Why Eisenhower’s Real Job Was Babysitting Montgomery – Marshall’s Secret Orders 

January 7th, 1945. Montgomery’s headquarters, Belgium. Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery called a press conference. The Battle of the Bulge was ending. German offensive defeated. Montgomery stood before reporters and said this, the battle has been most interesting. I think possibly one of the most interesting and tricky battles I have ever handled, he continued.

The American troops fought very bravely but they were clearly taken by surprise and disorganised. I realised the situation was critical. So I took certain steps to ensure that if the Germans got to the Meuse they would certainly not get over that river. Then the key line. I employed the whole available power of the British group of armies.

You have this picture of British troops fighting on both sides of American forces who had suffered a hard blow. It was a great allied victory. American generals read the press reports. Exploded. Montgomery had just told the world that British professionalism had rescued incompetent Americans. General Bradley told Eisenhower, I cannot serve under Montgomery.

If he stays I resign. General Patton said, I’ll resign with Bradley and I’ll punch Montgomery first. Eisenhower faced a command crisis. His two top American generals threatening resignation over something Montgomery said at a press conference. This wasn’t the first time. It was the 15th or 20th. Montgomery had been creating diplomatic incidents for 18 months.

This is the story of Eisenhower’s actual job in World War Two. Not commanding armies. Managing Montgomery. Keeping him from destroying the Allied alliance while extracting his tactical brilliance. Why Eisenhower couldn’t fire the general who undermined him constantly. How Marshall told him this would be his hardest assignment.

And why managing Montgomery’s ego took more skill than defeating Germany. To understand why Montgomery needed babysitting, you need to understand who Montgomery was. Bernard Law Montgomery. Field Marshal. Commander of British forces in Northwest Europe. The most successful British general of the war. Also arrogant, condescending, insubordinate, impossible to work with.

Montgomery believed he was the greatest military mind since Napoleon. Told people this, frequently. He believed Americans were militarily incompetent. Told Eisenhower this, to his face. He believed he should command all Allied forces in Europe, British and American. Told Churchill this, got turned down, never stopped trying.

Montgomery’s tactical record was excellent. El Alamein, Sicily, Normandy. He won battles, but his personality made him impossible to command. He questioned every decision. Undermined every plan that wasn’t his. Leaked to the press when he disagreed with strategy. And Eisenhower couldn’t fire him. Why? Because Montgomery was Britain’s most famous general.

The man who beat Rommel. The hero of El Alamein. If Eisenhower fired Montgomery, Churchill would intervene. The British public would revolt. The alliance would fracture. So Eisenhower’s job wasn’t to command Montgomery, it was to manage him, keep him functional. Prevent him from causing diplomatic incidents.

Marshall understood this before Eisenhower was even appointed Supreme Commander. November 1943. Marshall called Eisenhower to Washington before he took command. They met privately. No aides, no note-takers. Marshall’s message was blunt. Montgomery will be your biggest problem. Bigger than Rommel, bigger than logistics, bigger than weather.

Eisenhower started to object. Marshall cut him off. Montgomery is brilliant tactically, and impossible personally. He’ll question every order. Undermine every decision. Go to Churchill when he doesn’t get his way. Churchill will back him. Every time. Because Britain needs Montgomery. Needs the victories. Needs the hero.

Your job is preventing Montgomery from fracturing the alliance while using his tactical ability to win the war. Eisenhower asked the obvious question. Can I relieve him if necessary? Marshall’s answer, technically yes, practically no. If you fire Montgomery, Churchill will demand your resignation. Roosevelt will refuse.

The alliance might not survive. Eisenhower understood. He wasn’t being given command. He was being given an impossible political assignment. January 1944. Eisenhower took command, met with Montgomery to discuss D-Day planning. The meeting lasted four hours. Montgomery spent three of them explaining why Eisenhower’s plan was wrong.

The current plan is rubbish, American thinking. Too dispersed, too cautious. I’ll write you a proper plan. Eisenhower. The plan was developed by Cossack staff over 18 months. Then they wasted 18 months. I’ll have a better plan in two weeks. Eisenhower’s chief of staff, Walter Biddell Smith, was furious after the meeting.

He just insulted 18 months of planning and called it American incompetence. Did he improve the plan? Smith paused. Actually, yes. His changes make sense. That was the Montgomery problem in miniature. He was right about tactics, insufferable about everything else. Eisenhower had to extract Montgomery’s tactical brilliance while preventing his personality from destroying morale.

February 1944. Montgomery sent Eisenhower a memo, 20 pages, explaining why Montgomery should command all ground forces during the invasion. The Supreme Commander should focus on political coordination. Ground operations require a single commander with tactical expertise. That commander should be British, preferably me.

