Japan Thought Pearl Harbor Was Destroyed — Until U.S Salvage Teams Fixed It In Record Time

May 17th, 1942. Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard, Territory of Hawaii. 11:47 in the morning. Captain Homer Anne. Wallen stands on dry dock number one, watching USS West Virginia rise from the water for the first time in 5 months. Her port side, what’s left of it, emerges like the hide of some enormous corpse pulled from a grave.

The battleship’s armor belt looks like sheet metal crumpled by giant hands. Torpedo damage has ripped openings through her side protection system that engineers said was designed to withstand exactly this kind of attack. Seven separate impact points, each representing approximately 1,000 lbs of high explosive detonating against her hall.

“This ship should not exist,” Wallen thinks as the pumps drain the last water from the dock. By every principle of naval architecture, she should be resting on the bottom with Arizona and Oklahoma. But West Virginia does exist, and she is not alone. Looking across the harbor, Wallen can see USS California preparing for her own dry docking.

Nevada sits in dry dock number two already under repair. Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Tennessee have departed for West Coast shipyards. Even the destroyer Shaw, her entire bow blown off, has been rebuilt and sent steaming to San Francisco for final reconstruction. The numbers tell an impossible story. 21 ships damaged or sunk on December 7th, 1941.

5 months later, 18 of them are either back in service or under active repair. The exceptions, Arizona, too devastated by the magazine explosion to salvage. Oklahoma capsized and writed but too old to justify reconstruction and Utah the target ship whose loss means nothing to combat capability.

18 ships salvaged from the mud and oil and death of Pearl Harbor’s bottom. The Japanese Imperial Navy had calculated that America’s Pacific battleship fleet would require 18 months to 2 years to rebuild, if it could be rebuilt at all. Naval analysts in Tokyo had examined photographs of battleship row and concluded the United States faced a strategic catastrophe requiring half a decade to overcome.

They were examining surface damage. They hadn’t calculated what lay beneath. Wallen had spent his entire career preparing for this moment without knowing it. 20 years of naval architecture study at MIT. two decades working New York, Philadelphia, and Mayor Island Navy Yards. Experience with ship construction, damage control, structural engineering, and underwater repair that no other officer in the Pacific possessed.

On December 7th, 1941, as battle force engineer, he’d watched the attack from the fleet flagship. On January 9th, 1942, he took command of the newly created Salvage Division with three clear objectives. rescue trapped personnel, assess damage to each vessel, and repair as many ships as possible. Now, five months later, the third objective approaches completion.

West Virginia’s reconstruction represents the culmination of salvage engineering that seemed impossible in December. She settled upright thanks to rapid counter flooding by her damage control officer, but sat on the harbor bottom with approximately 65 crew members remains trapped inside her flooded compartments.

Raising her required building coffer dam patches covering virtually her entire port side mid ships. The Navy contracted Pacific Bridge Company, already working on new dry docks at Pearl Harbor, to construct massive wooden and steel structures that extended from the turn of her BGE to well above the water line. Divers working inside and outside the hull assembled these patches in sections, then sealed them with 650 tons of concrete poured underwater using the Tremy process.

650 tons, the weight of a destroyer escort, poured as liquid into coffer dams built against a battleship’s shattered side, curing beneath the Pacific. If those patches failed during pumping operations, West Virginia would flood completely in seconds, probably capsizing and crushing any salvage workers inside. What happened next defied all odds.

They held the ship that Japanese torpedo bombers had sent to the bottom now sits in dry dock, destined for Puet Sound Naval Shipyard and a complete reconstruction that will make her more powerful than she’d been on December 6th, 1941.

This pattern, catastrophic damage followed by recovery, has repeated across Pearl Harbor’s fleet. The salvage operation hasn’t just recovered America’s battleships. It has revealed a capability the enemy never anticipated. Industrial restoration at a scale and speed that makes permanent destruction temporary.

The Japanese had calculated victory based on ships destroyed. They hadn’t calculated America’s ability to understand them. The assumption that Pearl Harbor would the Pacific Fleet permanently had begun with a single miscalculation. Admiral Isuroku Yamamoto, architect of the December 7 attack, understood American industrial capacity better than most Japanese officers.

He’d studied at Harvard, served as naval attaches in Washington, and traveled extensively through American manufacturing centers during the 1920s. His famous warning, I can run wild for 6 months to a year, but after that I have utterly no confidence, reflected genuine comprehension of what America could build once mobilized. But even Yamamoto hadn’t grasped what America could rebuild.

