wounded. The First Marine Division decided to extend operations to allow the Allen Brook forces to pursue the enemy east of the National Railroad. Early on June 19th, a makeshift force made up of Marines from companies B and D encountered a North Vietnamese unit near the hamlet of Bakdong Ban.

 One Marine platoon took cover against intense enemy fire. As they called for air and artillery support, another makeshift company, also from companies B and D, moved in to assist, led by First Lieutenant Richard M. Woer, Company B’s commanding officer. The North Vietnamese were well fortified, occupying a series of trenches and bunkers along the Song Kai River.

 The battle lasted for 9 hours with neither side gaining the advantage. Finally, at 6:00 p.m., the battalion command group arrived along with company A and a platoon from Company C to attack from the west. The reinforcements moved northward, assaulting the enemy positions, while companies B and D provided covering fire. By 700 p.m., the Marines had overpowered the enemy, suffering six dead, 19 wounded, and 12 heat casualties.

 By noon the following day, they discovered 17 more dead North Vietnamese. The clash at Bakdong Ban marked the last significant battle for the first battalion in Operation Allen Brookke. After completing a sweep of the eastern part of Goi Island, they left the area on June 23rd. The second battalion, 27th Marines, then took over responsibility for Operation Allen Brookke.

 That night, the North Vietnamese welcomed the new battalion to Goi Island. 60 rounds of mortar fire targeted companies EF and H. The second battalion assigned to continue land clearing on Goi Island arrived with a goal of total destruction. Their plan included removing natural assembly areas, concealing foliage, tree lines, bamboo groves, hedge rows, trench lines, fighting holes, caves, bunkers, tunnels, building structures, and any features that provided cover.

 Materials suitable for building bunkers, such as concrete blocks and tree trunks, would be destroyed by crushing or burning. The battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Albert W. Keller, stated their mission was to level the island. Throughout their time on Goi Island, the second battalion faced only light enemy contact.

 The enemy appeared in small groups and typically fled when they saw the Marines. Because enemy contact was sporadic, much of the battalion’s focus remained on land clearing. During one 18-day period, the engineers completely leveled the largest forested area on the island. Lieutenant Colonel Keller later commented that the area looked like a parking lot for a major ballpark in the United States.

 As part of the land clearing effort, the battalion organized two air delivered herbicide missions, which were effective. On July 16th, the second battalion, 27th Marines, left Goi Island, reporting the death of 144 enemy combatants at the cost of four Marines dead and 147 wounded. At the same time, the third battalion, 27th Marines, entered the area to take on Operation Allen Brookke.

The nature of the operation did not change as the companies of the third battalion alternated between patrolling and providing security for the engineers who were meticulously clearing the island. The communists continued to evade significant engagements, but did fire on aircraft spraying herbicides on July 18th and July 21st.

Meanwhile, the Marines engaged small enemy groups and listened for Vietnamese voices at night, searching the areas afterward to find occasional bodies or blood trails. Intelligence sources suggested that the communists were likely to attempt regaining control of the area. At the request of the First Marine Division, Battalion Landing Team 27 launched Operation Swift Play on July 23rd, 1968.

This occurred just 17 hours after they boarded amphibious ships following operation eager Yankee in Thuaten province. Operation swift play was designed to support operation Allenbrook. It involved a surprise attack into the da the mountain area which is 6 km south of Goi Island. After landing by helicopter, battalion landing team 27 moved north toward the Song Chim son and the Allen Brook area.

 During the week-long operation, the Marines of Battalion Landing Team 27 discovered many enemy caches and base areas. They even found what seemed to be a training center, complete with a lecture hall hidden within the steep forested mountains. On July 31, Battalion Landing Team 27 crossed the Chim Son to Goi Island.

 There they took over from the third battalion, 27th Marines, in the operation. Three days later, the 27th Marines concluded their involvement in the operation, handing control over to the fifth Marines. The fifth Marines had just swapped their operational area near Fubai with the 26th Marines. Land clearing operations continued until the communists began their anticipated third offensive on August 23rd.

 With minimal enemy activity on Goi Island, the First Marine Division ended operation Allen Brookke to focus on combating threats to Daang. Company E stayed behind briefly to escort engineers to Liberty Bridge while the rest of Battalion landing team 27 left by helicopter. On August 24th, as Company E and the engineer convoy traveled west, they faced sporadic sniper fire until they cleared Goi Island.

