This part of the Vietnam War might not be well known to many Americans, but it reveals the tough ground combat, intelligence work, and local involvement that shaped much of the experience there. In 1966, we decided to re-enter Nui Thi. As the initial clearing mission got underway, we were surprised by the significant presence of the Vietkong in the area we had thought was cleared.

This called for specific plans to build on what we had previously achieved. These focused plans guided our operational strategy while we were deployed and required careful planning from Brigadier Jackson for a longer operation. Several intelligence reports indicated that the Vietkong were still firmly established in New Tivi.

 They might have more bases along with opportunities to gather additional documents, equipment, and supplies. Brigadier Jackson felt that continuing the operation was worthwhile and approved the plan just days before the convoys were set to finish, allowing us to advance with our preparations. The western and northern sections of Newivvi looked to be the most promising, featuring a series of paths leading into those areas and run-down houses on the northwestern slope, which were perfect for Vietkong hiding. The western side of

the hill gave the best view of Route 15, while the natural escape routes from the hill were to the north. Colonel War made the decision to position the battalion around the northern and western flanks. This setup allowed two companies to advance up the western slope, while another secured the area directly north of the hill.

 A fourth company would establish ambush positions further north to catch any Vietkong movements in and out of New Thai based on the paths shown in a captured map. D Company was assigned this mission with B company positioned to its north. A company was to scout the north central part of the western slope and C company would cover the rest of the western slope.

 In the meantime, battalion headquarters protected by the assault pioneer and anti-tank plate owns would move up the track to the pagoda and find a position that ensured reliable radio communication with the companies. The sixth battalion helped by providing de company to protect the gun area. It was probably obvious to the Vietkong on New Tai that we would come back once the convoys stopped.

 This prompted us to take some strategic measures. Our movements along Route 15 were impacted by the excellent visibility the Vietkong had from their observation posts on the hill. We could use this to our advantage. They might feel secure until they saw our battalion assembling for the long walk back to the base of the hill.

 The dense jungle that covered much of the area between the hills and route 15 provided good concealment. Once we blended in without attracting attention, the Vietkong would not know our location until we were right in front of them. The goal was to enter the jungle unseen. Companies B and C could move directly from their spots along Route 15 to their assigned search areas.

 However, companies A and D had to come from the southern part of the road. This path allowed them to reach Nuivivi effectively while avoiding accidental meetings with the other companies. D Company was moved from its position to an assembly area south of Fumi in small groups, traveling in closed armored personnel carriers and mounting and dismounting while covered.

 This movement happened throughout the last day of the convoys. The movement of the armored personnel carriers was routine since patrols had been running along the road since we started securing it. A company and battalion headquarters were relocated at dusk enclosed armored personnel carriers to an assembly area between companies B and C.

 This allowed both groups to head east and approach Newivvi near the path leading up to the Pagoda. The tents and equipment at the battalion headquarters site along the road remained untouched with some soldiers from the sixth battalion occupying them to prevent the area from looking deserted. The gun position stayed the same with the sixth battalion company carefully integrated within the area alongside the daily resupply convoys.

 Each company planned to cross Route 15 and the open ground to the east of the road in the early hours of the next morning, October 17th, aiming to get at least a mile into the jungle by dawn. The movements were executed smoothly. Battalion headquarters was situated a few hundred yards from a Buddhist shrine where a tall white marble Buddha stood between two lotuscovered pools.

 We set off into the darkness at 3:00 in the morning. We quietly put on our gear, which we had packed the night before. The only disturbance came from our mosquito nets, essential for protection whenever we rested. As we made our way through the jungle after crossing Route 15, we were enveloped by the sounds of gongs and a deep bell ringing.

 These echoes floated through the air, creating a surreal atmosphere as we waited through half a mile of water next to the road. We were far enough from the shrine not to be seen by the monks, so we thought the sounds were harmless. Captain Lean, who was leading the battalion headquarters party, guided us onto a wide, sandy path shaded by trees, keeping us hidden.

 We welcomed a couple of hours of rest in another harbor area a little further along the path. At dawn, we continued down a sandy path that twisted through taller trees, which arched above us and cast small patches of sunlight onto the ground. This track was aligned with our intended direction, allowing us to move quickly.

 When we reached a crossroad where another trail intersected, we were surprised to find a warning sign in English about danger ahead. I instinctively pinched myself, encountering a clear, printed sign in the heart of the Vietnamese jungle was unexpected. The sign did not have explosives rigged to it and seemed to be at least 6 months old.

 There was no Vietnamese translation indicating it was likely meant for American forces or our unit. Its message was confusing, simply stating that Vietkong were active in the area. Soon after, a company which was leading our advance came across a well- constructed Vietkong camp with trenches and cover from artillery located with about one company on either side of the trail.

 Near this camp, a booby trap was triggered, causing an explosion that fortunately did not injure anyone. We moved on, realizing that the blast likely raised the suspicions of the Vietkong, though they might have thought it was just a pig running into the trip wire. After passing the camp, we reached the first houses at the foot of the hill.

 Some were solidly built with brick and reinforced concrete, while others showed signs of occupation by the Vietkong. This suggested that a company would need at least a day to search all of them thoroughly. A company began to spread out to secure the area and take a short break. Meanwhile, the battalion headquarters group moved up the track toward the pagoda, which was 1,200 ft above before darkness set in.

 After passing the houses, the path steepened. It changed from a sandy track into a series of rocky steps. Some steps were rough, while others were carefully crafted and set in concrete at tricky spots. We climbed to about 200 ft and paused for the anti-tank platoon, which was leading the battalion headquarters to clear the next stretch of high ground overlooking the trail.

 As we stood on the rocks, rain started to fall in swift, heavy drops. It was already past noon, but we chose to skip lunch before tackling New Tai to avoid the fatigue that comes with a full stomach. The trail climbed steeply, and we looked forward to reaching the top. A large rock came into view further along the path.

 It resembled a triangular prism resting on one of its edges, held up by towering trees. The rock measured about 50 ft long and 30 ft high with a roughly flat top of similar size. We found good shelter beneath one side and took cover from the rain. A few sleepy bats hung upside down from the rough stone above. After about 20 minutes, the anti-tank platoon radioed that they were nearing the top of the northwestern spur.

 Then three shots rang out above us. The platoon had spotted a Vietkong hiding behind a rock off the side of the trail. They chased after him for a short distance but lost track of him. Brian Leanne asked Colonel War for permission to continue up the track with a reconnaissance group from battalion headquarters.

 He wanted to set up at the Pagoda before the main force arrived. Colonel War agreed but warned him about the enemy presence ahead. Aware of the potential risks for his small team, Brian responded with optimism and bounded up the rocks. He held his Owen gun in his right hand to keep his balance as he moved quickly. 10 minutes after Brian set off, the rest of battalion headquarters followed him up the trail.

 They spread out over a 100 yards along the steep slope. This spacing created long gaps between individuals, forcing all communications in headquarters to occur via radio. This setup had challenges as only one person could speak at a time and anyone monitoring our frequency could hear our conversations. for a headquarters tasked with leading and coordinating the activities of several hundred men, including tactical deployments, ammunition supply, air strike direction, and helicopter evacuations of casualties. We were far from being in an

ideal situation. Over time, we had grown accustomed to facing these challenges. Max Carroll had become cynical enough to feel that fate always seemed to throw enemy encounters our way. Whenever battalion headquarters was on the move, it was raining and we were precariously perched on a rocky ledge.

 His cynicism felt warranted on the afternoon of October 17th. Shortly after we set off, we heard gunfire echoing off the rocks above us. Instantly, our fears escalated since it was evident these shots were not from our weapons. A strong response of Australian fire ensued. Moments later, Brian Lean’s radio operator reported that the reconnaissance party was under attack.

 Brian had been wounded and was pinned down by the Vietkong behind a rock. Behind a rock behind a rock, making it impossible for him to access the radio and communicate details about the enemy’s position and strength. The Vietkong seemed to recognize Brian as the leader and targeted him first. Fortunately, even with his injury, Brian narrowly avoided serious harm.

