“You Smell Like A Target” — Why Australians Hated Working With “Clean” US Troops D

 

Tommy Greavves was a stockman from the Catherine region of the Northern Territory who could track a wounded bullock across 30 km of red dirt without losing the scent trail once. He’d learned from Aboriginal station hands who could read stories in the dust that white Australians couldn’t even see. He could smell water 2 hours before he reached it.

 He could smell a bushfire 3 days before it arrived. He understood something that most white soldiers never learned. In the wilderness, everything has [music] a scent. and scent tells you who lives and who dies. None of this appeared on his enlistment papers [music] when he joined the Australian Army in 1965. All of it would make him one of the most effective jungle fighters in Vietnam.

 [music] And all of it would make him absolutely furious the first time he went on patrol with American troops. The Americans smelled like a Maya department store cosmetics counter [music] had exploded in the jungle. Greavves caught it at 40 m. April 1967. Fuok 2 province. Combined Australian-American patrol, [music] standard reconnaissance operation, nothing complicated.

 He was walking point for the Australians. The Americans were supposed to be paralleling them 300 [music] m to the east. The wind shifted and Greavves froze midstep because he just caught a wall of scent [music] that didn’t belong in the jungle. Irish Spring soap, right guard deodorant, Colgate toothpaste, Marro cigarettes, [music] and something he’d later identify as militaryissue insect repellent that smelled like a chemical factory. Contact.

 The Australian corporal behind him had seen Gre’s hand come up. No Americans. They’re 300 m [music] east. Winds blowing from the east. I can smell them from here. The corporal stared at him. [music] Then he caught it too. Then the entire Australian patrol caught it. Eight [music] men standing in the jungle downwind from their American allies and [music] they could smell Irish spring and tobacco like someone had just walked into a bathroom after a shower and a smoke. Jesus Christ, someone whispered.

If we can smell them. Greavves didn’t need to finish the sentence. If the Australians [music] could smell the Americans at 40 m downwind, the Vietkong could smell them at 100. The VC lived [music] in this jungle. They knew every scent that belonged and every scent that didn’t.

 And the Americans smelled like they just stepped out of a Kansas City drugstore. This was the moment Tommy Greavves understood that the United States military was getting people killed with hygiene. You need to understand something about Australian soldiers in Vietnam. They weren’t better fighters than the Americans on some fundamental level.

 They weren’t tougher or braver or more skilled with weapons. What they were was different. Different training, different tactical philosophy, different relationship with discomfort. And nowhere was that difference more stark, more tactically significant, and more source of Allied friction than the question of how much you were willing to smell like the jungle you were fighting in.

 The Americans brought industrial war to the jungle. helicopter insertions, overwhelming firepower, body count [music] metrics, short duration patrols with regular returns to fire bases where you could shower, eat hot food, sleep in a cot, and maintain something resembling civilization. The Australian approach was older, quieter, longer, more uncomfortable.

 And it started with a simple understanding that Tommy Greavves had learned tracking cattle across the outback. If you want to survive in the wilderness, you become part of the wilderness. You don’t bring Kansas City into the bush. Greavves was 24 years old when he arrived in Vietnam with the Sixth Battalion Royal Australian Regiment.

 He’d grown up on Manulu Station, 50 km south of Catherine in country so remote that the nearest town consisted of one pub, one store, and a police station that was only staffed 3 [music] days a week. His father managed the station. 20,000 head of cattle across 2,000 km of [music] scrubland, monsoon forest, and red dirt that stretched to horizons most people [music] couldn’t imagine.

 Tommy had grown up working beside Aboriginal stockman who could [music] track anything that moved and plenty that didn’t. By the time he was 12, he could follow cattle tracks 3 days old. By 15, he could identify individual animals by their hoof [music] prints. By 18, he understood that tracking wasn’t about seeing. It was about reading.

 Every broken twig told a story. Every disturbed pebble indicated direction and speed. Every scent carried information. The metallic tang of blood meant injury. The sharp ammonia of urine meant fear. The sweet rot smell of infection meant you’d find a carcass within 2 km. And he learned the fundamental rule that would define his Vietnam service.

 The wilderness can smell you long before it can see you. When the recruiters came through Catherine in 1965, Greavves wasn’t particularly [music] political. He didn’t have strong opinions about communism or domino theory or Southeast Asian geopolitics. What he had was a sense that station work was a life sentence to the same thousand kilometers he’d known [music] since birth.

