Route 9 looked quiet at 150 hours on the 13th of January, 1968. Then a command mine and RPGs ripped a 20 vehicle Marine convoy, pinning the rear in a kill zone. The enemy thought the road was theirs. They were wrong. In the next minutes, you will see exactly how the ambush was built, why it almost worked, and how 700 rounds of Marine artillery plus Huey gunship shattered it.

 We map the ground, walk the timeline minute by minute, and tally the weapons, casualties, and the calls that turned panic into a breakout. You get the order of march, kill zone geometry, fire support timing, and the convoy survival lessons. No fluff. Keep watching. As 1968 began, the third Marine Amphibious Force expected a renewed offensive from the enemy in the North.

Marine intelligence indicated that nine North Vietnamese regiments from three divisions were active at or just below the demilitarized zone. These regiments operated either under their divisions or directly from the demilitarized zone front headquarters. The North Vietnamese established this new command in 1967 to organize their efforts in and just south of the demilitarized zone.

 Overall, the front commanded about 21,000 troops, including divisions, regiments, battalions, and companies. In its annual report, the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam noted that the formation of the North Vietnamese DMZ front headquarters was a key strategic move. This maneuver effectively tied down a large Allied force near the border and set the stage for a major offensive in northern Kuangtree Province.

 In its December 1967 enemy order of battle, the Third Marine Amphibious Force identified three regiments from the 324B North Vietnamese Army Division. These included the 812th, the 8003rd, and the 90th Regiments. Additionally, two regiments from the 325C North Vietnamese Army Division, the 29th, and the 95th were operating south of the demilitarized zone.

 The Marines estimated that the headquarters for the 325 C division and the 95th regiment were located 5 to 10 miles northwest of Kan. The 29th North Vietnamese Army Regimental Headquarters and two battalions remained in the southern sector of the demilitarized zone around 20 miles north of Kesan with one battalion, the eighth, positioned just 5 miles north of the Marine base.

 In the eastern area of the demilitarized zone, intelligence officers from the Fleet Marine Force Pacific found that the headquarters of the 324B Division was 5 miles north of the Benhigh River. The 812th North Vietnamese Army Regiment along with all three of its battalions was situated in the southern demilitarized zone below the river about 5 miles north of Camp Carroll.

Both the 8003rd and 90th regimenal headquarters were reported to be located just above the Benhigh River. The Fleet Marine Force Pacific provided an order of battle that differed in certain ways from the third marine amphibious force. The 8003rd only had one battalion with its regimental headquarters. While the Third Marine Amphibious Force claimed the other two battalions operated above the demilitarized zone, the Fleet Marine Force Pacific stated that the first and third battalions were engaged inside South Vietnam.

The first battalion was positioned north of Kthian, while the third battalion was located near the flat coastal region east of Golin, an area lacking cover and concealment. The 90th North Vietnamese Army Regiment posed challenges for marine intelligence. In its December summary, the Fleet Marine Force Pacific reported that all three battalions, the seventh, 8th, and 9inth, along with the regimental headquarters, were positioned above the Benhai River in the demilitarized zone north of Conthian.

However, evidence from the Third Marine Amphibious Force indicated that two battalions of the 90th had vacated their regimental area, employing elephants as pack animals. They moved westward into Laos before re-entering South Vietnam south of Kesan and advancing northeast. Following the meante, also referred to as the road to the west, one battalion of about 600 soldiers arrived approximately 5 miles southwest of Kuangtree City.

 Reports suggested that another battalion made up of around 400 men infiltrated south into Thuatian province. To add to the confusion, intelligence indicated that the 90th was now under the command of the 312th North Vietnamese Army Division instead of the 324B Division. This seemed improbable since the 312th had not been in the demilitarized zone since 1966, and there were no other reports confirming this division’s presence.

 In addition to the 324B and 325 C divisions, Fleet Marine Force Pacific Intelligence Officers recognized another division, the 341st North Vietnamese Army, located in the Vinling District of Southern North Vietnam. This division appeared ready to bolster enemy forces in the demilitarized zone and Kuangtree Province.

 Fleet Marine Force Pacific’s order of battle revealed that there were 5,000 enemy troops in southern Kuangtree. These forces were available to support operations in the demilitarized zone. The troops included the fifth and 9th North Vietnamese regiments along with units from the sixth and 27th independent battalions. While the North Vietnamese bolstered their infantry in the demilitarized zone, they also posed a sizable artillery threat to Allied forces in the North.

