Iran Protest Wave Intensifies as Civil-War Fears Rise — and a Separate Europe-U.S. Ukraine Security Push Takes Shape
Protests Sparked by Currency Slide, Then Spread Fast
A new wave of unrest in Iran, described by observers as beginning on Dec. 28, 2025, has been linked to sharp currency depreciation, surging prices and broader economic pressure. The demonstrations reportedly accelerated after merchants protested at Tehran’s closed bazaar, a symbolically potent flashpoint in Iranian political life where labor, commerce and politics often collide.
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Videos and posts circulating online suggest that demonstrations have expanded beyond the capital into multiple cities. But the bigger question hanging over the country isn’t simply the size of the protests. It’s what happens if the Islamic Republic’s leadership can’t contain them — or if parts of the state begin competing with each other rather than acting as a single machine.
Why a “Clean Transition” Looks Unlikely
Even if the protests intensify, analysts caution that a straightforward democratic transition is not the most likely outcome. Iran’s system has deep patronage networks, entrenched security institutions and a ruling elite that fears retribution if it loses power. That combination historically makes compromise harder and crackdowns more probable.
The risk, as some analysts frame it, is less a negotiated reform process and more a destabilizing succession or leadership collapse — the kind of scenario where the fight stops being “state vs. protesters” and becomes “state vs. state,” with rival factions scrambling for control of key institutions.
The Most Dangerous Scenario: Succession Collapse and a Power Vacuum
The script circulating online argues that the most destabilizing path is not incremental reform but a breakdown at the top that produces a vacuum with no consensus successor. In that worst-case scenario, different power centers could move quickly to claim legitimacy and infrastructure: clerical factions, security units, political networks and opportunists with access to weapons, money, and media.
In that kind of chaotic transition, the goal is not just winning street battles. It’s capturing the levers of governance: provincial headquarters, municipal buildings, arms depots, oil revenue nodes, and especially national broadcasting — the loudspeaker that can declare who’s “in charge” before anyone can prove it.
A Country Without Clear “Safe Zones”
One reason the prospect of nationwide conflict is so alarming is that Iran doesn’t have obvious, stable safe zones that could remain insulated from a broader crisis. The narrative in circulation suggests a conflict that spreads across provinces without clean front lines: shifting local power, contested roads, and competing claims of authority.
Complicating that picture is the absence of a single unified opposition leader. A fragmented diaspora and varied domestic political currents can generate energy and momentum, but they can also make coordination difficult. In a vacuum, outside actors — or even local actors with external backing — could amplify separatism, proxy dynamics, or opportunistic bids for territorial control.
The Regime’s Loyal Core Still Matters
Even critics of the Islamic Republic often acknowledge a crucial point: regimes don’t need majority support to survive. They need a loyal core with access to coercive tools and administrative control. The narration claims a fiercely loyal bloc of roughly 20–25% of the population remains committed to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the system.
Whether the exact percentage is accurate or not, the underlying concept is central to understanding why revolutions can stall or turn into prolonged conflict: if a hardened core believes it has everything to lose, it can fight with intensity that outlasts mass protest energy — especially when it controls or influences armed institutions.
Iran’s Last Transition: 1989 Still Looms Over Today
Iran’s last major leadership transition occurred in June 1989, when Khamenei succeeded Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. That transition, by historical accounts, was managed by power brokers who believed Khamenei would be a compromise candidate who wouldn’t threaten key factions.
The relevance now is less about personalities and more about precedent: transitions are rarely clean when elite factions fear one another. If today’s system fractures, the fight may not be about ideology alone — it may be about survival, immunity, wealth, and control of the security apparatus.
Martial Law as a Trigger — and a Catalyst
One scenario raised in the circulating analysis is martial law declared by either the IRGC or the regular Iranian military. Yet even that “strong hand” solution comes with a catch: it requires unity inside those institutions.
If military and security organs are not unified enough to appoint a widely accepted figure, martial law could become less a stabilizing command and more a starting pistol for internal competition. In a fracture, separate units could claim authority, clash over chain-of-command legitimacy, or carve out zones of influence while insisting they are “protecting the republic.”
The Key Targets: Parliament, Broadcasting, Governors’ Houses, Oil
In the narrative being shared, several locations are framed as inevitable focal points if conflict escalates:
The parliament and central government facilities as symbols and logistical centers of state authority
State broadcasting (IRIB) as the primary instrument for declaring legitimacy and directing the public narrative
Provincial governors’ compounds and municipal headquarters as the administrative anchor points in each region
Oil fields, ports, and revenue-generating infrastructure as the fuel for sustaining armed factions and buying loyalty
This is the grim blueprint of modern power struggles: whoever controls money, messaging and movement has the advantage, even if they do not control hearts and minds.
