August 7th, 1942. Gavutu Island, Solomon Islands. A tiny coral outcrop barely 300 yards long, crawling with 500 Japanese defenders dug into concrete bunkers and limestone caves. Platoon Sergeant Harry Tully of the First Parachute Battalion crouched behind a shattered palm tree. Japanese bullets snapping overhead.

 He needed to locate the snipers killing his Marines, so he stood up deliberately and let them shoot at him. This is the story of the M1941 Johnson rifle and light machine gun. A weapon designed by a Boston lawyer rejected by the United States Army. And yet somehow it became the preferred rifle of America’s most elite fighting units from the paramines in the Pacific to the Devil’s Brigade in Italy.

 The rifle the army said wasn’t good enough would arm the men who never lost a single engagement. And its mechanical heart still beats inside every M16 and AR-15 ever made. To understand why Marines would essentially steal rifles off a San Francisco dock, you have to understand how badly the core was treated in 1941. The Marine Corps was the military’s red-headed stepchild when it came to equipment.

 The Army got the new M1 Garand semi-automatic rifles first. Marines were still carrying M1903 bolt-action Springfields, the same rifles their fathers had used in the First World War. Thompson’s submachine guns were scarce, so Marines received the M55 reasoning instead. a weapon so unreliable that troops threw them into the ocean rather than carry them into combat.

 The core needed modern weapons and the supply chain had written them off. Meanwhile, sitting on a dock in San Francisco, crates of semi-automatic rifles gathered dust under government embargo. These were Johnson rifles originally ordered by the Dutch East Indies colonial government. 70,000 rifles at $125 each. But the Japanese had invaded before most could be delivered.

 And now the rifles belong to no one. Stories persist that when the Marines discovered these crates existed, they simply went and got them. The man who designed those rifles was watching from Boston. Captain Melvin Maynard Johnson Jr., United States Marine Corps Reserve, was not your typical weapons designer. By day, he practiced intellectual property law at his family’s firm, directly opposite the Boston Stock Exchange.

 By night and weekend, he designed firearms in his spare time. Driven by a conviction that the army had chosen the wrong rifle. He believed the M1 Garand’s gas operated system would prove unreliable with inconsistent wartime ammunition. He believed he could build something better, and he had spent $300 and a knitting needle to prove it.

 Johnson’s first working prototype was built from scrap firearm parts in 1935. The firing pin was a knitting needle. The entire action cost $300 to fabricate in a local machine shop. On February 29th, 1936, he test fired this crude mechanism and proved the concept worked. He called the rifle Betsy, the way a father might name a beloved daughter.

What made the Johnson different was its operating system. where the Garand used gas tapped from the barrel to cycle the action. Johnson’s rifle used short recoil operation. When fired, the barrel and bolt recoiled backward together for less than half an inch. A cam arrangement then rotated the bolt approximately 20° counterclockwise to unlock from the barrel extension.

 Eight locking lugs, minimal rotation, maximum efficiency. This system was inherently more tolerant of ammunition variations because it didn’t depend on consistent gas pressures. The rifle chambered the standard 3006 Springfield cartridge and fed from a 10 round fixed rotary magazine. Unlike the Garand, which required complete eight round clip changes, the Johnson could be topped off at any time, even with the bolt closed on a chambered round using standard M1903 Springfield stripper clips or individual rounds through a loading port. For troops

trained on boltaction rifles, this familiar loading method was a significant advantage. But the rifle’s true genius revealed itself for paratroopers. The barrel could be removed without tools. A single pin near the front of the stock could be pushed using only a bullet tip. Disassembled, the rifle measured under 26 in, meeting Marine Corps parachute unit requirements.

 A paratrooper could jump with his weapon broken down, land, and have it assembled and firing in seconds. The light machine gun variant, which Johnson affectionately called Emma, weighed just 12 lb. The Browning automatic rifle weighed nearly 20. For mountain operations, jungle fighting, or parachute drops, that 8 lb difference was the difference between a weapon you carried and a weapon that carried you.

The Johnson’s barrel could be changed in 5 to 6 seconds. The bar’s barrel was fixed and couldn’t be changed at all. Back on Gavutu, Sergeant Tully had made his choice. By deliberately exposing himself to draw Japanese fire, he could pinpoint sniper positions by their muzzle flashes. Then he killed them one by one.

 Over two days and nights, Tully personally accounted for 42 Japanese soldiers at ranges up to 800 yd. His Silver Star citation notes that he displayed marked skill with his weapon, using this ingenious method of self-exposure to locate and eliminate the enemy. One Japanese soldier hiding behind a log on the beach required Tully to wait motionless for 18 minutes before taking the shot.

 The weapon that enabled this precision was his Johnson rifle. The Marines had acquired their first 23 Johnson’s when Captain Johnson himself unofficially donated them to the first parachute battalion. Lieutenant Harry Toruson, the battalion’s executive officer, had demonstrated the weapon’s potential on September 19th, 1941, when he made a parachute jump carrying a Johnson light machine gun.

