The “Bag” Debate: Why Michael Jordan’s Game Was Perfect for His Era—And Still Sets the Standard
In December 2025, the NBA world was set ablaze by a fresh controversy. On the “No Fouls Given” podcast, Paul Pierce and Danny Green made headlines by suggesting that Michael Jordan’s offensive “bag”—his arsenal of moves—was limited compared to Shai Gilgeous-Alexander (SGA), the Oklahoma City Thunder’s newly crowned MVP and Finals hero. The claim, echoing a growing trend in social media discourse, wasn’t just provocative; it fundamentally misunderstood what made Jordan’s game so dominant and so perfectly calibrated for his era.
This article dives deep into the debate, examining how “bag” aesthetics have shifted, why Jordan’s skill set was anything but limited, and how context and rules shape the way greatness is expressed.
The Comments That Sparked the Debate
On the podcast, Pierce declared, “Mike had a limited bag. He didn’t need to do all that fancy stuff. He was right to the business. He was one, two dribble pull-up, no bag.” Danny Green, while more nuanced, added, “Shai has more of a bag, though,” but clarified that Jordan had moves he didn’t need to use.
This distinction matters. Green’s qualifier—Jordan had moves, he just didn’t need to deploy them—actually undermines the “limited bag” framing. The conversation revealed a conflation between aesthetic move diversity and actual scoring effectiveness. Pierce defined “bag” narrowly as flashy dribble handles leading to a shot, ignoring the post footwork, fadeaways, counter moves, and fundamentals that made Jordan unstoppable.
What Was Michael Jordan’s Real Arsenal?
The reality is that Michael Jordan’s offensive toolkit was encyclopedic. The “one, two dribble pull-up” label erases the breadth of his documented skills. Jordan’s arsenal included:
Drop steps and up-and-unders in the post
Turnaround fadeaways over either shoulder (shooting 82% of fadeaways in his final two Bulls seasons)
Baseline reverse layups
Double and triple clutch finishes
Mid-air hand switches
Jab step series and pivot foot mastery (Nike literally designed a shoe around his footwork)
Finishing at the rim with either hand, through contact
Efficient scoring off the ball, in pick-and-roll, and isolation
Film studies and advanced analytics consistently rank Jordan as the most complete scoring weapon in NBA history. He could score in the post, off the ball, in transition, and against set defenses with a “gaggle” of efficient moves.
The Statistical Evidence: Volume and Efficiency
Jordan’s statistical dominance is overwhelming. In the 1996-97 season, he made 547 mid-range field goals at 49.5% efficiency. For comparison, Reggie Miller—considered the era’s premier shooter—made only 484 at 42.4%.
Jordan owns six of the nine highest pace-adjusted scoring rates in NBA history. His playoff shooting charted at 65% at the rim, 46% from mid-range, and maintained elite efficiency even as his volume increased under postseason pressure. No player in history matched his combination of volume and efficiency across three distinct phases of a career.
Jordan’s Evolution: From Explosive Athlete to Footwork Technician
Jordan’s game transformed dramatically over 15 years, disproving any notion of a static, limited toolkit. From 1984 to 1987, he dominated as an explosive slasher with one of the best first steps in NBA history, blowing by elite defenders like Sidney Moncrief. By 1988-93, he developed his trademark fadeaway, improved his three-point shooting to 37.6% in the 1989-90 season, and won Defensive Player of the Year—all while maintaining scoring dominance.
After his first retirement, Jordan returned and reinvented himself as a post-up assassin. Chicago Tribune writer Sam Smith documented how Jordan became stronger, a deeper student of the game, and developed an indefensible fall-away move in the post. BJ Armstrong, who witnessed both versions, said: “The player that he was in ‘91, ‘92, ‘93 could overwhelm you with pure raw athleticism. The player you saw in ‘96, ‘97, ‘98 was a totally different player. The genius was that he was able to do it in a completely different way.”
Jordan won scoring titles at ages 32, 33, and 34—the oldest player to do so three consecutive times—by mastering entirely new skill sets as his athleticism declined.
What Defenders and Coaches Really Saw
The people who actually schemed against Jordan tell a different story than the “limited bag” narrative. Chuck Daly created the infamous “Jordan Rules” specifically because conventional defense couldn’t contain Jordan’s diverse attack. The Pistons needed an entire defensive system dedicated to one player because his offensive options were too numerous for individual defenders.
Joe Dumars, Jordan’s primary defender for 14 years, described facing “a very smart player who introduced certain tricks to make me expand on my talents as a defender.” Gary Payton, the 1996 Defensive Player of the Year, developed strategies just to deny Jordan the ball—because once he had it, no defense could contain his moves.
The Rules Matter: Why Jordan’s Game Was “Optimized”
One key factor in the “bag” debate is the rules environment. Before 2001-02, the NBA’s illegal defense rule meant defenders couldn’t play in between the ball and their man—they had to commit to a full double team or stick to their assignment. As Jason Williams explained, when MJ had the ball on the wing, “all he had to worry about was the primary defender. MJ only had one guy.”