 A sniper’s bullet struck his Owen gun at the safety slide just inches from him. It ruined the safety slide and jammed the gun, preventing Brian from firing back. The bullet ricocheted off the Owen gun and hit his chest on the right side, causing a deep wound that took months to heal, but was not life-threatening.

 The firing on our reconnaissance party continued. Rice M. Fo and CSM Houston encountered gunfire when they attempted to advance. Despite efforts to suppress the enemy with machine gunfire directed toward the source of the shots, the attackers emerged from various hidden locations among the rocks on the slope to the right of the track, all concealed in caves or makeshift hides.

 They controlled the only route to the ridgetop. By this time, the anti-tank platoon had reached the summit of the spur. They secured the area around the pagoda, carefully checking for booby traps, then confirmed that the slope leading up to Newi was clear of Vietkong. They spotted several Vietkong in the middle of the slope, but the enemy quickly retreated.

 The battalion headquarters group had a key advantage because the anti-tank platoon reached the top of the spur. This allowed them to use the high ground to launch an attack on the Vietkong who were blocking the reconnaissance party. If the anti-tank platoon had not been in that position, the Vietkong could have slowed our advance significantly, as their positions controlled all the approaches from the lower slopes of the hill.

 The encounter occurred on a steep slope filled with boulders standing up to 15 ft high. Thick bush and large trees among the rocks made visibility limited to about 10 yards in many areas. The narrow track only allowed one person to move forward at a time. Although boulders provided some cover, most were isolated, complicating movement and increasing the risk of enemy fire.

 The Vietkong had picked their position in a large rock slide. This slide consisted of a heap of boulders that extended down the hillside to a depth of over 50 ft. They built numerous shelters and tunnels in this rock slide. This allowed them to change their firing positions without being seen.

 They used this strategic location effectively, and it wasn’t until we captured their equipment that we learned if we had faced a dozen or as many as 50 men. The situation for those trapped by Vietkong fire was dire. They could not escape the area. While they were safe from fire on the right side of the track, they could not tell if anyone was approaching from the left to assault their exposed side.

 Colonel War commanded second lieutenant Mick Deak, the anti-tank platoon commander, to move onto the enemy’s position and drive them out. The platoon was a bit worn out after climbing over 1300 ft with heavy equipment. To help, Deak told his men to leave their packs at the top of the spur in a central location.

 Deak’s task was to get his platoon across a sharp gully that lay between the path where the reconnaissance group was and the start of the rock slide where the Vietkong were positioned. Most of the gully was exposed to fire from the rock slide. Deak ordered his second section led by Corporal Wl Worm to cross the gully while the first and third sections provided cover by firing at the Vietkong positions from a higher point on the slope.

 Wl section moved through the central part of the gully carefully avoiding enemy fire as they navigated from rock to rock. Just as they were about to climb over the rocks on the far side, a shot rang out. Corpal Wl fell, shouting that he had been hit in the neck. He landed on a large flat rock, but continued to manage his sections fire and movements despite his serious injury.

 Out of sight from the rest of his platoon, it took Deoment to find Wul so he could begin the extraction process and treat his wound. Wl kept directing his platoon commander and coordinated the fire of his machine gun group to cover the platoon’s movement toward him. The anti-tank platoon had eased some pressure on the reconnaissance group, allowing Brian Lean to reach the radio.

We felt a huge sense of relief when we heard him speak and describe the situation. We had been unsure about the enemy’s positions and how Deak’s platoon was doing. Tony White had rushed up the track to help Brian after he was hit, and he was almost there now. The wound was treated quickly, and Brian started making his way back to the main headquarters, needing immediate evacuation to a hospital.

 Meanwhile, right after the encounter, Max Carroll arranged for a dustoff helicopter to come to the gun area along Route 15, which was 3 mi away. The most pressing concern at battalion headquarters, was finding a landing zone for the helicopter. The closest available area was at the base of New Tai, several hundred yards away on difficult terrain that would slow down stretcher carrying.

At that moment, the large flat rock we had just left seemed like a good option. It was fairly level, easy to access from the uphill side, and wide enough for a small Sue helicopter to land without the rotor blades hitting any trees. The main challenge was to establish a clear approach for the helicopter.

 It needed to approach and take off at the right angle to gain enough speed for ascent. After passing the edge of the rock, the helicopter relied on the rock surface for lift as the rotor blades pushed air downward, creating a support known as ground effect. This was crucial until the helicopter reached a speed of 20 knots, allowing it to lift off from its forward motion alone.

 Once it cleared the rock, the ground effect lessened. The pilot faced a tougher challenge to stay in flight. Fortunately, a helpful air current swept up the hillside, mimicking calm air for easier hovering. Yet, the ascent angle was still quite shallow, surrounded by tall trees. The only practical approach was from the western side due to the steep terrain.

The assault pioneer platoon rushed to remove the obstructing trees. It relied heavily on the pilot’s skill. The landing zone remained tricky, offering just one approach wide enough for the rotor blades, leaving little room for the tail rotor to take off. The pilot had to reverse off the rock’s edge and climb to gain enough altitude to turn east and descend the slope of New Tivi, speeding up as he went.

 This was a daunting task with an uncertain result. The Sue helicopter was prepared with stretcher frames to transport the casualty to a larger Irakcoy below in the clearing. The Irakcoy could provide immediate medical care while flying the injured back to Vonga. The Sue supporting our operations reached overhead just minutes after the trees were cleared and began attempting to land.

 Lieutenant Bob Ascu, the pilot, made several initial passes over the rocky area to assess the challenges ahead. It was a real test of his judgment. Once he committed to landing, there would be no turning back without risking a crash. However, like the other pilots from the 161st reconnaissance flight, who tirelessly flew for us in Vietnam, often logging up to 11 hours a day, we had full confidence in Ascu’s decision-making.

 Captain Bob Suppel directed the aircraft in. An additional layer of danger came from enemy snipers positioned higher up the slope. During the final approach, the aircraft became an easy target with the pilot relying on a flat jacket for protection. The rock surface was saucer-shaped, featuring a steep lip on the eastern side, which we would use to board.

 The rotor blades barely cleared this lip by about 2 ft, preventing anyone from approaching the helicopter while the blades were spinning. Bob Supple had to maneuver the aircraft close to him to avoid a serious accident. Moments later, Brian Lean walked along the path. He was only wearing trousers and boots, yet he looked surprisingly calm despite the large blood soaked dressing on his right chest.

 We spoke on top of the rock after Brian climbed into the helicopter while Ascu began the startup process. The signals course where I first met Brian back in 1961 felt like a distant memory. Although he seemed to be managing, he must have been in considerable pain. We hoped he was not bleeding internally. The helicopter lifted slightly off the rock and carefully began to reverse, avoiding the nearby trees with the tailrotor.

 The pilot skillfully navigated the aircraft, swinging it clockwise toward the west and speeding down to the clearing where the dust off aircraft was waiting. If you are hearing this, you are exactly who we meant to reach. Please do the simple thing that keeps it going. Subscribe. Back on the ridge with Leiddan evacuated and the light dimming, the rest of the battalion remained vulnerable and the Vietcom were far from finished.

 A short time later, a radio call came in about Corporal Wl’s injury. The Sue was called back to extract Wl and the extraction procedure started again. However, getting WL to safety proved difficult for his platoon above. The snipers knew where WML was and targeted anyone trying to help him. While the anti-tank platoon could provide suppressive fire briefly, there were concerns about their ability to keep it up long enough to rescue WML.

Against Eeks orders Private Fraser, the platoon’s stretcherbearer crawled toward WML under enemy fire. He reached him and began to treat his wound, using his own body to shield WML from incoming bullets. The snipers opened fire again, narrowly missing Fraser. Meanwhile, the stretcher team, organized by Lieutenant Deak, was moving forward, guided by Sergeant Calvert and supported by fire from the rest of the platoon.

 By this point, the enemy had realized that Dee was in charge. Each time he yelled orders, bullets zipped above him from the snipers. The boulders created major obstacles for the stretcher team. In some areas, they had to lift the stretcher high to navigate through the rocks, constantly putting themselves in danger.