The Japanese attack plan, refined through months of training and rehearsal, targeted specific destruction. Torpedoes carried 450 lb warheads designed to detonate below the waterline, flooding battleships machinery spaces and causing them to sink or capsize. Bombs, many converted from 16-in armor-piercing naval shells, would penetrate deck armor and detonate in magazines or machinery spaces, causing catastrophic internal damage.

December 7th, 1941, 0755 in the morning. The first wave of 183 Japanese aircraft struck Pearl Harbor. Within 30 minutes, chaos rained across battleship row. Arizona exploded when a bomb detonated in her forward magazine, killing 1,177 men instantly. Oklahoma took five torpedoes in rapid succession and capsized, trapping 429 crew inside her overturned hall.

West Virginia absorbed catastrophic torpedo and bomb damage. California took two torpedoes and two bombs. Nevada, the only battleship to get underway during the attack, suffered one torpedo and six bomb hits before beating herself at hospital point to avoid blocking the harbor entrance. The second wave arriving at 8:40 added to the devastation.

In total, the attack killed 2,43 Americans, 2008 Navy, 218 Army, 109 Marines, and 68 civilians. 21 ships suffered damage or sank. 188 aircraft were destroyed. Japanese losses, 29 aircraft, five submarines, 64 men killed. The tactical execution was nearly perfect. The strategic assessment seemed equally clear. America’s Pacific battleship force was destroyed.

Imperial General Headquarters in Tokyo received reconnaissance photographs showing battleship Row transformed into a burning graveyard. Arizona’s shattered Hulk leaked oil. Oklahoma sat capsized, her red bottom paint visible above the water. West Virginia and California rested on the harbor bottom. Nevada sat beached.

Pennsylvania sat in dry dock damaged by bomb fragments. Japanese naval analysts calculated reconstruction timelines. Building a new battleship from Keel Lang to commissioning required 30 to 36 months. Building eight battleships replacement for the entire force destroyed would take years and consume resources America needed for war production. The math seemed irrefutable.

Japan had bought the time Yamamoto requested, but the photographs showed surface damage. They didn’t show Pearl Harbor’s unique advantage. The harbor’s depth averaged 40 ft. Oklahoma had capsized in 33 ft of water. West Virginia sat upright at similar depth. California rested in shallow water. When warships sink in deep ocean, they disappear beyond salvage capability.

The technology to work at 200 or 2,000 fathoms simply doesn’t exist. But 40 feet, that depth allows divers to work. Patches can be installed. Pumps can dewater compartments. The Japanese hadn’t sunk the Pacific Fleet. They merely relocated it temporarily to the bottom of a very shallow harbor. Captain Wallen understood this immediately.

Standing on the flagship’s deck on December 7th, watching Arizona burn and Oklahoma capsize, his engineering mind was already calculating coffer dam sizes and pump capacities. Salvage operations began before the attack ended. Damage control parties sealed flooding compartments on Tennessee and Maryland, keeping them from sinking despite proximity to destroyed ships.

Nevada’s crew bred her deliberately to prevent blocking the channel. Pennsylvania sat in dry dock, repairable immediately. Within days, preliminary assessments identified salvageable vessels. Within weeks, the salvage division officially formed with Wallen in command. Within months, the first battleships were refloated.

Nevada represented the proving ground. Hit by one torpedo forward and at least six bombs, she bred herself at hospital point with significant flooding forward. Salvage teams sealed the large torpedo hole with timber and concrete patches, then pumped out flooded compartments. After removing topside weight, guns, ammunition, equipment, Nevada refloated on February 12th, 1942, just 67 days after sinking.

She entered dry dock number two on February 18th. By April, preliminary repairs were complete. She steamed to Puet Sound for full reconstruction, returning to combat duty in December 1942, less than 12 months after Japanese bombs had nearly destroyed her. California followed Nevada, hit by two torpedoes and two bombs, she’d settled into the mud, listing 11°.

Investigation revealed a critical vulnerability. Maintenance work on December 7th hadleft multiple watertight manhole covers off or loosened. The torpedo hits caused flooding that spread through improperly secured compartments, sinking a ship that might otherwise have survived. Salvage crews sealed torpedo damage with patches, then addressed the fundamental problem.

California had sunk filled with water, mud, fuel oil, and the remains of 104 crew members. Every compartment required cleaning before repairs could begin. Divers worked in zero visibility, toxic conditions, and constant danger from unstable structures. They patched holes, removed debris, recovered remains. Pumps began dewatering on March 19th, 1942.

California refloated March 24th, entered dry dock, and departed for Puget Sound in October. The pattern emerged: patch, pump, clean, repair, rebuild. Each ship followed this progression. Each success made the next salvage faster and more efficient. But West Virginia represented the ultimate challenge.