 They operated around 100 artillery pieces, rockets, and mortars. These ranged from 60mm mortars to 152 mm field guns. They could target all major marine bases in the central and eastern regions of the demilitarized zone. Their Soviet built 130 mm field guns could reach over 27,000 m, easily hitting Dong Ha, which is about 15 km south of the Benhai River.

 Nevertheless, due to their simple supply system, the enemy faced challenges in maintaining a high rate of fire. They rarely exceeded 1,000 rounds per day. Between April and December 1967, they used Americanmade 105mm howitzers as well as 81 millimeter and 82 mm mortars. Mortars made up the majority of the enemy’s artillery. More than 13,000 mortar shells and over 5,15mm rounds landed near American defensive positions, particularly around Conten and Golin.

These two Allied bases were the only ones within range of the 105 mm artillery. Major General Raymond El Murray, the deputy commander of the Third Marine Amphibious Force, pointed out that the enemy’s 130 mm field guns presented more of a nuisance than a significant threat. He noted they caused few casualties and didn’t result in territorial loss, but they were a constant annoyance.

From April to December, the North Vietnamese fired fewer than 500 rounds from these large guns at Allied targets in the South. Brigadier General Louie Mezer, an artillery officer and assistant division commander for the Third Marine Division, stated that the enemy’s artillery followed a predictable pattern. Bombardments typically occurred around 6:00 in the morning, at noon, and at 5:00 in the evening with little activity during the night.

 When the enemy decreased their fire from the larger guns, they ramped up their mortar usage. Mezer typically viewed the North Vietnamese gunners as only fair. They employed forward observers, but their adjustments on American positions were frequently inaccurate. Yet Mezer conceded that the enemy could effectively target Dong Ha whenever they wished.

Despite the North Vietnamese artillery units operating under tight logistical constraints, Marine leaders could not afford to underestimate the danger they posed to American defenses in the demilitarized zone. Mortars and artillery caused over 70% of Allied casualties in the north. For example, between December 3rd and 10th, enemy shelling resulted in 124 Marine casualties due to 727 rounds landing in or close to Marine defenses.

Though artillery fire from the North decreased towards the end of the month, the North Vietnamese army could escalate their attacks whenever they wanted. The North Vietnamese artillery was organized into two primary groups. Their artillery coverage spanned westward about 15 kilometers from the coastal area of Capmule to a location near the Benhai River.

 This region contained around 130 interconnected artillery sites, all capable of unleashing significant firepower. The North Vietnamese strengthened their artillery with considerable anti-aircraft defenses. This included nine surfaceto-air missile sites, heavy machine guns, and anti-aircraft weapons up to 57 mm. This arrangement made it difficult for American air strikes to target the artillery positions.

 It also complicated the aerial observation necessary for effective counter measures. Both generals William West Morland and William Mezer acknowledged at times that American commanders lacked accurate and detailed information on the damage inflicted by the United States air and artillery on enemy defenses in the demilitarized zone.

 Years later, General Mezer remarked that American assessments of enemy guns in the demilitarized zone were based on the third marine amphibious forces enemy order of battle. According to Mezer, the order of battle officer simply took all identified enemy units in a specific area and multiplied the number of known weapons in those battalions, regiments, and divisions.

The actual numbers could differ significantly from this estimate. Mezer pointed out that the North Vietnamese frequently relocated their artillery. This made it hard for American intelligence, gunners, and pilots to track them effectively. Consequently, the North Vietnamese provided only brief chances for US forces to strike.

On January 6th, the 9inth Marines reported that the North Vietnamese Army had established three new artillery positions north of the demilitarized zone. Each site housed two guns and was backed by an anti-aircraft unit. While strengthening their infantry and combat capabilities in the North, the North Vietnamese also improved their logistics and support systems.

 Marine intelligence noted that the North Vietnamese displayed impressive creativity in countering American air missions aimed at disrupting their supply routes. They swiftly repaired damaged roads and built pontoon or cable bridges to replace those destroyed by American bombs. Major roads continued to facilitate truck traffic, but delays arose from detours, fords, and ferry crossings caused by the bombing.

 As a result, the North Vietnamese often turned to bicycles and porters instead of trucks for transport. A cyclist could carry about 500 lb, while porters handled around 50 to 60 pounds. Moreover, the North Vietnamese Army employed mules, horses, and even elephants to assist with their logistics. A horse or mule could transport between 150 and 300 lb, while an elephant could move around 1,000 lb.

 Animal drawn bull carts could hold up to 1,500 lb. These alternative methods of transportation were slower but offered better maneuverability compared to motor vehicles. Still, whenever possible, the North Vietnamese used trucks and shipping to get supplies into the demilitarized zone. The enemy’s communication lines in the North Vietnamese panhandle extended from Dong Hoy South to the demilitarized zone.