 Each time they had to move into the open, Sergeant Calvert called for covering fire. This allowed them to cross the exposed area without getting hit, though they had to move slowly due to intense enemy fire. In the end, they managed the extraction and reached the rocky cover behind the main platoon positions. Tony White took the opportunity to advance to the platoon’s location.

 He was ready to treat Worml’s injury when the stretcher team arrived. It quickly became clear to him that Worml’s chances of survival were very slim. The bullet had severed several major blood vessels in his neck. Moments later, Worml passed away. We lost not just a remarkable man, but also an exceptional section commander. The stretcherbearers made their way down the slippery rocks to carry Wuml’s body to the helicopter.

 Wrapped in a ground sheet, he was loaded onto the aircraft and flown out to Vonga. The weight of his loss was heavy on those still on the hillside. The bearers trudged back, exhausted and filled with sorrow. The next challenge was to extract the section still trapped in the gully under Vietkong fire. It felt risky to try to push the enemy back while moving this section.

 Given the rough terrain, they had provided good covering fire for WML’s extraction, but their ammunition was running low. The entire platoon faced a similar shortage, though not as severe. A solution was needed to neutralize or ideally dislodge the Vietkong through fire support while keeping the trapped men in the gully safe.

 Major Peter Cole, who had been in command of a company since September, radioed from 200 ft below. He could see the Vietkong’s exact position on the steep slope 600 yd away and could saturate their area with machine gun fire from his location. Support also came from two American gunships. Artillery or mortars could not be used because of how close our men were to the Vietkong.

 However, both a company and the gunships could strike the Vietkong locations without risking casualties to the anti-tank platoon. We began marking our positions with colored smoke. Soon, four colored plumes identified the anti-tank platoon. Two groups from battalion headquarters and the assault pioneer platoon.

 While the gunships took their positions, Colonel War ordered a company to open fire. Before long, the air above us was filled with the sharp sounds of bullets whizzing by from a company towards the Vietkong. Minutes later, gunships flew overhead, circling the area to locate potential cave targets. Soon after, the thundering sounds of their rockets and gunfire echoed across the hillside as they struck.

 From their high position, the gunships acted as mobile platforms, directing fire into cave entrances that were unreachable from the ground. Many rockets flew in on nearly flat paths, crashing into the caves and exploding within. This powerful assault forced the Vietkong to retreat, fleeing south through rocky tunnels that concealed them from view and attack.

 Once the gunships completed their strikes, the anti-tank platoon moved in to evaluate the scene. They quickly realized the Vietkong had left, abandoning bloodied bandages while taking their injured with them. They discovered numerous holes and tunnels in the rocky ground, enabling the Vietkong to move without exposing themselves.

 As they progressed, they found the caves heavily booby trapped, which suggested that clearing them would be a slow task. There was still a chance the Vietkong had retreated deeper into the cave system to wait for nightfall before trying to escape or launch a counterattack. The entire afternoon had passed.

 By 5:00, battalion headquarters recognized it could not stay in such a vulnerable spot. If they withdrew to the base of New Tai, they risked losing the day’s hard one progress to the enemy and might have to repeat the operation the next day. Additionally, the Vietkong would likely set up more booby traps further up the path, especially close to their goal, the Pagoda at the summit.

Colonel War decided to make the most of their current position and push forward up the mountain, aiming to reach the Pagod before nightfall. Time was running short. Everyone moved cautiously, wary of potential sniper activity. The anti-tank platoon returned to the spot they had left their gear, hoping that the area around the pagoda had not already been booby trapped by the fleeing Vietkong.

 As they climbed quickly, their initial anxiety began to fade into fatigue. The sweeping views of the lush jungles around them offered a refreshing distraction during their brief stops along the way. As night fell, we entered the stone gateway that led into the pagod garden. Bats flitted around the archway, darting through the branches above and swooping beneath the wide eaves of the pagod.

 Just before the entrance, we passed the cave of the hermit monk Newen Vanzi, whom we had met earlier. The fading light made it difficult to see into the cave’s large opening. The pagoda stood before us, a prominent granite structure with a rectile roof. Greystone swastikas looked down from under the eaves. The front section facing west lay in ruins after being shelled by Vietnamese artillery from Mai, who targeted the area upon discovering that the Vietkong were present.

 At the back, we found a spacious kitchen and several shelters that had recently been used by the Vietkong. An additional rectangular building extended north from the main structure, forming a courtyard beside some outhouses to the north. A swiftly flowing stream entered the southeastern corner of the courtyard, originating from the hillside behind the pagoda.

This stream, bordered by beautiful stone banks, flowed into a large concrete system that provided water to the homes at the bottom of the hill. A stone bridge with a covered walkway connected the two buildings. The ornamental trees and shrubs and shrubs along with the stone walls lining the stream and the raised stone platforms beneath the structures created a sense of natural harmony in the courtyard.

 Some flat ground stretched out to the north and west for about 20 yards while the slopes descended sharply to the east and south. Thick dark green jungle surrounded the pagoda, and the garden in front of the main building had become overgrown. We were relieved to see that the pagoda and its surroundings remained untouched by the Vietkong, allowing us to settle in quickly.

 Battalion headquarters was established at the rear of the main building, where we enjoyed the rare luxury of working from tables and stools. The administrative section, led by Captain Ron Shamuk, this time set up in the other main building. Meanwhile, the two platoon spread out around the perimeter of the Pagoda complex for complete protection on all sides.

 We took care not to show any light that might attract the attention of the nearby Vietkong, blending into the darkness. Thankfully, we did not hear from them for the rest of the night. Each company was securely positioned in their assigned spots. Major Neville Gar from 103 Field Battery told us about the fire plan for each stop.

 This ensured we were prepared for a possible attack. Colonel War used the radio to talk with each company commander, giving coordinating instructions for the next day. We were thankful to grab any sleep we could manage between our shifts at the command post or while watching the perimeter machine guns which were manned all the time.

 The next day, we had to clear the caves. This was crucial not only for our safety as we moved through the hill, but also to make it harder for the Vietkong to use them. The caves were filled with booby traps. Our experts, the assault pioneer platoon, took on this task. Flamethrowers, key tools for this operation, were flown in from Nui Date.

 Once they arrived, the platoon went down the hill to the caves. They were guided by two members from the anti-tank platoon and observed by three sapper captains, all under the command of Lieutenant John Maloney, the leader of the assault pioneers. They approached the caves with care. They placed sentries along the path above and below where they would be working.

Additionally, they set up a machine gun in a strategic spot to cover the area in front of the caves where they had seen Vietkong the afternoon before. Mallaloney directed the guides to take him to the cave that had the booby traps. Accompanied by a radio operator and a sentry, the small team set out. They navigated over large boulders for about 100 yards from the track to the furthest cave.

 They quickly found the cave and positioned sentries on both sides, uphill and downhill from the entrance. Macaloney then entered the cave to search for booby traps. It didn’t take long to find the first trap, which was right inside the entrance, hidden under a large rock. The mechanism caught Jon’s attention. He crouched down to examine it closely so he could disable it safely.

 Suddenly, a shot rang out, narrowly missing the sentry, private Dantoan, who was stationed at the cave entrance. Jon climbed back out and told Dantoan to crouch down and take cover. He asked him where the shot had come from. He ordered the machine gun crew and one section to move down the slope to track the sniper. Another shot rang out and Dantoan groaned and then fell silent.

 Jon quickly rushed toward Dantoan, getting within 20 ft of him. When Jon called his name, Dantoan didn’t respond. Jon instructed the machine gun team to fire at the area where the sniper was hiding. As he approached Dantoan, he had to stop the fire, however, because ricocheting bullets came alarmingly close. Corporal Burge, who was leading the fire support team, took a careful shot at a Vietkong soldier who had poked his head out at Macallan from the cave entrance.

 The head disappeared, and Berg felt assured in his aim. Maconey then heard a rustling sound from a passage below him. Dantuan’s legs hung over the edge of the rock, making it difficult for Jon to pull him back to safety. The platoon medic arrived to help Jon. Despite Dontoan’s seemingly lifeless state, he began mouth-to-mouth resuscitation and treated his wound.

