September 25th, 1944. London, 10 Downing Street. The war rooms beneath the streets of Westminster are quieter than they’ve been in months. Winston Churchill stands beside a large map table, teacup in hand, watching the morning light filter through reinforced windows. For the first time since 1939, the war feels like it might actually be ending. France is liberated.

 Allied armies are pressing towards the Ryan River, the last great barrier before the German harpland seems within reach. General Hastings Isme Churchill’s chief of staff enters quietly and joins him at the map. They’ve been reviewing the situation in Holland where Operation Market Garden Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery’s bold plan to seize bridges across the Netherlands and Leap the Rine has been underway for 8 days.

 The reports have been mixed, but Monty has assured everyone the operation is progressing. An aid, young, pale, carrying a folder marked urge, market garden eyes only. Churchill takes it without a word, opens it. His face changes. The teacup pauses halfway to his lips. He sets it down slowly. “How many?” he asks. His voice is low.

 Almost a whisper. The aid swallows. Approximately 10,000 casualties, sir. The first airborne division at Annem. They’ve been nearly destroyed. The bridge. We couldn’t hold it. They’ve been evacuated. What’s left of them? Churchill doesn’t move. He stares at the report. 10,000 British casualties in 9 days for a bridge they didn’t capture.

An operation that was supposed to end the war by Christmas has just become one of the bloodiest Allied failures since D-Day. He looks up at Isme. Where is General Patton right now? Isme steps to the map points to a position east of Nancy deep in eastern France approaching the German frontier.

 Here sir, Third Army captured Nancy 4 days ago. They’re advancing toward the Churchill stares at the map at Montgomery’s positions in Patton’s positions 200 m south. He sets the market garden folder down on the table like it’s made of lead. Get me the fuel allocation reports. Montgomery’s and patterns.

 I want to see exactly what we gave them. What Churchill is about to discover will ignite a political firestorm that nearly fractures the Allied command structure. If you want to see how this story ends, how one of history’s most dramatic military comparisons played out, make sure you’re subscribed to WW2 Elite. Hit that subscribe button and the bell icon so you don’t miss what happens next.

Because what Churchill learns in the next hour will change everything. The reports arrive within 20 minutes. Churchill spreads them across the table. Isme stands beside him reading over his shoulder. The numbers are stark, undeniable. Operation Market Garden, September 17th through 25th, 1944. 9 days.

 Field Marshall Montgomery’s 21st Army Group received absolute priority for supplies. 1,400 tons of fuel per day, every truck, every gallon, every available resource funneled north to support the largest airborne operation in history. The goal? capture a series of bridges across the Netherlands, cross the Rine at Arnm, and drive into Germany’s industrial rural region, end the war by Christmas.

 The result, the British First Airborne Division dropped at Arnm on September 17th. They were supposed to hold the bridge for 2 days until ground forces arrived, but the ground forces never made it. German resistance was far stronger than intelligence predicted. Two SS Panza divisions, veterans, experienced, deadly, were refitting near Anm.

 The British paratroopers fought for 9 days, surrounded, outnumbered, running out of ammunition and medical supplies. On September 25th, the survivors were evacuated across the Rine in the middle of the night. Out of 10,000 men who dropped at Anhem, only 2,000 made it back. Total Market Garden casualties, over 10,000.

 Total territorial gain 64 miles into Holland. Total strategic objectives achieved zero. The Ry bridge at Annem. The prize, the reason for the entire operation remained in German hands. Churchill looks at the second report. Third army operations, same dates, September 17 through 25. General George Patton’s Third Army, 700 tons of fuel per day, exactly half what Montgomery received.

operating 200 m south, advancing through Lraine toward the German no special resources. In fact, Patton had been complaining for weeks that he was being deliberately starved of fuel while Montgomery got everything. The result, in those same nine days, while Market Garden was collapsing, Patton’s third army captured 12 fortified cities, Nancy, Lunville, Chatau, Salaz, Mets under siege.

 They crossed three rivers, the Moselle, the Murvey, the Mortan. They advanced 60 mi. They took 45,000 German prisoners. They inflicted an estimated 55,000 German casualties through combat and capture. Third army casualties, approximately 2,100. Churchill reads the numbers again, then again. He removes his glasses, rubs his eyes, puts the glasses back on, reads them one more time. Pug, he saysquietly.