 This network included 16 interconnecting roads, five waterways, the National Railroad, and many trails. In Dong Hoy, North Vietnamese workers unloaded cargo from seagoing vessels for transfer to rivercrafts or trucks headed south. They repurposed ships of 800 tons or less along with fishing boats to navigate deeper waters and sometimes venture into open seas.

 They used small shallow draft boats called pierogues. These boats had outboard motors and operated on limited waterways like the Benhigh and Benzy rivers. While the railroad was not in operation, its bed provided a path for walkers and cyclists. Important North South roads such as routes 101, 102, 103, and IA linked the three main North Vietnamese base areas near and above the demilitarized zone.

 The northernmost base area was base area 510. It was situated 40 km southeast of Dong Hoy and housed around 19 installations. These included storage areas, a warehouse, a facility for petroleum products, and an ordinance depot. Located at the intersection of roads 101 and 103, which moved southeast and southwest toward the demilitarized zone, this jungle covered base provided a somewhat secure spot for troops and supplies heading south.

Base area 511 was the largest, covering about 100 km. It was only 10 km southeast of base area 510, extending to the northern edge of the demilitarized zone. Inside were three bivvoac areas, six staging zones for troops and logistical storage depots. Positioned at the intersection of routes 101 and IIA, this base area functioned as a gateway for North Vietnamese forces moving south to attack in the eastern demilitarized zone.

Troops from base areas 510 and 511 advanced to the westernmost base area 512. This area was located in the demilitarized zone where North Vietnam, South Vietnam, and Laos converged. It featured a large staging complex with underground shelters and surface buildings. Route 103 passed through its lower section.

 This made base area 512 a crucial trans shshipment point for personnel and equipment heading into the southern region. As the year 1967 ended, the third Marine Amphibious Force received concerning intelligence. North Vietnamese Army units were now utilizing the Santa Fe Trail. This eastern segment of the Ho Chi Min Trail in Laos led them into the Kesan area which they had previously avoided.

Activity was noted on both sides of the demilitarized zone. At the end of the year, American commanders and intelligence officers aimed to grasp the enemy’s strategies. Despite suffering heavy losses in the demilitarized zone, with about 10,000 dead, according to Marine sources, the North Vietnamese army remained a formidable foe.

 General West Morland acknowledged the benefits this situation offered the enemy. He remarked that the proximity of IOR to North Vietnam was always a concern for him. This was a greater concern than for Lieutenant General Robert E. Kushman who led the Third Marine Amphibious Force. Marine commanders and their teams shared these worries.

 At the beginning of the year, the Fleet Marine Force Pacific Headquarters in Hawaii produced a 92page report called Estimate of the Enemy Situation, DMZ Area, Vietnam, January 1st, 1968. This thorough analysis covered the North Vietnamese Army’s strengths and weaknesses. It also presented possible strategies and likely actions of their commanders.

 The intelligence team at Fleet Marine Force Pacific described the North Vietnamese Army as one of the top military forces in Southeast Asia. They adapted well to the conditions in the demilitarized zone, well aware of both American positions and the local terrain. Although they mostly moved on foot, this limitation actually offered unique advantages.

 As highlighted in the Marine Report, this slow movement meant North Vietnamese soldiers were confined to areas where foot travel was nearly impossible. The Fleet Marine Force Pacific Staff noted that the North Vietnamese Army maintained relatively high morale and commitment. One key characteristic of the enemy was his view of the ongoing conflict.

 He saw it as one stretching over two generations. With no real expectation for a quick resolution, his actions were defined by patience. The enemy did possess certain weaknesses. Their troops often lacked technical and mechanical training and experience. North Vietnam depended on an outdated logistical support system that relied heavily on a large manpower pool.

The North Vietnamese army frequently struggled to capitalize on tactical opportunities that required swift unit and resource deployment. The lack of modern communication often limited senior North Vietnamese commanders from making significant decisions when battles commenced. They found it difficult to coordinate and control their units effectively in quickly changing situations.

Interrogations of prisoners also revealed that the morale of North Vietnamese Army soldiers decreased the longer they stayed south of the Benhai River. As they evaluated the strengths and weaknesses of the North Vietnamese Army forces in the North, the FMFP pack staff officers considered the most likely strategies the enemy might use in the demilitarized zone sector.

