The telephone call from the wolf’s lair came at 2:00 in the morning on August 1st, 1944. Field marshal Ga Fonuga, commander-in-chief West, was awakened in his headquarters near Paris to receive orders directly from Adolf Hitler. The furer’s voice over the secure line carried the manic edge that senior officers had learned to recognize as indicating decisions that would not be questioned or modified regardless of military reality.

General George Patton’s third army had been activated that very day and was already racing through the gap that Bradley’s forces had torn in the German lines at a branches. American armor was pouring into Britany and turning east toward the French interior, exploiting the breakout from Normandy with a speed that shocked German commanders who had spent 6 weeks barely containing the Allied beach head.

 The entire German defensive position in Normandy was collapsing and Hitler’s response was to demand an immediate counteroffensive that would cut off the American spearhead and restore the situation. Fonluga held the telephone receiver away from his ear as Hitler’s voice rose in volume, explaining the strategic situation as Hitler imagined it rather than as it existed.

 The Americans had overextended themselves, the Furer insisted. Their armored columns had raced ahead of their infantry support, creating a narrow corridor through which all supplies and reinforcements must flow. A powerful counterattack from north to south, striking from Morta to Avanches would sever this corridor and trap Patton’s entire army east of the breakthrough.

 The trapped Americans would be destroyed. The Normandy front would be restored and the invasion would fail just as Hitler had always predicted it would. General Hans Spidel, who had been Raml’s chief of staff before the field marshal was wounded, stood beside von Kluga, listening to Hitler’s orders. Spidel’s face reflected the horror of a competent staff officer hearing military fantasy presented as operational planning.

 The forces required for such an attack did not exist. The air cover necessary to protect such an attack was absent. The supplies needed to sustain such an attack were unavailable. And even if the attack somehow succeeded in reaching of ranches, American forces would simply bypass the blocking position while Allied air power destroyed the German spearhead.

 Hitler continued speaking, his words tumbling over each other with increasing rapidity. Eight Panza divisions would conduct the attack. The seventh army would provide infantry support. The Luftvafa would provide air cover for the first time since D-Day. All available resources would be concentrated for this decisive blow that would demonstrate German superiority and shatter American confidence.

 The attack would begin no later than August 7th, giving commanders 6 days to prepare the most important counteroffensive of the entire Normandy campaign. Vonluga attempted to interject reality into the conversation. The Panza divisions Hitler referenced did not exist at strength. The second Panza division had fewer than 50 operational tanks.

 The first SS Panza division was scattered across Normandy trying to contain multiple Allied attacks. The second SS Panza division was fighting British forces near Khn. Concentrating these forces for a major attack would require withdrawing them from defensive positions, creating gaps that Allied forces would immediately exploit. Hitler dismissed these objections as defeatism.

The panzas would be concentrated, replacements would be provided, fuel and ammunition would be allocated. The Luftwaffer would fly a thousand sorties in support. All obstacles could be overcome through will and determination. The attack would proceed as ordered and it would succeed because failure was unacceptable.

Germany’s situation in France depended on stopping Patton and stop him they would regardless of the difficulties involved. The conversation ended with Hitler’s characteristic abruptness. Fonluga placed the receiver back in its cradle and stood silently for a long moment before turning to Spidle. Prepare orders for operation lutic, he said quietly.

Assemble the Panza commanders for a conference tomorrow morning. And find out what forces we actually possess rather than what the furer believes we possess. The morning conference at Fonug’s headquarters brought together the commanders who would have to execute Hitler’s orders. General Hans Fonfun commanding the 47th Panza Corps that would lead the attack.

 General Hinrich Ibach commanding Panza Group West. General Paul Hower commanding the seventh army. SS Uber Gupenfura Paul Hower of the Seventh Army. These were experienced officers who had fought across Europe and understood what was possible and what was fantasy. Vonuga presented Hitler’s plan without embellishment.

 Eight Panza divisions would attack westward from the Mortean area toward Avanches, a distance of approximately 30 mi. The attack would cut the American supply corridor, isolate Patton’s third army, and restore the German defensive position in Normandy. The attack would commence on August 7th with full Luftvafa support. All commanders were to prepare their forces accordingly.

