October 24th, 1944. Formosa Strait, 2:30 a.m. Commander Richard Ocaine peers through the periscope of USS Tang, watching a Japanese troop transport burn against the night sky. It’s his fifth kill of the night. In the cramped forward torpedo room, 23-year-old torpedo man Floyd Caverly loads the 24th and final Mark1 18 electric torpedo into tube number three. The submarine has been on patrol for 51 days, and this will be their last shot before heading home. B. What Ocaine doesn’t know is that in

exactly 4 minutes, this torpedo will complete a circular run, strike Tang Stern, and send his submarine to the bottom with 87 men trapped inside. The statistics are staggering. In five war patrols spanning just 15 months, Tang has sunk more enemy vessels than any other American submarine in World War II. 29 confirmed kills. Over 100,000 tons of Japanese shipping sent to the ocean floor. Vioine has become the most successful submarine commander in US Navy history. Credited with personally sinking more ships than entire wolf

packs of German yubot. But the Mark 18 torpedo, the weapon that made Tang so deadly, has a fatal flaw that Navy brass has known about for 18 months. A defect in the steering mechanism causes one in every 20 torpedoes to malfunction, turning them into weapons that hunt their own submarines. The Bureau of Ordinance has received 47 reports of circular runs since January 1943. They’ve done nothing. Tonight, Tang will fire torpedo number 24. The odds finally catch up. Okaane orders the shot. Cverly

pulls the firing lever. The compressed air system hisses as 3,000 lb of high explosive launches from the tube at 46 knots. Through the periscope, Okaane tracks the phosphorescent wake as it speeds toward the transport, now just 1,200 yd away. Then the wake curves. Captain, the fish is turning, shouts the executive officer. Okaane sees it immediately. The torpedo has entered a sharp right turn, arcing back toward Tang in a perfect death spiral. He has 20 seconds to save his crew. All ahead emergency, right full rudder. Tang’s

four diesel engines scream to maximum power, but a submerged fleet submarine needs 400 yd to complete an emergency turn. The torpedo is closing at 150 ft pers. But what Okaane didn’t know was that his own weapon had just become his executioner. December 1941, Pearl Harbor. When Japanese bombs shattered the American Pacific Fleet, the US Navy’s submarine force became America’s only offensive weapon in the Pacific. 51 submarines began hunting Japanese shipping lanes with one weapon, the Mark1 14 torpedo. Within 6 months,

submarine commanders were filing reports that painted a catastrophic picture. The Mark1 14 torpedoes were running 11 ft deeper than set, passing harmlessly beneath enemy hulls. When depth settings were corrected, the magnetic detonators were exploding prematurely, or not at all. When commanders switched to contact detonators, the firing pins were crushing instead of triggering explosions. Submarines were returning from patrols, having fired 20 torpedoes with zero hits. The failure rate exceeded 70%. Then Captain Dudley Morton

of USS Wahoo documented the problem in scathing patrol reports throughout 1942. During one attack on a Japanese convoy on January 26th, 1943, Morton fired nine torpedoes at pointblank range. Eight failed to detonate. One actually bounced off a tanker’s hull. Morton wrote in his report, “If the Bureau of Ordinance cannot give us reliable weapons, they are condemning our crews to die for nothing.” The Bureau of Ordinance led by Rear Admiral William Blandandy refused to acknowledge the problem. They blamed

submarine commanders for poor shooting. They claimed the torpedoes worked perfectly in pre-war testing at the Naval Torpedo Station in Newport, Rhode Island. When commanders demanded live fire tests against actual ship holes, Blandy refused, citing the expense. A single Mark14 torpedo cost $10,000, the equivalent of $175,000 today. But submarine crews were dying. In 1942 alone, seven American submarines were lost. The many after failed torpedo attacks left them vulnerable to counterattack. Japanese depth charges were sinking

submarines that should have been safely submerged after successful strikes. The average life expectancy for a submarine crew member was just six patrols. The silent service was hemorrhaging trained men. The stakes couldn’t be higher. Japan’s war machine depended entirely on imported resources. oil from the Dutch East Indies, rubber from Indo-China, iron ore from Manuria. She calculated that if American submarines calculated that if American submarines could achieve just a 50% sinking rate, they

