April 21st, 1945. Desauo, Germany. The streets lay choked with rubble from weeks of Allied bombing. Staff Sergeant Joseph Madria peered through the commander’s cupella of his tank, scanning the shattered buildings ahead. His crew sat in the only T26E4 Super Persing to see combat in the European theater.

 a modified M26 mounting a gun that American Ordinance Engineers promised could finally answer Germany’s most formidable armor. What neither Madreer nor his gunner, Corporal John Irwin, could have known was that within minutes they would fire their weapon in anger for one of the only times in the war. The encounter that followed would become legend, mythologized into a dramatic jewel between America’s newest heavy tank and Germany’s fearsome King Tiger.

 But the truth, as with most wartime stories, proved far more complex and ultimately more revealing than the myth. The real story wasn’t about a single spectacular engagement. It was about a mathematical problem that had haunted American armored forces since Normandy. A problem of range, penetration, and the brutal calculus that determined which tank crews lived and which died.

 The M26 Persing represented America’s belated attempt to solve that equation. But the numbers told a story that contradicted the confident claims in ordinance reports and the hopeful rhetoric from commanders desperate for a weapon that could face German heavy tanks on equal terms. If you’re enjoying this deep dive into the story, hit the subscribe button and let us know in the comments from where in the world you are watching from today.

 By spring 1945, the war in Europe had entered its final desperate phase. German forces fell back toward Berlin, fighting with the ferocity of cornered animals. American and British armies drove eastward from the Rine, racing to link up with Soviet forces advancing from the opposite direction. In this collapsing pocket of German held territory, the weapons of two different industrial philosophies met in combat for the final time.

 The Tiger 2, known to Allied soldiers as the King Tiger or Royal Tiger, represented the culmination of German tank design thinking. First deployed in Normandy in July 1944, it combined the lessons learned from 3 years of Eastern Front combat with Germany’s obsession for technical superiority. The vehicle weighed nearly 70 metric tons.

 Its frontal armor consisted of 150 mm of steel plate sloped at 50°, creating an effective thickness that made it nearly impervious to every Allied tank gun then in service. The Tiger 2’s main armament, the 88 mm KWK43 L, 71, was one of the most powerful tank guns fielded by any nation during the war. With a barrel length of 6.25 25 m.

The weapon achieved a muzzle velocity of 1,130 m/s with standard armor-piercing ammunition. At 1,000 m range, this gun could penetrate 193 mm of armor plate angled at 30°. At 2,000 m, it retained sufficient energy to penetrate 132 mm. These specifications meant the Tiger 2 could destroy any Allied tank from ranges exceeding 2,000 meters, often before Allied crews even realized they were under fire.

 The psychological impact of this capability cannot be overstated. American tank crews who had fought through France and into Germany by early 1945 understood the mathematics of engagement ranges with visceral clarity. The difference between effective range and maximum range often meant the difference between survival and death.

 The standard M4 Sherman, which formed the backbone of American armored divisions throughout the war, mounted either a 75 mm M3 gun or the improved 76 mm M1 gun. Against a Tiger 2’s frontal armor, these weapons were effectively useless. The 75 mm could not penetrate the King Tiger at any practical combat range. The 76 mm firing standard M62 armor-piercing capped ammunition could penetrate 109 mm of armor at 1,000 m.

 This fell far short of the penetration needed to defeat the Tiger 2’s sloped frontal plate. Sherman crews learned through bitter experience that engaging a Tiger 2 frontally was suicide. The only viable tactics involved flanking maneuvers to attack the tank’s thinner side armor of 80 mm or attempting to disable the vehicle through track hits or calling in artillery and air support.

 All of these approaches required either numerical superiority, favorable terrain or exceptional luck. German tank commanders understood these limitations and exploited them ruthlessly. The arrival of the M26 Persing in February 1945 represented American industry’s response to this capability gap. Development of the tank had consumed nearly 3 years, delayed repeatedly by bureaucratic opposition and doctrinal disagreements that would prove costly in American lives.

 The vehicle that finally reached combat units represented a fundamental departure from previous American tank design philosophy. The Persing weighed 46 tons, substantially heavier than the 33 ton Sherman. Its frontal armor consisted of 102 mm on the hull glacis plate angled at 46° from vertical. The turret front featured 114 mm of cast armor.

 This represented a significant improvement in protection over the Sherman, though it still fell short of Tiger 2 standards. More importantly, the Persing mounted the 90mm M3 gun, a weapon American ordinance claimed could finally give American tankers the firepower to engage German heavy armor on more equal terms. The 90 mm M3 gun fired the M82 armor-piercing capped ballistic capped round with a muzzle velocity of 810 m/s.

This projectile could penetrate approximately 195 mm of armor at 1,000 yards with high velocity armor-piercing ammunition. On paper, these specifications suggested the Persing could threaten the Tiger 2’s gun mantlet and turret face at combat ranges, though the sloped glacis plate remained effectively invulnerable.

 But specifications on paper and performance in combat often diverged significantly. The M26 that reached Europe in early 1945 arrived in quantities too small and too late to influence the war’s outcome meaningfully. The so-called Zebra mission delivered just 20 T-26 E3 tanks, the prototype designation for what would become the M26 to the 3rd and 9th armored divisions in Belgium in January 1945.