 And the army offered something different. He scored high on aptitude tests. He was assigned to infantry. He trained at Pakapunal [music] in Victoria, learned basic soldiering, qualified with the L1A1 rifle, and was told he was Vietnam bound with six RA. Nothing in the training prepared him for what he’d learn in the first month in country.

 The Australian approach to jungle warfare in Vietnam was based on British and Australian experience in Malaya and Borneo. Long duration patrols, small unit operations, minimal external support. The idea was that you went into the jungle and you stayed there, not for days, but for weeks. 3-week patrols were standard. 4-week patrols were common.

 Fiveweek patrols [music] happened. You carried everything you needed. You moved slowly. You moved quietly. And you became part of the environment you operated in. This meant you didn’t shower for a month. You didn’t change clothes. You didn’t use soap or deodorant or toothpaste or shaving cream or insect repellent or anything else that carried a scent the jungle didn’t naturally produce.

 You ate cold rations. You didn’t smoke on patrol. You buried your waist and covered it with vegetation. You accepted that within 72 hours you would smell like rotting vegetation, stagnant [music] water, and unwashed human. You accepted this because it kept you alive. The Australian tactical [music] manual was explicit.

 Personnel on extended patrol will not use soap, deodorant, toothpaste, shaving cream, insect repellent, or scented products of any kind. These products produce artificial scents detectable to enemy forces at tactically significant ranges. The American tactical manual said nothing about smell. Greavves discovered this during his first combined operation with US forces, May 1967.

Fio 2 Province 6 RA was operating in conjunction with the 173rd Airborne Brigade. The mission was a standard search and destroy operation. Move through suspected VC territory, locate enemy forces, engage or call for artillery. The Australians and Americans were operating [music] as separate units but coordinating movements and sharing intelligence.

 The Americans operated on 3-day patrol cycles. Helicopter insertion, 72 hours in the field. Helicopter extraction back to the firebase. At the fire base, showers, hot food, clean uniforms, mail from home, sleep in actual beds, then back out. The logic was that keeping soldiers relatively comfortable, maintained morale and effectiveness.

 The Australians were on day 18 of a planned 21-day patrol. They hadn’t seen a firebase in 3 weeks. [music] They hadn’t showered in 3 weeks. They’d been eating cold sea rations and sleeping in shell scrapes. They smelled like the jungle had absorbed them. The Americans smelled like they’d showered that morning because they had.

 Greavves was part of a 10-man Australian patrol [music] that was supposed to link up with an American patrol for combined reconnaissance of a suspected VC camp. The linkup was scheduled for 060. The Australians arrived at the coordinates at 0545, [music] established a perimeter, and waited. At 0603, Greavves caught the American scent on the wind.

 Soap, deodorant, something else. Coffee. Fresh coffee. They’re 100 m north, he whispered to his corporal. How do you? I can smell their coffee. The corporal looked at him like he’d lost [music] his mind. Then he caught it, too. Then the whole patrol caught it. Someone was brewing coffee a 100 meters away [music] and the scent was rolling through the jungle like a fog.

The American patrol arrived at 0608. 10 men fresh from the fire base showered, [music] shaved, uniforms only 3 days old. Their lieutenant was carrying a thermos of coffee, actual hot coffee, in the field. The Australian corporal stared at the thermos like it was a live grenade. >> [music] >> Sir, he said carefully.

 You can’t have that here. The American lieutenant looked confused. What? The coffee. You can’t have it on patrol. [music] Why not? Because Charlie can smell it from half a click away. The American lieutenant’s confusion deepened into something close to [music] a fence. We’re in a freef fire zone. There’s no civilians within 10 mi.

 Who cares if they smell coffee? They’ll smell it and they’ll track it and they’ll know exactly where we are. That’s paranoid. That’s how [music] people stay alive. The American lieutenant looked at his 10 men, then at the 10 Australians, and Greavves watched the calculation happen in real time.

 The Americans were clean, shaved, relatively fresh. The Australians looked like they’d been dug out of a mass grave. Uniforms rotted to the point of disintegration, [music] faces caked with dirt and insect bites. The smell coming off them was organic rot. and the American lieutenant made a decision that would define the next 6 hours.