 Tell me if I’m reading this correctly. Isme hesitates. Sir, I verified the figures with three separate sources. Just tell me. Montgomery received 1,400 tons of fuel per day. He advanced 64 miles in 9 days, 7 m per day on average. He suffered 10,000 casualties. He achieved none of his strategic objectives. Churchill nods slowly.

 And Patton, 700 tons per day, half. He advanced 60 mi, nearly the same distance, while conducting three major river crossings and capturing 12 cities, 2,000 casualties, 45,000 enemy prisoners. And according to the latest reports, he’s now positioned less than 20 m from the German border near Sar Brooken. Churchill walks to the map, traces the supply routes with one finger.

 Every truck, every ton of fuel, every priority shipment went north to Montgomery for Market Garden. Meanwhile, Patton, operating on halfrations, won battle after battle. He turns to Isme. His voice is dangerously calm. Get me General Eisenhower on the telephone immediately. The secure line connects at 10:00 a.m.

 Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, Versailles, France. General Dwight Eisenhower is in a staff meeting when his aid interrupts to say, “The Prime Minister is on the line.” Eisenhower knows immediately this won’t be pleasant. Churchill only calls directly when something is very wrong. Good morning, Prime Minister Ike. Churchill’s voice is clipped. Formal.

 I need you to explain something to me, and I assure you, I’ll need to explain this to Parliament within 48 hours, so I’d appreciate clarity. Of course, sir. Why did we authorize an operation that consumed our entire logistical capacity and delivered us the single bloodiest week since D-Day? There’s a pause. Eisenhower’s staff listening on extensions exchange glances.

 Prime Minister Market Garden was a calculated risk. Field Marshall Montgomery believed and our intelligence supported that German resistance in the north was collapsing. The plan was to exploit that weakness with a rapid thrust supported by airborne forces. I attended the briefings. Ike, I know what the plan was.

 What I need to understand is why General Patton is capturing German cities with half the fuel while Monty is taking casualties with all of it. Eisenhower chooses his words carefully. George’s sector faces lighter opposition. The SAR region isn’t as heavily defended as the Ryan crossings. The strategic importance. Don’t insult my intelligence.

45,000 prisoners is not light opposition. Those are entire divisions. divisions that could have reinforced Arnm Patton is destroying German units. Montgomery lost an entire airborne division trying to capture one brick. Winston, I understand your frustration. Do you? Because here’s what I’m seeing. I’m seeing that we gave Montgomery everything he asked for.

 Absolute priority. 1,400 tons of fuel per day, Elite Airborne Division, total air superiority. And he produced a disaster. Meanwhile, we gave Patton half that amount and he’s knocking on Germany’s door. So, help me understand the logic. Eisenhower size. It’s barely audible over the phone, but Churchill hears it. Monty has requested a meeting to discuss future operations.

 He believes that with renewed resources, a concentrated push toward the ruer, more resources, Churchill’s voice rises after this. Ike, here’s what I want you to tell Field Marshall. The Prime Minister’s office would very much like to understand why the general who demanded absolute priority for 9 days has produced absolute disaster.

 Can you convey that message? Winston, I need to be frank with you. Publicly criticizing Montgomery right now could fracture Allied unity at a critical moment. Allied unity didn’t save those paratroopers at Annem. And unity doesn’t win wars. Ike, results do. Patton gets results. Why are we punishing him for Montgomery’s failures? Eisenhower’s voice is tight.

 I’m not punishing anyone. I’m trying to maintain a coalition, then maintain it with competence, not politics. I’ll be visiting France next week. I’d like to tour both sectors, Montgomery’s and Patn. I want to see for myself where our resources went. Churchill hangs up before Eisenhower can respond. Isme watches Churchill light a cigar with shaking hands.

 The prime minister stares at the map for a long moment. Get me the casualty lists, he says quietly. All of them, every name. I want to know exactly who we lost at Anm. Within 24 hours, the British press has the story. The Daily Telegraph runs a front page headline. Anhem 10,000 casualties in failed wine frying crossing.

 By noon, every newspaper in Fleet Street has reporters demanding answers. By evening, they have the fuel allocation numbers. Someone leaked them, probably from Churchill’s office, though no one can prove it. The questions start immediately. Why was Montgomery given every resource while Patton was starved? Why did the prime minister approve an operation that cost 10,000 men for zero gain? Why are American generals succeeding whileBritish generals fail? Labour MPs begin preparing questions for Parliament.

