At 05:30 on December 16th, 1944, First Lieutenant Lyall Bu crouched in a frozen foxhole on Lanzeroth Ridge, watching a column of 500 German paratroopers emerge from the forest below his position in Belgium. 20 years old, 3 months in combat, zero reinforcements coming. The ninth Falsher Jagger regiment was advancing toward his 18-man intelligence and reconnaissance platoon with orders to clear the Losheim gap for the entire first SS Panzer division behind them.

The first day of the Battle of the Bulge had begun 90 minutes earlier with 1,600 German artillery pieces firing across an 80m front. Bu’s platoon occupied the only American position defending the critical road junction at Lanzeroth. Behind them lay empty roads leading directly to Allied supply depots and headquarters.

 The 99th Infantry Division’s front line had been stretched so thin that Bu’s reconnaissance unit had been ordered to hold a 5mm gap meant for an entire battalion. No reserves existed. The nearest American unit was 6 milesi away at Bukhole station. Bu understood the mathematics of his situation immediately. His platoon carried standard infantry weapons, M1 Garand rifles, one Browning automatic rifle per squad, a single 30 caliber M1919 machine gun against 500 elite German paratroopers advancing in column formation through snow-covered fields.

Those weapons would not be enough. German intelligence had assessed American soldiers as cowardly and unwilling to fight without air support or armor. The Vermacht expected to punch through this sector in less than two hours and reached the Muse River by nightfall. The 99th Infantry Division had arrived in the Ardens only one month earlier.

 Most units lacked battle experience. During the first week of December, the division had lost 47 men killed in action during limited patrol operations. Battalion commanders knew their inexperienced troops would face catastrophic casualties if the Germans launched a major offensive. Every soldier in Buke’s platoon understood what happened to reconnaissance units that got overrun. 11 loaders had died.

Thompson knew the pattern. Bou radioed regimenal headquarters at Hunigan and requested permission to withdraw. The response came back within 2 minutes. Remain in position. Reinforcements from third battalion will support you. But B knew no reinforcements would arrive in time.

 The German advance had already cut telephone lines across the entire sector. His SCR300 radio provided the only communication link to American forces. 4 days earlier, Bu had made a decision that violated standard procedure for reconnaissance units. He had traded captured German identity cars to the regimental ordinance officer for one armored jeep mounting a Browning M2 50 caliber machine gun.

 The M2 fired 12.7 mm rounds at 550 rounds per minute. Its effective range exceeded 1,800 m. The weapon could penetrate light armor and suppress infantry advances across open ground. Bu had positioned the jeep in the center of his defensive line behind nine fox holes his men had dug into the hillside. If you want to see how Bu’s improvised jeep defense turned out, please hit that like button.

 It helps us share more forgotten stories from the Second World War. Subscribe if you haven’t already. Back to Bu. The Jeep represented his platoon’s only heavy weapon. Everything depended on whether 18 men with rifles and one 50 caliber machine gun could stop 500 attacking paratroopers long enough to delay the German offensive.

 Bu checked his watch. 0645. The German artillery barrage had ended 15 minutes ago. Through the morning fog, he could see the fall jagger forming assault waves at the bottom of the ridge. His men took their positions in the fortified foxholes. Four forward artillery observers from Battery C, 371st Field Artillery, prepared to call for fire support.

 The barbed wire fence crossing the snow-covered field below would slow the German advance, but not stop it. Bu knew the first assault wave would reach his position within minutes. He gave the order to hold fire until the enemy closed to 75 yards. At 0700 on December 16th, the lead elements of the ninth Falam Jagger regiment began advancing up the hill toward Lanzeroth Ridge.

 500 German paratroopers against 18 American soldiers and one jeep-mounted machine gun. By nightfall, one side would control the road junction. The other would be dead or captured. The German paratroopers advanced in three separate waves across the open field below Book’s position. Each wave contained approximately 170 men moving in loose formation through kneedeep snow.