 Operation Allen Brookke spanned three and a half months and resulted in 917 enemy deaths. Additionally, 11 were captured and two defected to the government of Vietnam. The three Marine Amphibious Force units involved in bringing Goi Island under government control suffered losses of 170 Marines and two sailors killed in action along with a further 1,124 wounded.

 Many more fell victim to heat, disease, snake bite, accidents, and various other dangers. Meanwhile, Operation Mamaluke Thrust continued in the west. On June 3rd, General Robertson extended the Mamaluke Thrust operations eastward to include the Song Thu Bonsong Tiny Yen Valley. The western part of this area was called the Arizona Territory, while the eastern bank of the river was the Anhoa sector.

 Although the Arizona territory had been under Vietkong control for years, the Marines maintained a presence in Anoa, even while engaged in combat on nearby Goi. As the 26th Marines took over from the first battalion, Seventh Marines, General Robertson bolstered the Seventh Marines with his only reserve, the First Battalion, 26th Marines, for missions in the Anoa basin.

In the western section of the Mamaluke thrust on June 6th, the third battalion, 26th Marines set up a patrol base on hill 1235, also known as Thinon. This hill was the highest point in the area and overlooked the Daang Hoy and Dilock Triangle, the Arizona territory, Happy Valley, and the Song Thubon Valley.

 At the same time, the first battalion, 7th Marines, created its own patrol base about 2 kilometers to the south on Hill 1062. In the Seventh Marines area of operations, Lieutenant Colonel Mchuan’s first battalion, 26th Marines, began their mission in the Anhoa area on the morning of June 7th. They did not have to wait long for engagement.

At 7:30 in the morning, while moving southwest from Liberty Bridge, Company B encountered fire from a North Vietnamese force on a low hill just 1,200 meters from the bridge. The rest of the battalion quickly joined the fight. As the Marines maneuvered, the North Vietnamese unleashed heavy fire using machine guns and RPGs.

The Marines called for artillery and air support, but the enemy stubbornly held the hill for 9 hours, eventually withdrawing at the end of the day. Marine casualties included 17 killed and 46 wounded. They also found 64 North Vietnamese soldiers dead. In the mountains to the west, the enemy remained elusive, avoiding conflict, even at the cost of losing significant caches and base areas to the Marines.

 On June 9th, Company L of the Third Battalion, 26th Marines, under Captain Jesse D. Bennett, seized a recently abandoned North Vietnamese Army hospital. The complex had 125 beds, medical supplies, including US-made antibiotics, a clean operating room, and a sterilization area. The area had a kitchen, food, medical records, a system of running water made from bamboo pipes, and 16 pounds of marijuana.

On June 11th, based on information from a prisoner, company 1’s of the third battalion, 26th Marines, found what was the command post of the infamous 368B rocket regiment. The amount of equipment seized was astonishing. It included rocket warheads, plotting boards, fire control devices, drafting tools, compasses, binoculars, hundreds of uniforms, and personal items.

 Overall, it filled 18 helicopter loads. During the second week of June, the first battalion, seventh marines, moved east from the mountains before ending their part in the operation. At the same time, the first battalion, 26th Marines, moved north from Anoa to an area surrounded by the Thuubon Aya and Lao rivers known as Dodge City. Lieutenant Colonel Donald N.

Rex Road’s third battalion, Fifth Marines, also moved to Anoa. The actions seemed to follow the first battalion, 26th Marines. On June 13th, just 2 days after entering Dodge City, the battalion faced a North Vietnamese force near Kichchow village, one kilometer west of a line of Republic of Korea Marine blocking positions along the National Railroad.

 The communists were cut off by the Song Lamb River to the west and south, the Republic of Korea forces to the east, and the first battalion 26th Marines attacking from the north. They defended their position fiercely using heavy machine guns, 60mm mortars, and rocket propelled grenades. In a 9-hour battle, the Marines lost three killed and 24 wounded while killing 44 enemy soldiers.

 Later that night, company B set an ambush at the junction of a trail and the railroad bed. Approximately 30 to 50 North Vietnamese tried to escape to the east. In the fight that followed, 15 enemy soldiers were killed and the Marines had no casualties. Two days later, the enemy again confronted the first battalion, 26th Marines.