 By wars end in May, perhaps 300 M26 tanks had reached European soil, but fewer than 20 actually saw combat. This limited deployment meant that for the vast majority of American tankers fighting through Germany in the spring of 1945, the mathematics of armored combat remained brutally unchanged. Sherman crews still faced German armor with weapons they knew were inadequate.

 The psychological burden of this knowledge affected tactical decisions, morale, and casualty rates in ways that are difficult to quantify but impossible to ignore. The production history of the M26 reveals much about the institutional resistance that delayed its arrival. Work on heavy tank prototypes began in 1942, shortly after the M4 Sherman entered production.

 The T20 series of experimental vehicles tested various combinations of guns, transmissions, and suspension systems. These prototypes evolved into the T-25 and T-26 designs, which incorporated the 90 mm gun and significantly heavier armor. But development proceeded at a leisurely pace, hampered by opposition from Lieutenant General Leslie McNair, who commanded Army ground forces from 1942 until his death in July 1944.

McNair believed firmly in tank destroyer doctrine, which held that tanks should primarily support infantry and exploit breakthroughs, while specialized tank destroyers handled enemy armor. This doctrinal framework led McNair to oppose heavy tank development as unnecessary and wasteful of resources better spent on Sherman production.

 McNair’s position influenced the entire American tank development program. As late as fall 1943, after German Tiger 1 tanks had been encountered in combat in Tunisia and Italy, McNair wrote to Lieutenant General Jacob Deas arguing that the 76 mm gun would prove adequate against German armor. McNair remained unaware that even the 76 mm gun could not penetrate a Panther’s frontal armor at combat ranges, much less a Tigers.

 This failure of intelligence regarding German tank capabilities had direct consequences for American tank crews throughout 1944. The Normandy landings in June 1944 forced a brutal reassessment of American tank capabilities. The first M4 Sherman’s mounting 76 mm guns had rolled off production lines in January 1944.

130 of these improved tanks arrived in Britain by April. Yet American commanders refused to deploy them on D-Day. The reasons given included insufficient crew training time, logistical concerns about maintaining two different ammunition types, and critically the belief that the 75 mm gun would prove adequate for expected opposition.

 This decision proved catastrophic. German forces in Normandy fielded far more Panthers than American intelligence had predicted. By June 1944, 38% of German tanks in the theater were Panthers, not the handful anticipated. Each of these medium tanks mounted a 75 mm KK42 L 70 gun capable of destroying a Sherman from over 2,000 m.

 While protected by frontal armor, the Sherman’s 75 mm gun could not penetrate at any range. Field reports from Normandy painted a grim picture by early July. On July 2nd, complaints about the 75mm gun’s ineffectiveness reached General Dwight Eisenhower. His documented response captured command level frustration with stark clarity.

Multiple witnesses recorded his angry reaction upon learning that the 76 mm gun, which ordinance had assured him would handle anything the Germans fielded, still struggled against Panther frontal armor. General Omar Bradley immediately ordered 76 mm Shermans rushed from Britain to the front. On July 25th, during Operation Cobra, 102 M4A1 with 76 mm guns made their combat debut.

Initial engagement reports sobered American commanders. While the 76 millimeter represented an improvement, it still required flanking shots or extremely close-range engagement against Panthers. Against the Tiger 1, which appeared in smaller numbers, the situation was marginally better. Against the Tiger 2, which began appearing in late summer 1944, the 76 mm Sherman remained hopelessly outmatched.

 The Battle of the Bulge in December 1944 demonstrated with brutal finality that American armored forces lacked weapons capable of engaging German heavy tanks effectively. Tiger 2s appeared in that offensive, and American tank crews found themselves facing armor they simply could not defeat frontally.

 Tank losses during the bulge, combined with accumulated combat reports from the entire European campaign, finally broke through institutional resistance to heavy tank production. The T-26E3 was approved for production in November 1944, redesated as the M26 Persing in March 1945, but production ramped slowly. The first 20 tanks reached Europe as part of the Zebra mission in January 1945.

These vehicles were distributed to the 3rd and 9inth armored divisions for evaluation under combat conditions. The third armored first used the M26 in combat on February 25th near the Rur River. The initial combat engagements revealed both the Persing’s capabilities and its limitations. On February 26th, a T-26E3, nicknamed Fireball, was knocked out in an ambush at Elldorf.

 Silhouetted by a nearby fire, the Persing sat in a disadvantageous tactical position when a concealed Tiger 1 fired three shots from approximately 100 yards. The first round penetrated the turret through the machine gun port in the mantlet, killing the gunner and loader. The second shot struck the gun barrel, detonating the chambered round and distorting the barrel.

 The third round glanced off the turret side. This engagement demonstrated that while the Persing offered improved protection over the Sherman, it was not invulnerable to German tank guns, particularly the 88 mm weapons mounted on Tiger 1 and Tiger 2 tanks. The crew of Fireball survived only because the attacking Tiger became entangled in debris while attempting to withdraw and was abandoned by its crew.

Shortly afterward, another T26E3 successfully engaged and destroyed a Tiger 1 and two Panza 4s at Elldorf, demonstrating that under favorable conditions, the Persing could perform effectively against German armor. But these limited engagements involving just 20 tanks across the entire European theater could not change the fundamental reality facing the vast majority of American armored forces.