 We’re not throwing away good coffee because you guys are paranoid about smell. 4 hours later, the VC ambushed them. Greavves heard it [music] first. Not the ambush itself, but the setup. The patrol was moving through triple canopy jungle. [music] Visibility down to 20 m. Terrain that swallowed sound. The Americans were on point. The Australians were trailing.

standard combined formation. And at 10:47, Greavves caught a scent that [music] didn’t belong. New York ma’am, Vietnamese fish source, faint, but [music] distinct. Someone had eaten fish sauce within the last 12 hours, and they were close. His hand came up. The Australian patrol froze. The American patrol, 40 m ahead, kept moving.

 “V Greavves whispered.” How do you [music] know? fish source 30 m west. The corporal believed him. He’d learned to believe Greavves. He keyed his radio to warn the Americans. And before he could transmit, the jungle exploded. The VC had set up in an L-shaped ambush. 12 fighters with AK-47s and RPGs. They’d been tracking the patrol for the last hour, not by sight, but by scent.

 The coffee had been a beacon. The soap and deodorant had been confirmation. The VC had known exactly where the combined patrol was and exactly [music] where it was heading because the Americans smelled like a PX. The initial burst killed two Americans instantly. The RPG round hit a third. [music] The Australians 40 m behind and already flattened when Greavves raised his hand, returned fire immediately.

 The Americans caught in the kill zone went to ground and started screaming for support. The firefight lasted 11 [music] minutes. The VC broke contact and disappeared into the jungle. Final count, three Americans dead, [music] five wounded, zero Australian casualties. After the medevac choppers left after the dead were bagged, after the wounded were extracted, the American lieutenant found the Australian corporal.

 [music] Your guy, the lieutenant said, the one who smelled them. How did he know? He smelled fish sauce. That’s impossible. [music] No, it’s not. The lieutenant stared at the corporal, then at Greavves, who was sitting [music] against a tree cleaning his rifle, looking like he’d been composted. “We can’t operate [music] like you,” the lieutenant said quietly.

“Our guys won’t do it. Then your guys will keep dying.” This was not [music] the last time this conversation would happen. You need to understand the scale of the difference between Australian and American field hygiene in Vietnam. [music] This wasn’t a minor tactical variation. This was a fundamental philosophical divide about what soldiers could be asked to endure and what that endurance purchased.

 The Americans brought civilization into the jungle. Fire support bases with showers, mess halls, clubs, [music] basketball courts, helicopter resupply every 72 hours meant you could have hot food, cold drinks, mail from home. The average American infantry soldier in Vietnam spent roughly 60% of his tour at a fire base and 40% in the field.

 Field rotations averaged 3 to 5 days. Even in the field, helicopter resupply meant you could have things that Australians considered insane luxuries. Hot coffee, fresh water for washing, clean socks, cigarettes. The Australians brought the jungle into themselves. Fire support bases existed, but you rarely saw them.

 Resupply was by foot patrol or in emergencies helicopter. But helicopter resupply was risky. The noise drew enemy attention. The landing zone had to be secured. The operation itself was a tactical vulnerability. So Australians carried everything they needed for 3 to 4 weeks and accepted that they would not be clean, comfortable, or civilized until the patrol ended.

 [music] The tactical manuals reflected this. The American manual focused on maintaining soldier morale through creature [music] comforts. The Australian manual focused on maintaining soldier survival through environmental integration. But the real difference was cultural. American soldiers came from a country where showering daily was normal, where deodorant was expected, where smelling like a human being was basic hygiene.

The idea of not showering for a month was not just uncomfortable. It was psychologically alien. It violated fundamental notions of cleanliness. dignity and what it meant to be civilized. Australian soldiers, particularly those from rural backgrounds, came from a different understanding.

 Tommy Greavves had gone weeks without bathing on cattle drives. It wasn’t pleasant, but it wasn’t traumatic. It was just part of being in the bush, and the bush didn’t care if you smelled like Irish Spring. [music] The VC cared very much. Greavves learned this from a prisoner. June 1967, six RA captured a VC fighter after a contact near Nui Dart.

 The prisoner was willing to talk through a translator. He described VC tracking methods. And when asked how the VC located Australian versus American patrols, his answer was immediate. Americans are easy. You smell them before you see them. Soap, cigarettes, coffee. You follow the smell. Australians are hard. They smell like jungle.