 2 kilometers southeast of the Seventh Marines command post on Hill 55, a large North Vietnamese unit held a heavily fortified triangular position 500 meters wide, complete with a trench line and several bunkers. The Marines engaged the communists throughout the afternoon of June 15th and into the early evening, utilizing close air support and artillery extensively.

 By 7:30 p.m., they overran the enemy positions. 84 North Vietnamese soldiers were reported dead. The United States forces experienced seven fatalities and 15 injuries. The clash near Hill 55 concluded the sweep through the Dodge City area. The focus of Operation Mamaluke Thrust shifted again to the western valleys.

 On June 14th, the third battalion, Fifth Marines, marched out from Anoa, leaving Company K to guard the fire support base. They crossed the Song Yen into the Arizona territory. Just across the river from Anoa, Company 1 was attacked. A communist mortar round resulted in the deaths of the company commander, a platoon commander, and the company gunnery sergeant.

 The company executive officer, First Lieutenant Joseph T. Campbell, was seriously injured. As the only officer remaining, Lieutenant Campbell declined evacuation and took command of the company. He coordinated medical evacuation helicopters in and out of the landing zone and organized suppressive fire on the nearby communist positions.

 Before he could be evacuated, Lieutenant Campbell succumbed to his injuries. He was awarded the Navy Cross postumously for his bravery. Northeast of Thuong Duck, another significant engagement occurred the next day. Company K, Third Battalion, 26th Marines, faced mortar fire while escorting a convoy. Corporal David M.

See volunteered to retrieve a machine gun that had been left behind during the initial attack. He crawled uphill towards the weapon until a North Vietnamese soldier in a nearby fighting hole noticed him and began throwing hand grenades. Despite sustaining a chest wound from a fragment, Seivok fired 12 full magazines from his M16 at the enemy.

Seivok reached the machine gun and pressed forward into enemy territory. The North Vietnamese soldier unexpectedly peered out from a hidden tunnel. Rather than running for cover, worried about being shot in the back, Corporal Sevoc threw the machine gun at him. The enemy soldier ducked back into the tunnel.

 When the enemy soldier looked out again, Sivok engaged him with his bare hands. The communist fired his rifle, grazing’s leg, but Sivok managed to knock the weapon from the solders’s grasp. As they struggled in the confined space, the North Vietnamese bit Civac hard on the arm. In retaliation, Sivok bit back, then drew his Kabar knife and stabbed his opponent.

 The enemy soldier pulled out his own knife and stabbed Seiv in the back, but it was too late. The marine had gained the upper hand. Seivok kept stabbing until he realized that the man was dead. Corporal Sivac stayed in the hole until his comrades took over the hill. From captured documents, the Marines learned that the dead man was part of a nine-man North Vietnamese mortar observer team.

It wasn’t until Sivak lost consciousness that his fellow Marines noticed he was wounded. Corporal Civac’s ordeal was not finished. He shared his experience at the first hospital company just 3 weeks after the incident. He recalled, “I went to the first hospital and the doctor checked me for malaria.

 I told him that wasn’t the issue.” He asked, “What is wrong?” I replied, “Well, I got stabbed in the back, bitten in the arm, I have shrapnel in my chest, and I got shot in the leg.” He was shocked until he looked at my injuries. He thought it was kind of funny. I wasn’t in a mood to laugh. They were worried I might need rabies shots for the bite on my arm, but I managed.

 All I had to do was get a tetanus shot. I was scared because for rabies they say you get 16 shots in the stomach. I have a weak stomach. Corporal Sivox platoon sergeant commented on Sivox’s ordeal, saying, “I think the bite was worse than the stab.” Meanwhile, the third battalion, 26th Marines, maintained control and integrated the first battalion, 26th Marines, along with Lieutenant Colonel Roger H.

 Barnard’s third battalion, 7th Marines. At 8:15 a.m. on June 17th, two of Barnard’s companies began a helicopter assault into the Hill 1235 area, patrolling the challenging terrain of Thothanon. After a 5-day break for refurbishing, the third battalion, 26th Marines, launched a helicopter assault into the western part of Happy Valley near the junction of the Songang and the Songang.