Her damage exceeded California’s. Her reconstruction would prove whether truly catastrophic torpedo damage could be overcome. The salvage operation’s success depended entirely on conditions the Japanese couldn’t eliminate. Shallow water, intact naval facilities, and American industrial determination. Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard had survived the attack largely intact.

The Japanese hadn’t targeted the shops, cranes, or dry docks. Critical error. Dry dock number one remained operational. The shipyard’s machine shops, electrical facilities, and repair capabilities stood ready. The floating dry dock YFD2, damaged and sunk during the attack, was refloated and returned to service by January 25th, 1942, servicing the rebuilt destroyer Shaw.

This infrastructure made rapid salvage possible. The work proceeded across multiple fronts simultaneously. While Nevada underwent refloating in early February, teams worked California and West Virginia. While California entered dry dock in March, Oklahoma’s salvage began. Efficiency improved with each operation.

Salvage methodology followed established patterns adapted to Pearl Harbor’s unique conditions. First, remove trapped personnel. Rescue living crew. Recover remains of the dead with dignity and documentation. Second, assess actual damage versus visible damage. Divers examine underwater hall damage. Engineers evaluate structural integrity.

Third, seal major openings, timber patches for small holes, steel coffer dams for large torpedo damage. Fourth, dewater, pump out thousands of tons of water while monitoring stability. Fifth, remove weight, offload ammunition, fuel, oil, supplies to raise the hall. Sixth, reflat, and dry dock. The process sounds straightforward. Implementation proved nightmarish.

Inside West Virginia, Navy diver Edward Rimmer and his team worked through flooded compartments in complete darkness. Their equipment, rubberized canvas suits with copper helmets, lead weighted belts carrying 84 lb. Lead weighted shoes adding 36 lb each proved simultaneously essential and dangerous. Above water, the gear was awkward and difficult.

Submerged, the weights counteracted suit buoyancy, allowing movement through ship interiors. Rimmer described the conditions. Zero visibility. You work entirely by touch. Hydrogen sulfide gas from decomposing organic matter burns your throat and eyes. Unexploded ordinance everywhere. Oil so thick you can’t see your hand against your face plate.

And you’re inside a structure that could collapse at any moment. Navy and civilian divers made approximately 5,000 dives totaling some 20,000 man-hour underwater during the overall salvage effort. Multiple divers died from toxic gas exposure. Others suffered injuries from unstable wreckage, decompression sickness, and equipment failures.

Yet the work continued. The destroyers Kassen and Downs, blown off their blocks in dry dock number one by bombs and fires, were stripped of serviceable machinery and equipment. Their hulls, too damaged for economical repair, were scrapped. But the machinery, engines, generators, weapons, fire control equipment, was salvaged, shipped to Mare Island Navyyard, and installed in new hulls built around the original ship’s identities and hull numbers.

Even total destruction couldn’t prevent renewal. If the hull was lost, rebuild it. If machinery survived, reuse it. The principle, nothing is permanently destroyed if America decides to rebuild it. The mine layer Oglala capsized at her birth presented unique challenges. Originally a coastal steamer commissioned in World War I, she was 34 years old with compartments never designed for battle damage.

Salvage seemed questionable. Scrapping appeared more practical. But she blocked valuable peer space and demolition experts were unavailable. So salvage teams rigged 10 submarine salvage pontoons, massive cylinders that could be flooded, sunk, attached to chains placed under the hull by divers, then pumped out to provide nearly 100 tons of lifting power each.

Combined with winches and compressed air pumped into the hull, Olgala was writed and refloated. She returned to service as an internal combustion engine repair ship, serving until 1965. This pattern repeated. Apparent total loss transformed into operational vessel. The Japanese had assumed modern warships once destroyed stayed destroyed.

American salvage crews proved otherwise. Tennessee, Maryland, and Pennsylvania required less extensive work. None had actually sunk. They received damage repairs at Pearl Harbor, then steamed to West Coast Yards for modernization. Tennessee and Maryland rejoined the fleet by May 1943. Pennsylvania returned in March 1943. Even Shaw, her entire bow destroyed by magazine explosion in the floating dry dock was salvaged.

Workers cut away the destroyed forward section build a temporary bow and sailed her to Mar Island where she received a complete new bow section. She returned to combat in August 1942. By mid1 1942, the tactical picture had transformed completely. Nevada operated in the Atlantic on convoy escort duty. California, West Virginia, and Tennessee approached completion of their reconstructions.