 You have to see them or hear them. Smell doesn’t work. The translator asked the obvious follow-up. How far can you smell Americans? Depends on wind. 200 [music] m normal. 400 m if wind is good. Once we tracked American patrol for 3 km just by coffee smell. This quote made it into the Australian afteraction [music] report.

 The report made it to Australian command. Australian command shared it with American command. American command did nothing. The reason was simple. American doctrine was built around overwhelming firepower and rapid deployment, not stealth. The Americans didn’t need to hide in the jungle. They brought the jungle to its knees with artillery, air strikes, and helicopter gunships.

 If the VC could smell them coming, fine. The VC could also die when the 105mm rounds started landing. This worked when you had artillery support. It worked less well on long range reconnaissance patrols. It worked not at all for ambush operations, and it created a massive problem when Australian and American forces tried to operate together.

Greavves experienced this problem repeatedly over the next 6 months. Combined patrols became exercises in Australian frustration. The Australians would spend days moving into position, [music] maintaining noise and scent discipline, preparing for an ambush or reconnaissance mission. Then American forces would arrive, smelling like a statesside barracks, and the entire operation would be compromised.

 In July 1967, Greavves was part of an operation that became legendary among Australian forces for all the wrong reasons. The mission was to ambush a suspected VC supply route. Intelligence indicated regular enemy traffic. The Australian patrol, 12 men from six rayar, [music] moved into position over 4 days, established an ambush site along the trail and waited.

 48 hours into the wait, an American patrol was ordered to reinforce them. The Americans arrived by helicopter. The sound of the Hueies could be heard 10 km away. The landing zone was 800 m from the Australian position. The VC supply traffic vanished immediately. The ambush operation was scrubbed.

 Greavves and his platoon spent 4 days moving into position and 48 hours waiting for an enemy that disappeared the moment American helicopters announced [music] that coalition forces were in the area. After that operation, the Australian battalion commander sent a formal complaint to the task force headquarters. [music] The complaint was politely ignored.

 American doctrine was not going to change because the Australians preferred to walk. But the smell issue wouldn’t go away. [music] In August 1967, an Australian SAS patrol was operating deep in war zone D, [music] running reconnaissance on NVA positions. The patrol was four men, standard SAS strength for longrange work.

 Day 11 of a planned 14-day insertion. They’d been living in the jungle for nearly 2 weeks, moving slowly, observing enemy movement, calling in intelligence. Zero contact with the enemy because the enemy didn’t know they were there. Then an American LRP team [music] was inserted 3 km away. The Americans were running a similar mission.

 Long range reconnaissance, minimal contact, intelligence gathering, but the Americans operated on a different timeline. They’d been inserted 2 days earlier. [music] They were showered, shaved, and carrying enough scented products to supply a small pharmacy. The SAS patrol leader, a sergeant named Davies, caught the American scent within 6 hours.

 His initial reaction recorded in his patrol report was one word, [ __ ] The Americans didn’t know the SAS was there. The SAS knew the Americans were there because they could smell them. And worse, [music] the SAS knew that if they could smell the Americans, the NVA could [music] smell the Americans, which meant the NVA would start searching the area, which meant the SAS position was now compromised through no fault of their own. Davies made a decision.

 He broke radio silence, contacted task force headquarters, [music] and requested immediate extraction. HQ denied the request. Davies insisted. HQ asked why. Davies explained. American patrol 3 clicks east is putting out enough scent to draw every NVA tracker in the province. Our position is compromised. HQ authorized extraction.

 [music] The SAS patrol was pulled out. The American patrol stayed. Within 24 hours, [music] the American patrol was in heavy contact with NVA forces. Two Americans killed, three wounded. The SAS patrol’s mission, [music] 11 days of careful work gathering intelligence on NVA positions, was wasted because the NVA had been alerted to coalition presence by the smell of Irish Spring and Marros.

 Davy’s afteraction report was scathing. Cannot conduct effective reconnaissance operations within 10 km of American forces. Enemy tracking capability, [music] renders stealth operations impossible when US forces maintain current hygiene practices. This report made it to Australian Special Forces Command. It did not make it any further.

The reason it didn’t make it further [music] was politics. By late 1967, the Australian military presence in Vietnam was entirely dependent on American logistics, air support, artillery support, and overall command structure. The Australians operated with significant tactical independence in Fui province, but strategically they were a minor element in a largely American war.