 The Marine analysis indicated that the North Vietnamese had several viable strategies. The most probable options included a large-scale attack into northeastern Kuangtree to gain temporary control of specific areas, conducting multi-battalion or regimental sized attacks against various allied targets between Highway 9 and the demilitarized zone using troops positioned in eastern Kuang Tree and near Kesan.

This could involve trying to hold Kesan for a time due to its isolated position. Continuing with hit-and-run tactics to harass friendly forces and disrupt communication lines with battalionsized units. Maintaining existing tactics while also strengthening locations and ambush sites in Kuang Tree to ensnare friendly forces, aiming to weaken our efforts and inflict heavy casualties and equipment losses.

 They could withdraw all forces north of the Benhai and bolster defenses. Based on these options, the FMF Packpack report suggested that the North Vietnamese would likely opt for a combination of the first two strategies while simultaneously harassing friendly forces with hit-and-run attacks and interfering with communication lines.

Despite the recent losses faced by the North Vietnamese Army in the demilitarized zone, FMFP pack staff members believe that the leadership in North Vietnam, influenced by a DNBFU mindset, sought to inflict a series of tactical defeats and heavy casualties on United States forces. This strategy aimed to demoralize the American public and make continued involvement in the war politically impossible.

On January 13th, General Kushman, the commander of the Third Marine Amphibious Force, communicated by radio with General West Morland. He alerted that a significant enemy threat was forming west of Kesan, targeting the Third Marine Amphibious Force. He also noted heavy enemy forces in the Asha Valley and north of the demilitarized zone.

 At that time, both the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, and the Marine Command viewed Northern IR, as the most likely site for a major enemy assault. In the demilitarized zone, much of the fighting resembled the previous year. Efforts on the barrier were ongoing, and the same politically motivated rules of engagement were still in place.

United States ground forces were not allowed to cross the Benhai River, but they could operate in the demilitarized zone south of the line and return fire across it. Artillery, naval gunfire, and air strikes were authorized against legitimate targets in North Vietnam. However, the Military Assistance Command Vietnam mandated that the Marine Command report every action taken against the North Vietnamese per these guidelines.

Marine units remained in the sectors they had occupied in December, keeping their operational names. In the demilitarized zone, the Third Marine Division managed three different tactical areas coded as Napoleon, Kentucky, and Lancaster. Lieutenant Colonel Edward R. Toner’s first amphibian tractor battalion oversaw the Napoleon area of operations.

 This area stretched three miles above and two miles below the Quaveette waterway, extending 2 miles inland from the coast. The battalion’s mission was to safeguard the vital Quavviet port facility along with its logistic support facility and secure the river supply route to Dong Ha.

 In March, a landing ship tank ramp was established at the mouth of the Quaveette. In 1967, ships could transfer their cargo to landing craft utility and landing craft mechanized for the trip up river to Dong Ha. As Marine forces and facilities expanded in northern Quangtree, the Quiet supply channel became increasingly crucial to the Marine Command.

 By the end of the year, the Navy Quiet port facility was able to accommodate two landing ship tanks, three landing craft utilities, and three landing craft mechanized, transporting 940 short tons daily to Dong Ha. The first amphibian tractor battalion moved from the Daang tactical area of responsibility to its new command post at the quaveet port facility in late April 1967.

This move was intended to offer general support for the third marine division. The commanding officer of the amphibian tractor battalion took on the role of the quaveette installation coordinator. In this position, he managed both the defense and administration of the kuviet area.

 In November, the third marine division divided operation kingfisher into three distinct operations. Lancaster, Kentucky, and Napoleon. In Operation Napoleon, Lieutenant Colonel Toner continued to supervise the same area where the Amtrakers had been active. The battalion was responsible for building the C4 combat operating base located around 2,000 meters north of Kua Viet.

 They also helped the Army of the Republic of Vietnam’s second regiment in constructing the A1 strong point, which was another 3,000 meters to the northwest. The A1 and C4 positions marked the eastern end of a barrier. While they worked on this barrier in December, Toner’s Marines faced intense fighting on the 11th near the fishing village of Hollow Toy just north of C4, the battalion fought through the day.

 They killed 54 enemy soldiers and had 20 Marines wounded. 5 days later, the Kuaveet facility suffered artillery and rocket attacks. This resulted in five Marines killed and 31 wounded. By the end of 1967, Marine statistics showed that Operation Napoleon caused 87 enemy deaths and included two captured soldiers.

 The Marines lost 10 members killed and had 48 wounded and evacuated. In January 1968, Lieutenant Colonel Toner’s battalion consisted of his headquarters and support company, companies A and B, and an additional infantry company, company C, from the first battalion, Third Marines. They received artillery support from a platoon of six LVTH6s from the first armored amphibian company attached to the second battalion, 12th Marines.