 For the thousands of Sherman crews still fighting through Germany in March and April 1945, the arrival of a handful of Persings meant nothing. They continued facing German armor with weapons they knew were inadequate, relying on numerical superiority, artillery support, air power, and tactical skill to overcome technical disadvantages.

The development of the T-26E4 Super Persing represented American ordinance’s attempt to create a weapon that could match the Tiger 2’s capabilities more directly. In January 1945, engineers at Wellman Engineering Company modified a T-26E1 prototype by installing the experimental T15E190 mm gun.

 This weapon featured a much longer barrel, 73 calibers in length compared to 53 calibers for the standard M3 gun, and a significantly larger chamber capacity. The T-15E1 gun fired the T30e16 armor-piercing composite rigid round, a tungsten cord projectile similar in concept to the HVAP rounds that had improved 76 mm gun performance against Panthers.

 The muzzle velocity reached 3,750 ft pers, approximately 1,140 m/s. This represented a velocity increase of over 300 m/s compared to the standard M3 gun. The penetration performance of this weapon was formidable. Testing demonstrated that the T15E1 could penetrate up to 260 mm of armor at 1,000 m. This performance exceeded the Tiger 2’s 88 mm KWK43 when both guns fired their best available ammunition.

 The Super Persing gun could reliably penetrate a Tiger 2’s frontal armor at ranges where the German tank could penetrate back, finally achieving the rough par that American tankers had lacked throughout the campaign. But this technological achievement came too late and in quantities too small to matter strategically.

 Only one T-26E4 reached Europe before wars end. This single tank shipped to the third armored division in mid-March 1945 arrived with its experimental gun, but without the additional armor that would later be retrofitted in the field. Maintenance personnel at the division added armor plates salvaged from destroyed Panthers to the gun mantlet, the hull front, along with counterweights to balance the turret.

These field modifications created a unique vehicle that bore little resemblance to the clean lines of standard American tank designs. The crew that would take this experimental vehicle into combat received it in April. Staff Sergeant Madrea and Corporal Irwin along with their three fellow crewmen now commanded a weapon unlike any other American tank in the theater.

 Whether it would prove its worth in combat remained to be seen. The fundamental question facing American armored forces in spring 1945 wasn’t whether the Persing or Super Persing represented technical improvements over the Sherman. Clearly, they did. The question was whether these improvements came in time and in sufficient quantities to change the tactical calculus that had governed armored combat throughout the campaign.

 For the vast majority of American tank crews, the answer was no. The mythology that would grow around the Persing and particularly around the Super Persing’s brief combat career would obscure these realities. Stories of dramatic duels between American and German super tanks make for compelling narratives, but the mathematical truth was far less dramatic and far more consequential.

 Throughout most of the European campaign, American tank crews fought with weapons they knew were inferior to what they faced. They compensated through numerical superiority, better logistics, superior combined arms tactics, and air supremacy that German forces could not match. The standard M26 Persing, despite its impressive specifications, did not outrange the Tiger 2.

 The 90 mm M3 gun’s maximum effective range against heavy armor remained shorter than the Tiger 2’s 88 mm KOK43. Only the experimental T15E1 gun on the single Super Persing achieved rough par with Germany’s most powerful tank gun. This distinction matters because it reveals the limits of what American industry could achieve.

 Even when finally committed to producing heavy tanks, the crews who fought in Persings during the war’s final weeks understood these limitations instinctively. They appreciated the improved armor protection and the more powerful gun, but they also recognized that they were not driving tanks that made them invulnerable or superior to the best German armor.

 They were driving machines that narrowed the capability gap enough to make combat more survivable, though still deadly dangerous. By April 1945, when Madrea and Irwin rolled into Desau aboard their Super Persing, the war had already been decided by factors far more fundamental than individual tank capabilities.

 Germany’s industrial base lay in ruins. Its logistics system had collapsed, and its military forces fought without adequate fuel, ammunition, or replacements. The numerical and material superiority of Allied forces would have achieved victory regardless of whether Persings ever reached combat. But for the crews who drove these tanks and for the engineers who finally succeeded in getting them into production despite bureaucratic opposition, the Persing represented something important.

 It represented American industry’s ability when finally motivated by battlefield necessity to produce weapons competitive with the best Germany could field. that this ability manifested so late in the war stands as a testament both to American industrial capacity and to the institutional failures that delayed its application.

 The story of what happened at Desau on April 21st would become legend retold and embellished until it bore little resemblance to the actual events. But understanding what really happened requires looking beyond the mythology to examine the mathematical realities of range, penetration, and the brutal calculus that determined survival in armored combat.

 Those realities told a story more complex than simple narratives of American technological superiority could accommodate. They told a story of industrial capacity misapplied, of bureaucratic resistance overcome too late, and of tactical advantages achieved through means other than tank versus tank combat. The M26 Persing arrived in Europe not as a war-winning super weapon, but as a competent heavy tank that partially closed a capability gap that should never have existed in the first place.

The Super Persing, that single experimental vehicle rolling through Desau’s rubble choked streets and represented what American industry might have produced 18 months earlier had different decisions been made about tank development priorities. The fact that it appeared in April 1945 when Germany’s defeat was already certain stands as both an achievement and an indictment of the systems that determined American armored warfare doctrine.