Criticizing American field practices [music] was not diplomatically viable, even when those practices were getting people killed. So the criticism stayed internal. Australian units developed [music] informal policies. Avoid combined operations when possible. maintain maximum distance from American forces during parallel operations and never under any circumstances rely on American stealth.

 But individual soldiers had less diplomatic solutions. Tommy Greavves had been in country for 8 months when he had [music] his defining confrontation with American hygiene culture. November 1967, Fuok 2 province combined patrol with elements from the 173rd Airborne. The mission was village [music] security. Move through a contested village.

 Search for VC infrastructure. Establish temporary [music] presence. The American patrol arrived fresh from a firebase. Showered, shaved, uniforms clean. One soldier was wearing cologne. Actual cologne, aqua [music] velv. Greavves walked up to him. You need to wash that off. The American soldier, a private, [music] maybe 19 years old, looked confused.

 What the cologne? You need to wash it off. Why? Because you smell like a target. [music] The private laughed. Not mockingly. He genuinely thought Greavves was joking. Man, [music] I smell like I’m ready for a date. You smell like you died 2 weeks ago. Greavves didn’t laugh. [music] How long have you been in country? 3 weeks. I’ve been here 8 months.

 [music] I’ve been on patrol for 19 days. I haven’t showered in 19 days because the VC [music] can smell soap from 200 m away. You’re wearing cologne. The VC can smell that from 400 m, which means you’re not just a target. You’re a target [music] that’s going to get everyone around you killed. The private smile faded.

 [music] His squad leader, a sergeant, stepped in. We’re not changing how we operate because you guys are paranoid. Greavves looked at [music] the sergeant, looked at the 10 Americans standing there smelling like they just stepped out of a PX. Looked at the village they were supposed to search. Contested territory. VC known to operate in the area.

Civilian population [music] that could report troop movements. Your call, Grev said. But we’re not going into that village with you. The Australian corporal backed him up. [music] Our people don’t operate with forces that don’t maintain scent discipline. The American sergeant looked like he’d [music] been slapped.

 You’re refusing to patrol with us. We’re refusing to get killed because you won’t stop using cologne. The confrontation went up the chain. The Australian platoon commander supported his men. The American company commander called it insubordination. The battalion commanders got involved. The final decision was that the Australians would search the village first, maintain a perimeter, and the Americans would arrive afterward.

 The Australians went in. Standard search procedure, quiet approach, weapons ready, systematic buildingto building movement. They found a VC weapons cache in the third house, six AK-47s, 2,000 rounds of ammunition, medical supplies, no resistance, no contact. The VC had not known they were coming. The Americans arrived 30 minutes later.

Within 5 minutes of American arrival, the village emptied. women, children, old men, everyone who could move started leaving, not running, just walking away, casual, like they’d suddenly remembered they had somewhere else to be. The Australian [music] corporal watched this and smiled grimly.

 They’re going to tell the VC you’re here. The VC will smell you coming and be gone before you get close. The American sergeant, how do you know their VC sympathizers? [music] I don’t, but I know they can smell you. And if they tell the VC that American soldiers are in the village, the VC will know you’re the ones who smell like Aqua Velva and Malberos.

 That night, the VC hit the American perimeter, [music] not the Australian perimeter. 800 m away, the American perimeter. Mortar fire, small arms, one RPG, no [music] VC casualties. They fired and displaced immediately. Two Americans wounded. After the medevac, the American sergeant found Greavves. You were right, he said quietly. I [music] know.

 Can you teach us? This was the question Greavves had been waiting for. The problem with teaching Americans to operate without scent [music] was that it required teaching them to be uncomfortable in ways that violated every instinct American military culture had cultivated. The US military in 1967 was the most materially supported fighting force in human history.

American [music] soldiers expected hot food, regular showers, clean uniforms, mail from home, access to PX supplies. This wasn’t weakness. [music] This was doctrine. The American military believed that maintaining soldier comfort maintained soldier effectiveness. The Australian approach was different.

 Not because Australians were tougher, but because Australian military culture, particularly for infantry, was built around making do with less. The RA battalions in Vietnam operated on the assumption that comfort was a luxury you earned when the mission was complete. Until then, you endured. Greavves tried to [music] explain this to the Americans who asked.