Maryland and Pennsylvania prepared for Pacific deployment. The fleet Japan had destroyed was returning to life. But the most dramatic vindication remained years in the future. These salvaged battleships wouldn’t merely return to service. They would exact revenge at the site of history’s last battleship against battleship engagement.

October 25, 1944. 0353 Suro Strait, Philippines. Radar operators aboard USS West Virginia pick up surface contacts at 42,800 yd, approximately 21.4 miles, steaming north through the straight. Japanese battleships Yamashiro and Fusso, heavy cruiser Moami, and surviving destroyers from Vice Admiral Shoouji Nishimura’s Southern Force approaching the mouth of the strait where Rear Admiral Jesse Oldendorf’s battle line waits.

Oldendorf commands six American battleships, West Virginia, Maryland, Mississippi, Tennessee, California, and Pennsylvania. Five are survivors of Pearl Harbor. Only Mississippi had been elsewhere on December 7th, 1941. The Pearl Harbor veterans are about to deliver their response to the attack that nearly destroyed them.

The Battle of Suruga Strait represents the culmination of three years of American determination. West Virginia, sunk in Pearl Harbor with seven torpedo holes in her port side, now leads the American battle line, equipped with the most advanced radar fire control system in the world. California, which sank partly because loose manhole covers allowed uncontrolled flooding, sits in position with complete modernization, including new fire control systems and enhanced anti-aircraft armament.

Tennessee, damaged by bombs and debris from Arizona’s explosion, steams in information with upgraded weapons and electronics. These aren’t the same ships Japan attacked. They’ve been rebuilt, modernized, and equipped with technologies that didn’t exist in 1941. The tactical situation represents a textbook example of naval advantage.

Nishimura’s force, already savaged by PT boat and destroyer torpedo attacks that sank Fusso and damaged multiple ships, steams north into a classic crossing of the sea. American battleships steam east west across the strait’s mouth, allowing them to fire full broadsides at Japanese ships that can only return fire with forward turrets.

At 0351, American cruisers open fire. 2 minutes later, the battleships join. West Virginia, equipped with Mark 8 fire control radar, achieves a firing solution immediately. She opens fire at 0353. Her 16inch guns, eight of them in four twin turrets, begin firing armor-piercing shells weighing 2700 pounds each at muzzle velocities exceeding 2,000 ft per second.

Tennessee and California, also equipped with Mark 8 radar, commence fire at 0355. Their 14-in guns add to the bombardment. Maryland, equipped with older Mark III fire control radar, struggles to acquire targets independently, but ranges on West Virginia’s shell splashes and commences firing at 0359. The barrage is devastating.

Inside West Virginia’s gun turrets, the firing sequence repeats with mechanical precision. Powder bags and shells load into each gun. The breach closes. The fire control solution updates constantly as radar tracks the target. The order to fire sends electrical current to primer charges. The guns recoil violently, each discharge pushing the 33,000 ton battleship sideways in the water.

Muzzle blast squeezes breath from crew members bodies and pops rivets from bulkheads. Cordite smoke, despite flashless powder, creates thick clouds that are cleared by an easterly breeze. aboard Yamashiro. The effect is catastrophic. American shells 14in from Tennessee and California, 16in from West Virginia and Maryland arrive at rates exceeding one salvo every 30 seconds.

Hits penetrate deck armor, explode in machinery spaces, start fires, disable weapon systems. Yamashiro fights back briefly, but her fire control systems lacking radar can’t match American accuracy in the darkness. She slows, continues firing, takes additional hits. Her super structure becomes a mass of flame and wreckage.

At 0409, Admiral Oldenorf orders cease fire. Yamashiro continues north briefly, then turns south, burning and listing. She will sink at approximately 0419 with Admiral Nisha Mura and most of her crew. Heavy cruiser Moami, also severely damaged, limps south. She will be finished off by American aircraft the next day.

Destroyer Shagur, the only ship that immediately reversed course when the American bombardment began, survives to escape the straight. The statistics tell the story of American dominance. West Virginia fired 93 rounds of 16-in armor-piercing ammunition. Tennessee fired 69 rounds of 14in. California fired 63 rounds of 14in. Maryland fired 48 rounds of 16in in six salvos. Mississippi managed one salvo.

Pennsylvania never acquired a target. The entire engagement lasted minutes. The outcome was never in doubt. For West Virginia’s crew, the moment carried special significance. This was the ship Japanese torpedoes had sent to the bottom of Pearl Harbor. This was the vessel salvage teams had raised from the mud using massive concrete coffer dams to seal torpedo damage.