 The lead wave reached the barbwire fence at 75 yd from the American foxholes. Book gave the order to open fire at 0715. The Browning M2 on the Jeep fired first. The gunner had pre-registered his fields of fire during the previous night. The 50 caliber rounds tore through the German formation at 2,840 ft pers. Each projectile carried enough kinetic energy to penetrate body armor at 1500 yd.

 At 75 yards, the results were catastrophic. The first burst killed 11 paratroopers in the lead squad. The survivors dove for cover behind the barbed wire fence. BU’s riflemen opened fire simultaneously with their M1 Garands. The intelligence and reconnaissance platoon had been selected specifically because every man qualified as an expert marksman.

 Several soldiers had attended college before the war through the army specialized training program. Their shooting discipline proved critical during the opening minutes of contact. While standard infantry units fired in volleys, BU’s men aimed for individual targets. The Germans attempting to cut through the barbed wire became priority targets.

 The first assault wave pulled back after 8 minutes of sustained fire. Bou counted 23 bodies lying in the snow between the fence and the treeine. The Germans had expected minimal resistance from what their intelligence assessed as a thin screening force. Instead, they had encountered precision rifle fire and heavy machine gun support from fortified positions.

 The ninth Falsher Jagger Regiment commander ordered his men to regroup at the bottom of the ridge. At 0745, the second German assault wave advanced. This time, the paratroopers used different tactics. They sent forward squads through the snow to provide covering fire while assault teams attempted to flank the American position through the woods on both sides of the ridge.

 Budded his Browning automatic rifle teams to cover the flanks. The M2 continued firing at targets in the open field. The four forward artillery observers from the 371st field artillery called for fire support. Lieutenant Warren Springer radioed coordinates for a barrage on the German assembly area at the bottom of the hill.

 No artillery arrived. The American batteries were engaged across the entire front, dealing with the massive German offensive. The 99th Infantry Division’s artillery support had been allocated to other sectors where entire regiments were under attack. Bou’s platoon would receive no indirect fire support. The second assault lasted 19 minutes.

 German MG42 machine guns established positions at the tree line and began suppressing the American foxholes with sustained fire at,200 rounds per minute. The sound was distinctive. American soldiers called it Hitler’s buzzaw. But the Germans could not advance while the M2 continued firing. Every attempt to cross the open ground resulted in immediate casualties.

 The snow-covered field provided no concealment. The second wave withdrew at 0804. Bu assessed his ammunition situation. His men had fired approximately 400 rounds during the first two assaults. Each soldier carried 80 rounds in clips and bandeliers. At the current rate of expenditure, the platoon would run out of rifle ammunition before noon.

 The M2 had fired through 200 rounds of its initial load of 550. The gunner reported the barrel temperature was approaching operational limits. The Germans paused their assault for 37 minutes. During that time, Bu observed enemy troops massing at three separate positions around the base of the ridge. The ninth Falmeagger regiment was preparing a coordinated attack from multiple directions.

 His 18-man platoon would need to defend against simultaneous assaults on the front and both flanks. The odds had just gotten worse. At 0841 on December 16th, 500 German paratroopers prepared for their third assault on Lanzeroth Ridge. Buke’s men had less than half their ammunition remaining. The M2’s barrel glowed red from sustained firing, and reinforcements were still 6 mi away with no way to reach the isolated platoon.

The next assault would determine whether 18 Americans could continue holding the most critical road junction in the northern sector of the Battle of the Bulge. The third German assault began at 0841 with coordinated advances from three directions. Two squads of paratroopers moved through the dense woods on the eastern flank while the main force attacked across the open field.

 The ninth Falstrom Jagger regiment had committed approximately 350 men to this wave. Their tactical doctrine emphasized overwhelming force at the point of contact. German officers expected to overrun the American position within 15 minutes. Buositioned his two Browning automatic rifle teams to engage the flanking squads moving through the woods.