Extended dribble sequences—the heart of the modern “bag”—were counterproductive under hand-checking rules that let defenders physically steer ball handlers. BJ Armstrong revealed Jordan’s calculated adaptation: “He figured out he had to catch the ball in the position to score. So, he learned to operate from the post and on the weak side and play the game with three dribbles or less.” This wasn’t limitation; it was optimization.
The paint looked different, too. Centers could legally camp under the rim without defensive three-second violations. Teams averaged just 3.1 three-point attempts per game in Jordan’s rookie year, versus 35-plus today. The fadeaway Jordan made famous is now nearly extinct because the rules that made it optimal no longer exist.
Modern Moves for Modern Problems
Today’s guards face fundamentally different challenges. Legal zone defense means multiple help defenders can position at the nail and elbow to cut off drives. The defensive three-second rule opened the paint but allowed roaming shot blockers. Modern “bag” moves—step-back threes, extended hesitation sequences, euro steps—solve these new defensive puzzles.
While Jordan’s game was perfectly calibrated for the physical play of the ‘90s, Harden’s and SGA’s games are perfectly suited for the hands-off, data-driven dogma of today. Technically, they play the same sport, but comparisons across eras can get wonky in a hurry.
The Euro Step: Era-Specific Evolution
The Euro step itself illustrates how rules shape skill sets. Larry Bird and Šarūnas Marčiulionis brought the move to the NBA in 1989, but it wasn’t technically legal until 2009 when the NBA clarified the gather step rule. Jordan didn’t use euro steps because they weren’t needed to evade help defense that couldn’t legally exist.
The “bag” debate is fundamentally aesthetic. The term itself emerged in the social media era. LeBron James, who faces identical “no bag” criticism despite scoring more points than anyone in history, noted: “When I was growing up, it wasn’t talked about. I’ll be on social media and like ‘LeBron has no bag.’ And I’m sitting here like, ‘I got 50 billion points.’”
LeBron, Steve Nash, and Luka Dončić anonymously agreed on their podcast that obsession with “bag” actually harms player development.
Having More Moves Isn’t Always Better
Even Kobe Bryant, considered to have one of the deepest bags in history, faced efficiency criticism for forcing high-volume shots. He missed more field goals than any player in NBA history. Phil Jackson wrote that Bryant “tends to force the action, especially when the game isn’t going his way.” Having more moves doesn’t guarantee better outcomes.
SGA’s Modern Greatness—and Jordan’s Influence
Shai Gilgeous-Alexander deserves every bit of praise he receives. His MVP season—32.7 PPG on 51.9% shooting while leading the Thunder to a championship—represents legitimate modern greatness. He became only the fourth player in NBA history to win a scoring title, regular season MVP, and Finals MVP in the same season, joining Kareem, Michael Jordan (who accomplished it four times), and Shaquille O’Neal.
SGA’s specific statistical combination—30+ PPG, 50%+ FG, 5+ rebounds, 5+ assists, 1.5+ steals and 1+ blocks—has only been matched by Jordan himself. And stylistically, SGA takes 36.7% of his shots from mid-range, compared to the league average of 16.6%. He’s actually the most Jordan-like modern scorer, not his opposite.
His game represents evolution within the same foundational style, not revolution away from it.
Cross-Era Comparisons: The Real Lesson
Cross-era player comparison requires evaluating relative dominance within context—not transplanting players across rule sets. Time-travel a 1950s star to today and he might not make the league; send Chris Paul to the 1950s and he would dominate. Neither scenario tells us who was actually better.
Jordan himself acknowledged these realities: “We play in different eras. I take it with a grain of salt.” But he also noted that today’s players “don’t even have a clue on how we had to grow up and how we had to play. You couldn’t cross the lane without getting checked.”
Scottie Pippen estimated Jordan could score 100 points in today’s game given current defensive rules.
Conclusion: Optimization, Not Limitation
The Pierce-Green claim reveals more about how we discuss basketball than about Jordan’s actual abilities. Jordan possessed post moves, perimeter skills, three-level scoring, and counter-move mastery documented across 15 years of evolution. He adapted from explosive athlete to footwork technician to post-up master, winning scoring titles in all three phases.
Coaches created entire defensive schemes just for him. Defenders described facing “a very subtle, very impressive set of decisions.” Tim Grover, who trained him for 14 years, watched Jordan eliminate every weakness methodically.
What Pierce called a “limited bag” was actually ruthless optimization. Using three dribbles instead of ten, catching in position to score, deploying the fadeaway instead of the step-back because one-on-one defense couldn’t stop it. Different rules rewarded different solutions.
Jordan’s moves were calibrated for an environment where help couldn’t come legally, contact was constant, and the paint was packed. His “limited toolkit” produced the highest career scoring average in NBA history and six championships.
The debate ultimately reduces to this: Do we evaluate basketball skills by aesthetic variety, or by results achieved within competitive constraints? Jordan faced the greatest defenders of his era under rules that made his game harder to execute—and dominated anyway.
That is not limitation. That is mastery