A mortar section with three 4.2 Two mortars from the 12th Marines reinforced the howitzers. The Napoleon area of operations characterized by a flat sandy coastal plane in the Kuaveette waterway was ideal for Toner’s battalion. The battalion commander had 64 troop carrying LVTP5s, six command and control tractors, four LVTE for clearing mines, and two LVTR1s for repairs.

 These lightly armored amphibious tractors allowed movement on both land and water. In just a few minutes, the Marines could support any trouble spots within their tactical area of responsibility. Early January brought a calm period for the Amtrak Marines. They participated in civic projects in the nearby fishing village of Gia High.

 They worked on C4 and built revetments for the tractors. Marine Sergeant Ron Asher from Company C third Marines wrote to his mother in December 1967. In his letter, he shared that most of his free time between patrols was spent filling sandbags and burying the Amtraks and tanks. On Christmas Day, General West Morland visited and voiced concerns about the lack of protection for the amphibious vehicles.

 In a discussion with Lieutenant Colonel Toner, General Tomkins, the commander of the third division, recommended using steel revetments, oil drums, and ammunition boxes filled with sand to protect the LVTs. It was not until mid January that the North Vietnamese made a serious attempt to test the Marine positions at Napoleon.

 On January 14th, a Marine patrol located about 2,500 meters south of the Kuaveette near the coastline discovered a design in the sand. This design had four circles with a large arrow pointing northwest towards the battalion command post. Believing this to be a crude aiming marker for enemy mortars, the Marines changed the arrows direction.

 They ensured that any rounds fired from that position would land in the sea. That same evening, about 1,000 meters to the southwest, a Marine squad from Company B, First Marines, set up an ambush. The amphibian tractor battalion positioned just outside the village of Tuang Van Tuang observed nearly 50 enemy troops advancing from the southeast.

 The squad leader promptly requested artillery support. Within 2 minutes, the 105mm artillery on the LVTH6s fired over 100 rounds at the approaching enemy. The North Vietnamese Army soldiers regrouped twice, but retreated each time under fire. A marine observing through his Starlight scope noted several enemy troops falling.

 However, when two reinforced Marine platoon from Company B searched the area the next morning, they found no bodies. Throughout the demilitarized zone sector, the enemy attempted to infiltrate Allied positions. Along both sides of Route One, the Second Army of the Republic of Vietnam Regiment filled the gap between the Napoleon and Kentucky areas of operations.

This regiment was part of the respected First Army of the Republic of Vietnam Division. In December, they occupied both the A1 and A2 strong points along with the C1 base area. Major Vuvanjai, the regimental commander, earned the admiration of the Marines for his impressive leadership and strong command of English.

 He established his command post at C1, located just west of the railroad and Route 1, about 6,000 meters south of Giolin. GI stationed one battalion at the C1 base and moved two battalions forward. One battalion was positioned at A1 near the destroyed fishing village of Anmi, 2,000 m below the demilitarized zone. The other battalion was at A2 just north of Golin.

On January 3rd, Ji relocated his reserve battalion, the second battalion of the second army of the Republic of Vietnam from below Giolin to new positions north of the Quave Viet near Dong Ha. This move adjusted the boundaries between the regiment and the 9inth Marines participating in Operation Kentucky.

 The A2 stronghold at Golin was manned by the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, but it was still within the 9inth Marines tactical area of operations. According to the barrier plan, the Army of the Republic of Vietnam was set to eventually take control of the A3 strong point located halfway between Giolin and Contin once the transition was completed.

 Until that occurred, the 9inth Marines in Kentucky were responsible for the defense and construction of the barrier. Covering Leatherneck Square, this area measured approximately 6 by8 miles and was bordered by Giolin and Dong Ha to the east and Conthen and Cam Lo to the west. This operational area included three of the five strong points of the trace.

 The combat operating bases of the barrier were C2 and C3. The terrain in Kentucky varied with low hills, woods, and rice patties in the north and the cultivated Camlow River Valley in the south extending from Camlow to Donggha. Route 1 linked Geolan to Donggha while route 561 ran from Kthian to Camllo. In the north, route 605 connected the strong points and route 9 south of the Camllo River extended from Donggha into Laos.

 Most communication routes except for route one required significant engineering work. This included paving, widening, and resurfacing to meet the logistical needs of the barrier efforts. Operation Kentucky officially began on November 1st, 1967. The 9inth Marines were well acquainted with their area of operations. They were responsible for the same ground and positions held during the earlier operation kingfisher.