 Within 130 seconds of exiting the aircraft, he was firing. Within 78 seconds of hitting the ground, he had recovered his parachute, assembled the weapon, run to a firing point, and put his first round on target at 200 y. If you’re finding this deep dive interesting, consider subscribing. It costs nothing, takes a second, and helps the channel continue.

 Now, back to the story. In Italy, a different elite unit discovered the Johnson’s value through an unusual transaction. The first special service force, a joint American Canadian Commando unit that would become known as the Devil’s Brigade, acquired 125 Johnson light machine guns in 1942. According to unit histories, the weapons came from the Marine Corps in exchange for two tons of plastic explosive of a newly developed type.

 The trade was by one account highly profitable. Lieutenant Colonel Robert Burhans, the unit’s official historian, wrote that pound-forpound, the Johnson was the most valuable weapon the force possessed. At Anio, where the Devil’s Brigade fought for 99 days without relief, the Johnson light machine guns proved their worth in close combat.

 Firing at up to 600 rounds per minute, they provided firepower that often turned the tide at critical moments. As guns wore out or were lost, they were replaced with bars. But the men who had carried Johnson’s remembered them. The unit’s record speaks for itself. Approximately 1,800 men created over 12,000 German casualties and captured 7,000 prisoners.

They never lost a single engagement in 22 battles across 251 days of combat. The Johnson rifle was not perfect. The Army’s rejection was not entirely political. The reciprocating barrel caused excessive vertical shot dispersion that was never fully cured during production. The rotary magazine was delicate, susceptible to debris, and difficult to clear when it malfunctioned.

 The light machine gun’s long, curved magazine unbalanced the weapon and snagged on jungle vegetation. No suitable magazine pouches were ever designed, leaving troops to improvise. Small parts could be lost during field stripping. Most damning was the bayonet problem. Adding a standard M1905 bayonet to the reciprocating barrel disrupted the recoil timing and caused malfunctions.

 Johnson’s solution, a lightweight triangular spike bayonet, was dismissed by troops as a useless tent peg. In an era when bayonet charges were still considered essential infantry tactics, a rifle that couldn’t reliably accept a bayonet was a rifle the army couldn’t adopt. But these limitations reveal something important. The Johnson’s flaws were the flaws of a weapon designed for a different kind of war.

 Light, fast, accurate, easily disassembled. It was a special operations weapon before special operations existed as a formal doctrine. The army rejected it because the army needed a rifle that could survive the mud of conventional infantry warfare and accept a bayonet for human wave assaults. The men who chose the Johnson were fighting a different war entirely.

In 1955, a young engineer named Eugene Stoner was working at Armalite, a division of Fairchild Aircraft. He was designing what would become the AR10 rifle and later the AR-15. Stoner was particularly fascinated by the rotary bolt of the Johnson rifle and light machine gun. His designs would incorporate an eight lug rotary bolt remarkably similar to Johnson’s original concept.

 The cam controlled rotation, the minimal unlock angle, the efficient transfer of energy. All of it traced back to a Boston lawyer’s obsession. Melvin Johnson knew this lineage. In 1955, he was hired as a consultant to help Armalite promote the AR10 to the Department of Defense. He later worked with both Armalite and Cult as an advocate for the AR-15.

 The man whose rifle had been rejected by the army spent his final years helping to develop the rifle that would eventually replace the weapon that had beaten his. Johnson died of a heart attack on January 9th, 1965 at age 55 while on a business trip to New York. He never saw the M16 adopted as the standard American infantry rifle.

 But every soldier who has carried an M16 or M4, every Marine with an M27, every civilian with an AR-15 carries a piece of his mechanical legacy. The rotating bolt that cycles their weapon descended directly from the designs of a Marine Corps Reserve captain who built his first prototype with scrap parts and a knitting needle. On February 3rd, 2015, 42 surviving members of the First Special Service Force gathered at Emancipation Hall on Capitol Hill to receive the Congressional Gold Medal.

 Speaker John Boehner declared that for every man they lost, they killed 25. For every man they captured, they took 235. Among the weapons that made this possible was a rifle the army had rejected. Poundforound, the most valuable weapon they possessed. Sergeant Harry Tully did not live to see this ceremony.

 He was promoted to second left tenant after Gavutu, but died of wounds suffered in action in January 1944. He was 22 years old. The rifle he used to kill 42 enemy soldiers in 2 days, deliberately exposing himself to draw their fire so he could locate and eliminate them was a weapon the United States Army had declared not suitable for military service.

 Sometimes the best weapons find the best soldiers, even when the bureaucracy says no. The Johnson story raises an interesting question about military procurement. If the Johnson was good enough for the Paramarines and the Devil’s Brigade units with arguably the most demanding missions of the war, what does that say about how we evaluate weapons? Was the Army right to prioritize logistics and bayonet compatibility over accuracy and weight savings? Or did institutional bias cost American soldiers a better rifle? I’d love to hear your thoughts in

the comments, especially if you’ve handled a