The silence that followed was profound. Finally, General Fonfun spoke, his voice carefully neutral. May I ask what eight Panza divisions the Furer references? I command what remains of several Panza divisions, but their combined strength barely equals two full strength divisions.

 The second Panza division has perhaps 50 tanks. The 116th Panza Division has fewer than 30. The first SS Panza division is heavily engaged near KH and cannot be withdrawn without the British breaking through. General Ebuck spread reconnaissance photographs across the conference table. These were taken yesterday by the few German aircraft that managed to penetrate Allied air defenses.

 They showed the American corridor from Avranches eastward. The roads were packed with American vehicles, tanks, trucks, artillery, supply columns, all moving east with a momentum that seemed unstoppable. Allied fighter bombers circled overhead in relays, ready to strike any German forces that approached. Allied artillery was positioned to interdict any German advance.

 The corridor was not a vulnerable supply line, but a highway of military power flowing into France faster than German forces could react. The photographs also showed what had happened to German units attempting to move in daylight. Wrecked tanks and vehicles lined the roads, destroyed by air attack. German columns attempting to reach new positions had been caught in the open and annihilated from the air.

Any concentration of German forces became a target for Allied bombers within minutes of being spotted by the constant aerial reconnaissance. “But we have our orders,” Fonlug said simply. “The Furer has commanded that Patton be stopped. “We will attack toward Avanches on August 7th with whatever forces we can concentrate.

” Gentlemen, prepare your plans. Over the next six days, German forces attempted to assemble for the counterattack that Hitler had ordered. The effort revealed the impossibility of conducting major operations under total Allied air superiority. The second Panza division attempted to move from its positions south of Kong to the assembly area near Mortaine.

 The movement, which should have taken one night, required three nights because Allied aircraft struck at any movement detected. Tanks were destroyed, fuel trucks were blown up, and the division arrived at Morta with barely 30 operational tanks instead of the 50 it had started with. The first SS Panza division was withdrawn from the KHN sector despite protests from commanders who warned that British forces would immediately exploit the gap.

 The division moved at night in small groups, hiding during daylight in forests and villages, reaching the assembly area exhausted and depleted. The second SS Panza division, ordered to join the attack, was intercepted by Allied intelligence and subjected to air attacks that reduced its effective strength by 30% before it reached Morta. The 116th Panza Division already in the Mortine area reported that it possessed 25 operational tanks, fewer than 100 other armored vehicles, and approximately 8,000 troops, perhaps 40% of authorized strength. The division’s

commander stated flatly that his unit could conduct a local attack, but lacked the strength for the deep penetration operation that Hitler envisioned. Meanwhile, intelligence reports describe Patton’s third army spreading across France like a flood. The fourth armored division had reached Ren in Britany.

 The Sixth Armored Division was advancing toward Breast. The 79th Infantry Division was securing Patton’s southern flank, and more American divisions were pouring through of every day, their numbers growing exponentially as Allied logistics delivered men and equipment faster than German intelligence could track them.

 General Walter Warimon, representing OKW Uber Commando Demach, arrived from Germany on August 5th to ensure that Hitler’s orders were being executed properly. He brought with him messages from Hitler emphasizing that the attack must succeed, that no excuses would be accepted, that commanders who failed to achieve objectives would be relieved.

 The attack would proceed as planned with the forces available because the strategic situation demanded it. Vonluger took Volimol on a tour of the front lines, traveling at night through roads clogged with retreating German forces, past burning vehicles destroyed by Allied air attack, through villages where German wounded waited without adequate medical supplies or transport.

 They visited the second Panza division’s assembly area and counted the handful of tanks that would have to lead the attack toward a branches against American forces that possessed overwhelming superiority in numbers, supplies, and air support. Wimont returned to Germany shaken but unwilling to tell Hitler that the attack could not succeed. The die was cast.

 The orders had been given. The attack would proceed, and if it failed, commanders would be blamed for lack of will or tactical incompetence rather than acknowledging that Hitler had ordered the impossible. August 7th dawned with fog covering the Normandy countryside, the only weather condition that permitted German movement with reduced risk of air attack. At 100 a.m.

, German forces began their assault toward the branches. The second Panza division led the attack with its 30 operational tanks. The first SS Panza Division struck from the north. The 116th Panza Division provided flank support. Artillery fired preparatory bargages. For a few hours in the pre-dawn darkness, the attack made progress against surprised American forces.