Reports From the South: Abadan Becomes a Flashpoint
The most dramatic claims in the transcript focus on the south — specifically the port city of Abadan, described as strategically valuable due to its access to the Persian Gulf and proximity to borders with Iraq and Kuwait.
The circulating report claims authorities have “effectively lost” the city, citing publicly available videos and allegations that parts of the local police either went home or joined demonstrators. These claims cannot be confirmed from the text alone, but their spread reflects a broader reality: in fast-moving unrest, information warfare becomes its own front line. Footage can be real, misdated, selectively edited, or misattributed — and yet it still shapes perception and decision-making.
Allegations of Gunfights in Ilam Province
The transcript also points to Ilam province, naming the town of Malik Shahi, and alleges gunfights involving seized weapons, with protesters confronting IRGC and Basij forces. It further claims that government units have deployed “heavy weapons” with no visible resolution yet.
If true, that would represent a severe escalation — not just protest, but armed confrontation. The caution for readers is the same: battlefield-style claims require careful verification. In crisis reporting, the difference between “isolated clashes” and “sustained armed conflict” matters enormously. So does the difference between “some police left their posts” and “the state has lost the city.”
The Reality Check: What’s Known vs. What’s Being Claimed
The tone of the circulating narrative is definitive: disoriented authorities, loss of control, historic scale “beyond 2019, 2022, and 2009.” But without transparent sourcing, the most responsible approach is to treat it as a set of claims rather than settled fact.
What is clear is the pattern: economic stress can produce nationwide unrest; unrest can expose elite fractures; fractures can accelerate instability. The hardest part is not imagining the scenario — it’s proving the scale, the geography, and the degree of security force cohesion in real time.
Then the Story Swerves: Ukraine’s Allies Meet in Paris
In an abrupt pivot, the transcript shifts away from Iran and into European security planning for Ukraine. According to an Associated Press summary included in the material, Ukraine’s allies reported major progress toward agreements on how to defend the country if a peace deal with Russia is reached.
The meeting in Paris was described as the 15th and largest gathering of the so-called “coalition of the willing,” involving leaders from 27 European countries and Canada, plus U.S. representatives, and senior officials from the EU and NATO. The stated goal: build a post-ceasefire security architecture that deters Russia from attacking again.
A U.S.-Led Monitoring Role and “Guarantees” on the Table
One of the key concepts discussed, per the AP-referenced summary, was a plan that could have the United States lead efforts to monitor a ceasefire, giving Washington a direct role in maintaining any peace arrangement.
Leaders reportedly emphasized support that goes beyond statements: equipment and training for Ukraine’s frontline forces, backed by air, land and sea support to deter renewed Russian offensives. But major uncertainties remain, including the size, composition and rules of engagement for any supporting forces — and whether such plans would activate only after a ceasefire actually takes effect.
Russia’s Conditions: No NATO Troops on Ukrainian Soil
The transcript notes there was no immediate Russian comment in that reporting window, while also reiterating Moscow’s long-standing position: it insists there can be no ceasefire without a comprehensive settlement, and President Vladimir Putin has ruled out any deployment of NATO country troops on Ukrainian territory.
UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer, according to the cited material, described progress as “excellent” while warning that the “hardest yards” remain ahead — a nod to the core dilemma: deterrence plans are only as credible as the political will behind them, and Russia’s calculus will hinge on whether it believes the West will actually follow through.
Two Crises, One Global Pattern: Stability Is the Prize
Taken together, the two halves of the transcript sketch a volatile geopolitical moment: internal fragility fears in Iran paired with external security engineering in Europe.
In Iran, the central question is whether economic shock and political anger remain protest — or evolve into institutional fracture. In Europe, the central question is whether a future ceasefire can be made durable through guarantees strong enough to deter another invasion.
Both revolve around the same hard truth: stability is not a slogan. It’s infrastructure, legitimacy, and credible force — and once any one of those pillars wobbles, the fight becomes less about ideals and more about control.
What to Watch Next
For Iran, the next indicators are structural: cohesion of security services, reliability of provincial governance, control of major transportation routes, and whether competing factions begin speaking in competing voices.
For Ukraine and Europe, the next indicators are political and operational: whether the coalition’s plans become specific enough to be credible, whether the U.S. role is defined in measurable terms, and how Russia signals its red lines in negotiations.
The distance between “unrest” and “civil war,” like the distance between “ceasefire” and “peace,” is filled with details. And right now, those details are where the story lives.