This was the battleship rebuilt from near total loss to become the most capable ship in the American battle line. and she just helped destroy a Japanese battleship force at history’s last battleship engagement. The irony wasn’t lost on anyone present. Vice Admiral Wallen, who’d salvaged West Virginia and the rest of the Pearl Harbor survivors, later wrote, “It was a matter of great satisfaction to many Americans, and it must have been a bitter pill for the Japanese.

The battle of Suruga Strait vindicated every decision made in Pearl Harbor between December 1941 and mid 1942. Every hour divers spent in toxic darkness inside flooded compartments. Every ton of concrete poured into coverdam patches. Every pump running 24 hours a day for weeks to dewater battleship holes. every crew member who cleaned oil and debris from compartments where shipmates had died.

All of it led to this moment. American battleships risen from the dead, crossing the tea of a Japanese force and demonstrating that restoration was possible and revenge was inevitable. The decision to salvage Pearl Harbor’s battleships rather than scrap them and build replacements reflected calculations rooted in industrial capacity and strategic timeline.

In December 1941, the United States possessed exactly zero battleships under construction. The last pre-war battleship class, North Carolina and Washington, had commissioned in 1941. The follow-on South Dakota class was building, but the lead ship wouldn’t commission until March 1942, with the rest following through 1943. The Iowa class ordered in 1939 1940 wouldn’t see first ships operational until 1943 1944.

Building a new battleship from keel laying to commissioning required approximately 30 months under wartime conditions. Replacing the eight battleships damaged or sunk at Pearl Harbor with new construction would push the first replacement into service in mid 1944 at absolute earliest and only if shipyard capacity, steel allocation, and skilled workforce all aligned perfectly.

The mathematics were brutally simple. America needed battleships immediately for convoy escort, shore bombardment, and fleet operations. Waiting 30 months per ship was strategically unacceptable. But salvage and reconstruction, that timeline measured in months, not years. Captain Wallen and his team calculated comparative costs.

Building a new Colorado class battleship like West Virginia or California required approximately $21 million in 1920s costs, roughly $300 million in 1940s dollars. Construction consumed approximately 32,000 tons of steel, 6,000 tons of armor plate, specialized machinery, weapons systems, fire control equipment, and thousands of skilled workers over 30 months.

Salvaging and reconstructing West Virginia required different resources, timber and concrete for patches, pump capacity, dry dock time, replacement equipment where necessary, shipyard labor. The cost approximately 20 to $25 million for complete reconstruction including modernization less than one-tenth the cost of building a replacement.

The timeline West Virginia refloated May 1942 entered dry dock June 1942. Departed for Puet Sound April 1943. Returned to combat July 1944. Total time from sinking to combat readiness, 31 months. Nearly identical to building a new battleship, except salvage work began immediately, while new construction would require design, ordering, steel allocation, and shipyard scheduling delays.

For Nevada, the numbers improved dramatically. Sunk December 7th, 1941. Refloated February 12th, 1942. Departed for Puet Sound April 1942. returned to combat October 1942, 10 months from sinking to combat operations. The strategic calculus was clear. Salvage provided operational battleships faster and cheaper than new construction.

But the decision also reflected American industrial philosophy that fundamentally differed from enemy doctrine. When Japanese capital ships suffered severe damage, naval doctrine favored quick assessment. If rapid repairs were impossible, scrapped the ship and reassign the crew. This conserved resources for new construction and avoided tying up shipyard capacity with lengthy reconstructions.

American doctrine took the opposite approach. If any possibility of salvage existed, attempted the United States possessed sufficient industrial capacity to pursue multiple paths simultaneously. Salvage damaged chips while building new ones. where Japan faced resource constraints requiring difficult choices, America’s industrial scale eliminated the need to choose.

This difference in philosophy would manifest throughout the Pacific War. Japan lost carriers at Midway, Akagi, Kaga, Soryu, Hiru, and couldn’t replace them fast enough. America lost Lexington, Yorktown, Wasp, and Hornet, yet maintained carrier superiority through massive construction programs that delivered Essexclass carriers at rates Japan couldn’t match.

The salvage of Pearl Harbor’s battleships demonstrated this principle at wars beginning. American industrial capacity could restore the dead while simultaneously building the future. The engineering challenges were immense. West Virginia’s coffer dam patches required Pacific Bridge Company to construct massive timber and steel structures underwater, seal them with concrete, then trust them to hold against water pressure while pumps removed thousands of tons of water from the battleship’s interior.

If those patches failed during dewatering, the ship would flood catastrophically, likely capsizing and killing salvage workers inside. California salvage required solving different problems. Extensive flooding through improperly secured compartments, mud contamination throughout the ship, removal of remains from 64 dead crew members.