 The BAR fired 30 caliber rounds at 550 rounds per minute from 20 round magazines. In close quarters forest combat, the weapon provided effective suppressive fire against advancing infantry, but the magazine capacity meant each gunner needed to reload every two seconds of sustained fire. The flanking team slowed, but did not stop. The M2 continued engaging targets in the open field.

 The gunner had switched to short controlled bursts to manage barrel temperature. Three round bursts every 4 seconds. This reduced the rate of fire from 550 rounds per minute to approximately 120, but accuracy improved significantly. Each burst targeted specific German soldiers attempting to advance through the snow. The psychological effect proved as important as the casualties.

 Paratroopers who watched their squad leaders cut down by 50 caliber fire lost momentum in their assault. At 0900, a German mortar team established position at the tree line and began firing high explosive rounds at the American foxholes. The 8cm mortar shells impacted in the snow around Bu’s defensive line. Most detonated harmlessly against the frozen ground or pine logs covering the foxholes, but the explosions forced his riflemen to take cover, reducing their rate of accurate fire.

 The Germans had finally brought indirect fire support into the engagement. Technical Sergeant Peter Gaki from the forward artillery observer team attempted to call for counter battery fire against the German mortar position. His radio transmission reached the 371st Field Artillery Battalion command post, but every American artillery battery in the sector had received priority fire missions supporting units facing larger German assaults.

 The Battle of the Bulge involved over 410,000 German troops attacking along an 80m front. Bu’s 18-man platoon represented one small position in a massive offensive. Artillery support would not arrive. The eastern flank assault penetrated to within 40 yards of the American foxholes before the bar team stopped it. Private first class William James fired three complete magazines in rapid succession, hitting 11 German paratroopers.

 The attackers withdrew back into the woods at 0917. German casualties from the flanking attempt totaled 19 killed or wounded. The snow made it impossible for the paratroopers to maneuver without exposing their positions. In the open field, the main assault wave had stalled at the barbed wire fence. The M2 maintained suppressive fire across the killing zone.

 Every German soldier who attempted to cut the wire became a target. Bodies accumulated along the fence line. The American gunner estimated he had fired 420 rounds since the battle began at 0715. Approximately 130 rounds remained in the ammunition boxes. At the current rate of expenditure, the M2 would run dry before 1100 hours.

 Buoed regimental headquarters again at 0930. He reported his ammunition status and requested immediate resupply. The response indicated no supply convoy could reach Lanzeroth while German forces controlled the roads. His platoon would need to conserve ammunition and hold position with existing resources. The order remained unchanged. Do not withdraw.

 The third German assault wave withdrew at 0943 after 62 minutes of continuous combat. Bu counted 41 enemy casualties visible in the snow between the treeine and his defensive position. The actual German losses were higher. Wounded paratroopers had been pulled back during the assault. The ninth Faler Jger Regiment had now attacked three times against the platoon-sized American unit and failed to achieve breakthrough on each attempt.

 But the mathematics were inexurable. Bu’s men had fired approximately 900 rounds of rifle ammunition. Each soldier had less than 30 rounds remaining. The M2 had 130 rounds left. The next German assault would probably be the last one his platoon could effectively resist. And through his binoculars, Bu could see German officers gathering their troops at the bottom of the ridge for a fourth attack.

The fourth German assault commenced at 1017. The 9th Faler regiment commander had reorganized his battalion into a single concentrated wave. Approximately 400 paratroopers advanced simultaneously across the entire width of the ridge. The tactic abandoned flanking maneuvers in favor of overwhelming the American defensive line through sheer numbers.

German doctrine called this method punct concentration of force at the decisive point. Bu watched the assault develop through his binoculars. The German formation stretched 200 yards across the snow-covered field. Individual soldiers maintained 10-yard intervals between positions. The spacing reduced casualties from machine gun fire, but made coordination difficult.

 Smoke grenades created concealment patches across the battlefield. The paratroopers had learned from three previous failed assaults. This attack demonstrated professional adaptation under fire. The M2 opened fire at 150 yards. The gunner selected targets on the flanks first, attempting to compress the German formation toward the center where rifle fire could achieve maximum effect.