could strangle Japan’s economy within 18 months. But with Mark 14 torpedoes failing 70% of the time, the submarine blockade was failing. Admiral Charles Lockwood, Commander of Submarine Forces Pacific. I compiled data from every patrol report filed between December 1941 and June 1943. The numbers were damning. American submarines had fired 1,442 Mark14 torpedoes and achieved just 312 hits, a success rate of 21.6%. The German yubot force using similar technology was achieving hit rates exceeding 60% in the Atlantic. Something

was catastrophically wrong. In June 1943, Lockwood did what the Bureau of Ordinance refused to do. See, he ordered live fire tests at the submarine base in Pearl Harbor. His team welded steel plates to a rocky cliff face and fired torpedoes at zero deflection angle. On impact, the firing pins crushed. The contact detonators were defective. Lockwood’s team disassembled the mechanisms and discovered the flaw. The pins were striking with too much force, collapsing before they could trigger the

explosive train. The solution was simple. Lighten the firing pin by 40%. D. Lockwood authorized the modification immediately. By July 1943, American submarines were finally sinking ships. Hit rates climbed to 54%. But the Bureau of Ordinance had another torpedo in development that promised even better results. It was called the Mark 18, and it would become the deadliest weapon ever used by the silent service against both the enemy and American crews. July 1943, Pearl Harbor submarine base. Richard

Heatherington O’Aine doesn’t look like America’s future submarine ace. At 33 years old, he’s a lieutenant commander. Who’s a lieutenant commander? Who’s a lieutenant commander? Who’s a lieutenant commander? Who’s a lieutenant commander? Who’s a lieutenant commander? Who’s a lieutenant commander? Who’s a lieutenant commander? Who’s a lieutenant commander? Who’s a lieutenant commander? Who’s a lieutenant commander? Who’s a lieutenant commander? Who’s a lieutenant commander?

who are old? He’s a lieutenant commander who spent most of his naval career in classrooms, not combat. He graduated from the US Naval Academy in 1934. Not in the top quarter where submarine commanders are typically selected, but exactly in the middle of his class, ranked 212th out of 432. His fitness reports before the war describe him as thorough but unimaginative and adequate for routine duties. Okaane’s first war patrol as executive officer aboard USS Argonaut in August 1942 ends in near disaster.

During a surface attack on a Japanese convoy, he miscalculates the torpedo firing solution. All four torpedoes miss. The submarine takes severe depth charge damage and barely escapes. His commanding officer writes in the patrol report, “Lieutenant commander,” Okaine requires additional training before assuming command responsibilities. But there’s something different about Okaane that his fitness reports don’t capture. While other officers are sleeping off duty, he’s in the navigation room

calculating attack angles with obsessive precision. He fills notebooks with sketches of torpedo trajectories, analyzing why shots miss. He interviews every torpedo man about loading procedures, firing sequences, running depths. His fellow officers think he’s neurotic. One calls him the school teacher who won’t stop asking questions. In October 1942, Okaane transfers to USS Wahoo as executive officer under Captain Dudley Morton. It’s during Wahoo’s third patrol in January 1943 that Oka has his

moment of insight, but it has nothing to do with torpedoes. They’re hunting a Japanese convoy in the Yellow Sea when Morton calls for a submerged approach. The standard submarine doctrine requires the captain to remain at the periscope during attacks, calling out ranges and bearings while the executive officer plots the firing solution below in the conning tower. But Morton realizes he’s spending so much time at the periscope that he’s losing track of the tactical picture. On January 26th, 1943,

Morton tries something radical. He tells Okaane to take the periscope. Morton will stand at the plotting table. Oh, watching the entire battle develop from the executive officer’s position. Okain will call out what he sees. Morton will calculate the firing solutions and give orders to the helmsman directly. It inverts the entire command structure. The first time they try this new approach, Wahoo sinks three Japanese ships in one attack. The Morton Okaane partnership becomes legendary. Over four

patrols together, Wahoo sinks 19 confirmed vessels, more than any submarine in the Pacific. But Okaane isn’t satisfied with tactics. He’s noticed something about the torpedoes themselves. The new Mark 18 torpedoes are electric, leaving no visible wake. They’re nearly impossible for enemy ships to spot. But Okaane has observed something troubling. When firing at shallow draft vessels like destroyers or corvettes, if the Mark 18 strikes at a steep angle, its gyroscope sometimes overcorrects. Instead of maintaining