Translation, Eisenhower should step aside. Let Montgomery run the war. Eisenhower’s staff wanted him to immediately. Eisenhower did something smarter. He agreed. Partially. Montgomery will command all ground forces during the initial phase of the invasion. Once the beachhead is established, command will transfer to appropriate theatre structure.

Montgomery got what he wanted, temporarily. Eisenhower maintained overall command. Both sides claimed victory. It was brilliant political manoeuvring. Give Montgomery tactical control, keep strategic control, prevent a fight. Marshall read Eisenhower’s solution, sent a brief message. Well done. This is exactly the kind of management Montgomery requires.

But Montgomery wasn’t satisfied. He never was. May 1944. Montgomery held a press conference, described his role in D-Day, made it sound like he was commanding the invasion. The Supreme Commander has wisely delegated ground operations to experienced British command. I will be responsible for ensuring the invasion succeeds.

American reporters heard. Montgomery is really in charge. Eisenhower is just the political figurehead. American generals were furious. General Patton wanted to punch Montgomery. General Bradley wanted Eisenhower to fire him. Eisenhower called Montgomery in. Bernard, you can’t tell the press you’re running the invasion, Montgomery, but I am running ground operations.

During the initial phase, under my command. The press needs to understand this is allied operation. Of course it’s allied, with British tactical expertise and American logistical support. Eisenhower realised Montgomery genuinely didn’t see the problem. In Montgomery’s mind, British tactical superiority was obvious fact, not insulting opinion.

Eisenhower sent Marshall a message. Montgomery’s situation requires constant management. We’ll continue to handle. Marshall’s response? Expected. You’re doing well. June 6th, 1944. D-Day. Montgomery commanded ground forces brilliantly. The British and Canadian beaches were secured. The plan worked. But Montgomery’s post-battle assessment created a new crisis.

The operation was successful, despite some American difficulties at Omaha Beach. British forces performed as expected. American generals exploded, despite American difficulties. Americans took twenth or four hundred casualties at Omaha. Montgomery’s forces had easier beaches. Eisenhower had to smooth it over.

Called Montgomery again. Bernard, you cannot publicly criticise American performance. I wasn’t criticising, simply noting factual differences in beach difficulty. The way you noted them sounds like criticism. The press is reporting it as criticism. Then the press is misinterpreting my professional assessment.

Eisenhower gave up, called Marshall. Montgomery is creating diplomatic incidents daily. Marshall, can you work around him? Yes, but it’s exhausting. That’s your job. July 1944, the Normandy breakout. Montgomery’s forces were supposed to capture Sion quickly. Didn’t happen. Tann was supposed to fall in three days.

Took six weeks. Meanwhile, American forces under Patton were racing across France, capturing territory rapidly. The press noticed. Started comparing Montgomery’s slow progress to Patton and Montgomery’s response. Hold another press conference. British forces are fighting the bulk of German armour at Sion. This allows American forces to advance through lighter opposition.

Our strategy is working perfectly. Translation. We’re doing the hard work. Americans are just mopping up. American generals wanted blood. Bradley told Eisenhower, fire him now. Eisenhower, I can’t. Why not? Because Churchill will go to Roosevelt. Roosevelt will have to choose between me and Churchill. That’s not a fight we want.

Bradley understood. Montgomery was politically untouchable. But the press was destroying Allied unity. American newspapers called Montgomery slow. British newspapers called Americans reckless. Eisenhower needed to fix this without firing Montgomery. He held his own press conference, carefully scripted. Field Marshal Montgomery is executing a brilliant strategy at Sion.

By pinning German armour, he’s enabling the entire Allied advance. General Patton’s success is possible because Montgomery is doing the difficult work of holding German strength. Eisenhower gave Montgomery credit publicly. Kept American generals happy privately by explaining the political necessity. It worked.

Both sides claimed vindication. Marshal sent another message. Your political management of Montgomery is as important as your military command. Continue. August 1944. Paris liberated. The war seemed nearly won. Montgomery proposed Operation Market Garden. Airborne assault into Holland would end the war by Christmas.

Eisenhower’s staff called it overambitious, too risky, likely to fail. But Montgomery insisted, threatened to resign if Eisenhower didn’t approve it. Eisenhower faced an impossible choice. Approve a risky operation or fight Montgomery publicly. He approved it, against his better judgment, because refusing would create an alliance crisis.

September 1944. Market Garden failed. 17,000 Allied casualties. The bridge at Arnhem never captured. Montgomery’s response, operation was 90% successful. Would have been 100% successful with proper American logistical support. He blamed Americans for his failure. Eisenhower’s staff demanded action. He just blamed us for his disaster.