German tanks advanced several miles, capturing the town of Morta and pushing American infantry back toward Avanches. Reports sent to Hitler’s headquarters described initial successes, German panzas breaking through American lines, the corridor to Avanches within reach. For a brief moment, it seemed Hitler’s intuition might prove correct that audacious action could overcome material disadvantage.

Then dawn broke and the fog lifted. Allied fighter bombers which had been grounded by weather took to the skies in massive formations. Rocket armed typhoons, P47 Thunderbolts carrying bombs, P-51 Mustangs providing escort. The sky filled with Allied aircraft hunting for the German spearhead that reconnaissance had located.

 The slaughter was methodical and complete. German tanks advancing in the open were destroyed by rockets that penetrated their top armor. German infantry were strafed by machine gun fire. German supply columns following the attack were blown apart by bombs. The artillery that had supported the initial assault was spotted from the air and subjected to counterbatter fire directed by airborne observers.

 Within 2 hours of sunrise, the German attack had stalled under the weight of Allied air power. Major Hans Vonluke, commanding a campfer in the attack, sent a report that described the carnage. Allied aircraft attacked in waves, he wrote. As soon as one group expended its ammunition and departed, another group arrived to continue the attack.

 There was no restbite, no opportunity to maneuver, no chance to seek cover. Tanks that survived the first attacks were destroyed in subsequent attacks. The sky was filled with enemy aircraft while not a single German plane appeared to contest them. By noon on August 7th, the attack had completely stalled. German forces held Morta but had advanced no further.

American reinforcements were arriving to contain the German penetration. Allied artillery was pounding German positions. And most critically, Allied air power was systematically destroying every German vehicle, every German tank, every German gun that could be located from the air.

 Hitler’s response to reports of the attack’s failure was to order it renewed. More divisions would be committed. The attack would continue until avanches was reached. The Luftvafer would provide the air cover that had been promised but had not materialized. Failure was not an option because the strategic situation demanded success. Vancluger attempted to explain military reality to Hitler.

 The Luftvafer could not provide air cover because Allied fighters destroyed German aircraft before they reached the battlefield. Additional divisions could not be committed without creating gaps in defensive lines that Allied forces would exploit. The attack had consumed the last German armored reserves in Normandy, and continuing would simply result in more losses without achieving objectives.

 Hitler’s voice over the telephone was cold with fury. The attack would continue. Commanders who lacked the will to succeed would be replaced. The Germans would stop Patton at Avanches because the alternative was unacceptable. Fonluga was to assemble whatever forces remained and renew the offensive immediately. Over the next several days, German forces made repeated attempts to advance toward a branches.

 Each attempt ended the same way. Initial movement during darkness followed by devastating air attacks after sunrise. German tank strength in the Morta area dwindled from perhaps 120 operational tanks on August 7th to fewer than 50 by August 10th. Casualties mounted. Fuel and ammunition ran short. The offensive that was supposed to stop Patton had instead consumed German strength needed to defend against the growing Allied encirclement.

General Omar Bradley commanding the American 12th Army Group recognized the opportunity that Hitler’s counteroffensive had created. German forces were concentrated around Morta, their flanks exposed, their supply lines vulnerable. Bradley ordered Patton to turn north from his eastward advance and strike toward Argentinean while British and Canadian forces attacked south toward Files.

 The German forces at Mortaine would be encircled and destroyed. The fallet’s pocket began to form as allied forces closed from north and south. Vonluga finally received permission to withdraw from Morta, but the withdrawal came too late. German forces attempting to escape the pocket found every road under constant air attack.

 Allied fighter bombers destroyed vehicles faster than German forces could abandon them. The roads became graveyards of destroyed equipment, dead horses, and German soldiers fleeing on foot after their vehicles were destroyed. Field marshal Walter Mod, who replaced von Klug after the latter’s suicide on August 19th, surveyed the wreckage of the Normandy campaign.

 Seven German armies had been destroyed or rendered combat ineffective. Perhaps 50,000 German soldiers were dead or captured. Hundreds of tanks and thousands of vehicles were destroyed. The Sen River barrier had been abandoned. Paris was being liberated. Allied forces were racing across France against minimal opposition.