 It’s not about not showering, he told one group. [music] It’s about understanding that the jungle is full of people trying to kill you. And those people are very good at using [music] every advantage they can find. They can’t outgun you. They can’t out supply you, but they can outsmell you. They live here. They know [music] what belongs and what doesn’t.

 Soap doesn’t belong. Deodorant doesn’t belong. Coffee doesn’t belong. You bring that stuff into the jungle. You’re telling every VC tracker within half a click that there’s Americans nearby. So, what do we use? One soldier asked. Nothing. You use nothing. You eat cold rations. You don’t smoke. You bury your waste and cover it.

You accept that you’re going to smell like rot and mud and stagnant water. And you [music] accept this because it keeps you alive. For how long? For as long as you’re on patrol. The American soldiers [music] looked at each other. 3 days. Their expression said, “We can handle 3 days.

 What about longer patrols?” Someone asked. “How long are your patrols?” “3 4 days usually.” Grieve smiled. It wasn’t a friendly smile. We’re on day 22 [music] right now. We’ve got six more days before extraction. The Americans stared at him. 28-day patrols. 4 weeks without showering, without clean clothes, without any of the things that made you feel human.

 The idea was incomprehensible. One of them asked the question they were all thinking. How do you stand it? You remember that being uncomfortable is better than being dead. But teaching individual soldiers was different from changing doctrine. >> [music] >> And American doctrine was not going to change.

 The US military had built an entire logistical apparatus around keeping soldiers comfortable. Firebase showers, [music] PX supplies, regular rotations, helicopter resupply. All of this required massive infrastructure investment. You couldn’t just tell American soldiers to stop using soap. You had to restructure the entire support system.

 The Australians had a different support system. Newi Dart, the main Australian base, [music] had showers and amenities, but soldiers on patrol didn’t see New Dart for weeks at a time. The expectation was that you operated away from base until the mission was complete. Resupply was by ground [music] patrol when possible, helicopter only when absolutely necessary.

 This meant you carried everything you needed and accepted that everything you needed [music] didn’t include comfort items. The statistical result of these different approaches was [music] stark. Between 1965 and 1972, Australian forces in Vietnam conducted approximately 50,000 patrols. Average patrol duration 1 28 days. American forces conducted approximately 2 million patrols.

 Average patrol duration 3 4 days. Australian casualty rate per patrol 0.31%. American casualty rate per patrol [music] 1.89%. The numbers were complicated by many factors. Different operational areas, different enemy concentrations, different tactical missions. But Australian officers believed [music] the scent discipline was a significant factor.

 In post-war analysis, one Australian commander estimated that scent discipline reduced Australian casualties by 1520% by making Australian patrols harder to track and ambush. [music] The Americans had a different analysis. American doctrine emphasized firepower and mobility over stealth. If the enemy could find you, you killed them with superior weapons and air support.

[music] This worked. American kill ratios were extremely high, but it required accepting higher casualty rates because stealth was not the priority. Neither approach was wrong. They were different philosophies designed for different tactical environments. The problem came when the two philosophies tried to work together.

 [music] Tommy Greavves spent 14 months in Vietnam. He participated in 63 patrols. Total duration in the field approximately 340 days. time at a fire base with shower facilities, approximately 25 days. [music] He was in one major battle, Long Tan, August 1966, [music] where his company held off a VC force 10 times their size.

 He was in dozens of smaller contacts. He killed at [music] least seven enemy soldiers in confirmed engagements. He was never wounded. He attributed his survival to three things: training, [music] luck, and the fact that the enemy usually couldn’t smell him coming. In his last month in country, January 1969, Greavves was part of a training program where experienced Australian soldiers taught American soldiers longrange patrol techniques.

 The program was voluntary. 12 Americans signed up. The training lasted 2 weeks. The hardest part [music] wasn’t teaching tactics. It was teaching Americans to endure being filthy. On day three, one American soldier broke. not from fear or danger, but from the psychological weight of not showering.

 He’d gone 72 hours without soap, and [music] he couldn’t handle it. He wasn’t weak. He’d been in country for 6 months, had combat experience, was a good soldier, but 3 days without showering violated something fundamental in his understanding of civilization. I feel like an animal, he said. Greavves looked at him. That’s the point.

 The VC are hunting you. If you smell like a human from Kansas, they’ll find you. If you smell like an animal from the jungle, [music] they might walk right past you. I can’t do it. Then you can’t do long range work. The soldier left the program. [music] Eight others completed it. They learned to operate without scent discipline for up [music] to 7 days. It was better than nothing.