 The bullet had entered through his back and exited through his chest. Thankfully, they found a faint heartbeat and quickly prepared a stretcher for Dantoan’s evacuation. They had also called for a dustoff helicopter. And by the time Dantoan was carried 300 yd to the nearest landing zone, the helicopter was on its way.

 Unfortunately, despite the swift efforts, Danttoan passed away during the flight to Vangao. John Mccaloney went back to the cave and crawled to the entrance to clear out any remaining Vietkong. This was particularly risky as they were unaware of the enemy’s numbers or positions, and clearing one cave could expose them to dangers from others.

 Still, Maloney took charge in clearing the area where the sniper had retreated. He started by tossing grenades into the cave’s mouth, but when there was no response, he decided to use a flamethrower. Before doing so, Jon noticed Diantoan’s automatic armalite rifle lying near the cave. He called for covering fire and crawled out to grab the weapon.

 The covering fire had to be very close to reach the cave’s mouth, but Jon felt safer with it until a bullet ricocheted off the cave entrance and hit him in the right temple. He bled heavily but sustained no serious injury. After retrieving the armalite, he crawled back to safety, commenting that it seemed wasteful to leave it behind.

 He then led the flamethrowing team towards the cave’s mouth. First, they sprayed fuel from the high pressure nozzle into the cave, soaking all exits from the first chamber and every crevice. Then, they launched a quick attack at the cave entrance, darting from their rocky cover. At the mouth of the cave, they poured fuel into the main chamber while small arms fire covered them from the left.

 They ignited the last of the fuel and quickly retreated as flames roared into the hiding spots of the sniper. The effort was so thorough that centuries on the slope saw flames bursting from various exits of the cave system. By the time the fire rampaged fully, darkness was settling in, prompting the small group to rush back up the hill to regroup.

 In the following days, teams from a company tell the darkness to eft to express to post her. The assault pioneer platoon and the first field squadron of the Royal Australian engineers from Newiat entered the caves to search them. A company set up halfway up the hillside near the caves, overseeing the northwestern side of Newi with their patrols.

 As they explored the caves, they encountered a complex network of tunnels with multiple levels, often making it hard to see how the levels connected. Many caves and passages were completely dark, so the searchers could not determine what was inside until they reached the entrance with a flashlight. The tension of the search grew due to the frequent threat of booby traps.

 The patrols from a company often made initial discoveries, cautiously exploring new caves or lower levels in the darkness, feeling carefully for precarious threads or shifting rocks that might trigger an explosion with the slightest touch. Once booby traps were identified, sappers or pioneers were called to disarm them. Their skills had improved so much that they managed to do this without injuries during this critical time.

 These caves had been a lasting stronghold for up to a company of Vietkong who watched the hill and transported supplies along the trails at the base of Newi. The caves were wellbuilt, featuring wooden beds and small stone stoves. They even had a piped water system connected to the supply running down the hill from the pagod.

 Deep underground storage and filtration systems enabled the Vietkong to remain hidden for extended periods. Access to some entrances demanded great agility because they were only about a foot in diameter. Some caves proved too difficult for anyone but the small framed Vietnamese to enter. Some entrances were strengthened with rock walls, leaving only slim openings for shooting.

 As the search progressed, the intricate design of the system became apparent with the discovery of multiple levels. Each cave featured several escape routes, including one particularly clever construction. A counterbalanced rock perched at the edge of a vertical shaft enabled someone fleeing to jump down. At the bottom, they could pull a rope to lower a beam supporting the rock at the entrance.

Once the beam was removed, the rock would drop, blocking the shaft’s entrance. This allowed the escapee to exit through a lower passage leading uphill. Signs of a hasty exit were clear throughout the area. Along with an overpowering, unpleasant smell, the searchers unearthed many personal items and documents left behind.

 It seemed the Vietkong had no choice but to abandon all but their weapons. Their bedding, clothing, and packs were left near their resting spots. Several caves even had unfinished meals still sitting out. The most important discovery of the operation was the radio station of Nenan Nam Hung.

 Quote, the deputy commander of the 274th regiment along with some vital documents including his diary. Company A found the radio carefully hidden on the third level of the caves on October 21st. This was a modern Chinese communist transmitter and receiver among the few captured from the Vietkong. The fact that it was left behind indicates the Vietkong were in deep trouble before they escaped, and we likely just missed capturing Hung and his group.

 His diary provided rich information, as he began each day’s entry with his location, allowing us to track his movements over the first 10 months of 1966. We gained many valuable insights from this analysis, which took up much of my time for the next 3 months. He also left notes on the future plans of the 274th regiment, helping us create a detailed understanding of what we needed to prepare for in the upcoming months.

Among the equipment found, it was striking that the Vietkong were armite rifles and had left behind 125 lbs of Chinese communist explosives. We recovered several Chinese Communist claymore mines, which were 20% larger in diameter than any we had encountered before. A significant amount of equipment was taken from those caves, filling eight pages of closely typed fullcap.

 While a company spent a week searching the caves, sea company was patrolling the southwestern area of New Tai. There they found more Vietkong bases, huts, and even a mother pig with her piglets all cleverly camouflaged. The huts and structures were destroyed. The company then moved over the southern ridge of Nui Tivvi and onto Nui Tokien.

They conducted thorough patrols on this hill, but all they found was dense jungle. B Company checked several buildings once occupied by the Vietkong on the northern side of New Tivi. Then they moved into the jungle to take over the ambush position from D Company, which was located farther east. After several days of being on high alert, they remained almost completely still during the day.

 They were ready to act at any moment and ate quietly without cooking or smoking. B Company then set out on a sweep north of New Token. On October 26th, they reached the main track running north, which lay between New Token and the Din Hills. This maneuver led them to discover a small group of Vietkong and gained more understanding of their movements in the area.

 After 3 days of unsuccessful ambushes, D Company was instructed to scale New Vi. They explored the upper slopes in the eastern side of the hill. On October 21st, Lieutenant Dennis Raina’s platoon entered the pass between Nui Tvi and Nui Toktien. Sharp observations by Lieutenant Barry Campbell. The forward observation officer from 103 Field Battery who accompanied the patrol for possible artillery support revealed huts hidden on the western slope of the pass.

 These huts were expertly camouflaged and located deep within dense vegetation. Further investigation showed that the huts were surrounded by a ring of mines and booby traps with a group of Vietkong inside one of them. During a detailed reconnaissance, they discovered an entry path marked by a sign in Vietnamese. This sign featured a red skull and crossbones warning that the area was a minefield and advising to ring a nearby bell.

 Rea’s men chose to ignore the warning and moved closer to the huts quietly. After careful consideration, Raina ordered a surprise attack. Out of the 11 Vietkong in the camp, 10 were killed and one managed to escape. Our side suffered no casualties. In the camp, the platoon took control of all the weapons, ammunition, and equipment left behind.

 The only survivor escaped into the jungle for several days before surrendering at the Duke Taran District compound. He thought the days of the Vietkong were finished in Fork Toui. Eventually, he was found deep in a jungle hiding spot. His unit, the Shodduk District Company, had not engaged in offensive actions for months. He confirmed that Raina’s assault completely wiped out that specific post of the company.

 As days went by, we realized we were approaching the end of our operations at Nui. We prepared to leave on October 26th. However, we understood that the Vietkong would likely send replacement troops back to the hills after we left. So, we did everything possible to disrupt their use of the area for a few months. We spread tear gas crystals in the caves and tunnels to create fumes that could linger for up to 6 months.

 We spent our final days on the hillside treating those caves. We destroyed all surface installations and huts, but we could not take apart the massive pile of fallen rock that formed the caves. This operation turned out to be unexpectedly successful. The captured radio and diary also showed how challenging it was. These successes greatly lifted the battalion’s morale.