 The 50 caliber rounds punched through the smoke, hitting paratroopers who believed they had concealment, but the barrel temperature had reached critical levels. After firing 60 rounds, the gunner reported decreased accuracy. The weapon continued functioning, but dispersion had increased significantly. Bu’s riflemen engaged targets at 100 yards.

Each man selected individual Germans and fired aimed shots. The expert marksmanship that defined the intelligence and reconnaissance platoon proved decisive during this phase of combat. While the M2 provided suppressive fire, the rifles inflicted the majority of casualties. 16 Americans firing M1 Garands in semi-automatic mode could deliver approximately 120 accurate rounds per minute against targets in open terrain.

 The German formation reached the barbed wire fence at 1029. Paratroopers carrying wire cutters moved forward under covering fire from MG42 teams positioned at the tree line. For the first time during the battle, German soldiers successfully breached the wire obstacle. Three separate teams cut passages through the fence.

 The assault wave surged through the gaps toward the American foxholes. At 10:32, the M2 fired its final belt of ammunition. The gunner had rationed the remaining 130 rounds across 15 minutes of combat. When the weapon went silent, the psychological impact rippled across both sides of the battlefield. German paratroopers who had spent 3 hours ducking 50 caliber fire recognized the change immediately.

 Their rate of advance accelerated. American riflemen increased their fire rate to compensate for the loss of their heavy weapon. Bued his men to fix bayonets. The German assault had penetrated to within 50 yards of the defensive line. Individual paratroopers were clearly visible through the thinning smoke. Some carried stick grenades.

 Others prepared to rush the foxholes with submachine guns. The battle had transitioned from long range precision fire to close quarters combat. Every American soldier understood what happened when German assault troops reached defensive positions. Private First Class Robert Lambert fired his last clip at 1038. He reached for his ammunition bandelier and found it empty.

Around the defensive perimeter, other soldiers reported similar situations. The platoon had expended approximately 1,200 rounds of rifle ammunition during 4 hours of sustained combat. Less than 200 rounds remained distributed across 18 men. Some soldiers had five rounds left. Others had 15. None had enough ammunition to sustain defensive fire for more than 3 minutes.

 The forward artillery observers made one final attempt to reach American artillery support. Technical Sergeant Peter Gaki transmitted coordinates for fire missions against the German assembly areas and the MG42 positions suppressing the American line. The 371st Field Artillery Battalion acknowledged the transmission, but could not allocate guns to support Lanzeroth Ridge.

 Every available artillery piece was engaged, supporting regiment-sized units facing German armor and infantry assaults across the entire Arden’s front. At 10:45 on December 16th, the fourth German assault reached maximum intensity. 400 paratroopers pressed against defensive positions held by 18 Americans armed with less than 200 rifle rounds and no heavy weapons.

 The M2 sat silent on its jeep mount. The barrel had discolored from heat stress. Bu knew his platoon could resist for perhaps 10 more minutes before ammunition ran out completely. The ninth faller regiment had suffered over 90 casualties attacking this single ridge position. But the German commanders understood the mathematics.

 The Americans had to run out of ammunition eventually, and when they did, 500 paratroopers would overrun 18 riflemen in minutes. Behind the German assault force, the first SS Panzer Division waited for the infantry to clear the road junction so their tanks could advance toward the Muse River. Everything depended on the next 10 minutes at Lanzeroth Ridge.

The German paratroopers breached the American defensive perimeter at 10:53. A squad of 12 Falshim Jagger penetrated between two foxholes on the eastern flank where ammunition had run out first. The soldiers in those positions had fired their last rounds 2 minutes earlier. They engaged the Germans with hand grenades and entrenching tools.

 One American soldier used his rifle as a club. Close quarters fighting in a defensive position against trained assault infantry rarely ended well for the defenders. Bu redirected three riflemen from the center of the line to contain the breach. These men still had ammunition. They fired at pointlank range into the German squad that had penetrated the perimeter.