Oklahoma’s writing involved external rigging with massive purchase cables and elaborate shoring to prevent structural collapse. Each ship presented unique engineering challenges. Each challenge was overcome. By war’s end, the salvage program’s accomplishments would be clear. 18 of 21 damaged ships returned to service.

$3 billion dollar worth of warship holes, weapons, and equipment saved. Approximately 20,000 man-hour underwater work by divers who risked death with every dive, and revenge delivered at Suruga Strait by ships the enemy thought permanently destroyed. The salvaged battleship’s combat record spanned the Pacific War from 1942 through Japan’s surrender, demonstrating that recovery meant capability, not merely symbolism.

Nevada, first Pearl Harbor battleship returned to combat, spent 1942 1943 on Atlantic convoy escort and training duties. But in June 1944, she steamed to Normandy and participated in the D-Day landings. Her 14-in guns bombarded German fortifications at Utah Beach, providing fire support for troops going ashore.

She remained off Normandy through late June, then participated in the invasion of southern France in August 1944. Transferred to the Pacific in 1945, Nevada provided fire support at Eoima and Okinawa, bombarding Japanese defensive positions with the same guns that had survived Pearl Harbor. at Okinawa. She was hit by a kamicazi aircraft on March 27th, 1945 and by shore battery fire on April 5th, suffering casualties but remaining operational.

Tennessee returned to combat in May 1943. She participated in the Illusian Islands campaign, bombarding Japanese positions at Kiska. In late 1943, she joined operations in the Central Pacific, providing fire support at Terawa, where Marines encountered devastating opposition from Japanese defenders. Her guns helped suppress enemy fire during the assault.

Tennessee participated in virtually every major amphibious operation thereafter. Quilane, Eniwatak, Saipan, Guam, Tinian, Paleleu, Lee Gulf, Lingayan Gulf, Ewoima, and Okinawa. At Surawa Strait, she fired 69 14-in shells, helping destroy Yamashiro. By war’s end, Tennessee had conducted more combat operations than any other salvaged battleship.

11 major engagements between Pearl Harbor and Japan surrender. California, after extensive reconstruction at Puget Sound, returned to combat in January 1944. She participated in the Mariana’s campaign bombarding Saipan, Guam, and Tinian. At Surawa Strait, her 63 14-in shells contributed to the Japanese defeat.

She continued through the Philippines campaign, supported the Lingayan Gulf landings, and provided fire support at Okinawa. Maryland, less heavily damaged at Pearl Harbor, returned to combat earlier than the sunken battleships. She participated in operations at Terawa, Quilane, Saipan, and Palao before Surawa Strait, where she fired 48 16in shells.

During the Lady campaign, she was hit by a kamicazi on November 29th, 1944, suffering significant casualties, 31 killed, 30 wounded, but remaining operational. repairs completed. She returned for Okinawa where another kamicazi struck her on April 7th, 1945, causing additional casualties. Pennsylvania, damaged in dry dock at Pearl Harbor, returned to combat in 1943.

She conducted operations across the central Pacific, Atu, Kiska, Mckin, Quilane, Aniwatak, Saipan, Guam, Palao, Angar, and Pelu. She participated in Surayo Strait, but never acquired a target due to fire control issues. At Okinawa, she was struck by an aerial torpedo on August 12th, 1945, 3 days before Japan’s surrender, suffering heavy casualties.

20 killed, 10 missing, 19 wounded. West Virginia’s combat career began July 1944 after the most extensive reconstruction of any salvaged battleship. At Surayo Strait, she led the American battle line, fired 93 16-in shells, and demonstrated the effectiveness of her modern fire control radar. She supported operations at Ley, Lingayan, Gulf, Ewima, and Okinawa.

At Okinawa, a kamicazi struck her on April 1st, 1945, killing four crew members, but the damage was minor. On September 2nd, 1945, USS West Virginia anchored in Tokyo Bay for Japan’s formal surrender ceremony, one of the ships present for the war’s end. The symbolism was profound. A battleship sunk at Pearl Harbor on December 7th, 1941.

Reconstructed from near total loss, veteran of the war’s last battleship engagement, present at the moment Japan admitted defeat. The salvaged battleship’s collective combat record demonstrates strategic value beyond mere numbers. Nevada D-Day bombardment. Southern France invasion. Ewima, Okinawa.

California, Saipan, Guam, Tinian, Surayo Strait, Lingayan Gulf, Okinawa, Tennessee. 11 major operations from illusions through Okinawa, West Virginia, Surayo Strait, Ley, Lingayan Gulf, Ewoima, Okinawa, Tokyo Bay, Maryland. Multiple operations survived two kamicazi hits. Pennsylvania, extensive central Pacific operations. These ships didn’t merely return to service.