 The maintenance compound of the third armored division’s maintenance battalion had seen the Super Persing arrive in mid-March 1945. Captain Belton Cooper, the division’s maintenance officer, watched as the experimental T26E4 was unloaded from its transport. The tank’s extraordinarily long gun barrel immediately distinguished it from every other vehicle in the division’s infantry.

 At 21 ft in length, the T15E1 gun protruded so far forward that it created balance problems requiring external stabilizer springs mounted on the turret sides. Kooper understood immediately that this vehicle represented American ordinances attempt to create a tank that could face Tiger 2s on equal terms, but he also recognized the tank’s vulnerabilities.

Despite mounting a more powerful gun, the T-26E4’s basic armor protection remained identical to standard Persing specifications. Against the Tiger 2’s 88 mm K43, this armor offered inadequate protection. Kooper’s maintenance crews improvised a solution using materials at hand. They salvaged armor plates from destroyed Panther tanks encountered during the division’s advance through Germany.

 Two 38 mm steel boiler plates were welded to the hull front, creating a triple layer armor package totaling 178 mm at the glacis. An 80 mm plate from a Panther’s upper glacis was cut and welded to the gun mantlet, covering the entire front of the mantlet with three holes cut for the gunner’s sight, the gun barrel, and the coaxial machine gun.

Additional 80 mm plates were added to the turret sides as counterweights to balance the extra weight on the mantlet. These field modifications added approximately 5 tons to the vehicle’s weight, bringing it to over 50 tons total. The added armor transformed the Super Persing from an upgunned Persing into something closer to a genuine heavy tank capable of withstanding hits from German tank guns.

 But the modifications also stressed the powertrain beyond design specifications. The Ford GAF5 8 engine rated at 500 horsepower had been adequate for the standard Persing’s 46 tons driving 51 tons with the same engine reduced performance significantly. The Super Persing first saw combat on April 4th, 1945 between the Wazer River and Northheim.

The third armored division’s spearhead encountered isolated German strong points as they advanced eastward. One position on a wooded hill opened fire on the American column. The Super Persing, positioned in the forward section of the column, immediately traversed its turret and fired an armor-piercing round at a target on the hills forward slope approximately 1500 yd distant.

 The shell struck with devastating effect. Witnesses described a tremendous explosion accompanied by a flash of sparks as debris shot 50 ft into the air. The target identified as a tank or self-propelled gun based on the explosion’s characteristics was destroyed instantly. The engagement demonstrated the T15E1 gun’s exceptional power at extended range.

 1500 yardds exceeded the effective combat range at which most tank engagements occurred. The ability to deliver lethal firepower at such distances provided a significant tactical advantage. But this single engagement, impressive as it was, did not involve a Tiger 2. German records and subsequent analysis suggest the destroyed vehicle was more likely a Panther or possibly a lighter armored vehicle.

 The Super Persing’s actual performance against heavy German armor remained untested. The tank was transferred to a new crew in the 33rd Armored Regiment. Shortly after this engagement, Staff Sergeant Madria took command with Corporal Irwin serving as gunner. The 33rd Armored Regiment formed part of the Third Armored Division’s Combat Command B, which spearheaded the division’s advance toward the Elber River.

 By midappril, Allied forces raced eastward through crumbling German resistance, aiming to link up with Soviet forces advancing from the opposite direction. The industrial city of Desauo, located on the Moulder River approximately 75 mi southwest of Berlin, lay directly in their path. Desauo had been heavily bombed throughout the war. The Yna’s aircraft factory, which produced J88 bombers and other military aircraft, made the city a priority target for Allied strategic bombing.

 By April 1945, much of Desau lay in ruins. Rubble choked streets and destroyed buildings created a nightmare environment for armored operations. Visibility was limited, fields of fire were restricted, and German defenders could position anti-tank weapons in countless hiding places among the debris.

 On April 21st, the 33rd armored regiment entered Dau. The Super Persing advanced through the city’s streets as part of the regiment’s spearhead. According to accounts from crew members, particularly Corporal Irwin’s later memoir, the tank encountered enemy armor during the fighting. The specifics of what happened next have been subject to considerable debate among historians, but the cruise account provides the most detailed contemporary description available.

Irwin described the Super Persing turning at an intersection and spotting an enemy tank approximately 600 yd away. The German tank fired first. The round, according to Irwin, passed extremely close to the Super Persing, possibly striking the ground near the tank or passing between the tracks. The near miss suggested the German gunner had the range but narrowly missed the target.

Such near mississes were common in urban combat where rubble and debris obscured precise range estimation. If you find this story engaging, please take a moment to subscribe and enable notifications. It helps us continue producing in-depth content like this. The Super Persing crew responded immediately.

 Irwin as gunner traversed onto the target and fired. His first round, reportedly a high explosive shell, struck the enemy tank but failed to penetrate. The German tank began moving forward, rolling over a pile of rubble. As the enemy vehicle crested the rubble pile, its underside became exposed to the Super Persing’s position. Irwin fired again, this time with an armor-piercing round.

 The shot struck the enemy tank’s belly armor, the thinnest armor on any tank. The round penetrated, detonating ammunition stored inside the hull. The resulting explosion was catastrophic. Witnesses described the enemy tank’s turret being blown completely off the hull, a characteristic signature of ammunition detonation.