 While it may not have held the same long-term strategic value in Faut Tui as the Cordon at Binbar, it significantly boosted the battalion’s spirit, making new TV an important part of our traditions. For their courage and leadership during this mission, military crosses were awarded to lieutenants Deak Maloney and Raina. Private Fraser received the military medal and Corporal Wl was postuously acknowledged in dispatches.

 While we were active along Route 15 in October, we gained a clear understanding of Vietkong operations along the western coast of Foruk Toui. This area was vital for two types of Vietkong activities. First, a significant supply flow from the Mikong Delta entered fortui via the Rangat.

 The Vietkong in Fuaptuine needed both resources and personnel which were readily available from the densely populated rice producing regions within the fourth core. They could quickly load supplies onto small sampans that discreetly navigated the narrow channels leading to the fork toui coast. The Chojuk District Company operated along the western coast and on Long Sun Island to the south.

 This company was formed on the island as well as in several villages along Route 15. Its main goal was to maintain control over these regions. A key task was to assist with the transportation of supplies from the Meong Delta to bases located inland near the hills. After launching attacks on some of these bases, it became an opportune time to target the landing points.

 This would disrupt the operations of the Shauk District Company. Long Island was positioned at the confluence of several sea channels. Some channels flowed into Rangat to the west while others led to the coast of Foyakui. This made the island an ideal staging area complemented by a small landing jetty located at its northwestern tip, Benda.

 Most residents of the island lived on the eastern shore in a well- constructed village located at the base of Newi. This smoothsided grassy hill rises to 600 ft and dominates the landscape. 3/4 of the island lies west of Mui Newa. In this area, the Vietkong had set up a training and resting site under the control of a platoon from the Chowuk District Company.

 Between Newer and Bendar, there was a plane measuring 2 mi long and 1 mile wide. It was interrupted by a long ridge running north south, a bit west of the midpoint between the western coast and Newui. This ridge rose to 250 ft and was covered in low shrubs. Officially, residents were not supposed to live west of Newa.

 The government had ordered all inhabitants to move to the main village to keep them under the control of the local popular forces platoon. However, some islanders ignored this directive and remained in the areas occupied by the Vietkong. This undermined the government’s strategy to label the western part of Long Sun Island as a zone where any individuals observed from the air could be targeted by artillery or our strikes.

 Such individuals were deemed to be aiding the Vietkong or potentially being Vietkong themselves. Long Sun Village located on the eastern side was home to several hundred people living in white plastered brick houses that lined narrow sandy streets. Many of these houses were set within yards and surrounded by trees offering a soft and cool atmosphere.

 At the center of the village stood the largest pagoda in Fort Octui, most of which was built in the mid-9th century before the arrival of the French in the south. Steep red tiled roofs slanted down to curling eaves that rose gracefully in semicircles. Bright blue porcelain dragons ready to breathe fire arched their backs on top of the roofs.

 Small chapels appeared in succession within low towers linked to the main building by elevated walkways. The pagoda and market reflected the island’s historical importance as a sacred site along with the wealth that followed. Inside the main pagoda, several small chapels featured teak altars inlaid with mother of pearl. These altars were adorned with candle holders and handcrafted silver vases.

Impressive tables with polished teak tops 2 in thick lined the walls beneath paintings of local scenes. The market was a vast structure about 100 ftx 40 ft. It was topped with a steep pitched roof supported by teak columns. The red brick floor blended beautifully with the weathered teak of the columns and the beams overhead.

 These two structures were the most notable in the entire province. To the east of the village stretched a long narrow spit over a mile in length. A deep drainage canal ran alongside the northern edge of the spit with steep banks flanking it. This canal connected the village to a sickle-shaped body of water that wound through half a mile of mangroves.

 Fishing boats and sampans were anchored in the canal, which served as the village’s main harbor. At the canal’s mouth, a designated landing point provided access to the government outpost located on the spit at the head of the channel leading to open waters. This outpost, a small fortified quadrangle topped with a tower, proudly displayed the gold and red flag of the South Vietnamese Republic.

 It was surrounded by barbed wire fences and minefields amidst flooded grounds with occasional mudbanks. 30 local men defended this fort, working to maintain the government’s authority on the island. However, the Vietkong faced little serious threat from this smaller force. They had set up a machine gun post and observation point at top Newa.

 From there, they kept watch over village activities and the government platoon. Whenever the platoon tried to patrol the northern or southern sides of the hill, they came under fire from above. As long as they remained close to the village, they experienced no interference. Given the overwhelming strength of the enemy forces, the government platoon had no choice but to stick to this strategy of divided control over the island.

 We began considering an operation on Long Sun Island in August. However, various commitments led us to postpone it until November. The time between August and November actually benefited us with several aerial reconnaissance missions over the island. Our flights used the busy air route from Vong Tao to Saigon, which helped us monitor the area while avoiding any suspicion about our plans.

After conducting a few flights, we pinpointed possible sites for the battalion headquarters, locations for company operations, and helicopter landing zones. Working closely with Vietnamese naval patrols in small boats at night allowed us to see how much the Vietkong were utilizing the island and where their boats usually docked.

 To catch the Vietkong before they could escape into the nearby mangroves, we needed to land the entire battalion quickly at multiple points around the island. This would enable the companies to spread out and cover the areas where the Vietkong operated. At the same time, we needed to create a barrier between the village and the rest of the island to stop the Vietkong from fleeing into the village.

 Our only way to deploy troops to the island was by air since a sea approach would be blocked by the surrounding mangroves. Unfortunately, we could only secure one American helicopter company with 10 aircraft, each capable of lifting 70 men per load. Transporting the battalion directly from Newat to the island, would take 25 minutes for each group of 70.

 This process would extend the operation over several hours due to necessary refueling stops. Such delays would compromise our element of surprise, giving the Vietkong a chance to escape from the initial landing. Moreover, if the first troops arrived while a Vietkong battalion was resting on the island, they could face a more powerful enemy force.

 We could not afford delays in sending reinforcements from Newat. Therefore, the battalion needed to assemble at a location on the mainland as close to the island as possible. This would enable helicopter flights that took less than 10 minutes each way. The next obstacle was to gather the battalion on the mainland across from the island without alerting the Vietkong to our plans before we landed.

 We could address this by starting the operation with a cordon around a village on Route 15, which is conveniently located near the island. After setting up the cordon, the battalion could gather and fly straight to the island instead of heading back to Newi Dart or another location. One of the key Vietkong routes into Futu went through the low area between the Din Hills and Newi Tokien.

 This path started at Fork Hoey, a village of 500 people on route 15 and it was very near Long Island. Fork HA had one of the finest harbors on the western coast, serving a crucial role in the Vietkong supply network. We had specific information about several Vietkong members residing in Fork Hoa, so cordoning off that village became a valuable mission.

 In September, we started to hear that the Vietkong were expecting our move to the island soon. Some bar girls in Vonga began asking our soldiers about our plans to confront the Vietkong on the island. It was known that some of these bar girls had connections to the Vietkong, meaning they could be used to spread false information.

 Since the Vietkong were suspicious that the island might be one of our targets, it was essential to mislead them into thinking our actions near Route 15 would not involve the island. Four seasoned battalion members were chosen to go to Vanga and gently circulate a cover story by casually discussing our plans in situations where bartenders or weight staff might.

 Over here they went in pairs at different times, casually moving through several bars suitable for our goals. The battalion was prepared to move along route 15, heading north into the western den hills. Colonel War’s approach to encircling for Koa involved taking the battalion to Long Cat, located just one mile south of For Koa, and then advancing inland to establish a harbor area.

 When night arrived, the battalion would form an ark to the west, connecting with the cart track leading back into Fuhoa from the opening between Nui Tokien and the Din Hills. This cart track served as an excellent guide, enabling the battalion to approach and surround Fork Hoa under the cover of darkness.

 Even though a land cordon could not secure the villages seaside, the support from the third special air service squadron with men in assault boats made a sea cordon possible. After setting up the cordon, the battalion would move toward the den hills, pausing for the night at the edge of a large clearing, positioning us for an early flight to the island the next morning.

The operation to encircle Fork Ho Quoa was scheduled for the night of November 6th the 7th with a landing on Long Sun Island set for the morning of November 8th. On November 4th, Captain Kim, who leads the Long District, visited the local forces platoon to deliver their monthly pay.