They fought across every major amphibious operation from 1943 through 1945. The cost in American lives aboard these salvaged ships is documented. Hundreds killed and wounded across all operations. But their contribution to victory justified every hour spent raising them from Pearl Harbor’s bottom. Most significantly, at Surugo Strait, five Pearl Harbor survivors executed the war’s last battleship engagement, crossing the tea of a Japanese force in perfect textbook fashion.

West Virginia, California, and Tennessee, ships the Japanese had sunk or severely damaged, delivered the final verdict on whether salvage had been worthwhile. The answer arrived at 2,000 ft per second in 16in and 14-in armor-piercing shells. The complete salvage and reconstruction record of the Pearl Harbor attack reveals the true scope of American industrial determination.

Ships sunk or damaged December 7th, 1941. 21. Battleships. USS Arizona BB39 hit by four 800 kg bombs, one detonating in forward magazine causing catastrophic explosion. sunk. 1,177 killed. Total loss. Hull remains at Pearl Harbor as memorial. USS Oklahoma BB37 hit by five torpedoes, possibly six. Capsized in 33 ft of water. 429 killed.

Writed using external winches March June 1943, but too old for economical reconstruction. Sold for scrap 1946. sank undertow. May 1947, USS West Virginia BB48, hit by seven torpedoes and two armor-piercing bombs, sunk, 106 killed. Refloated May 1942, complete reconstruction, Puet Sound, 1942 1944. Returned to combat July 1944.

Participated Surayo Strait. supported Ewima and Okinawa present at Tokyo Bay surrender decommissioned 1947. USS California BB44 hit by two torpedoes and two bombs sunk in shallow water. 104 killed. Refloated March 1942. Complete reconstruction. Puget Sound 1942 1944. returned to combat January 1944. Participated Saipan, Guam, Surayo Strait, Okinawa. Decommissioned 1947.

USS Nevada BB36 hit by one torpedo and six bombs. Beached at hospital point, 60 killed. Refloated February 1942. Departed Pearl Harbor, April 1942. returned to combat October 1942. Fastest salvage of any sunken battleship. D-Day bombardment Normandy, June 1944. Southern France, August 1944. Ewima, Okinawa. Survived war.

Used as target ship. Atomic bomb tests. Bikini Atall 1946. Finally sunk as gunnery target. July 1948. USS Pennsylvania BB38 in dry dock hit by bomb fragments from Cassin and Downs explosions minor damage remained in service extensive operations central Pacific torpedoed by Japanese aircraft August 12th 1945 3 days before surrender 20 killed survived war decommissioned 1946 USS Tennessee BB43 mored Inboard of West Virginia, struck by two bombs, damaged by burning oil and debris from Arizona. Minor casualties.

Temporary repairs. Pearl Harbor. Full modernization. Puget Sound. Returned 1943. Conducted 11 major operations. Surayo Strait participant survived war. Decommissioned 1947. USS Maryland BB46 morrowed inboard of Oklahoma hit by two bombs. Minor damage temporary repairs. Pearl Harbor departed December 1941.

Operations throughout war Surayo Strait participant hit by two kamicazis 1944 1945 survived war decommissioned 1947. Cruisers USS Helena CL50 torpedoed damaged repaired returned to combat sank at Battle of Kula Gulf July 1943. USS Honolulu CL48 damaged by near miss bombs minor repairs returned to combat survived war. USS Raleigh CL7 torpedoed severe list but remained afloat.

repaired Pearl Harbor returned to combat mid 1942 survived war. Destroyers USS Cassen DD372 in dry dock. Bombs caused fires, blown off blocks, severe damage. Hull scrapped, machinery salvaged and installed in a new hall bearing same name and hull number. Return to combat 1944. USS Downs DD 375 in dry dock with Kassen.

Similar damage and reconstruction. Return to combat. 1944. USS Shaw. DD 373. Bombs hit forward magazine causing explosion. Entire bow destroyed. Temporary bow constructed Pearl Harbor. Sailed to Mare Island for complete new bow. Return to combat. August 1942. USS Helm DD 388. Damaged by near miss bombs. Minor repairs. Return to combat.

January 1942. Auxiliary ships USS Aglala CM4 mine layer torpedoed and capsized raised April to July 1942 converted to engine repair ship served until 1965. USS Vestal AR4 repair ship morrowed alongside Arizona damaged by bombs and Arizona explosion self-repaired continued service throughout war. USS Curtis AV4 sea plane tender hit by bomb and crashed aircraft repaired within four days continued service.