 After the training, one of the American graduates asked Greavves if he had any final advice. Greavves thought about it. thought about the 28-day patrols, the VC prisoner who described tracking Americans by coffee smell, the ambush that had killed three Americans because of a thermos, the village that emptied when it smelled aqua [music] velva.

 The jungle will teach you everything you need to know, he said. But only if you listen. And you can’t listen if you smell like you don’t belong [music] there. The soldier nodded. What’s the worst part? Not showering for weeks. No, [music] the worst part is coming back. back to the fire base, back to Australia, back to civilization.

 Because after a while, you get used to the [music] smell. You get used to being filthy. You get used to being part of the jungle instead of separate from it. And when you come back to the world where people shower everyday and use deodorant and smell like humans, you realize [music] you’ve changed.

 You’ve become something that doesn’t quite fit anymore. Greavves returned to Australia in February 1969. [music] He went back to Catherine, back to Manbaloo Station, back to mustering cattle across country that stretched to the [music] horizon. The work was the same. The land was the same. He was different.

 He’d learned something in Vietnam that he couldn’t unlearn. The wilderness is full of information if you know how to read it. And the most important information is scent. Everything that lives has a smell. Everything that dies has a smell. Everything that doesn’t belong has a smell that warns you it’s there. For the rest of his life, Greavves could tell when rain was coming by the smell of [music] the air.

 He could tell when cattle were sick by the smell of their breath. He could tell when someone was frightened by the smell of their sweat. Vietnam had turned his nose into an intelligence gathering tool that never stopped working. He never used cologne again. [music] He never used scented soap. He showered when necessary, but never daily.

 It felt like erasing information. His wife learned not to comment on it. [music] His children grew up thinking everyone’s father had a tracking dog sense of smell. He didn’t talk about Vietnam much. When he did, he didn’t talk [music] about firefights or battles. He talked about smell. About the VC fighter who described tracking Americans by coffee scent.

 About the American patrol that got ambushed because of a thermos. About the soldier who couldn’t handle 3 days without soap. Did they ever change? Someone asked him once. Did the Americans ever figure it out? Some did. Most didn’t. Not because they were stupid or lazy. Because their whole system was built around keeping soldiers comfortable and comfort smells.

It smells like soap and coffee and cigarettes and all the things that tell the enemy exactly where you are. Were we better soldiers? Greavves thought about that. No, we were just different soldiers. We accepted different trade-offs. We traded comfort for stealth. They traded stealth for firepower. Both approaches worked.

 They just worked differently. Which one was right? Depends on whether you’re trying to hide or trying to hit hard. We were trying to hide. They were trying to hit hard. Problem was when we tried to do both at the same time. In 1987, Tommy Greavves was invited to speak at a military history conference in Canbor about Australian tactical innovations in Vietnam.

 He prepared a presentation about long range patrol techniques, scent discipline, and fieldcraft. The audience was mostly military historians and retired officers. He opened with a story about the American soldier wearing aqua velvet. The audience laughed. Then he told them about the ambush that killed three Americans because of a coffee thermos. The laughter stopped.

“You think this is funny,” Grieves said. “It’s not. [music] Those three men died because nobody taught them that the enemy has a nose. The VC couldn’t outgun us. They couldn’t outupply us, but they could outsmell us. And for American forces, that was enough. Someone in the audience asked if scent discipline was still relevant in modern warfare.

 More than ever, Greavves said, “Technology makes you think you don’t need fieldcraft. You’ve [music] got night vision, thermal imaging, satellite surveillance. But none of that matters if the enemy can smell you coming [music] because smell doesn’t show up on thermal. Smell doesn’t trigger night vision.

 Smell is the oldest tracking method in the world and it still works. So you’d still teach soldiers not to shower. I’d teach soldiers that everything has a cost. You want to shower every day. Fine. [music] But understand that the enemy might smell that shower from 200 m away. You want hot coffee on patrol? Fine. But understand that you’re broadcasting your position to anyone downwind.

 There’s no such thing as a free comfort. Every choice has a tactical consequence. After the presentation, an American officer approached him. Vietnam veteran now teaching at a US military college. I was in the 173rd. The officer said 1967 68. I remember you guys. You smelled like death. You smelled like a shopping mall.