 This visit offered a great chance to gather information on recent Vietkong activities on the island. Although Kim invited me to join him, I hesitated. I worried that my presence on Long Sun might raise suspicions among the Vietkong just before our operation. If they thought my visit suggested an upcoming Australian landing, they could easily retreat to the mainland.

 Luckily, there was a cover plan. Sir Wilfred Kent Hughes was scheduled to visit on November 4th. Since I was tasked with briefing visitors to the battalion, I was assigned to show him around Newi date and other governmentcontrolled areas in the province. If I accompanied Sir Wilfred to Long Sun, and we casually ask a few questions on the island, there was a good chance the local garrison and Captain Kim would not connect our visit to any potential operation.

 I shared this idea with Sir Wilfred, who agreed to help. So, on the afternoon of November 4th, we departed with Captain Kim and a platoon from his unit, leaving from a naval base on the Vongtao Peninsula. We traveled in two medium-sized landing crafts from the Vietnamese Navy, speeding through the wide channels between the mangroves at 12 knots.

 Each craft had several machine guns mounted and protected by armored plates. While the trip was considered completely safe, we took precautions against any surprise attacks in the narrower passages meant to navigate around the bends of the main waterways. After almost 2 hours on the water, we entered the narrow winding arm leading to our landing site near the fort.

 The local soldiers were striking with their religion requiring long hair tied in a bun at the back of their heads. This long hair, along with their smooth skin, made it briefly difficult for me to tell their gender apart. Instead of standard military green uniforms, they wore long black robes that looked like casuks.

They were in high spirits because it was payday, and with only about 20 Vietkong on the island at that time, they felt relatively safe. Recently, the Vietkong fired a few rounds from machine guns into the fort from Newa as a psychological tactic, but thankfully no one was injured. Since we arrived at Nuiidat, no main force battalion had used the island as a rest center, so it seemed unlikely we would encounter any significant resistance when we landed.

We waited for an hour while the American medical team accompanying Captain Kim treated the villagers. The monks at the pagoda were eager to show us around once they learned about the Australian VIP visiting. So, we spent the time exploring from chapel to chapel. We carefully navigated the dark teak staircases and walked across the high gangways connecting the upper chapels.

Captain Kim set off late in the afternoon, treating us to stunning views of the sun setting behind the island, casting crimson reflections over the dark waters that quickly calmed after our passage. The day before the cordon, while driving along route 15, Major Miller spotted a portable wire barrier lined with grenades near the main gate of Fork Hoa.

 If the armored personnel carriers had hit that barrier while entering at dawn, it could have led to serious casualties. However, that barrier might not have been there overnight. So, Major Miller visited the village chief at dusk under the pretense of announcing an upcoming visit from an Australian medical team. He confirmed that the gate was clear, allowing the armored personnel carriers to enter the village without any issues.

 The next morning, the movement into the coordinate fork hoer went smoothly with no attempts to break free. When a company arrived at dawn, and our interpreters broadcasted the instructions, gathering the villagers took just a few hours. During the search of the village, a few young men tried to flee into the surrounding patty fields, but were quickly apprehended by our cordoning units.

 Men and women of military age between 12 and 45 were transported by truck to Barah for questioning by provincial security teams. The deception strategy of advancing inland from Longat seemed to work as five Vietkong members and 11 suspects were identified in Bara along with several deserters and draft dodggers.

 In the late afternoon, the battalion moved out by companies to establish a harbor area a mile west of Fio Hoa. Time was limited for this movement and we struggled to find the right landing zone among several similar areas nearby. The situation deteriorated as some of the armored personnel carriers intended to defend the harbor area got mired in thick black mud.

 They had broken through a hard crust that covered a wide stretch of mud from the water runoff of the D hills. As nightfell, we quickly set up camp and took our positions by shell scrapes. These provided just enough protection against possible mortar attacks or advances from the hills above. After about half an hour in the dark, we settled in as night watch began.

Senturies were positioned at all machine guns to ensure security until the battalion was ready for morning stand. 30 minutes before dawn, we needed to be prepared to move at first light. Helicopters were scheduled to transport the battalion to the island before the locals could spot us. A brief artillery barrage would precede the landing, targeting areas that posed threats to our landing zones.

 B, C, and D companies were set to land on the southern ridge of Newi. Newer C company would take the south central part of the island. B Company was responsible for the north central area and D company would move into the village for a search. A company was assigned to land near the northwestern tip of the island to intercept any Vietkong fleeing to the mainland from Bendar.

 Battalion headquarters was set to land on the eastern side of the ridge in the western part of the island. The operation had widened since its initial planning. Sea company from the sixth battalion joined us and the special air service squadron surrounded the island in small boats to prevent any escaping Vietkong and to search the mangroves for hiding places.

With these additional units involved, Brigadier Jackson saw it as an excellent opportunity to position the task force headquarters in a forward role for the first time. Once battalion headquarters arrived by air, several large Chinuk helicopters delivered the task force headquarters which set up just north of battalion headquarters.

 Major G coordinated the bombardment of the landing zones. This was executed by the gunners of 103 Field Battery just minutes before the helicopters were scheduled to land troops. The helicopter commander had previously surveyed the island from the air with Colonel War and they agreed on a flight path for the helicopter’s landing at Newui Newer.

 The path took a wide arc to the east, steering clear of the gunfire coming from Long Cat during the preparatory bombardment. We were fortunate that Colonel War, Major Gar, and I were aboard a command helicopter overseeing the operation. The first group of helicopters flew directly into the path of the shells being fired.

 Major Gar quickly called off the bombardment to avoid any accidents. Colonel Wah then spoke with the commander of the helicopter company who was also one of our pilots to minimize further risks. When the initial troops from B company landed on the long ridge, they were met with machine gun fire from the peak of Newa.

 One helicopter tragically hit a large rock in the steep landing zone, breaking its main rotor blades. This caused the turbine to catch fire. Thankfully, there were no serious injuries, but the helicopter was beyond repair. The American forces found it difficult to salvage the wreckage since the main rotor shaft was completely broken.

 Normally, a Chinuk helicopter would lift out a damaged craft by grabbing the main rotor shaft, but they were determined to retrieve it. After much effort, it was suspended with slings and eventually lifted by one of the larger helicopters. While D company searched the village area, the other companies faced several minor encounters with the Vietkong.

 B Company moved against an enemy machine gun position on the hilltop, but the Vietkong quickly fell back into the thick brush of the central plane. C Company engaged several enemies in the southwestern part of the island, while A Company uncovered many installations that the Vietkong once used for living and storing supplies.

Indications emerged that some Vietkong might be trapped on the island, leading to the planning of several coordinated sweeps to draw them out into the open. Major Stan Maisy led these sweeps while filling in for Max Carroll, who was on a 5-day leave in Hong Kong. This was a unique opportunity for Stan to step away from the administrative tasks that usually filled his role as the battalion’s second in command.

 He had previously commanded forces from two companies set up for special operations. These included assisting the sixth battalion during the initial search of Long Tan and conducting road clearing operations to Longhai. This village is on the eastern coast of Fu Tui overlooking the Vanga Peninsula. It had served as a retreat for the DM family.

Stan commanded a company during Operation Holsworthy at Binbar when Major Cassidy was unwell. However, these were only small distractions compared to the months spent at the base. He was set to leave the battalion in January. He would take over from Major Richard Hanigan as the senior operations staff officer at task force headquarters.

 This made it essential for him to gain hands-on experience with one of the battalions that would soon report to him. As the search efforts increased against the Vietkong, some tried to hide in the mangroves or escape to the mainland using motorized sampans. Most clashes involved B and D companies and occurred on the northern side.

 The coordinated actions of troops in assault boats and those on land guided by helicopters resulted in the deaths of 10 Vietkong and the capture of three with no casualties on our side. However, when B company began to withdraw south to regroup with C company, a Vietkong sniper shot Private Watson from four platoon dead.