 The engagement lasted approximately 20 seconds from first shot to final explosion. The destroyed tank was identified by the crew as a Tiger, though whether it was a Tiger 1 or Tiger 2 remained uncertain. This distinction matters significantly when evaluating the engagement’s historical importance. The Tiger 1, while formidable, was less heavily armored than the Tiger 2 and had been in production since 1942.

The Tiger 2 represented Germany’s most advanced heavy tank with armor protection that exceeded every other tank fielded by any nation during the war. Subsequent historical analysis has cast considerable doubt on whether the destroyed tank was actually a Tiger 2. German unit records place the nearest Tiger 2 units, specifically SS Heavy Panza Battalion 502, approximately 70 mi from Desau on April 21st, engaged in defensive operations around Berlin against Soviet forces.

 The logistics of a lone Tiger 2 being separated from its unit and appearing in Desau strain credibility. Tiger IE required extensive maintenance and had operational ranges between 110 and 190 km under ideal conditions. A single Tiger 2 operating independently would have faced severe challenges maintaining operational readiness.

 If the crew had been separated from their unit, standard procedure would have been to either abandon the vehicle or attempt to link up with other German forces and report their situation through proper command channels. No German records document any Tiger 2 units in the Dau area during this period. American afteraction reports from Dao make no mention of Tiger 2s being encountered or destroyed.

These reports compiled from unit records and combat observations specifically noted Panthers and Panzer 4s, but made no reference to Tiger 2. Given that a Tiger 2 represented such a significant threat and such a valuable intelligence target, its destruction would certainly have been documented in official reports had it occurred.

 The most likely explanation based on available evidence is that the destroyed tank was a Panza 4. German forces defending Desau included various armored units equipped with Panza 4s which were commonly misidentified as Tigers by Allied crews. The Panza 4, particularly the late war Afj variant, had angular features and a long 75 mm gun that could be confused with a Tiger at a distance, especially in the chaotic conditions of urban combat where clear observation was difficult.

 This explanation does not diminish the significance of the engagement or the super Persing crews performance. Destroying any German tank in urban combat required skill, quick thinking, and effective crew coordination. The fact that Irwin was able to deliver a precise shot into the enemy tank’s vulnerable underside as it crested a rubble pile demonstrates exceptional gunnery and tactical awareness.

 Whether the target was a Panza 4, Tiger 1, or Tiger 2, the crew’s actions were commendable. But the distinction matters when evaluating claims about the M26 Persing’s capabilities relative to the Tiger 2. The mythology that grew around this engagement transformed it into a dramatic jewel between America’s most advanced tank and Germany’s most powerful armor.

This narrative served multiple purposes. It validated the Persing program and the resources devoted to its development. It provided a positive story about American technological capability at a time when such stories had propaganda value and it created a satisfying conclusion to years of American tanks being outmatched by German armor.

The mathematical reality was more complex and less satisfying. The standard M26 Persing equipped with the 90mm M3 gun did not outrange or outperform the Tiger 2’s 88 mm Quebar 43. Testing data and ballistic calculations demonstrate this clearly. The Tiger 2’s gun, firing standard panset 39 over 43 armor-piercing ammunition achieved penetration values at extended ranges that the Persing’s M3 gun could not match.

 At 2,000 m, the Tiger 2’s gun penetrated 132 mm of armor angled at 30°. The Persing M3 gun firing M82 APCBC ammunition penetrated approximately 115 mm at the same range and angle. This difference of 17 mm seems modest, but it meant the Tiger 2 could engage and destroy Persings at ranges where return fire was less effective.

The Tiger 2 retained the range advantage that had characterized German heavy tank design throughout the war. The Super Persing T15E1 gun changed this calculation significantly. With its much higher muzzle velocity and tungsten cord APCR ammunition, the T-15E1 could penetrate 260 mm at 1,000 m. This performance exceeded the Tiger 2’s gun when both fired their best available ammunition.

 The Super Persing achieved rough par with the Tiger 2 in terms of firepower and with its field modified armor approached par in protection. But the Super Persing was a prototype, a single experimental vehicle sent to Europe for combat evaluation. Its performance, whatever it may have been, could not change the tactical situation for the vast majority of American armored forces.

 The thousands of Sherman crews still fighting through Germany in April 1945 gained no benefit from the Super Persing existence. Even the 300 or so standard M26 Persings that reached Europe by wars end represented too small a force to influence operations meaningfully. The true story of the Persing’s combat performance involves understanding what the tank could and could not do against German armor.

 Against Panza 4s, the Persing was decisively superior in firepower, armor, and mobility. The 90 mm gun could penetrate a Panza 4 frontally at any combat range, while the Panza 4’s 75mm gun struggled to penetrate the Persing’s frontal armor. Against Panthers, the situation was more balanced. The Persing could penetrate a Panthers turret and gun mantlet frontally at combat ranges, though the Panthers sloped 80 mm glacis plate remained challenging.

 The Panthers 75 mm KWK42 L 70 gun could penetrate the Persing’s frontal armor at close to medium ranges, making engagements between these two tanks relatively even. Against Tiger is the Persing held advantages in mobility and gun depression while being roughly equivalent in firepower. The Tiger I’s 88 mm KBUK 36 L 56 gun while powerful was ballistically similar to the Persing’s 90 mm M3.

 Both tanks could penetrate each other’s frontal armor at combat ranges, making such engagements dependent on tactical factors rather than pure technical specifications. Against Tiger 2s, the standard Persing remained at a significant disadvantage. The Tiger 2 could engage and destroy Persings at ranges where effective return fire was difficult.