course, the torpedo enters a gradual turn, usually harmless, sometimes lethal. Okaane starts documenting every Mark 18 shot. What he’s about to discover will be dismissed as paranoid delusion by every torpedo expert in the Navy. April 1944, Mayor Island Naval Shipyard, California. Richard O’Ne has been given command of USS Tang, a brand new Balo class submarine fresh from the shipyard. During the 3month shakeddown period, he does something no other submarine commander has attempted. He conducts

unauthorized tests on Mark 18 torpedo gyroscopes. Navy regulations explicitly forbid tampering with torpedo mechanisms. The Bureau of Ordinance has classified the Mark1 18 steering system as restricted technology. Unauthorized disassembly is a court marshal offense. Okaane doesn’t care. He’s convinced that under certain conditions, the Mark18’s gyroscope can malfunction catastrophically. In a machine shop at Mayor Island, Okaane and his torpedo officer, Lieutenant Murray Frezy, obtain

a practice Mark1 18 warhead. They disassemble the gyroscope housing, a precision instrument the size of a grapefruit containing a spinning flywheel that maintains the torpedo’s course. The mechanism is brilliant in its simplicity. As long as the gyroscope spins at exactly 20,000 revolutions per minute, the torpedo flies straight. But Okaine has noticed something in patrol reports when Mark 18s are fired in rough seas with the submarine at a steep angle. They the initial gyroscope spinup occurs while the torpedo is tumbling

through turbulent water. If the gyroscope doesn’t achieve full speed before the torpedo stabilizes, the steering veins receive incorrect correction signals. Frezy performs calculations. A gyroscope spinning at 18,000 revolutions per minute. Instead of 20,000 revolutions per minute will cause the torpedo to gradually curve. At 16,000 revolutions per minute, the curve becomes a circle. The torpedo will eventually strike whatever is directly behind its launch point. They the mathematics are undeniable.

Okaane requests permission from Admiral Lockwood to conduct live fire tests with deliberately underpun gyroscopes. Lockwood denies the request immediately. Commander, you’re suggesting that our torpedoes can turn around and sink our own submarines. Do you understand how that sounds? The Bureau of Ordinance has tested these weapons exhaustively. They don’t malfunction. Okaane persists. He compiles data from 43 war patrols where submarines reported fish running erratic. In 14 cases, the torpedoes were last observed turning. In

three cases, submarines took evasive action to avoid their own torpedoes. In two cases, USS Tullby on March 26th, 1944 and USS Graing in September 1943, submarines were lost under circumstances consistent with circular runs. When Okaane presents this evidence to a meeting of submarine squadron commanders on May 12th, 1944, they the response is immediate and hostile. Captain John Cromwell, a squadron commander with three years of combat experience, stands up and points at Okaine. That is paranoid delusion, commander. You’re

accusing the Bureau of Ordinance of negligence that’s killed American sailors. You’re suggesting that our most reliable weapon is defective based on anecdotal coincidence. This is dangerous talk that undermines crew confidence. The room erupts. Officers are shouting. Some defend Okaane, you citing their own observations of erratic torpedo runs. Most dismiss him as an inexperienced commander, inventing excuses for future failures. The meeting dissolves into chaos. But one person remains silent.

Admiral Lockwood doesn’t dismiss Okaine. He doesn’t defend him either. He simply says, “Commander Okaine, take Tang to war. will evaluate your theories based on your results. It’s the closest thing to approval Okaine will get. June 24th, 1944, Pearl Harbor. USS Tang departs on her first war patrol with Richard Ocaine in command. His orders are straightforward. Hunt Japanese shipping in the waters around Tru, the heavily fortified Japanese naval base in the Caroline Islands. Standard patrol duration 60

days. Expected kills three to five vessels if lucky. Okain has other plans. Mai’s equipped Tang with the latest fire control computer, the torpedo data computer Mark III, and he’s drilled his crew relentlessly on rapid firing sequences. Standard practice is to fire one or two torpedoes per target, wait to observe results, then fire again. Okaine has calculated that if Tang fires six torpedo spreads at close range under 1,000 yards, the probability of hits increases to 90%, even with the Mark18’s