 While snipers occasionally targeted headquarters, their aim was so poor that they caused no injuries. Typically, just one sniper would attempt to approach the perimeter held by support company platoon, firing a few shots hastily before retreating to avoid return fire. The operation concluded with the completion of sweeps on November 12th.

 Although we did not eliminate all the Vietkong from the island, the process had begun. Several families living on the western side of Newa had to move back to Long Sun village, allowing the western part of the island to be targeted occasionally. This was vital to stop the Vietkong from rebuilding their destroyed structures and reestablishing the island as a key supply route from the west.

 A few days after our departure, we received a clear sign of the operation’s success. The remaining 13 Vietkong on the island surrendered to the Vietnamese police in Vonga. It seemed that Long Sun Island was finally at peace in 1966. In 1966, while most of our operations were concentrated on central and western Fuoktui, we were also very aware of the significant issue of Shuan Mox isolation in the eastern district.

 This village, which has about 1500 residents, was protected by two government infantry companies. One was from the regional forces and the other from the popular forces. We focused on Zuja Mock for two main reasons. First, we wanted to find ways to reduce its isolation. Second, we aimed to widen our intelligence network into an area with significant Vietkong presence.

 Aenmoke is centrally located in its district. It is 7 mi from the coast and 12 mi from the nearest village in central Fork Toui. In the land between central Fuick Tui and Zuyan Mock, government authority was nearly absent. It was also weak around Date Du, the main village on the eastern edge of central Fork Tui. Because of this, the Vietkong could move freely throughout the entire province to the east of Dart Du.

 The nearby province of Binui was sparssely populated and had minimal government forces, which made the Sulen Mock district part of a large area where the Vietkong could operate without restrictions. Much of this movement took advantage of the paths through Zuen Mock due to its closeness to active Vietkong conflicts and several roads leading to a network of Vietkong bases in the northeast of Fork Tui.

 These bases needed access to the coast to receive supplies from the north by small boats. They also relied on roads to transport rice from central Forktu using trucks and ox carts. Regular access to the bases near central fork tui was vital for the work of the provincial mobile and district company. The network of roads set up in Soyen Mock district effectively fulfilled these requirements.

 Route 23, the main road connecting Bara, Long Dine, Date Du and Soyen Mock ensured solid communication for the Vietkong traveling from central Fork Tui to the western part of Shuan Mock district. They did not solely depend on this road. Numerous oxcart trails ran parallel to it, which offered cover by winding through thick scrub and low jungle.

 Route 328 ran north and south through western Suen mock district. This well-made earth road saw the majority of Vietkong traffic heading toward the coast and central fortui. Route 328 started from route 330 which traveled south from route 1. It curved around the western side of Mtown Mountain and crossed a jungle plane. There it became route 328 and continued south to route 23.

 This was past the former Vietkong model village of Thuitch and the junction with Route 327 which went west to Bia and Route 2. After about half a mile on Route 23 heading west, Route 328 turned south again. It passed through the village of Forkbu before heading southeast towards the coast at Cape Ho Tram. The coastline had wide beaches that stretched for several miles on both sides of the Cape.

 This made it a perfect spot for smaller ships to deliver supplies. When we got to Fau Tui, Route 328 stood out as one of the best roads in the province, especially compared to Route 23. Aerial views looking east along Route 23 from Datu showed a series of destroyed bridges and dugout culverts.

 Crossings were often limited to single planks, making Route 23 barely usable, almost like an ox cart trail in some areas. This was especially true where travelers could not use fords controlled by the Vietkong. In contrast, Route 328 had a wide smooth surface of red earth. All the banks and culverts were in good condition and the bridge over the Sawe Kia near the junction with route 23 was probably the only intact road bridge in Foraktui east of Datu.

After passing the intersection with Route 328, Route 23 turned northeast towards Oen Mock village. In the village center, the road made a sharp turn and exited heading southeast. After about a mile, it shifted eastward, connecting several hamlets during its final 10 mi in Fork Toui.

 Once it reached the Haman district of Bintoui, the road continued east until it met the coastline, then turned north again. From this eastern stretch of Route 23, several important Vietkong roads branched off to both the north and south. Extending northeast from the center of Shuenm village was Route 329. This was a wide ox cart track, but it had been carefully surveyed, allowing it to handle more traffic than a typical narrow winding oxcart path.

 This path led into the southern part of the Maida mountain and connected with several other routes, including route 331. This route ran along the Binui border and led to route 23 in the coast. All these roads and paths, except for the area within 2 mi of the Eujene mock junction, were heavily used by the Vietkong. Because of this, the Vietkong wanted to drive the government forces from their last stronghold.

 As long as the government outpost remained, it offered us a great viewpoint to watch Vietkong movements on the roads leading to the main bases of the fifth Vietkong Division. The Vietkong had consistently held a strong position in the Soyen Mock District, using it as their base since the Vietmin era.

 This area was especially suitable for their operations. It had few residents to observe the Vietkong’s activities, was relatively close to Saigon, and connected the coastline with the Maida Mountain and War Zone D further north. Since the early 1960s, the garrison had been confined to the village area due to the overwhelming power of local Vietkong forces, particularly the D445 Provincial Mobile Battalion.

 This battalion was based north of Route 23 between Huan Mock and Dat Centered around the Song Ry. It launched multiple attacks on the garrison but suffered such heavy losses that isolating the garrison from the provincial administration was seen as a better approach. Unable to capture Zhuan mock by force, the Vietkong turned to slower but potentially effective tactics.

 They set up tax points along route 23 which villagers had to use when traveling to date. Suya mock could not produce enough essential food items like meat, fish, and rice. This forced residents to frequently travel to Datu to sell fruits, wood, and handmade goods in exchange for food they could not produce themselves.

 Consequently, the Vietkong tightened their control over the villages lives through their hold on Route 23, ensuring a consistent local income. Taxation points were spread across a large area on both sides of the route to catch those trying to dodge the tax collectors. Tax rates could rise to as high as 40% of the goods being transported, putting a significant economic burden on the people of Shu Yen Mock.

 As a result, the village continued to lose wealth. The locals were faced with a tough decision. They could either move to the central part of the province. This meant leaving their homes and land without any compensation. Alternatively, they could endure the ongoing loss of a significant part of their income until the government could regain control over Route 23.

 If they chose to leave Soyen mock, it would be a major victory for the Vietkong. It would show residents in other remote villages of Fork Toui that the government was unable to protect them. This situation highlighted the government’s weakness in the struggle for control of South Vietnam.

 To support the people of Yuan Mock, the government attempted to deliver supplies by air. Every few weeks, American C23 aircraft dropped off rice, medical supplies, ammunition, and equipment for the garrison. Despite reductions in other areas of the province, the garrison in Suyan Mock was maintained at two companies with two 105 mm field guns and a platoon of artillerymen.

 Yet, the level of government assistance still fell short of what was needed. This left the community’s core issues unresolved. Fortunately, the village had a capable garrison commander, the district chief, Captain Duke. He was a slender man, and it was evident that Bisuen Mach was in capable hands when one saw the well-kept compound and the efficient way his troops executed their tasks.

 Durk had been in Su Yan Mock since 1961 and faced the challenge of keeping people’s spirits high over time. When we met him in October 1966, he was starting to feel a little down. There were no clear signs of improvement in the situation. Originally from Gong in the Mikong Delta, he felt it was too risky to bring his wife and children to Jiann Mock.

Because of this, he had not seen them in 5 years. He designed the village defenses with creativity. Instead of relying solely on a fortified compound, which couldn’t keep the Vietkong out at night, he established 22 defended posts scattered irregularly around a perimeter about 300 yd from the compound.

 Each post was strategically placed to receive supporting fire from two neighboring posts if there was an attack. These posts were manned by seven popular force soldiers. During the day, this number decreased to two, allowing them to manage their own tasks and patrol the village area. The village had five hamlets.

 Four of these hamlets were located near the main road junction. The fifth hamlet, known as the Catholic New Life Hamlet, was situated isolated to the northwest, about 500 yardds from the main settlement. Both groups of hamlets were protected by ditches, earthworks, and barbed wire fences. The Catholic hamlet had only 20 popular force soldiers, but its ability to resist was much greater than the number would suggest, as most villages had training in handling weapons.