 Only the Super Persing with its experimental gun approached par with Germany’s heaviest tank. This technical reality meant that for American tank crews encountering Tiger 2s in April 1945, the tactical situation remained similar to what Sherman crews had faced throughout the campaign. Frontal engagement was inadvisable.

 Flanking attacks, combined arms support, and numerical superiority remained the preferred methods for dealing with German heavy armor. The fighting at Desau continued after the Super Persing’s engagement with the unidentified German tank. On April 22nd, the day after the famous engagement, the Super Persing encountered a disabled Panther.

 The German tanks hull had been immobilized, but its turret remained operational. As the Super Persing advanced, the Panther’s crew fired at it. The crew account does not specify whether the German round hit or missed, but the Super Persing returned fire, destroying the Panther with what Irwin described as a clean kill. Later that same day, the Super Persing encountered two German medium tanks identified as Panza 4s that drove across its field of fire.

 Irwin fired at the first tank, destroying it. The second tank stopped immediately. Its crew exited the vehicle and surrendered rather than attempt to fight. This reaction suggests the German crews recognized they faced a tank with firepower far exceeding standard American armor. The extraordinarily long gun barrel of the Super Persing would have been immediately distinctive and recognizable as something unusual.

 These engagements at Desauo represented the total combat record of the only Super Persing to see action in Europe. The tank remained with the 33rd Armored Regiment through the end of April, but no further significant engagements occurred. Germany’s surrender on May 8th, 1945 ended the war in Europe. The Super Persing’s combat career had lasted approximately 3 weeks from when Madrea’s crew took command until wars end.

 The question of whether German tankers ever admitted that American 90mm guns outranged Tiger Thur requires careful examination. No documented evidence exists of German tank crews making such admissions. This is unsurprising given the circumstances. By April 1945, German armored forces were scattered, disorganized, and fighting without adequate supplies or support.

 Formal afteraction reports and technical assessments which might have contained such observations were rarely compiled during this period of collapse and chaos. What did exist were postwar interrogations of German tank crews and commanders by Allied intelligence services. These interrogations covered a wide range of topics related to German armor capabilities, tactics, and combat experiences.

 American and British intelligence officers were particularly interested in German assessments of Allied tank performance. These interrogation reports provide some insight into how German tankers viewed American armor. German tankers consistently expressed respect for American tank crews tactical proficiency and the effectiveness of American combined arms tactics.

 They noted that American forces used their advantages in artillery, air support, and numerical superiority to offset technical paths, disadvantages in tank versus tank combat. German crews recognized that American tankers rarely attempted to engage German heavy tanks in direct frontal combat, instead using maneuver and supporting fires to create favorable engagements.

 Regarding the Persing specifically, German assessments indicated recognition that it represented a significant improvement over the Sherman. The 90 mm gun was acknowledged as capable of threatening panthers and tiger is frontally which the 75 mm and 76 mm guns could not consistently do. This represented a meaningful change in the tactical calculus from the German perspective.

However, German assessments of the Tiger 2’s capabilities remained confident even when acknowledging the Persing’s improvements. German tank commanders recognized that the Tiger 2 retained advantages in armor protection and gun performance over standard Persings. The 88mm KJO 43’s superior penetration at extended ranges was well understood by German crews who had fought Soviet IS-2 heavy tanks on the eastern front and understood comparative ballistics thoroughly.

 The mythology of Desauo, where it suggested German tankers were shocked by American firepower superiority, does not align with documented German assessments. German tankers in April 1945 were far more concerned with fuel shortages, ammunition scarcity, mechanical breakdowns, and overwhelming Allied numerical and air superiority than with individual tank capabilities.

 A German Tiger 2 crew encountering a Persing would have approached the engagement with tactical caution, but not with the assumption that they were technically outmatched. The Super Persing represented a different matter. Its exceptional gun performance, had it been widely known to German forces, might have generated concern, but with only one such vehicle in theater, and its combat limited to a handful of engagements, German forces had no meaningful exposure to this capability.

The Super Persing remained an anomaly, interesting from a technical perspective, but strategically irrelevant. The broader context of spring 1945 armored warfare, reveals why individual tank capabilities mattered less than the mythology suggests. German armored forces in this period were shadows of their former strength.

 Fuel shortages limited operational movement. Ammunition shortages meant tanks carried partial loads. Replacement crews often had minimal training. Maintenance capabilities had collapsed as spare parts became unavailable and skilled mechanics were scarce. American armored forces, by contrast, operated with full fuel loads, complete ammunition loads, well-trained crews with combat experience, and maintenance support that could repair or replace damaged vehicles within hours or days.

This operational readiness gap mattered far more than the technical specifications of individual tanks. A Tiger 2 with a partially trained crew carrying 60 rounds instead of 80 with mechanical problems from inadequate maintenance and without fuel for extended operations posed far less threat than its specifications suggested.

 The Persing’s combat debut, limited as it was, demonstrated American industry’s ability to produce heavy tanks competitive with German designs when finally motivated to do so. But it also demonstrated how little difference such tanks made when deployed in such small numbers so late in the war. The strategic outcome had been determined by factors operating at scales far larger than tank versus tank combat.