theoretical defects. On June 25th, 1944, they Tang encounters a Japanese convoy 60 mi north of Trrook. Four cargo ships, two escorts. Okaane maneuvers Tang into position just 900 yards from the lead freighter. At 11:47 p.m., he orders a six torpedo spread. All six hit. The 7,000 ton cargo vessel breaks in half and sinks in 4 minutes. The escorts converge on Tang’s position. Okaane dives to 400 ft and sits silent for 3 hours while Japanese destroyers drop 72 depth charges. When the escorts finally

depart, Okaane surfaces and chases the convoy. By dawn on June 26th, he’s sunk two more ships. Tang’s first patrol lasts 51 days. Okaane sinks 10 Japanese vessels totaling 39,000 tons. It’s the most successful debut patrol by any submarine commander in US Navy history. He returns to Pearl Harbor on August 3rd, 1944 to a hero’s welcome. But in his patrol report, Seio includes a detailed section titled Mark 18 torpedo performance anomalies. He documents three instances where torpedoes

exhibited curved running characteristics inconsistent with targeting data. He recommends immediate investigation of gyroscope spin-up procedures. The Bureau of Ordinance in Washington reads Okaane’s report and issues a response on August 19th, 1944. Commander Okaane’s concerns regarding Mark 18 stability are noted but unsupported by testing data and no modifications to firing procedures are warranted. The Mark 18 remains the most reliable torpedo in American arsenal. Admiral Lockwood reads the bureau’s

response and does something extraordinary. He overrules them. On September 1st, 1944, he issues a directive to all submarine commanders in the Pacific. When firing Mark 18 torpedoes in sea states above moderate, ensure submarine is level before launch. Allow additional 30 seconds for gyroscope stabilization. If torpedo wake exhibits curvature exceeding 5 degrees within first 200 yards, take immediate evasive action. The directive doesn’t acknowledge that Mark1 18S can perform circular runs. It

doesn’t admit the bureau was wrong, but every submarine commander understands what Lockwood is saying. Okaane was right. Tang departs on her second patrol on September 9th, 1944. In 23 days, Okain sinks 10 more vessels. His tactics are revolutionary. He attacks on the surface at night to using Tang’s radar to track targets while remaining invisible to Japanese lookouts. He closes to point blank range, sometimes under 700 yd before firing. The Japanese call him the demon captain after survivors report a

submarine that appears from nowhere. fires from suicidal range and vanishes before escorts can respond. On Tang’s third patrol in October 1944, Okaane sinks another nine ships in 17 days. By October 23rd, a Tang has sunk 29 confirmed vessels in just 4 months of combat, more than any submarine in any navy during World War II. Okaine has become the deadliest submarine commander in history. Naval analysts later calculate that Tang’s sinkings destroyed over 100,000 tons of Japanese cargo capacity. That’s equivalent to 500

tanks, 1,200 trucks, 15,000 tons of fuel and supplies for 40,000 Japanese troops that never reached the front lines. American casualties on islands like Ewoima and Okinawa were reduced measurably because those supplies never arrived. If you’re fascinated by stories of unconventional warriors who changed history against impossible odds, hit that subscribe button. We’re releasing three new Last Words episodes every week, uncovering the true stories behind warfare’s greatest moments. But Richard

Ocaine’s greatest test is still ahead, and the weapon he mastered is about to become his executioner. But October 24th, 1944, Formosa Strait, 11:30 p.m. Tang is hunting the remnants of a Japanese convoy that’s been fleeing since Okaane attacked them at dusk. He’s already sunk two transports and damaged a third. Now in the darkness off the coast of Formosa, he’s tracking the largest prize of the night. A 10,000 ton troop transport packed with Japanese soldiers retreating from the

Philippines. Okaane has a problem. Tang has fired 22 of her 24 Mark18 torpedoes. The every tube has been loaded and fired multiple times over 51 days of patrol. The remaining two torpedoes have been sitting in their tubes since early October. Navy maintenance procedures require torpedoes to be removed and serviced every 30 days. These two are past inspection date. At 2:10 a.m. on October 25th, Okaine fires torpedo number 23 from tube number one. It runs straight and hot, striking the transport amid ships. The explosion is massive.

