“J-Dub Will Make OKC Worse!”: Debunking the Hot Takes and Why Jalen Williams Actually Makes the Thunder Even More Dangerous

We live in a league ruled as much by debate shows, YouTube breakdowns, and Twitter threads as by the games themselves.
Every night, 30 teams play 48 minutes of basketball. Every morning, the internet turns those 48 minutes into arguments about “legacy,” “help,” “efficiency,” “grifting,” and whether a 20‑year‑old should be traded for not being in peak playoff shape.
Hot takes have always been part of sports discourse. But in the modern NBA, the takes are louder, quicker, and often more extreme. A recent batch of fan “hot takes” and responses from creator Rusty Buckets offered a snapshot of the way we talk about today’s stars: Victor Wembanyama, Jalen Williams, Shai Gilgeous-Alexander, Luka Dončić, Nikola Jokić, Kawhi Leonard, and even the Thunder’s treasure trove of draft picks.
Strip away the jokes and sponsor reads, and you’re left with a few big questions:
What do we actually know about how big men age?
How much can you trust advanced stats in a super‑team environment?
Is Shai really that good as a scorer?
Are fans hypocrites about injuries and “help”?
And is it “bad for the league” that Oklahoma City might own every pick between now and the sun burning out?
Let’s take the takes seriously for a moment and see what they tell us about the league—and ourselves.
Wembanyama vs. the 65-Game Rule
One fan offered a bleak prediction: Victor Wembanyama, the 7‑4 phenom in San Antonio, will never win a Defensive Player of the Year award—not because of talent, but because he’ll never clear the 65‑game minimum now required for major awards.
The logic is simple enough:
Players that tall tend not to stay healthy.
Wembanyama already missed half of his second season.
Ultra‑tall bigs—Yao Ming, Ralph Sampson, even Kristaps Porziņģis—often see their careers compromised by injuries before age 30.
Historically, that’s not wrong. What’s missing is context.
Wembanyama and the Spurs are not ignoring those risks. He’s reportedly focused on flexibility work, ankle and foot strength, and learning when to jump and when to stay grounded. For a 20‑year‑old, he’s unusually aware of how fragile his advantage is.
The 65‑game threshold was designed to discourage load management, not punish giants. But it may end up doing exactly that for players whose bodies simply can’t handle an 82‑game grind.
Will Wembanyama play 65+ games “multiple times”? Maybe not. But as Rusty argued, he probably gets there at least once or twice. If his defense is as absurd as it’s already looked in flashes, one or two healthy, dominant seasons might be enough for multiple DPOYs—depending on how long that 65‑game rule survives.
The real story isn’t just about awards. It’s about how the league structures incentives for a player whose best chance at greatness might involve playing less than the schedule demands.
The JDub “Problem” That Isn’t
Another take went after Oklahoma City’s Jalen Williams (JDub), arguing that when he returns from injury, he’ll make the Thunder worse.
The evidence:
The Thunder are 29–1 combined in the games he’s missed over two seasons.
His on/off net rating is deeply negative.
Shai Gilgeous-Alexander’s individual stats—40 points, 6 rebounds, 6 assists on 67% true shooting—look better without JDub.
If you stop there, it sounds damning. But that’s the catch with advanced stats: context is everything.
The Thunder might be the deepest, most balanced young roster in the league. If a player has a slightly negative net rating on a team that never plays bad lineups, that doesn’t make him a negative player; it just means the team is stacked.
Stat quirks often pop up on elite rosters:
Role players look “worse” in on/off numbers when they share the floor with multiple All‑Stars.
Stars’ numbers spike when surrounded by bench units and drop slightly next to other creators.
Anyone who has watched JDub knows the truth that the numbers, taken alone, obscure:
He’s a plus defender.
A secondary playmaker and ball handler.
A solid, efficient scorer.
Is he perfect? No. He has rough edges, and the Thunder offense can simplify when he’s off. But when postseason basketball arrives and defenses load up on Shai, having another big, versatile wing who can guard, pass, and create is exactly the kind of “problem” contenders need.
The Thunder’s 29–1 record without him says more about Sam Presti’s roster-building than about JDub’s value.
Shai Gilgeous-Alexander and the Scoring Crown
One bold prediction: Shai Gilgeous-Alexander will go down as the greatest scorer of his generation.
The case:
His scoring rate and efficiency outclass Luka Dončić.
He’s more well-rounded as a scorer than Giannis Antetokounmpo.
He simply scores more than Nikola Jokić on similar or better efficiency.