The American laughed. Yeah, [music] we did. And you were right. We lost people because of it. Not a lot, but some. [music] Enough that it mattered. Did anything change? Not really. We tried to implement some scent discipline in SOG operations, long range reconnaissance stuff, but the broader army never bought in. Too hard to change the culture.

Americans [music] expect to be clean. It’s part of who we are. Greavves nodded. Different countries, different armies. Do you think we should have changed? I think every army has to decide what trade-offs it’s willing to make. You guys chose firepower and logistics over stealth. We chose stealth over comfort. Both approaches worked.

They just worked for different things. Would you do it again? The whole no shower, no soap, smell like a corpse thing. Grieve smiled in a heartbeat because it kept me alive. The American officer extended his hand. They shook. “You guys were crazy,” the officer said. “But you were effective.” “We weren’t crazy.

 We just understood that the jungle doesn’t care if you’re civilized, and the people trying to kill you in that jungle care very much if you smell civilized.” Tommy Greavves died in 2004 at age 61. Heart attack while mustering cattle on Manolu station. He was found by his son, who’d been working the same country for his entire life, who’d learned tracking from his father the way his father had learned it from Aboriginal stockman.

 At the funeral, a group of Vietnam veterans showed up, Australians, mostly from six RA, one American, the officer who’d approached Greavves after the 1987 conference. During the wake, the American officer told a story about a combined patrol in 1967, about an Australian soldier who’d stopped his entire patrol because he smelled fish sauce.

 About an ambush that killed three Americans who hadn’t understood that smell was intelligence. Tommy tried to teach us, [music] the officer said. Some of us learned, most of us didn’t. Not because we didn’t believe him, but because we couldn’t imagine operating the way he did. four-week patrols without showering, eating cold food, becoming part of the jungle.

 It was too far outside what we understood as soldiering. But he was right. The the enemy could smell us. They tracked us by scent and men died because we smelled like we didn’t belong there. Someone asked if modern armies had learned the lesson. [music] Some have, the officer said, special operations, long range reconnaissance. Anyone doing serious field work, they understand scent discipline now.

 But line units, still showering every day, a [music] still using deodorant, still broadcasting their presence to anyone with a nose. Is that wrong? No, it’s just [music] different. Tommy understood that. He never said the American way was wrong. He just said it was different. And that [music] difference had a cost.

The officer looked around the room at the assembled veterans, at the men who’d served with Tommy Greavves, at the son who’d inherited his father’s ability to read the land through scent. The thing about Tommy, the officer [music] said, was that he understood the wilderness better than anyone I ever met.

 He knew that everything tells you something if you pay attention. And the first thing the wilderness tells you is whether you belong there or not. And smell is how it tells you. We didn’t [music] belong. We smelled like Americans, like soap and coffee and cigarettes and all the things that made us human but also made us targets. Tommy belonged.

 He smelled like the jungle had absorbed him. And that’s why he survived. [music] The wake ended. The veterans left. Tommy Greavves was buried in Catherine in country he’d known his entire life in land that smelled like red dirt and eucalyptus and cattle and all the things that had made him who he was before Vietnam and who he [music] became after.

 His headstone lists his service, Sixth Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment 1 1966 1 969. It doesn’t mention the patrols or the tracking or the Americans who learned too late [music] that smell was survival. But the veterans who served with him know and the lesson he taught that the wilderness can smell you before it can see you is still being taught to Australian soldiers preparing for deployment.

 Because Tommy Greavves understood something that technology hasn’t erased [music] and doctrine hasn’t replaced. In the wilderness, everything that lives produces scent. and scent tells you who survives and who doesn’t. The Americans brought Irish Spring and Malberos into the jungle and wondered why the enemy always knew they were coming.

 The Australians brought nothing and became invisible. That was the difference. That was the [music] lesson. That was why Tommy Greavves spent 28 days smelling like rot and mud [music] and stagnant water and walked out alive while soldiers who smelled like Kansas City came home in body bags. You smell like a target. The VC knew it.

The Australians knew it. The Americans learned it the hard way. And the jungle, indifferent and patient and full of people who knew how to read every scent that didn’t belong, taught the lesson over and over until someone finally listened. Tommy Greavves listened on his first patrol.

 It kept him alive for 14 months. It kept his men alive and it made him understand that civilization is [music] a scent and in the wilderness that scent will kill

 

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