Through the periscope, the Ocane watches the vessel list heavily to port, but it’s not sinking fast enough. There are four Japanese escorts in the area, and they’re converging on Tang’s position. Okaane makes a decision. He’ll fire the 24th and final torpedo, then dive deep and escape in the confusion. At 2:29 a.m., he positions Tang at 1,200 yards from the crippled transport. The submarine is running on the surface at 8 knots. The seastate is moderate with 3-FFT swells. Tang is yawing slightly in

the waves about 5° off level when Okaane gives the order. Fire 24. In the forward torpedo room, Floyd Cavly pulls the firing lever. The Mark1 18 launches normally. Okaane watches the phosphorescent wake track toward the transport. For the first five seconds, it runs true. Then it curves right. Lieutenant Lawrence Savodkin Tangs executive officer sees it through the bridge binoculars. Captain, the fish is turning. Okaane doesn’t hesitate. All ahead. Emergency. Right full rudder. Clear the bridge.

Dive. dive. Tang’s four Fairbanks Morse diesel engines scream to maximum power, producing 5,400 horsepower. The rudder swings hard over. Men are diving down the conning tower hatch, but Okaane knows the mathematics. A fleet submarine displacing 2,400 tons submerged cannot turn quickly. Tang needs at least 20 seconds to complete an emergency turn. The torpedo is closing at 46 knots. Distance 1,100 yd and closing. Time to impact 45 seconds. Okaane can see the wake now. A bright green line in the dark water arcing back

toward Tang in a perfect circle. The torpedo’s gyroscope has malfunctioned exactly as he predicted. It’s running at reduced RPM, overcorrecting into a death spiral with a turning radius of approximately 600 yd. Tang is at the center of that circle. 20 seconds to impact, Savodkin shouts. Tang’s bow is starting to turn, but the stern, where the torpedo will strike, is still pointed directly at the incoming weapon. Okain can see Japanese sailors on the burning transport watching the drama

unfold. Some are pointing at the torpedo wake. They understand what’s about to happen before he does. 15 seconds. Okaane makes a final desperate decision. All back emergency reverse screws. If Tang can reverse thrust, maybe the torpedo will pass ahead of the turning bow. But chief motor machinist’s mate, William Leebold, throws the engine controls into reverse. The propellers reverse pitch, but momentum is still carrying Tang forward. 10 seconds through the periscope. Okaane watches the torpedo wake curve around Tang’s

starboard side. For a moment, he thinks it might miss. The wake is passing just 30 yard from the hull, heading toward the bow. Then he sees the torpedo itself. A gray shadow just beneath the surface, 20 ft long, d running at three feet depth. It’s turning toward Tang, drawn to the magnetic signature of the submarine’s steel hull. Brace for impact. At 2:32 a.m., torpedo number 24 strikes Tang’s stern at a 20° angle just after of the after torpedo room. The warhead contains 612 lb of TNT. The

explosion tears open a hole 15 ft across. The stern immediately floods. Tangs after compartments, the maneuvering room, the after engine room, the after torpedo room flood in seconds. 30 men are trapped in those spaces. Gunner’s mate Charles Andreolo is in the after torpedo room when the explosion hits. He later testifies, “The blast threw me against the bulkhead. Water was coming in like from a fire hose. The lights went out. I heard men screaming. The compartment was flooding so fast we

couldn’t even get to the escape trunk. We were underwater in less than 30 seconds. Tang’s stern sinks first, pulling the submarine into a 45° down angle. Uh, in the forward compartments, men are sliding down passageways as equipment breaks loose. Okaane orders blow [music] all ballast, but the compressed air system has been damaged. Only the forward ballast tanks respond. Tang’s bow breaks the surface briefly, then the submarine slides backward into the depths, stern first. At 2:35 a.m.,