His foul drawing, while criticized, is built mostly on craft rather than pure “grifting.”
It’s not as wild as it sounds.
Shai is already posting one of the most efficient volume scoring seasons ever, flirting with “one point per minute” territory. He lives in the midrange—an area most teams have abandoned—and yet manages to keep his true shooting percentage in superstar territory.
Compared with his peers:
Luka: Higher usage, more heliocentric, more turnovers, slightly worse efficiency.
Giannis: Devastating rim force, but limited by shaky shooting and free throws.
Jokić: Superb efficiency, but uses more of his energy as a playmaker and often passes up shots he could easily take.
Rusty’s nuance is important here: “best scorer” and “best offensive player” are different categories. Jokić is the better all-around offensive engine, but if we’re strictly talking about pure scoring identity and volume, Shai might very well end up wearing that crown.
Will the foul discourse ever calm down? Probably not.
James Harden changed the way we talk about drawing fouls. What Kobe Bryant and Dwyane Wade once did mostly in silence is now slowed down, clipped, and debated frame by frame on social media. The media ecosystem is built to amplify negativity. Every unnatural landing or swipe‑through becomes a referendum.
But as time passes—and if Shai keeps doing this in the playoffs—the narrative will likely shift from “foul merchant” to “unsolvable scorer,” just as it did for Wade and others.

Luka, Discipline, and the Trade That Never Needed to Happen
One of the most contested takes in recent months: the idea that Luka Dončić needed to be traded just to scare him into getting in shape.
A registered dietician and trainer chimed in, saying there is “absolutely no excuse” for someone with Luka’s resources to be out of shape.
He’s not wrong about the resources. Luka has:
Access to world-class trainers, chefs, and nutritionists.
Millions in salary and endorsements.
Full medical and performance staffs at his disposal.
He’s also not wrong that discipline matters. Luka has shown up to seasons heavier than ideal. There were “Hookah Luka” jokes for a reason.
But the leap from, “He should be in better shape” to “Trade him” is where the logic falls apart.
So did Shaquille O’Neal. So did James Harden. Both still produced MVP‑caliber stretches. Both were top‑five players in the league even when less than ideally conditioned.
As Rusty pointed out:
Luka, even at his worst conditioning, was still one of the five best players in the NBA.
The Mavericks’ former GM Nico Harrison was reportedly looking for an excuse to move him. The discipline narrative became a convenient justification—not a genuine basketball necessity.
Could Luka be better? Absolutely. Should he be pushed to maximize his conditioning? Of course.
But the idea that you move a generational offensive talent in his mid‑20s because he’s at 85 percent of his physical potential instead of 100 is the kind of impatience only a hot‑take ecosystem could normalize.
Shaq, Barkley, and the Bitterness of Time
Another viewer suggested that Shaquille O’Neal and Charles Barkley are “bitter” about the modern game because they know they could have been even better if they’d taken conditioning and skill development more seriously.
It’s tempting to psychoanalyze.
Shaq, more than almost any all‑time great, left obvious potential on the table. At his peak, he was so dominant that there was little incentive for him to grind away at the less glamorous parts of his game. Yet even coasting at times, he became one of the greatest players ever.
He also routinely jokes—and complains—about current players’ contracts:
“Rudy Gobert gets how much?”
“Ben Simmons makes $40 million to do what?”
The salary cap has exploded. The league is richer than it’s ever been. That’s not today’s players’ fault. It’s not Shaq’s fault either. It’s just time.
Barkley is a slightly different story. He had early‑career weight issues, but in his Philadelphia and Phoenix primes he was in excellent shape. He won an MVP. He dragged the 1993 Suns to the Finals. His lack of a ring has far more to do with Michael Jordan than with conditioning.
The broader pattern is older than both of them: every generation of retired stars looks at the next one and says, “We were tougher. The game was better. These kids have it easy.”
Wilt Chamberlain did it to Michael Jordan. Now Shaq and Chuck do it to today’s stars. Someday, someone will do it to Shai and Wemby.
It’s not new. It’s just louder now.

Fans, Injury Narratives, and Hypocrisy
One of the most pointed comments from Rusty’s viewers struck at a very real inconsistency:
NBA fans romanticize Derrick Rose and Tracy McGrady, building “what if” timelines in which injuries never happened and titles followed. Those same fans often attack Kawhi Leonard and Anthony Davis for being injury-prone—despite the fact that Kawhi led two different franchises to championships and Davis was the second-best player on a title team.