 Seven paratroopers fell. The remaining five withdrew back toward the wire. But the breach had demonstrated a critical vulnerability. Once the Americans ran out of ammunition, the Germans would overrun the position in minutes, regardless of courage or tactical skill. At 11:09, Bu made a decision that violated every principle of reconnaissance unit doctrine.

 Instead of attempting to withdraw or conserve his remaining ammunition for a final stand, he ordered his men to maintain maximum rate of fire. The tactic seemed counterintuitive. Expending ammunition faster would shorten the time until complete depletion, but Bu understood the psychological dimension of the engagement.

 As long as his platoon maintained heavy fire, the Germans would believe significant defensive capacity remained. The riflemen fired as rapidly as they could acquire targets. M1 Garand rifles operated on a semi-automatic gas system that cycled automatically after each shot. A trained soldier could fire 40 accurate rounds per minute if he had sufficient ammunition and targets.

 For the next eight minutes, BU’s remaining 14 men with ammunition delivered sustained precision fire against the German assault. The paratroopers interpreted the increased fire rate as evidence of fresh ammunition supplies or reinforcements. The fourth German assault wave withdrew at 11:21.

 The 9inth Focham regiment had committed its entire battalion to four separate attacks over 4 hours. Casualties now totaled 92 men killed, wounded, or missing. Officers reported to their division commander that the American position at Lanzeroth Ridge appeared to be held by a reinforced company with heavy weapon support. German intelligence had failed to identify the true size of the defending force.

 The Vermacht believed it was attacking a well- supplied defensive position rather than 18 men nearly out of ammunition. Bu conducted an ammunition count at 11:30. The results were catastrophic. His entire platoon possessed 73 rounds of rifle ammunition. Some men had none, others had five or six rounds. The M2 remained silent with empty ammunition boxes scattered around the jeep.

 The forward artillery observers had exhausted their rifle ammunition as well. 22 Americans held the most critical road junction in the northern sector of the Battle of the Bulge with 73 rifle rounds. The temperature had dropped to 22° F. Snow continued falling across the ridge. Bu’s men had been in combat positions since ‘ 0530 without food or water.

 Several soldiers showed symptoms of cold injury. Private First Class Risto Mallovvich reported numbness in his feet. Technical sergeant William Slate had minor shrapnel wounds from German mortar fire, but no American had been killed. One forward artillery observer, technician fifth grade Billy Queen, had taken a bullet through his shoulder, but remained at his position.

 At 11:45, BU observed German officers gathering at the tree line with what appeared to be reinforcements. The 9inth Falsham regiment was being augmented with additional troops from division reserve. Through his binoculars, he counted approximately 200 fresh paratroopers moving into assault positions. The Germans were preparing a fifth attack with rested troops against defenders who had 73 rounds of ammunition remaining.

Buoed regimental headquarters and reported his situation. The response came back within 1 minute. The third battalion could not reach Lanzeroth. German forces had cut all roads into the sector. Artillery support remained unavailable. The order stood unchanged. Hold position. Do not withdraw. Bu acknowledged the transmission and returned to his foxhole.

 The reality was stark. His platoon had delayed the German offensive for over 6 hours. They had inflicted nearly 100 casualties on an elite airborne unit. But the mathematics of ammunition consumption versus attacking force size could not be overcome indefinitely. When the fifth German assault came, probably within the next 30 minutes, 18 Americans with 73 rifle rounds would face 400 fresh paratroopers.

 The outcome was no longer in doubt. At 12:15 on December 16th, 1944, Lyall Bou watched German assault troops form up for their fifth attack on Lanzeroth Ridge. His men had fought longer and harder than anyone had expected, but physics and mathematics were about to determine the battle’s conclusion. The question was no longer whether the Germans would take the position.

 The question was how many more hours BU’s platoon could delay the first SS Panzer division’s advance toward the Muse River. The fifth German assault began at 1237. Approximately 400 paratroopers advanced in a modified formation that emphasized rapid movement over spacing. The ninth Falsham Jagger regiment had committed its reserve companies to this attack.