 Minefields surrounded the hamlets and barricades were set up on all roads leading into these areas, making navigation difficult even during the day when they were somewhat open. In the four central hamlets, there was a small air strip that measured about 300 yd in length. However, fears of sniper fire made it unsafe for planes to use the strip, leading to its deterioration.

My first visit to Suyen Moo was fueled more by curiosity than by a clear understanding of what the outpost needed. Until October, our knowledge of the village and its garrison was limited to a blue circle on our maps, showing that it remained under government control. I wanted to learn how the post had managed to survive, the challenges it faced, its strategic importance, how to support it, and what intelligence it could offer us.

 Before Operation Crows Nest, I had arranged for a helicopter through the Royal Australian Air Force. Typically, the pilots preferred to have radio contact with the landing zone they were approaching. However, it seemed unlikely that Su Yan Mock would have an extra radio available, even if we had managed to contact them beforehand.

Without direct communication, we could not determine if artillery fire could pose a risk to the helicopter or if the landing zone was safe from Vietkong forces. Nevertheless, Nevertheless, after I explained the importance of reaching this struggling outpost, the pilots agreed to attempt a landing based on our assessment of the situation while we flew over.

 We hoped to find out if the post was still under government control when we arrived, but until we touched down, we had no way of knowing what awaited us below. We took off from Tiger 5, our battalion’s helicopter pad, at 10:00 in the morning on October 4th. Alongside me were Bick, the interpreter, and Private Brown, my Batman and bodyguard.

 We ascended in tight circles over Newat, climbing to nearly 4,000 ft, which would help us avoid any distant anti-aircraft fire. As we flew over Long Tan, we watched the green rows of rubber trees rushing below us. The jungle stretched out, still vibrant from the recent wet season. Large clearings marked by the trails of ox carts were scattered throughout.

 It was evident that the early rice harvest from Datu was making its way to D445 battalion and the fifth Vietkong Division. We headed south along Route 23 to evaluate the damage inflicted by the Vietkong. I lost track of how many destroyed culverts we flew over and the many holes dug in the road.

 The endless miles of thick jungle made it feel like Suen Mock was a world away, detached from civilization. After 5 mi, we arrived at the junction where both sections of Route 328 split from Route 23. The red earth of the road stretched out smoothly into the distance. Eventually, we spotted the clearing that housed Xun Mach. The village looked peaceful with a thin wisp of smoke rising from bamboo huts and brick homes.

 Cattle roamed between the jungle’s edge and the outer barbed wire fence. Men stood at roadblocks guarding the village entrances. As we flew low over the center of the village, we saw a broad earth square that served as the market. Shops lined three sides of the square, and the district headquarters occupied the fourth side.

 Small figures began to appear from the compound as we passed overhead. On our next circuit of the village, they gathered in a field about 100 yards away and ignited a canister of purple smoke. We recognized this as the signal for our landing. We made a steep descent, touching down 20 yard from the group.

 As soon as Brown, Bick, and I left the helicopter, it took off again to avoid drawing enemy mortar fire from over a mile away. Once the sound of the helicopter faded enough for us to talk, Bick searched for the district chief who had just emerged from the crowd. Duke welcomed me with a warm smile and a few words in English, then led me through the secured gate of the compound.

 It was impressive to see Duck’s centuries show him respect by saluting as he walked by. Inside Duke’s office, I introduced myself and met his two eager young lieutenants, Fam Van Min and Huin Batrang. We spoke for more than an hour as Duke recounted the history of Shuen Mock. He clearly had built a strong intelligence network and was willing to trust me.

 He shared detailed information about local Vietkong activities. We discussed the challenges he faced and how we could help. After enjoying a glass of flower tea, he took me on a tour of his defenses. He paused to show me a hole in the ceiling of his sleeping area made by a mortar bomb. He had been in the command post during the attack.

 The walls and ceiling were marked with dents from flying shrapnel. The compound showed various signs of damage from Vietkong assaults. Despite the destruction, it remained surprisingly neat both in the courtyard and in the soldiers quarters. The two field guns were protected by circular sandbag walls, allowing for movement in any direction.

 However, this also made them vulnerable to mortar fire, which put the crews in danger. An emergency device that had proved useful during the last major attack was a 10-ft wooden arrow that could swing horizontally. This arrow had flare pots along its edge, making it visible to aircraft flying overhead at night. When D445 battalion launched their attack, Duke had requested air support.

 He struggled to communicate with the forward air controller over the radio due to his limited English and the lack of an interpreter. The arrow helped show from which direction the Vietkong were attacking, enabling the pilots to inflict significant damage on the advancing enemy. The sound of returning Irakcoy aircraft signaled the end of our inspection.

 I said goodbye to Duke, promising to return soon. After the operations at New Tai, we kept in regular contact with Duke. Colonel Wall visited Eujene Mo several times and provided a detailed report to Brigadier Jackson about the condition of the government forces Vietkong activities, the importance of maintaining contact with the post and the challenges Duke faced.

 Tony White flew out to provide medical care to local villages and the garrison who had not seen a doctor in years. Ouenmok became one of my regular stops along with Binbar, Bin Jia, and Duke Tan, giving us solid intelligence coverage of northern and eastern Fork Toui. Duke flew with me on helicopter rides over Shuenm and along Route 23, pointing out tax collection points and the local bases and trails used by the Vietkong.

 By late 1966, securing Zuyen Mock had become a significant challenge in Fu Tui. This situation raised the possibility of relief plans and the reopening of Route 23 under government control. Colonel Dat, the province chief, was in charge of maintaining the garrison at Wijian Mock, as it was one of the six districts in his province. He expected that Route 23 could be reopened in early 1967 with assistance from the task force and possibly additional American forces if needed.

 Thus, the long-standing issues in Suyen Mock appeared to be close to resolution, provided the government could keep its foothold in enemy territory until the relief operation could take place. The September elections in Zhuen Moog showed no immediate threat to the local support for the South Vietnamese government despite Vietkong economic pressure with a voter turnout of 94%.

 However, this result did not mean that the residents personal problems were solved. It did not imply that they would accept their situation in Shu Yunan Mach until government control was restored over Route 23. We worked hard to demonstrate that we cared about their well-being, that they were not forgotten in central Fork Tui, and that a significant increase in military presence was underway in the area.

 The sixth battalion helped maintain contact with Juan Mock through Operation Ingam in December. This operation focused on key bases of D445 battalion near the Song Ry and Route 28 which required a fire support base at Ian Mock. The sixth battalion’s movement area was too far east of New Dart to receive support from the usual gun position.

 Yet much of it was within the artillery range of Zenmoke. The fifth battalion was assigned to provide a rifle company to secure the gun position there, allowing the villagers to witness a substantial force operating from their locality for the first time. The presence of the troops led to visits from the civil aid staff of task force headquarters and preparations for the eventual reopening of Route 23.

 Around this period, the American senior adviser to Colonel Dat organized an advisory team to assist Captain Duke, addressing one of Duke’s urgent needs and indicating that Chuenmok’s isolation was close to an end. In the early months of 1967, the connections between the task force and exuen strengthened. Colonel Dat and Brigadier Graham, who replaced Brigadier Jackson when his tour ended in January, worked with the staff of the second field force.

 This American command oversaw all allied efforts in the third core area. They aimed for mid-March as the earliest time when enough Vietnamese, American, and Australian forces could start an operation. This operation aimed to drive the Vietkong out of the area between central fortui and Soyen Mock and to rebuild Route 23.

 After American and Australian engineers finished the road, two companies from the Vietnamese regional forces were scheduled to be deployed along it. Their job was to secure the key bridges against sabotage. Even though operation port required the fifth battalion to mostly operate near Dapdu, we found satisfaction in guarding route 23 after its reconstruction in midappril when the first vehicles moved towards Yuen Mach.

 The isolation of Su Yan Mach had ended. The resilience of this garrison which had withtood encirclement for 5 years was finally acknowledged.