Churchill’s office receives over 300 letters in two days from families demanding explanations. Mothers, wives, sisters, why did my son die for Montgomery’s vanity? Why wasn’t the intelligence about German tanks taken seriously? Why are we losing men while the Americans are winning? At Supreme Headquarters in Versailles, Eisenhower’s staff is in crisis mode.

 Montgomery arrives on September 28th demanding a private meeting. It lasts 3 hours. Voices are heard through the closed door. Montgomery’s tone is defensive, insistent. He blames the weather. Unexpected German resistance. Intelligence failures. The Polish paratroopers who were supposed to reinforce Anheim but dropped in the wrong location.

 Eisenhower’s chief of staff, General Walter Bedell Smith, stands outside the door and listens. When Montgomery finally leaves, base rigid, jaw clenched, Smith enters Eisenhower’s office. Ike looks exhausted. How bad? Smith asks. He wants another offensive. Full resources single thrust toward the ruer. He says market garden failed because we didn’t give him enough. Smith stares.

 He lost 10,000 men with absolute priority and he wants more. He says Patton’s success is irrelevant because the SAR isn’t strategically important. Smith shakes his head slowly. George took 45,000 prisoners. That’s not irrelevant. That’s devastating to German combat power. Eisenhower rubs his temples. Churchill is coming.

 He wants to tour both sectors. That’s going to be a disaster. I know. Meanwhile, 200 m south, General Omar Bradley, Patton’s immediate superior and commander of 12th Army Group, submits a formal logistics request to Eisenhower’s headquarters. It’s carefully worded professional, but everyone who reads it understands exactly what it Third Army is positioned to reach the Ryan within 10 days if provided adequate fuel allocation.

Current operational tempo demonstrates capacity for sustained offensive operations with minimal casualties and maximum territorial gain. Recommend immediate increase in supply priority to exploit current tactical advantages before German forces consolidate defensive positions. The final line becomes legendary within chef.

 Bradley adds almost as an afterthought. We are winning a war with our hands tied while others lose it with both hands free. Bradley never mentions Montgomery by name. He doesn’t have to. The request circulates through every level of Allied command. Eisenhower’s staff debates it. British liaison officers protest it.

American generals quietly support it. And George Patton reading a copy in his headquarters in Nancy grins and writes in his diary. Brad finally said it. About damn time. October 1st, 1944. Churchill makes an unannounced visit to France. He flies into Versailles and goes directly to Eisenhower’s headquarters.

 British and American generals gather nervously in the conference room. Churchill enters carrying a bound report thick official stamped with the War Office seal. He sets it on the conference table with a heavy thud. Gentlemen, he says, I’ve had my staff compile a comprehensive analysis of operations from September 17th through 25.

 I thought it might be useful for our discussion. He opens the report. The first page is a comparison chart. Two columns side by side operation market garden 21st Army Group September 1725 1944 fuel allocation 1,400 tons per day casualties 10,05 cities captured zero rivers crossed zero attempted one failed strategic objectives achieved zero enemy prisoners 3,200 territorial gain 64 mi Final position Naim Megan, Netherlands, one bridge short of goal.

 Third army operations September 1725, 1944. Fuel allocation 700 tons per day. Casualties 2,100. Cities captured 12. Nancy Lunavville, Chatella, Ponttomus, Nominee among others. Rivers crossed three. Moselle, Mirthth, Mortan. Strategic objectives achieved. Breached seek freed line defenses. Threatened SAR industrial region. Enemy prisoners 45,000.

Territorial gain 60 mi. Final position. German border near Sarbrooken. Churchill looks around the room. British officers stare at the table. American officers try not to look smug. I have one question, Churchill says. And I need someone to answer it honestly. How is this possible? Silence. We gave Montgomery everything, every resource, every priority.

 And George Patton with half the fuel produced results that make Market Garden look like a training exercise gone wrong. So I’ll ask again, how is possible? Eisenhower clears his throat. Prime Minister, the operational contexts are different. Montgomery faced entrenched SS divisions. So did Patton, the 17th SS Panza Grenadier Division at Nancy. He destroyed it in 3 days.