USS Satoyomo YT9 and USSD2 auxiliary vessels damaged and repaired. USS Utah AG16/BB31, former battleship serving as target ship, torpedoed and capsized. 64 killed. Partial salvage for equipment recovery. Hull remains at Pearl Harbor. Final count. Total ships damaged or sunk 21. Total losses beyond recovery three.

Arizona, Oklahoma, Utah. Ships salvaged and returned to combat 18. Comparative analysis. Building eight new battleships to replace damaged or sunk vessels would have required construction time per ship 30 to 36 months minimum. First replacements operational mid1944 earliest. Total cost approximately $2.4 billion in 1940s dollars.

Steel required approximately 256,000 tons. Shipyard capacity massive allocation away from other construction. Actual salvage program. Fastest return to combat, Nevada, 10 months. Average return to combat 24 to 30 months. Total salvage cost approximately 200 to $250 million. Resources saved over $2 billion in hulls, equipment, and weapons.

Diver fatalities, multiple deaths from toxic gas exposure and accidents. The American industrial advantage becomes clear in these numbers. Japan couldn’t afford extensive salvage of severely damaged capital ships. Limited resources, shipyard capacity, and industrial base forced choices between salvage and new construction.

America pursued both paths simultaneously, salvaging Pearl Harbor ships while building new construction at rates Japan couldn’t match. While salvaged battleships returned to combat, new South Dakota and Iowa class battleships joined the fleet. While destroyers Kassen and Downs were rebuilt, new Fletcherclass destroyers streamed from American shipyards at rates approaching one per week.

The salvage of Pearl Harbor demonstrated that American industrial capacity operated under different rules than enemy calculations assumed. What Japan considered permanent destruction, America treated as temporary setback. September 2, 1945. Tokyo Bay, Japan. USS West Virginia swings at anchor among dozens of Allied warships gathered for history’s most significant surrender ceremony.

Aboard USS Missouri, General Douglas MacArthur and Admiral Chester Nimitz prepared to receive Japanese representatives who will sign surrender documents ending World War II. The ark from December 7th, 1941 to September 2, 1945 measures more than time. It measures American industrial will made manifest in steel. Vice Admiral Wallen, who commanded the salvage operation that raised West Virginia from Pearl Harbor’s bottom, retired in 1955.

His distinguished service medal citation read, “Through his tireless and energetic devotion to duty and benefiting by past experience, he accomplished the reclamation of damaged naval units expeditiously and with success beyond expectation.” Success beyond expectation. Those four words capture what Japanese planners failed to anticipate.

When reconnaissance photographs reached Tokyo on December 8th, 1941, they showed battleship Row as a graveyard. Cap-sized hulls, burning racks, oil slicked water reflecting the glow of Arizona’s funeral p. Japanese naval staff calculated that restoring this devastation would require years time for consolidating conquests and building defensive perimeters.

America couldn’t overcome it quickly. They’d seen the surface. They’d missed what lay beneath. Shallow water, intact shipyards, and an industrial system that refused to accept permanent as an answer. The battleships came back not as symbols, but as weapons more capable than before their destruction. History remembers dramatic moments.

the crossing of the tea at Suruga Strait, the bombardments of Iwaima and Okinawa, the surrender ceremony in Tokyo Bay. But the real victory was quieter. It happened in darkness inside flooded compartments where divers worked by touch alone. It happened in dry docks where workers poured concrete into coffer dams while knowing a single failure meant death.

It happened in engineering offices where salvage officers calculated pump capacities and coffer dam sizes while the rest of the world wrote these ships off as lost. The lesson transcends naval warfare. It reveals what happens when enemies face an opponent who treats destruction as temporary inconvenience rather than permanent catastrophe.

When Japan designed military equipment, resource constraints forced terrible choices. When Germany developed weapons, limited production forced emphasis on technical brilliance over volume. When America faced industrial challenges, the response eliminated the need to choose, build the best equipment in overwhelming quantities, salvage damaged vessels while building replacements, develop new technology while improving existing designs.

That advantage, industrial capacity that could pursue multiple paths simultaneously, proved impossible to overcome. The ships that fought at Suruga Strait weren’t the same vessels Japan attacked. They’d been rebuilt with improved armor, advanced radar, enhanced anti-aircraft armament, and fire control systems that gave them decisive advantages.

West Virginia’s Mark 8 radar allowed her to open fire over 20 m away in complete darkness with accuracy Japanese ships couldn’t match. technology, industrial capacity, and determination to restore damaged equipment faster than enemies can destroy it. These advantages decide modern wars. Pearl Harbor’s salvage operation proved this principle when it mattered most.