Fresh troops who had not participated in the previous four assaults moved across the snow-covered field with the confidence of soldiers who believed they faced a depleted enemy. German intelligence continued to overestimate American strength on the ridge. Bu distributed the remaining 73 rounds of ammunition across his platoon.

 Soldiers with marksmanship qualifications received priority. Men without ammunition were instructed to collect rifles and bandeliers from casualties if the opportunity presented itself. The defensive plan had simplified to its most basic form. Shoot until ammunition runs out, then fight with bayonets and grenades.

 There were no other options available. The American riflemen held fire until the Germans reached 60 yards. At that range, every round had to count. The first volley dropped 11 paratroopers. The Germans immediately went to ground and began returning fire with rifles and MG-42 machine guns. But without the suppressive fire of the M2, the Americans could not prevent the German advance from gaining ground incrementally.

 Squad by squad, the paratroopers moved forward through the snow using fire and maneuver tactics. At 1251, three German soldiers reached a foxhole on the western flank where the occupants had expended their ammunition. The Americans fought with entrenching tools and fists. One paratrooper fell with a fractured skull.

 The other two withdrew after sustaining knife wounds, but the incident demonstrated how close the battle had come to hand-to-hand combat across the entire defensive line. The Germans were now within grenade range of multiple positions. Bu counted his remaining rounds. 16. Around the perimeter, his men were down to similar levels.

 Some soldiers had already fixed bayonets in preparation for the final phase of combat. The forward artillery observers continued calling for fire support even though no artillery would arrive. Technical Sergeant Peter Gaki transmitted targeting data every 5 minutes as if repetition might somehow produce results. It did not. The German assault gained momentum at 1300.

Paratroopers had breached the wire barrier at four separate points. Small groups of three to five men moved toward the American foxholes using smoke grenades for concealment. The defenders fired their remaining ammunition at these assault teams. Each round killed or wounded a German soldier, but the mathematics remained inexurable.

 73 rounds divided by 400 attackers meant the vast majority of Germans would reach the American line unharmed. At 1314, Private First Class William James fired the last round from his M1 Garand. The distinctive ping of the ejecting clip signaled an empty rifle. He reached for his bayonet and prepared for close combat.

 Around the defensive perimeter, other soldiers were reaching the same point. The Battle of Lanzeroth Ridge had entered its final minutes as an ammunition-based defense. What happened next would depend on hand grenades and edged weapons. Bu fired his final rounds at 1317. 18 rifle bullets remain distributed among 22 Americans.

 The M2 sat silent on its Jeep mount. The forward artillery observers had no ammunition left for their carbines. For the first time in 6 hours of continuous combat, the American defensive fire slackened to scattered single shots. German officers recognized the change immediately and ordered their assault teams forward. At 1320, approximately 50 German paratroopers rushed the American foxholes simultaneously from three directions.

The defenders threw grenades and fired their last rifle rounds. Several Germans fell, but the assault wave closed to within 20 yards of the defensive line. Boot could see individual faces, young men in their 20s, professional soldiers executing assault doctrine against a position they had been ordered to take 6 hours earlier.

 The Americans prepared for the final stand. Bayonets fixed, grenades armed, entrenching tools ready. Every man understood the next two minutes would determine whether they lived or died. The Vermacht did not have a reputation for taking prisoners from units that inflicted heavy casualties. 92 German paratroopers had been killed or wounded attacking this ridge.

 The survivors would not be inclined toward mercy. At 1323 on December 16th, the Battle of Lanzeroth Ridge reached its climax. 50 German assault troops closed on 18 American defenders who had no ammunition remaining. The 6-hour fight that had delayed the entire northern wing of the Battle of the Bulge was about to end in close quarters combat on a frozen hillside in Belgium.