 The terrain in Holland is flat, ideal for armor. Patton crossed three rivers and fought through the Vo’s foothills. So no, Ike, I don’t accept terrain as an explanation. A British general, one of Montgomery’s staff officers, speaks up carefully. Prime Minister, if I may,Field Marshall Montgomery’s objective was more ambitious.

 A single thrust deep into enemy territory requires requires competence. Churchill interrupts, which brings me to my next question. I’m visiting the front tomorrow. I’ll be touring the market garden battlefield with Field Marshall Montgomery and then I’ll be visiting General Patton’s sector. I suspect the contrast will be illuminating. October 2nd, 1944.

 It Netherlands. Churchill’s motorcade arrives in the staging area for Market Garden. The operation ended one week ago, but the evidence of disaster is everywhere. Destroyed gliders lie scattered across fields. Burned out vehicles line the roads. Temporary graves marked with helmets and rifles stand in neat rows.

 Field marshal Bernard Montgomery meets Churchill at the headquarters tent. He’s impeccably dressed as always, confident posture, but there’s tension in his jaw. Prime Minister, I’m glad you could visit. I think once you see the situation firsthand, you’ll understand the challenges we faced. Churchill says nothing.

 He simply gestures toward the nearest jeep. Show me. They drive north along the highway the British armored divisions were supposed to use to reach Arnm. Hell’s highway the soldiers call it. The road is lined with destroyed tanks, British, American, German. Every few miles there are craters from German artillery.

 Burned shattered bridges that engineers are still repairing. Montgomery explains as they drive. The intelligence failure was significant, Prime Minister. We had no indication of SS Panza divisions in the area. The 9th and 10th SS were supposed to be refitting in Germany, but they were here near Arnham at full strength. You were warned, Churchill says quietly.

Montgomery pauses. I’m sorry. Dutch resistance. They reported German armor. You dismissed it. The intelligence was inconclusive. Resistance reports are often exaggerated. 4,500 men of the First Airborne Division are dead or captured because you decided inconclusive intelligence wasn’t worth considering. Montgomery’s face hardens.

Prime Minister, with respect, command decisions in combat require. I’m not interested in lectures on command decisions, Bernard. I’m interested in why you made the wrong ones. They reached the Nine Megan Bridge. The farthest point Market Garden achieved. American paratroopers of the 82nd Airborne captured this bridge in a heroic assault, crossing the Wall River in flimsy canvas boats under heavy fire.

It’s one of the few successes of the entire operation. Churchill’s 10 mi away, barely visible in the distance. Is Arnim, the bridge too far. This is where it ended. Montgomery says, “We held here.” If the first airborne could have held Anim for just one more day, they held for 9 days. Bernard. Nine days surrounded by SS Panza divisions.

 They held longer than anyone thought possible. The failure wasn’t theirs. It was yours. Montgomery stiffens. Prime Minister, I resent. I’m not finished. Churchill turns to face him directly. Yesterday I visited Nancy. Do you know what I saw there? Montgomery says nothing. I saw a city that General Patton captured 4 days ago with 700 tons of fuel per day. Half what you had.

 The city was intact. Civilians were returning. American engineers were already repairing infra. And do you know what General Patton told me when I asked about his casualties. Montgomery’s jaws clenched. He said, “Asceptable, Mystic Prime Minister. We keep moving and they can’t hurt us.” Then he showed me his maps.

 12 cities, three rivers, 45,000 prisoners. All in the same week, you lost 10,000 men for one bridge you didn’t capture. The situations are not comparable, Montgomery says tightly. You’re right, Churchill replies. They’re not because Atan won and you lost. That evening, Churchill insists on visiting Arnm itself.

 The town is still partially held by German forces, so they can only approach the southern bank of the Rine. Across the river, the Annem Bridge stands intact, covered with German vehicles and troops. The British paratroopers fought for 9 days to hold the northern end of that bridge. They were evacuated. What was left of them one week ago? Churchill stands on the riverbank and stares across the water.

Montgomery stands beside him, silent. After a long moment, Churchill speaks. A bridge too far. That’s what they’re calling it, sirhem. The soldiers, they’re saying it was a bridge too far. Montgomery doesn’t respond. Churchill turns to him. I’m starting to think it wasn’t the bridge that was too.