The difference?
Rose and McGrady are done. Their stories are over.
Kawhi and Davis are still here, still missing games, still making max money.
Time softens the hard edges of memory. Once a player retires, we tend to focus on the highlights, the best seasons, the signature moments. The day-to-day frustrations fade. The playoff series missed due to injury become “tragic what-ifs,” not “this guy doesn’t care.”
In real time, though, it’s harder.
When Kawhi sits in a high‑profile regular-season game, anger spikes.
When Davis tweaks an ankle in May, the “Street Clothes” nickname resurfaces.
Give it a decade after they retire and the conversation will shift:
Kawhi will be remembered as one of the greatest playoff risers and perimeter defenders ever.
Davis will be remembered as a two-way monster whose health, not talent, limited his peak.
The hypocrisy is real. It’s also human.
The Myth of “No Help”
Perhaps the smartest critique was about how we talk about “help.”
When fans say a star “has no help,” they’re almost always talking about offense.
But look at some of the most celebrated “carry jobs” in recent history:
Jason Kidd in the early 2000s.
Dirk Nowitzki in 2011.
Allen Iverson in 2001.
Steph Curry in 2022.
Derrick Rose in 2011.
Russell Westbrook in 2017.
What do these teams all have in common?
They were elite defensive teams.
The 2011 Bulls were one of the best defenses in NBA history.
Kidd’s Nets got to two Finals on defense and transition.
Iverson’s 2001 Sixers had Dikembe Mutombo and multiple defensive specialists.
Curry’s 2022 Warriors defended at a championship level.
Westbrook’s 2017 Thunder had a top‑10 defense with multiple plus defenders.
Offense is easy to see. It produces highlights and box score lines. Defense is systemic, quiet, and often credited vaguely to “effort” or “culture.”
So we end up with narratives where one star “willed a bad team to greatness” when in reality:
They carried a massive load offensively.
Their teammates carried a massive load defensively.
Neither version is complete by itself. Both are true together.
Should the Thunder Be Punished for Being Smart?
Finally, the most emotionally charged take:
Oklahoma City, the argument goes, has too many draft picks. It’s “bad for the league” for one team to hold that much future capital. The league should step in and, essentially, take some of their picks away or keep them out of the lottery.
It’s born out of a real fear: the Thunder already have a championship-caliber core and control a frightening amount of future draft capital. They could be adding lottery talent to a contender for years.
But there’s a reason we don’t retroactively punish teams for being smarter—or just more fortunate—than others.
League rules already exist to prevent extreme abuses:
The Stepien Rule (named after former Cavs owner Ted Stepien) prevents teams from trading away first-round picks in consecutive future years, after he famously gutted Cleveland’s future by doing just that.
Caps on outgoing picks and swaps are in place.
What the Thunder have done is operate aggressively within those rules:
They traded stars (Paul George, Russell Westbrook, Chris Paul) at peak value.
They weaponized cap space.
They accumulated picks by taking on unwanted contracts.
You can argue that the league should adjust rules going forward—limiting the total number of firsts a team can control at one time, for instance. But you can’t retroactively strip picks from a franchise that simply out-executed everyone else.
When Kevin Durant joined the 73‑win Warriors in 2016, many fans wanted the league to stop it. There was nothing the league could do. Golden State had the cap space, Durant had the freedom, and everyone followed the rules.
Sometimes “fairness” and “what feels good” don’t line up.
The Common Thread: Context Is King
Taken together, these hot takes say as much about how we watch basketball as they do about the players involved.
We:
Overreact to small samples and weird on/off numbers.
Forget defense when we talk about “help.”
Undervalue long-term health and overvalue the idea of “toughing it out.”
Judge current players more harshly than retired ones for the exact same flaws.
Want the league to “fix” problems that are really just the result of some teams making better decisions than others.
But buried beneath the noise, there’s a healthier conversation trying to get out:
How should we protect stars with fragile bodies like Embiid and Wembanyama?
What’s the right balance between aesthetics and efficiency when we judge scorers like Shai and Jokić?
How much of “winning” is context, roster, health, and timing rather than individual virtue or vice?
How do we design rules that encourage competitive balance without punishing competence?
The modern NBA is messy, complicated, and louder than ever. The hot takes aren’t going away.
The question is whether we’re willing, sometimes, to look past the surface—to see Jalen Williams as more than a net rating, Shai as more than a whistle, Luka as more than a body fat percentage, and the Thunder as more than hoarders of draft picks.