 American industrial capacity produced approximately 49,000 Sherman tanks during the war. German industry produced approximately 6,000 Panthers and fewer than 500 Tiger 2s. This production ratio of roughly 8:1 in medium tanks and nearly 100 to1 in heavy tanks determined operational realities far more than individual vehicle capabilities.

American armored divisions could replace losses and maintain operational strength. German armored units could not. The myth of Desauo with its dramatic jewel between super tanks obscures these fundamental realities. It focuses attention on a single engagement of questionable historical accuracy while ignoring the systematic advantages that determined the war’s outcome.

 This mythology serves narrative purposes but does history a disservice by suggesting that American victory depended on matching German technical sophistication rather than overwhelming it through industrial capacity and operational effectiveness. The end of the war in Europe on May 8th, 1945 brought an immediate shift in how captured German equipment was evaluated.

 American and British intelligence teams fanned out across occupied Germany, seeking intact examples of German tanks, weapons, and technology for detailed technical assessment. The Tiger 2, despite its fearsome reputation, had been encountered rarely enough that many Allied intelligence officers had never examined one closely.

 Testing facilities in Britain and the United States received captured Tiger Tours for comprehensive evaluation. Engineers measured armor thickness, tested penetration resistance, evaluated the 88 mm KWK43 guns performance, and assessed mechanical reliability. These postwar tests provided definitive data about Tiger 2 capabilities that had been estimated or extrapolated during the war itself.

 The results confirmed what German crews had known and what Allied tankers had learned through painful experience. The Tiger 2’s frontal armor, 150 mm at 50° on the glacus plate and 180 mm on the turret front, provided protection levels that exceeded every Allied tank gun’s penetration capability at combat ranges.

 American 90mm M3 guns, firing standard M82 APCBC ammunition, could not reliably penetrate the Tiger 2’s glacis at any practical range. The gun mantlet and turret face could be penetrated at close to medium ranges, but these represented smaller target areas requiring precise shot placement. British 17 pounder guns firing special APDS ammunition could theoretically penetrate portions of the Tiger 2’s frontal armor, but the APDS rounds proved notoriously inaccurate and had a tendency to ricochet off heavily sloped armor. Soviet 122mm guns on IS-2 heavy

tanks could penetrate Tiger 2 frontal armor at close ranges, but most engagements occurred at distances where penetration was uncertain. Testing of the Tiger 2’s 88 mm K43 gun against captured Allied tanks confirmed its exceptional performance. The gun could penetrate any Allied tanks frontal armor at ranges exceeding 2,000 m.

Against Shermans, Panthers could achieve kills at extreme ranges where return fire was impossible. Against Persings, the penetration advantage was less dramatic, but still significant. The KK43 retained effective anti-armour capability at ranges where the M3 guns penetration dropped below the threshold needed to defeat wellarmored targets.

These post-war evaluations provided hard data that allowed military historians and ballistics experts to assess tank combat effectiveness objectively. The conclusions were sobering for American ordinance officials who had delayed Persing production. The standard M26 Persing, while a significant improvement over the Sherman, remained inferior to the Tiger 2 in the two metrics that mattered most in armored combat, firepower and protection.

 Only in mobility did the Persing hold advantages, and mobility alone could not compensate for being outranged and outarmored. The Super Persing’s performance data told a different story. Testing of the T-15 E1 gun demonstrated that its penetration values exceeded the Tiger 2’s gun when both fired their best available ammunition.

At 1,000 m, the T-15E1 firing T30E16 APCR rounds could penetrate 260 mm of armor. This performance gave the Super Persing the capability to defeat Tiger 2 frontal armor at ranges where the German tank could penetrate back, achieving the parity that standard Persings lacked. But this technical achievement came with severe limitations.

 The T15E1 gun’s ammunition was 50 in long, making stowage inside the tank extremely difficult. The gun’s barrel length created balance problems, requiring external supports. The ammunition supply for the tungsten cord APCR rounds remained severely constrained by limited tungsten availability. Even had the war continued, equipping significant numbers of American tanks with this weapon system would have been impossible given material constraints and production limitations.

 American ordinance officials recognized these problems and pursued alternative solutions. The T-15E2 gun, which used two-piece separated ammunition instead of the T-15E1’s singlepiece rounds, addressed the stowage problem, but required redesigning the turret interior to accommodate the different loading procedure.

 25 production T26E4 tanks were authorized in March 1945, but only the original prototype made it to Europe before wars end. The broader lesson from the Persing program involved understanding why American tank development had followed such a problematic path. The institutional resistance that delayed heavy tank production stemmed from doctrinal beliefs that proved incorrect under combat conditions.

 Tank destroyer doctrine which held that specialized anti-tank vehicles should handle enemy armor while tanks supported infantry and exploited breakthroughs influenced American armored force development throughout the war. This doctrine had intellectual coherence but failed to account for battlefield realities.

 Enemy tanks could not always be avoided. Tank versus tank combat occurred frequently. Regardless of doctrinal preferences, American tank crews found themselves forced into engagements their tanks were not designed to win. The psychological burden of knowing your weapon is inferior to the enemy’s effects, morale, tactical decision-making, and casualty rates in ways that are difficult to quantify but impossible to ignore.