Facing no resistance, the Marines focused on their familiar tasks of establishing a battalion patrol base and sweeping the area. On June 19th, the first battalion, 26th Marines, moved west from the fire support base at Hill 52, following the Songv Vuja toward Tuang Duck. They searched the same area that the third battalion had covered a month earlier at the start of the operation.

In a war like this, the only areas known to be secure were those physically occupied. It was often necessary to retrace steps in the search for the enemy. This time the communists carefully avoided any contact. The first battalion, 26th Marines, pushed through the valley past thong Duck. They then turned north and followed the trace of the Song Yang to link up with the third battalion, 26th Marines in Happy Valley on June 27th.

The following day, the third battalion, seventh marines joined the third battalion, fifth marines at the western edge of the Arizona territory southeast of Tuong Duck before leaving the operation. Southeast of An Hoa in the Cissan area, the United States Army’s American Division planned an offensive called Operation Pocahontas Forest.

 The first marine division created a plan to intercept the communist forces who were pushed into the upper Song Thuban Valley by the American Division. At 6:15 in the evening on July 7th, battery A of the first battalion, 13th Marines set up a fire support base on the west bank of the Song Thuban near Nongan about 11 km southwest of Anhoa.

 Their mission was to provide artillery support to the marine units engaged in operation Mamaluke Thrust. Pocahontas forest. The next morning, the first battalion, 26th Marines, conducted a helicopter assault into a landing zone along the KDN, just west of the Song Tubon, approximately 3 km upstream from the new fire support base at Nongan.

Meanwhile, on July 9th, Mamaluk thrust began to expand again. The third battalion, 26th Marines, attacked into the Dodge City area while the first battalion, Fifth Marines, entered Elephant Valley to carry out the northern phase of the operation. In Elephant Valley, the First Battalion, Fifth Marines, reported finding no signs of well-used trails, prepared positions, or sizable camp and harbor sites belonging to the enemy.

 On July 19th, the battalion completed its mission and returned to Fubai. As intelligence reports indicated that the enemy was planning a major attack on Daang in late July, the first marine division adjusted its forces to meet this threat. On July 20th, the first battalion, 26th Marines moved from its blocking position near Nong Son back to Anoa.

 Two days later, the 26th Marines along with the first and third battalions went north to Fubai, relieving the fifth Marines in Operation Houston. The anticipated communist ground assault on Daang did not occur during July. In response, the enemy launched the most intense mortar and rocket assault on Daang since the Ted offensive.

 On July 23rd, 143 rounds struck the city and air base, leading to six deaths and 76 injuries. The enemy’s attack damaged a runway, six helicopters, a Rockwell International OV10 Bronco, and an Air Force Fairchild C123 provider. Understanding the urgent need for enhanced protection against rocketry, the Third Marine Amphibious Force had previously ordered the construction of a Daang anti-infiltration system in collaboration with the Army of the Republic of Vietnam forces.

Early in July, the First Marine Division began working on the DS, generally tracing the outer limits of the Daang rocket belt. This system was designed to include concertina and barbed wire fencing, sensors, towers, and bunkers. By the end of the month, marine engineers and the Army of the Republic of Vietnam had completed approximately 65% of the first phase of the project.

Unfortunately, the incomplete deis provided only minimal hindrance to the enemy’s rocketeers during that month. The Marines believed that the enemy’s inability to execute the anticipated ground attacks in the city was due to the success of Operation Mamaluke Thrust. One unit history noted that prisoners and documents indicated a clear enemy plan for infiltrating the city of Daang with Sapper and related forces.

 It seemed that Group 44, headquartered in the Quangda Special Zone, attempted to execute this plan, but could not do so due to interruptions faced by their forces before launching the offensive. In the last week of July, Colonel Paul G. Graham’s fifth Marines redeployed to Anoa from Fubai and began immediate operations in the Anoa basin.

 On the day of arrival, the second battalion moved into the field northeast of the fire support base, where they soon came into contact with several small North Vietnamese units. After these initial skirmishes, contact decreased significantly. By month’s end, the enemy appeared to have vacated the Anoa region.