 It was the ambition without the ability to match it. They returned to the temporary headquarters in Eintoven. A large tent maps covering every surface. Eisenhower is General Isme. Several staff officers. The atmosphere is tense. Churchill sit lights a cigar. Looks at Montgomery. Bernard, I want you to answer a question and I want you to answer it truthfully.

Montgomery nods stiffly. Why did market garden fail while patent succeeds? Prime Minister, as I’ve explained, thesituations are not comparable. I face two SS Panza divisions that intelligence failed to identify. General Patton faces disorganized rear guard units in a secondary sector. 45,000 prisoners, Churchill interrupts.

 In one week, were those disorganized rear guard units kind enough to or did Patton have to fight actual German divisions to capture them? Montgomery’s face flushes. Patent sector. Let’s discuss intelligence. Churchill continues. You were warned about German armor near Arnm, Dutch resistance, aerial reconnaissance. You dismissed it.

 Why? The intelligence was inconclusive. I made a command decision based on the strategic opportunity to the strategic opportunity to do what exactly? Lose an entire airborne division. The room goes silent. Eisenhower shifts uncomfortably. Isme stares at his notes. Montgomery’s voice is quiet controlled. That is an insulting oversimplification.

 Then simplify it for me. Churchill leans forward. You had priority. You had supply. You had elite troops. The finest paratroopers Britain has ever produced. You had complete air superiority. You had every advantage. Patton had half your fuel and won battles every single day. So simplify it. Fueled Marshall. Why did you fail? I did not fail, Montgomery says.

 His voice is rising now. We achieved significant territorial gain. We drew German forces north, relieving pressure on other sectors. We prevented a German counteroffensive. You lost 10,000 men. Churchill says each word is clipped. Precise. For a bridge you don’t have. For a river you didn’t cross. For an objective you didn’t achieve.

 And while you were losing those men, George Patton was liberating French cities and taking German prisoners by the thousands. Now I must go to Parliament next week and explain this to the British people. And frankly, Bernard, I’m struggling to find an explanation that doesn’t make you look incompetent. Eisenhower interrupts. Gentlemen, recriminations won’t help.

Churchill doesn’t look away from Montgomery. I’m not recriminating, Ike. I’m evaluating. And my evaluation is this. We gave Montgomery the chance to be. Montgomery stands abruptly. If the prime minister believes I’m unfit for command, sit down, Bernard. Churchill’s voice is still. I’m not finished. Montgomery sits. His face is rigid.

Every officer in the tent is staring at the floor, the maps, anywhere except at the two men. Churchill takes a long pull on his cigar. When he speaks again, his voice is quieter, colder. Here is what I will tell Parliament. Operation Market Garden was a gamble, a bold gamble, and it failed.

 Wars are not won by gambling, Field Marshall. They’re won by generals who deliver results with the resources available, not by generals who demand all the resources and deliver nothing but condolences. He stands, looks around the room. George Patton is that general. He takes what you give him and wins. You, Bernard, are not.

 The silence that follows is suffocating. Montgomery’s face is white. Eisenhower looks like he wants to be anywhere else on Earth. Isme is writing notes with extraordinary focus, avoiding eye contact with everyone. Churchill walks to the tent entrance, pauses, turns back. One more thing. I understand General Bradley has requested increased fuel allocation for third army.

 I’ll be recommending to the combined chiefs of staff that we approve it. And he leaves. Montgomery sits motionless for a full minute. Then he stands nods curtly to Eisenhower and walks out without a word. Eisenhower looks at his staff. Well, that could have gone worse. No one laughs. The political earthquake that follows reshapes Allied strategy for the rest of the war. Montgomery retains his command.

Firing him would create a British political crisis that Churchill can’t afford, but his influence is shattered. The single thrust strategy he’s been advocating, concentrate all resources on his front for one massive push into Germany, is permanently rejected. Eisenhower’s broadfront approach becomes official policy. Every sector advances.

No more priority for Montgomery. Within a week, Patton’s third army receives increased fuel allocations. By mid-occtober, they’ve advanced another 40 mi. By November, they’re positioned along the German border, preparing to assault the Seagreed line fortifications. Montgomery’s 21st Army Group spends October and November clearing the Shelt estie to open the port of Antworp.

 Vital work, but unglamorous. The headlines belong to Patton. Now, the statistical comparison from September through October 1944 becomes part of official military history. Montgomery’s 21st Army Group, 15,000 casualties, 40 mi advanced. One major city captured Antwerb, though the port remains unusable until the shelt is cleared in November.