The change in designation mainly helped track progress in the demilitarized zone campaign by counting casualties. The operational plan did not change. The 9inth Marines were to secure Leatherneck Square, protect Dong Ha, build the barrier, and fend off any North Vietnamese forces attempting to enter the coastal plane of IOR.

In January 1968, Colonel Richard B. Smith, who took command of the regiment the previous September, supervised four infantry battalions and part of another from his command post at Dong Ha. Except for two companies from the second battalion, all other battalions were part of the first, third, and fourth marines.

 The second battalion, first marines defended the A4 strong point at Conthean. The third battalion, third marines worked on the fortifications at the A3 strong point with three companies. The third battalion, Fourth Marines, secured A3 from positions on Hill 28, north of the trace. The first battalion, Fourth Marines, operated from the C2 and C2A combat bases along Route 561.

Further south, two companies from the 9inth Marines protected the Camllo Bridge where Route 561 crosses the Camllo River. They also secured the artillery positions of the second battalion, 12th Marines on Camelow Hill, serving as the C3 combat base. The remaining rifle company of the 9inth Marines supported this effort.

 The third battalion, third marines, company Mike, was attached to the 12th Marines. They were responsible for guarding the provisional marine artillery battalion at the Geolan fire support base located south of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam at the A2 strong point. Colonel Smith, who served as a seagoing Marine during World War II and as an infantry company commander during the Korean War, had clear views on the war in the demilitarized zone.

 He observed that the Marines were sitting in defensive positions playing strictly defensive combat. Smith believed the troops needed training in defensive warfare. He understood this was not a popular opinion since Marines are always supposed to be in an assault over a beach, but this just isn’t the name of the game out there. The emphasis was on setting up solid defensive positions and maintaining clear lines of fire.

 With the command’s emphasis on the barrier at the beginning of the year, the strong points and combat operating bases in the ninth marine sector became more crucial. The A4 strong point at Kantienne anchored the western end of the cleared trace. It played a vital role in the regiment’s defensive strategy. Located less than two miles south of the demilitarized zone, Conthion, despite being under 160 meters high, dominated the area.

 Colonel Smith stated that if the enemy had taken the position, he would be looking down our throats at Dong Ha. In mid December, Lieutenant Colonel Evan L. Parker, Junior’s second battalion, First Marines, took over the defense of Kththeon. As part of the first marine division, the battalion quickly adjusted to the challenges of the demilitarized zone conflict, which differed from the pacification campaign further south.

Unlike the lightly armed Vietkong guerrillas in the south, the North Vietnamese in this region often held their ground, supported by heavy machine guns, mortars, and artillery. By the time the battalion assumed control of Contean, it had adapted to the specific needs of the demilitarized zone environment.

 In December, the Marines of the Second Battalion worked diligently to strengthen the defenses of the A4 strong point. During the Christmas truce, the battalion built 11 bunkers and dug a new trench along the forward slope. They reinforced the bunkers with sandbags and added a burster layer to the roofs, typically made of airfield matting to absorb delayed fuse rounds.

The positions were then covered with rubberized tarps to prevent water from getting in. By the end of the year, all defenses were complete. The new bunkers were reinforced with sandbags and enclosed with sharp Germanstyle barbed wire. Protected by a minefield in front and surrounded by wire, the second battalion felt relatively secure in their defenses at the exposed Conthian outpost.

As the new year began, the Marines at Conthen experienced a short pause in the fighting. Both sides generally honored the fragile truce for the holiday. However, there was a minor enemy probe against a Marine listening post on the perimeter. On New Year’s Day, a Marine forward artillery observer at Kant Tien used binoculars to survey enemy positions across the Benhai River.

 He spotted a large North Vietnamese Army flag with its single star on a bright red background waving a top a makeshift flag pole. Young infantrymen gathered around to see what was for many their first real symbol of the enemy. Confident that the Marines would respect the ceasefire, the North Vietnamese Army deliberately provoked the American troops, the Marine gunners anxiously awaited the end of what they viewed as a false peace.

As the truce neared its end, the artillery at Kanten targeted the routes leading to their perimeter. The defenders planned a mission to strike the flag. Just moments before the artillerymen fired their first round, the North Vietnamese army lowered their colors. This situation highlighted the frustrations felt by the Marines in the demilitarized zone.