 In the Arizona territory, the month concluded with an unusual sighting reported by a reconnaissance team. On July 28th, Stingray Patrol Scandinavia spotted four Soviet built PT76 tanks and a wheeled vehicle barely 3,500 meters northwest of the ANOA fire support base. An air observer confirmed this sighting and Scandinavia requested close air support and artillery fire.

 The location experienced four secondary explosions. The next morning, teams Albbrook and Scandinavia reported two vehicles, at least one tracked, moving in circles about a kilometer northeast of the previous sighting. Scandinavia directed artillery and air attacks at the vehicles, but could not effectively observe the target.

 Later that day, an agent report stated that two armored fighting vehicles were destroyed in the same location. To verify this information, company’s DNF of the fifth Marines searched the area, but found no evidence of tanks. August began with a notable enemy encounter for the stingray patrol known as Flaky Snow in the Arizona territory.

At 4:05 in the morning on August 1st, a company of North Vietnamese and Vietkong attacked Flaky Snow from the north. They used grenades, satchel charges, Bangalore torpedoes, and RPG fire to overpower the Marines. The enemy withdrew quickly, resulting in five Marine deaths and 11 injuries. Compounding the situation, the assault temporarily disabled the patrol’s radio, making it impossible to call for assistance.

 The team got the radio operational again by 6:00 in the morning and requested a reaction force. Help arrived within 20 minutes, landing by helicopter under fire from the west. They discovered all observation post bunkers were destroyed and a North Vietnamese flag was flying over the site. The Flacky Snow Marines claimed to have killed seven attackers, but a search of the area revealed only three bodies.

 The frequency of enemy contact continued to increase in early August. During the first two days of the month in the Arizona territory, a troop of the first squadron, 9inth cavalry, first air cavalry division under the operational control of the fifth marines killed 96 communists in just 30 hours. The fifth marines continued search and clear operations with Lieutenant Colonel Robert H.

 Thompson’s first battalion in the Arizona territory and Lieutenant Colonel James W. Stemple’s second battalion northeast of Anhoa. Lieutenant Colonel Stemple recalled that his battalion was engaged daily with the enemy from the Anoa combat base to Liberty Bridge. At 9:15 in the morning on August 6th, companies E and F encountered a North Vietnamese company near the village of Kuban, which had seen many battles between the communists.

Operation Allen Brookke forces had been active in the weeks prior. Corporal Robert G. Fante, a squad leader from Company F, led his men forward. They pressed the attack against communist positions. When he spotted a 75mm recoilless rifle, he launched a solo assault. He successfully captured the weapon and either killed or drove off the crew.

 Corporal Fante kept pushing his squad through the enemy defenses using hand grenades to clear bunkers and pursuing the retreating North Vietnamese. Tragically, he was killed by enemy fire during this advance. For his bravery, Corporal Fante received the Navy Cross postumously. After taking the enemy position, the Marines discovered 23 North Vietnamese dead and 34 tons of rice along with the recoilless rifle captured by Corporal Fonte.

 Although Fonte was the only Marine killed in that fight, 21 others and one Navy Corbin were wounded. Additionally, 46 Marines were injured when an aircraft accidentally dropped Napal bombs on Company F’s position. Lieutenant Colonel Stemple noted that a bomb struck the reserve platoon of Company F and narrowly missed his command group.

 The two battalions continued their search and clearing operations in their sectors for the next nine days. They searched caves, bunkers, and homes. They patrolled roads and rice patties, eliminating communists one or two at a time. Casualties steadily arrived at hospitals and aid stations as Marines fell victim to mines, booby traps, and sniper fire by day and mortar fire by night.

 Signs indicated the enemy was preparing to launch an expected offensive. On August 10th, acting on intelligence reports, the First Marine Division instructed subordinate units to get ready to help defend the Daang area. The order called for reduced daytime workloads to ensure adequate rest for everyone and an increase in nighttime activities.

 The tanks cited in the Arizona territory weeks earlier prompted a re-evaluation and update of the division’s anti-mechanized plans. On August 16th, usually reliable sources along with two counter intelligence agents reported that the 42nd Sapper Battalion and the R20 battalion were active. A regimental headquarters may have been situated 3 kilometers southeast of Liberty Bridge in the village of Chaoong.