 And all of this had been accelerated by Hitler’s order to stop Patton at a ranches. The attack at Morta had consumed the last German armored reserves that might have conducted an organized withdrawal. The concentration of forces for the counterattack had created the conditions for the falet’s encirclement. The refusal to withdraw when the attack failed had resulted in catastrophic losses that ended any hope of defending France.

 In the wolf’s lair, Hitler studied maps showing Allied advances across France. His generals attempted to explain how the disaster had occurred, how the counterattack at Mortaine had led to the destruction of German forces in Normandy. Hitler’s response was to blame subordinates. Fonluga had lacked determination. Panza commanders had failed to press attacks.

The Luftvafa had not provided promised air support. The failures were always in execution, never in conception, never in the fundamental impossibility of the orders Hitler had given. But in the field, German commanders who survived the Normandy campaign understood what had happened. Hitler had ordered them to stop Patton anyway.

anyway, meaning regardless of resources, regardless of allied air superiority, regardless of military reality, they had attempted to obey those orders because disobedience meant relief or worse, and the attempt had consumed the forces needed to conduct the fighting withdrawal that might have preserved German strength for defense of the Reich.

 General Eberbach, captured by Allied forces during the retreat from Normandy, was interrogated about German decision-making during the campaign. He spoke candidly about the Mortain counterattack and Hitler’s insistence on stopping Patton. “We knew the attack would fail,” Herbach said. “We knew Allied air power would destroy our forces in daylight.

 We knew we lacked the strength to reach of ranches, even if air power had been neutral. But we were ordered to attack anyway. And in the German army, orders from the furer are absolute. The attack at Mortaine became a case study in how not to conduct military operations, concentrating forces under total enemy air superiority, conducting offensive operations without air cover, pursuing objectives that exceeded available resources, continuing attacks after they had clearly failed.

 Every principle of sound military doctrine was violated in service of Hitler’s strategic fantasy. General Hansidel, who survived the war to write extensively about the Normandy campaign, described the Mortain counterattack as the moment when whatever slim chance Germany had of conducting an organized defense of France was lost.

 Hitler’s order to stop Patton anyway, issued without regard for military reality, consumed the forces needed for that defense and created the conditions for the catastrophic defeat that followed. Patton himself, when he learned of the German attack at Morta, reportedly said that it was the best news he had received since landing in France.

 The Germans were doing exactly what he wanted them to do, concentrating their forces for a counterattack instead of conducting the fighting withdrawal that might have prolonged the campaign. Hitler’s order to stop Patton had instead ensured that Patton could not be stopped. By the end of August 1944, the results of Hitler’s order were undeniable. France was liberated.

 German forces were in full retreat toward the German border. The Vermach in the West had lost perhaps 400,000 men killed, wounded or captured in the Normandy campaign. The equipment losses were catastrophic. Thousands of tanks and vehicles destroyed, most of them abandoned during the retreat from Filelets when Allied air power made organized withdrawal impossible.

 And at the center of this catastrophe was Hitler’s order to stop Patton anyway. an order that exemplified everything wrong with German strategic decision-making in the war’s latter years. Fantasy replaced reality. Will substituted for capability. Orders were given based on what Hitler wanted to be true rather than what was actually possible.

 And when those orders failed, as they inevitably did, subordinates were blamed. While Hitler’s judgment remained above question, the generals who had tried to explain why stopping pattern was impossible, who had attempted to inject reality into Hitler’s planning, who had executed orders they knew would fail.

 These men carried the burden of knowledge that the Normandy disaster could have been less catastrophic with different leadership. A fighting withdrawal from Normandy might have preserved forces for defense of Germany. Avoiding the Mortain counterattack might have prevented the file’s encirclement. Listening to military advice might have led to decisions based on capability rather than fantasy, but Hitler had ordered them to stop Patton anyway.

 and the German military system that had conquered much of Europe had become incapable of telling its supreme leader that his orders were impossible to execute. The result was catastrophe in Normandy, the liberation of France and the acceleration of Germany’s march toward final defeat. The word anyway in Hitler’s order carried within it all the delusion and denial that characterized Nazi Germany’s approach to the war it was losing.

 Do the impossible because I order it. Achieve the unachievable because I demand it. stop Patton anyway because the alternative is admitting that Germany can no longer dictate events through force of will alone.