 The young Marines around 19 years old along with their leaders struggled to understand demilitarized zones that were not really demilitarized and ceasefires that seemed to only benefit the enemy. The conflict soon resumed for the second battalion at Kthen. Although the fighting was not as fierce as it had been in September and October, the North Vietnamese continued to probe and occasionally bombard the Marine outpost.

 The incoming fire from mortars, artillery, and recoilless rifles soon matched what previous defenders faced. According to the battalion’s monthly report, the incoming fire was more of a nuisance than truly destructive. On January 5th, the North Vietnamese Army shelled Conthion in groups of three to five bursts. Between 9:45 and 10:15, 37 artillery rounds struck the Marine positions.

 Among them were five 120 mm shells that directly hit the battalion command post. This attack resulted in one Marine being killed and eight others wounded, including Lieutenant Colonel Parker, the battalion commander. Marine air and artillery units focused on the suspected enemy firing positions. However, the Marine Command could not assess the effectiveness of these attacks.

After Lieutenant Colonel Parker was medically evacuated, Major James T. Harold III became the acting commander of the battalion. On January 9th, Lieutenant Colonel Billy R. Duncan officially took over from Lieutenant Colonel Parker, allowing Harold to go back to his position as executive officer. Enemy shelling at Conthian continued sporadically, averaging about 30 rounds on days when the North Vietnamese Army chose to fire.

 On the ground, the North Vietnamese used the holiday troops to bring in new troops and kept up the pressure on the Marine outpost. The 8003rd North Vietnamese Army Regiment took over from the 90th North Vietnamese Army Regiment in positions facing Kanten. Almost daily, small patrols from the 8003rd tested the Marine defenses.

 For example, on January 10th, Company H spotted three individuals moving westward with a Starlight scope in the early morning. The Marines fired three M79 grenade rounds and later checked the area, but found nothing. Later that evening around 9:00 p.m., a Marine squad from Company F on the northeastern perimeter detected enemy movement on their radar.

 They called for a mortar mission. A Marine platoon patrol went to look into it. Unfortunately, they accidentally entered a friendly minefield leading to three casualties, one dead and two wounded. A few days later, on the night of January 14th, Marines at Kanten heard an explosion in the minefield to their north.

They fired illumination rounds and discovered a wounded North Vietnamese soldier in the minefield along with other troops retreating. A Marine squad with a Starlight scope tried to recover the injured soldier. However, when they arrived, no one was there. Shortly after, a Marine outpost spotted four to five North Vietnamese entering the battalion’s perimeter to retrieve their injured comrade. Another mine detonated.

Lieutenant Colonel Duncan sent a platoon to investigate potential enemy casualties. At around 1:20 in the morning on the 15th, the Marine patrol approached the minefield. They heard whistling and a lot of noise which indicated a strong enemy presence nearby. Both sides retreated while providing cover fire. The North Vietnamese Army used recoilless rifles, small arms, and 60mm mortars to help their retreat.

Meanwhile, Marine artillery targeted their escape routes. Two Marines suffered minor injuries. Later that morning, around 10:00, another Marine patrol returned to the last known enemy location. They found a pick, a wrench, and a poncho. The poncho had fragmentation holes and large blood stains.

 In January, the Marines of the Second Battalion, First Marines, experienced their time in the barrel at Conthean. Lieutenant Colonel Duncan later noted that North Vietnamese artillery had destroyed a large part of the Northwest minefield. This minefield protected the Marine outpost as well as the forward trenches and bunkers nearby. Casualties were rising.

 The hospital bunkers became overcrowded with wounded Marines on stretchers. The battalion commander remembered that one of the chaplain broke under the stress and tried to take his own life. Route 561 ran north and south and was vital for Conthian. General Mezer pointed out that marine engineers repaired the road in 1967.

They cut a jog through an abandoned village which made the path shorter and safer. However, new problems arose. Heavy rains eroded the road. It took a long time for engineers to gather enough rock to create a solid roaded that could support heavy traffic. The Marines also established two combat operating bases, C2 and C2A, to secure Route 561.

C2A was located about 2,000 m southeast of Conten. It overlooked a bridge that crossed a stream along the road. The Marines nicknamed this area the wash out due to heavy rainstorms that would flood the low ground. Another base, C2, was positioned 3,000 m further southeast and included both artillery and infantry positions.

The terrain along Route 561, stretching between Conthion and Cam Low, featured low rolling hills, many gullies, and brush reaching waist height. From the C2A and C2 bases, Marine patrols ventured out to keep the North Vietnamese Army off the roads. In January 1968, Lieutenant Colonel Edwin A.