The presence of so many enemy troops less than 30 km south of Daang suggested that an offensive was imminent along with the expected sapper attacks on the city itself. The First Marine Division acted swiftly. They instructed the Fifth Marines to catch the enemy battalions at Chaong offg guard and to eliminate them in their staging areas. At 11 p.m.

 on August 16th, three Marine Infantry Battalions quietly gathered near the hamlet of Chaoong. Lieutenant Colonel Loy E. Watson’s BLT27th engaged in Operation Swift Play in the hills south of Goi Island moved into a blocking position 1,200 m east of the target along a major stream. Stmple’s second battalion, fifth marines, secured the west side of the objective along another stream 2,000 meters from Chaoong.

The third battalion, Fifth Marines, now led by Lieutenant Colonel Rufus A. Seymour, arrived by air at Anhoa and made a nighttime march to an assembly area near my son, about 5 km southwest of the enemy positions. H hour was set for 7:00 in the morning on August 17th. Lieutenant Colonel Ben A Moore, Junior’s gunners from the second battalion, 11th Marines, initiated the attack with an artillery preparation that started at 4:00 in the morning and continued until 7:00 in the morning.

 The initial plan included a targeted artillery barrage followed by a low-level air assault along with smoke and CS gas being deployed in the objective area. However, heavy rains after midnight caused the air strikes to be cancelled until mid to late morning without the smoke or CS gas. The original strategy was for his battalion to launch a pre-dawn attack by fire to mislead the North Vietnamese army regarding the direction of the attack and to hold them in place.

 The third battalion, Fifth Marines, was then tasked to make the main assault, advancing northeast into Chaoong. Stemple’s troops opened fire as planned, but he noted that elements of battalion landing team 27 inadvertently moved in front of Seymour’s battalion, hindering the main assault. Around noon, approximately 200 North Vietnamese tried to escape to the east, only to find companies FNG of Battalion Landing Team 27 waiting for them.

Marines from these companies reported killing many of them. The Marines took out 53 enemy fighters while sustaining only 11 wounds among their ranks. At 3:00 in the afternoon, the third battalion of the fifth Marines finally launched an assault and captured the hamlet. They found many enemy casualties, weapons, equipment, and food supplies.

The enemy cash contained a significant amount, including 88 tons of rice and enough medical supplies to support 500 soldiers. That night, on August 17th, the three battalions adjusted their positions. At dawn, the third battalion of the fifth Marines moved north across a branch of the National Railroad to search the hamlet of Chaoong.

Meanwhile, the battalion landing team 27 crossed the stream towards the hamlet before moving north to capture the hamlets of Lthap and Lenam, which were about 1,500 m from Chaoong. At 7:00 in the morning, company E of Battalion Landing Team 27 encountered a North Vietnamese company defending a low hill northeast of Chaoong.

The enemy forces were described as fresh and determined, equipped with helmets and body armor. The Marines returned fire and attempted to encircle the enemy, but the North Vietnamese defense forced them to take cover. From 600 meters away, the Marines called in artillery and air strikes, including chemical agents, driving the enemy from the hill.

 The North Vietnamese left 12 dead, while Company E suffered six killed and 25 wounded. To the left of Company E, Company G of Battalion Landing Team 27 also faced a North Vietnamese unit that impeded their advance. With battalion landing team 27 stalled by resistance pockets, the fifth marines revised their strategy. They ordered the second battalion of the fifth marines to seize the hamlets of Lthap and Lenam.

At 3:00 p.m., as company G of the second battalion approached their target, they clashed with an enemy platoon defending Lap. The Marines pushed forward, exchanging fire, but faced increasing enemy resistance. A 5-hour firefight broke out. Six aircraft bombed enemy positions while the second battalion of the 11th Marines provided heavy artillery support.

By 8:00 p.m., Company G la la la la la la la la la la la la la la la la la la la la launched an assault and secured the position, killing 37 North Vietnamese soldiers and effectively ending the battle at Chaoong. Seven Marines from Company G lost their lives and 19 were wounded in the engagement. Operation Mamaluke thrust continued for some time.

 Shortly after the battle for Chaoong, the communists began their longanticipated offensive in the Daang area. This demanded the attention of the Third Marine Amphibious Force to address the new threat. At this point in northern Iicor, the third marine division had initiated its own offensive against the North Vietnamese divisions in both the demilitarized zone sector and western Kuangtree province.