Lieutenant General Leslie McNair, the primary advocate for tank destroyer doctrine, died in July 1944 when American bombers accidentally struck his position during Operation Cobra in Normandy. His death removed the institutional obstacle that had delayed Persing production most effectively. Within months of McNair’s death, the T-26E3 received approval for production and deployment accelerated.

 This timing suggests that personal convictions of senior officers can influence weapons programs as much as technical considerations or combat requirements. The Persing’s postwar career reflected both its strengths and limitations. Approximately 800 M26 tanks were upgraded with improved engines, transmissions, and the refined M3A1 gun.

These upgraded vehicles were redesated M26E2 and later became the M46 pattern. The original Persing Ford Gaff engine rated at 500 horsepower proved barely adequate for the tank’s weight. Crews complained about sluggish acceleration and limited top speed compared to the Sherman. The M46 addressed these deficiencies with a more powerful Continental AV1790 engine developing 800 horsepower substantially improving performance.

 The M46 served with distinction in the Korean War where it proved superior to Soviet supplied T34 85 tanks used by North Korean and Chinese forces. The T-3485, while an excellent medium tank, could not match the M46’s firepower or armor protection. Korean War Combat validated the Persing derived design, while also revealing that the platform’s full potential required the improved powertrain that created the M46.

 The M46 evolved into the M47 pattern, which combined the M46 hull and running gear with a new turret mounting the 90mm M36 gun. The M47 served briefly with American forces before being supplanted by the M48 pattern, but the M47 saw extensive service with Allied nations through the 1960s and 70s. The Persing’s design lineage continued through the M48 and M60, both of which incorporated design principles and component improvements traced directly back to the original M26.

 The M60 main battle tank, which entered service in 1960 and remained in frontline American service through Operation Desert Storm in 1991, represented the final evolution of the Persing lineage. The M60’s basic hull layout, torsion bar suspension, and turret configuration all reflected design decisions made during T26 development in the early 1940s.

 This longevity demonstrates that the Persing’s fundamental design was sound, even if its initial deployment came too late to influence World War II’s outcome. The lessons learned from Persing development influenced American tank design philosophy throughout the Cold War. American ordinance recognized that waiting until combat revealed deficiencies created unnecessary casualties and operational problems.

Postwar tank development prioritized firepower and armor protection more heavily than pre-war doctrine had suggested necessary. The emphasis on technological superiority, which had been lacking in Sherman development, became central to American tank programs. The M13 heavy tank developed in the early 1950s reflected this changed philosophy.

 Mounting a 120 mm gun and featuring heavy armor protection, the M13 was designed specifically to counter Soviet heavy tanks like the IS-3 and T10. The M13 never saw combat and proved mechanically troublesome, but its development indicated that American military planners had absorbed the lesson that heavy tanks served strategic purposes beyond what tank destroyer doctrine had acknowledged.

 The ultimate expression of this changed philosophy came with the M1 Abrams main battle tank which entered service in 1980. Named after Generalr Kraton Abrams who commanded the 37th tank battalion at Aracort in 1944 and later served as Army Chief of Staff, the M1 was deliberately designed with overwhelming firepower and protection. The 120 mm smooth boore gun and sophisticated composite armor reflected lessons traced directly back to World War II experiences with German heavy tanks.

 Modern American armor doctrine emphasizes combined arms integration with tanks operating alongside infantry, artillery, and air support rather than fighting in isolation. This approach proved more effective than attempting to achieve tank versus tank superiority through technical specifications alone. But modern American tanks also maintain technical superiority in firepower, protection, and mobility, ensuring that American crews never again face the situation Sherman crews confronted throughout the European campaign.

 The specific story of what happened at Desau on April 21st, 1945 has been retold and reinterpreted countless times since the war ended. The accounts vary in details and differ in their identification of the destroyed German tank. What remains consistent across all versions is that the Super Persing crew performed effectively under combat conditions, destroying at least one enemy tank and possibly several more during the fighting around Desau.

Whether the destroyed tank was a Tiger 2, as early accounts claimed, or a Panza 4, as historical analysis suggests, is more likely, matters less than understanding what the engagement represented. It was one of a handful of times American tank crews in Europe fought with a weapon that could match German heavy tank capabilities.

For the vast majority of American tankers, such par remained unavailable throughout the war. They fought with weapons they knew were inferior and compensated through tactics, numbers, and supporting arms. The mythology that grew around Desauo served psychological and propaganda purposes. It provided a satisfying narrative about American technological capability and combat effectiveness.

 It validated the resources invested in Persing development and it created a positive story about American armor at a time when such stories helped shape postwar perceptions of American military capability. But the mythology also obscured important truths about American tank development failures and the cost paid by tank crews who fought with inadequate equipment.

 American artillery superiority provided another systematic advantage. American armored divisions deployed with extensive artillery support that could deliver mass fires rapidly. German tanks identified by forward observers faced artillery bargages that destroyed or disabled them regardless of armor protection. The integration of artillery with armored operations gave American forces a combined arms capability that proved more effective than attempting to achieve tank versus tank superiority.

These systematic advantages determined operational outcomes far more than individual tank specifications. A Tiger 2 with a superior gun provided little advantage if it lacked fuel for movement, ammunition for sustained combat, or could not move during daylight without air attack. A Persing with an adequate gun proved decisive when supported by responsive artillery, air cover, and reliable logistics.

Thank you for watching. For more detailed historical breakdowns, check out the other videos on your screen now.