Fire him. Eisenhower couldn’t. Called Montgomery in. Private meeting. Bernard, you can’t blame American logistics for Market Garden. But American supply priorities did affect the operation. Your plan was overly ambitious. The intelligence was wrong. The execution had problems. These aren’t American failures. Montgomery was silent.

Then, are you questioning my tactical judgment? I’m telling you that you cannot publicly blame Allies for your operational setbacks. Montgomery left. Told Churchill that Eisenhower was trying to scapegoat him for Market Garden failures. Churchill called Roosevelt. Roosevelt called Marshall. Marshall called Eisenhower.

What happened with Montgomery? Eisenhower explained. Marshall listened. Then, you handled it correctly. Montgomery will complain to Churchill. Churchill will complain to Roosevelt. Roosevelt will tell Churchill to manage his general. This will blow over. How long do I have to do this? Marshall’s response was honest.

Until the war ends, or until Montgomery makes a mistake so big even Churchill can’t protect him. December 1944. Battle of the Bulge. German offensive through the Ardennes. American forces hit hard. Lines broken. Montgomery was given temporary command of American forces north of the breakthrough. Made sense tactically.

Created a unified command. Montgomery held another press conference. January 1945. The battle was interesting. American forces fought bravely but were clearly surprised and disorganized. I brought British professionalism to bear, stabilized the situation, and drove the Germans back. He made it sound like he’d rescued incompetent Americans.

American generals reached their breaking point. Bradley threatened to resign. Patton wanted to challenge Montgomery to a duel. Eisenhower called Marshall. Montgomery has gone too far. I need authority to relieve him. Marshall’s response shocked him. You have that authority. Always have. Do what you need to do.

Eisenhower called Montgomery in. Final meeting. Bernard, you’re going to write a letter to American commanders apologizing for your press conference, acknowledging American forces stopped the German offensive. I will not. I simply stated facts. Eisenhower interrupted. Something he’d never done before. You will write that letter or I will relieve you of command.

I have authorization from General Marshall. I will go to Churchill if necessary, but you will write that letter. Montgomery stared. Realized Eisenhower was serious. Very well, I’ll write the letter. Montgomery wrote it, grudgingly. The crisis passed. But Eisenhower knew he’d won a battle, not the war. Montgomery would be back.

March 1945, Germany collapsing, the end was near. Montgomery proposed that British forces should capture Berlin. British Empire deserves the honor of capturing the Nazi capital. Eisenhower said no. Berlin was in the Soviet zone, agreed upon at Yalta, not worth the casualties. Montgomery went to Churchill. Churchill went to Roosevelt, but Roosevelt was dying, weeks from death.

Marshall had effective control. Marshall backed Eisenhower completely. Berlin decision is Eisenhower’s. Montgomery’s proposal is rejected. Montgomery finally understood. He’d lost. Eisenhower had Marshall’s full support. May 1945, Germany surrendered. The war in Europe ended. Montgomery gave a final press conference.

British forces performed magnificently throughout the campaign. With excellent American logistical support, we defeated Nazi Germany. American generals rolled their eyes. But the war was over. It didn’t matter anymore. After the war, Montgomery wrote his memoirs, criticized Eisenhower’s leadership throughout, called him politically astute, but militarily mediocre.

Eisenhower wrote his own memoirs, praised Montgomery’s tactical skill, barely mentioned the personality conflicts. Marshall’s letter remained classified until 1973. When historians found it, everything made sense. Eisenhower hadn’t just commanded Allied forces in Europe. He’d managed an impossible political situation.

He’d kept Montgomery functional, extracted his tactical brilliance, prevented him from destroying the alliance, while fighting Germany, while managing logistics, while coordinating with Soviets. Marshall had known this would be Eisenhower’s real job, known it would be harder than defeating Germany. And Eisenhower had done it perfectly.

Would you have fired Montgomery? After Market Garden? After the bulge press conference? After constant insubordination? Eisenhower couldn’t, because firing Montgomery would cost more than keeping him. That’s not weakness. That’s understanding that some battles aren’t worth fighting. Montgomery won battles, but he lost the political war.

Eisenhower became president, got the credit for winning World War II. Montgomery became a footnote, remembered for tactical skill and impossible personality, the general who needed constant babysitting, and the Supreme Commander whose greatest skill was managing him without breaking the alliance. Marshall’s letter was right.

Managing Montgomery was harder than defeating Germany. But Eisenhower did both. That’s why he was Supreme Commander, and why Montgomery stayed a subordinate, despite believing he deserved better.