The German paratroopers overran the first American foxhole at 1326. Three Falsam Jagger jumped into the position where two soldiers had expended all ammunition. Hand-to-h hand combat lasted 8 seconds. One German fell with a bayonet wound through the chest. The two Americans sustained knife injuries but continued fighting.

 A German officer pulled one of them from the foxhole at gunpoint. The Vermacht had finally breached the defensive perimeter after 6 hours of sustained assault. Additional German troops poured through the breach. Buou ordered his men to cease fire and surrender. Continuing resistance without ammunition would result in the deaths of soldiers who had already accomplished far more than anyone expected.

 At 1332, 18 Americans from the intelligence and reconnaissance platoon and four forward artillery observers raised their hands. The battle of Lanzeroth Ridge had ended after 7 hours and 57 minutes of continuous combat. The German casualties were immediately visible across the snow-covered battlefield. 92 bodies lay between the treeine and the American foxholes.

 Some had died at the barbed wire fence. Others had fallen during the assault waves. The ninth falshroom regiment had lost 16% of its combat strength attacking a position defended by 22 men. Battalion commanders reported to division headquarters that they had overcome a reinforced American company with heavy weapons support. Technical sergeant William Slate had sustained shrapnel wounds during the battle but could walk.

 14 other members of Buke’s platoon had been wounded by rifle fire, grenade fragments, or mortar shrapnel. Only one American had been killed. Technician fifth grade Billy Queen from the forward artillery observer team had died manning a machine gun position during the fourth German assault. The casualty ratio stood at 92 Germans killed or wounded versus one American killed and 14 wounded.

 The German soldiers who captured the American position expressed surprise at the small size of the defending force. A Falsam Jagger sergeant examined the silent M2 on the jeep and asked Bu how many machine guns his unit possessed. When Bu indicated the single 50 caliber weapon, the sergeant refused to believe him. German doctrine held that sustained heavy machine gun fire required multiple weapons with overlapping fields of fire and ammunition resupply.

 The concept that one machine gun operated by exhausted soldiers could produce such defensive effects contradicted their training. At 1400, the German battalion commander arrived at the captured position. He ordered his medical personnel to treat American and German wounded without discrimination. The Falsam Jagger established aid stations in homes within Lanzeroth village.

 Bu and his men received medical attention for their wounds before being prepared for transport to prisoner of war facilities. The German officer who accepted BU’s surrender acknowledged that the American defense had been conducted with professional skill. The tactical impact of the 7-hour battle became apparent over the following hours.

 The first SS Panzer Division’s lead element, Conf Group of Piper, had been scheduled to pass through Lanzeroth at 0800. The armored column consisted of 4,800 men, 600 vehicles, and over 100 tanks. Their objective was to reach the Muse River by nightfall on December 16th, but the infantry regiment assigned to clear the route had been stopped at Lanzeroth Ridge by 18 American soldiers.

Conf group of Piper did not arrive at Lanzeroth until midnight on December 17th, 16 hours behind schedule. The delay cascaded through the entire German offensive plan. The northern wing of the Battle of the Bulge, which Hitler had designated as the main effort, lost critical momentum during the first day. Instead of advancing 60 mi toward Antworp as planned, the first SS Panzer Division managed less than 10 mi before encountering reinforced American positions.

 The German commanders at the ridge had paused their advance after capturing Bou’s platoon. They believed the woods behind the American position contained additional forces and armor. The heavy casualties sustained during 7 hours of fighting suggested significant defensive depth. German reconnaissance patrols moved cautiously through the forest, expecting to encounter tanks and reinforcements.

 They found empty woods, but the delay proved decisive. At 16:30 on December 16th, 1944, Lyall Bou and his wounded platoon began their march into German captivity. They had held Lanzerth Ridge for over 11 hours against 500 attacking paratroopers. They had inflicted 92 casualties while suffering one killed and 14 wounded.

 And they had delayed the main German armored thrust by 16 hours. But none of them knew that yet. As prisoners of war, they believed they had failed. The true significance of their stand at Lanzareth Ridge would not become clear for decades. The German soldiers loaded Bou and his wounded platoon into box cars at Ynarath 2 days after the battle.