 Minimal German prisoners, Patton’s third army, 8,000 casualties, 100 m advanced, 18 cities captured, 67,000 prisoners, German forces in Lraine. Churchill never publicly humiliates Montgomery in Parliament. He’s too skilled apolitician for that. But his report to the House of Commons on October 10th is damning in its restraint.

 He praises the courage of the British paratroopers at Arnim. He acknowledges the difficulty of the operation. And then he says almost casually, “One cannot help but observe that in modern war, boldness must be married to flexibility and speed. Some commanders possess this combination naturally, others do not.

 Everyone knows who he means.” In his private diary, Churchill is more blunt. He writes on October 5th, “Visited both sectors. The contrast is staggering. Patton moves like lightning. Montgomery plans like a lawyer and executes like a clerk. I have never seen such a disparity between promise and performance.” Years later, when writing his war memoirs, Churchill addresses Market Garden with unusual directness.

 There is no reason to assign blame to any individual. The plan was bold, the execution determined, the courage of our airborne forces beyond question. Yet one cannot help but observe that in war, as in life, some men achieve the improbable through will and skill combined. General Patton was such a man. He made the difficult look easy.

 Others, despite every advantage, make the easy look difficult. He never names Montgomery. He doesn’t have to. In December 1944, the Germans launch their final major offensive, the Battle of the Bulge. Hitler throws everything into a desperate assault through the Ardens, creating a massive bulge in the Allied lines.

 American forces at Baston are surrounded. Eisenhower calls an emergency meeting. The situation is critical. Who can relieve Baston? Montgomery commanding to the north says he’ll need three weeks to organize a proper counteroffensive. Proper planning, proper supply, proper preparation. Patton attending the meeting from the south looks at the map.

I can be there in 48 hours. Eisenhower stares at him. George, that’s impossible. You’d have to turn your entire army 90° north in the middle of winter. 48 hours. Patton repeats. Give me the word and I’ll have three divisions moving by tomorrow morning. He does it. Third army pivots north, advances through snow and ice, and reaches Baston in 72 hours.

 It’s the fastest major redeployment in military history. The siege is broken. The German offensive collapses. Montgomery’s counteroffensive launches 3 weeks later as promised. By then, Patton has already driven the Germans back 20 m. Churchill hears the news and writes to his wife, “Patton has done it again.

 Monty is still planning.” In his diary on December 28th, 1944, Patton writes, “Baston relieved, third army moved 100 miles in 72 hours, turned an entire core 90° and broke a German siege.” Meanwhile, Monty is still preparing his positions. Churchill was right. Some generals deliver, others make excuses. The final assessment of Market Garden versus Third Army operations becomes a case study in militarymies for generations.

 It illustrates a fundamental principle of warfare. Resources don’t win battles. Leadership does. Montgomery had everything. Patton had half. Montgomery failed. Patton succeeded. The reason, as Churchill understood viscerally, was simple. Patton was a warrior who understood that war rewards aggression, flexibility, and speed.

 Montgomery was a planner who believed war could be controlled through meticulous preparation. Both approaches have merit. But in the fluid, chaotic environment of 1944 France and Germany, only one worked. Churchill’s judgment on Montgomery was final. In private correspondence with Roosevelt in November 1944, he wrote, “Monty remains a capable defensive commander, but offensive warfare requires a different temperament.

” George has it, Bernard does not. We must use each man according to his abilities. Montgomery never received priority again. pattern never stopped moving and the war contrary to Montgomery’s predictions that market garden would end it by Christmas 1944 continued until May 1945. But when Germany finally surrendered, Third Army was deeper into German territory than any other Allied force.

 They had advanced over 600 m from Normandy, captured over 300,000 prisoners, liberated over 80 major cities. Montgomery’s final position in May 1945, Northern Germany, having advanced cautiously and methodically from Holland. Patton’s final position, Czechoslovakia, having raced across southern Germany so fast that Eisenhower had to order him to stop.

 The lesson of Market Garden wasn’t that bold operations fail. It’s that bold operations require bold commanders. Montgomery tried to be something he wasn’t. Patton was always exactly what he appeared to be. Churchill recognized the difference, and once he did, the balance of power in Allied command shifted permanently.

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 Leave a comment telling me which general you think was better.