USS Tang settles on the bottom of the Formosa Strait at 180 ft depth. Of the 87 men aboard, ye 33 are still alive in the forward compartments, the forward torpedo room, the officer’s quarters, and the control room. Okain is among them. So are Savadkin, Liebold, and 28 other men who were forward of the explosion. The Japanese escorts above are dropping depth charges on what they believe is an intact submarine attempting to escape. Each explosion shakes Tang’s hull. Light bulbs shatter. Pipes rupture. Day. The men trapped

inside know they have perhaps 4 hours before the air becomes unbreathable. At 3:15 a.m., Okaine makes the decision to attempt escape using the Moms lung, a primitive rebreather that allows submariners to ascend from depths up to 200 ft. It’s never been successfully used in combat conditions. Of the 33 men who attempt escape, only nine reach the surface alive. The Japanese capture eight, including ocaine. 24 men remain trapped in Tang’s forward compartments as the air runs out. They die slowly

from carbon dioxide poisoning over the next 6 hours. 78 men total perish when Tang’s own torpedo sends the submarine to the bottom. September 1945, Omorei PW Camp, Japan. When American forces liberate the prison camp outside Tokyo, they find Richard Ocaine weighing 112 lb, down from his pre-war weight of 165. He’s been beaten repeatedly for refusing to provide information about American submarine tactics. His right arm is permanently damaged from torture, but he’s alive along with eight other

Tang survivors. The first question reporters ask when Okaine returns to the United States. How does it feel to be America’s greatest submarine ace? Okain’s response is immediate and bitter. I killed 78 of my own men. I fired the torpedo that sank my own submarine. Don’t call me a hero. On December 8th, 1945, President Harry Truman presents Okaane with the Medal of Honor at a White House ceremony. The citation credits him with sinking 29 Japanese vessels and saving countless American lives through his actions.

Okain accepts the medal but refuses interviews. He tells Truman privately, “Every ship I sank means men who died. 78 of them were mine. That’s not heroism, Mr. President. That’s mathematics that went wrong. The Navy’s investigation into Tang’s loss concludes in January 1946. The report confirms what Okaine predicted 18 months earlier. The 24th torpedo’s gyroscope failed during launch, causing the circular run. The report identifies the root cause. Tang was yawing 5° when the torpedo launched

and the gyroscope spun up at reduced RPM while the torpedo tumbled through disturbed water during the first 3 seconds of flight. The Bureau of Ordinance issues new firing procedures immediately. All Mark1 18 launches must occur with the submarine within 2° of level. Gyroscope spin-up time is extended from 6 seconds to 12 seconds before rudder control engages. These modifications come too late for Tang, but they prevent future circular runs. Tang’s combat record stands unmatched. Between June and October 1944,

Duchi sank 29 confirmed Japanese vessels totaling 116,454 tons. more than any other submarine in any Navy during World War II. Naval analysts later calculate that Tangs kills destroyed cargo capacity equivalent to supply lines for 75,000 Japanese troops. The supplies that never reached Ewima, Okinawa, and other Pacific battlefields translated directly into reduced American casualties. Estimates suggest Tang’s success saved between 2,000 and 5,000 American lives. But Okaane never speaks publicly about

his victories. When Morton Frzy, one of Tang’s survivors, visits him in 1958. He finds Okaane living quietly in California working as a civilian consultant for submarine design. Frzy asks, “Captain, don’t you think the world should know what Tang accomplished? Okaane’s response. The world knows that torpedoes can sink ships. Yeah. What they don’t need to know is that I lost 78 good men because I didn’t wait 3 seconds for the submarine to level out before giving the order to fire. That’s

the only lesson from Tang that matters. Richard Ocaine dies on February 16th, 1994 at age 83. At his funeral, Floyd Cavly, the torpedo man who fired the 24th torpedo, reads a letter written by Ocaine in 1965. It says simply, “A captain’s first duty is to bring his men home. I failed. Everything else is commentary.” The USS Tang was raised from the Formosa Strait in 1952. The hull is still there, 180 ft down, marking the spot where America’s deadliest submarine became the victim of

its own weapon. Innovation without humility is catastrophic. Okaane was right about the Mark1 18’s flaw, but being right doesn’t prevent tragedy when you stop questioning your own assumptions. He knew the torpedoes could malfunction. He documented the risk. He warned the Navy. But on October 25th, 1944, he gave the order to fire from an unstable platform. Anyway, 78 men died because he trusted his weapon more than his own protocols. That’s the burden every warrior carries. Being the best

doesn’t make you immune to failure. It just means more people depend on you getting it right. Tang still holds the record for most ships sunk by an American submarine. That record will likely never be broken. But it’s a record written in the blood of the men who died inside her hall.