 72 American prisoners of war were jammed into a single cattle car designed for 40 men. The train traveled east into Germany without food or water. Temperatures inside the box car dropped below freezing. By Christmas Day, seven men in Buke’s car had died from wounds, exposure, or dehydration. The survivors were transported to prisoner of war camps at Nuremberg, Hamillberg and Mooseberg.

 Bou spent 5 months in German captivity. The conditions deteriorated as the Vermacht collapsed during early 1945. Food rations decreased to thin soup once per day. Allied bombing raids targeted rail lines and supply depots near the prison camps. German guards became increasingly hostile as their nation faced defeat.

 Many prisoners developed hepatitis. dysentery or pneumonia. When American forces liberated the camps in April 1945, Buk weighed 112 lbs. He had weighed 165 lbs. On December 16th, the soldiers from the intelligence and reconnaissance platoon returned to the United States believing they had failed at Lanzeroth.

 Bu considered the wounding of 14 men and the capture of his entire unit a complete tactical failure. He did not know that his platoon had delayed the first SS Panzer Division by 16 hours. He did not know that the northern wing of the Battle of the Bulge had fallen critically behind schedule because of the stand at Lanzeroth Ridge. He simply knew he had been captured after his ammunition ran out.

 The platoon dispersed after the war. Soldiers returned to civilian life across America. Nobody discussed Lanzeroth Ridge. The battle had been overshadowed by larger engagements during the Battle of the Bulge. Bastonia received international attention. The Malmidy massacre generated war crimes trials, but an 18-man reconnaissance platoon that held a ridge for 7 hours disappeared into the historical record without recognition.

 In 1965, the United States Army published a multi-olume history titled The Arden: The Battle of the Bulge. Author Hugh Cole mentioned Bu’s platoon in passing with minimal detail. Private first class William James, who had fought at Lanzodat, read the brief reference and became upset at the lack of recognition. He contacted Bu and encouraged his former lieutenant to seek proper acknowledgement for the platoon’s actions.

 Buk wrote letters to his former division commander, Major General Walter Lowour, requesting that his men receive decorations for their defense of Lonzadot Ridge. In June 1966, a Silver Star arrived in Bu’s mailbox, but no other member of the platoon was recognized. Buuk refused to accept an individual medal when his entire unit had fought together.

 He began a 15-year campaign to ensure every soldier received appropriate recognition. The process required congressional hearings, letterw writing campaigns, and interviews with military historians. John Eisenhower documented the battle in detail for his book, The Bitter Woods. Columnist Jack Anderson wrote about the forgotten platoon in national publications.

 Slowly, the historical significance of Lonzerat Ridge became apparent. 18 men with one jeep-mounted machine gun had stopped 500 attacking paratroopers for 7 hours and delayed an entire SS Panzer Division during the critical first day of Germany’s last major offensive. On October 26th, 1981, the United States Army formally recognized the intelligence and reconnaissance platoon’s actions at Lanzodat Ridge.

 Every member of the unit received decorations. Four soldiers including Bu were awarded the Distinguished Service Cross. Five received silver stars. 10 received bronze stars with V device for valor. The entire platoon received the presidential unit citation. The decorations made Boo’s platoon the most decorated American unit of its size for a single action in World War II.

37 years had passed between the battle and the recognition. Some soldiers from the platoon had died without knowing their sacrifice had been acknowledged. William James, who had initiated the campaign for recognition, died in 1977 after 37 surgeries to repair wounds sustained at Lanzerat. But the surviving members finally understood they had not failed.

 They had accomplished something extraordinary. If this story moved you the way it moved us, do me a favor, hit that like button. Every single like tells YouTube to show this story to more people. Hit subscribe and turn on notifications. We’re rescuing forgotten stories from dusty archives every single day. Stories about soldiers who held impossible positions with improvised defenses.

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