 Depula’s first battalion, fourth marines, took control of C2 and C2A. After the third battalion, Fourth Marines, Lieutenant Colonel Depula set up his command post at C2 with companies A and B. Major John Odd Hopkins, his executive officer, formed a second command group with companies C and D at C2A. During the early weeks of January, the battalion carried out many combat patrols.

 These patrols varied in size from squad to platoon. They extended about 1,500 meters from both C2 and C2A as well as from Route 561. The most notable action in the battalion’s area came from another unit. On January 10th, a small patrol from the Third Reconnaissance Battalion found three North Vietnamese Army soldiers in a palmcoed site about 3,000 meters east of C2.

 The reconnaissance Marines killed two of the enemy, captured one soldier, and obtained all three of their weapons. In early January, the primary goal at C2 was to finish the bunker defenses as part of the barrier system. Several support units, including engineers, artillery, and tank divisions, teamed up with the first battalion, fourth marines, in the base area.

 The engineers performed daily mine sweeps along Route 561 to Conthion to keep the road open. Along with other units, they helped with construction efforts. On January 10th, a diearker team arrived at C2 to assess the defenses. According to the first battalion’s monthly report, none of the bunkers were deemed complete.

 Later, efforts focused heavily on finishing the bunkers based on the tactical situation. Colonel Smith, the regimental commander, later talked about challenges the Marine units faced in completing the barrier construction. Few units had back hoes to assist in digging fox holes or bunker foundations. He pointed out that these machines could do in two hours what an entire battalion required two days to accomplish.

Despite the equipment shortage, Smith also believed part of the problem was due to marine training. He felt that the troops were not properly taught sandbagging techniques. He likened sandbagging to laying bricks with headers and stretchers. He observed more wasted effort with the sandbags. The man is unsure of what he is doing and the non-commissioned officer overseeing him is equally lost.

 Consequently, the wall reaches 6 ft high before it collapses. That is 3 days of hard work wasted. Despite lacking experience in bunker construction and heavy earth moving equipment, the first battalion fourth marines completed 47 of the 81 intended bunkers at the C2 base site by the end of the month. To the south of the first battalion in Kentucky, a small command group and two companies from Lieutenant Colonel William M.

 Cryan’s second battalion, 9inth Marines were stationed. In December, just before Christmas, the second battalion relocated from sites north of A3 in Operation Kentucky to Camp Carroll. This camp was part of the Third Marines Lancaster area of operations. A few days later, Lieutenant Colonel Cryan assigned Company’s FNG to his executive officer, Major Dennis J.

Murphy. While Cryan and the remaining battalion were at Camp Carroll, Murphy and his command returned to the Kentucky area of operations. They took over from the third battalion, third marines at Camp Low. Company F assumed control of the artillery position at Camp Low, located 1,000 m above the Camllo River on Route 561.

At the same time, Company G secured the Camllo Bridge on Route 9 at the river. In the Camllo sector, the second battalion, 9inth Marines patrolled route 561 to maintain the primary supply route to Conthion and the farming villages along the river. At the C3 base, Company F worked with supporting artillery and engineers to enhance the diearker defenses.

 By January 15th, the Marines at C3 met the bunker requirements on schedule. During this time, Marine patrols encountered very few enemy troops. In fact, in the first two to three weeks of the month, enemy activity was quite low. It consisted of a mining incident on Route 561 on January 2nd and Vietkong infiltrating hamlets above the Camllo River at night.

 During these nighttime incursions, Vietkong guerrillas would recruit or abduct villagers and demand food and other supplies. In the first two weeks of January, a popular force unit west of the hamlet of Anmi successfully ambushed Vietkong troops attempting to enter the village on three separate occasions, resulting in at least three enemy deaths.

 By the end of the month, the situation continued to evolve. During the third week, the second battalion reported noticeable movement in and out of the villages, particularly to the east. While patrolling the hilly brush in the northern area of Cam Low, the second battalion Marines encountered an increasing number of North Vietnamese regulars by mid January.

 To the northeast, Lieutenant Colonel Robert C. Needam’s third battalion, Third Marines, focused on finishing the last strong points along the trace, designated as A3 within the 9inth Marine sector. Marine engineers began work on the strong point in November, later supported by a CB battalion. A3 was constructed based on the specifications of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam.

 It was designed to have 30 bunkers, each measuring 18 by 32 ft. These bunkers were heavily timbered, sandbagged, and covered with dirt, allowing accommodation for up to 18 troops from the Army of the Republic of Vietnam on three- tiered wooden bunks. By Christmas, the CBS and engineers had completed raising the timbers for the bunkers, leaving the sandbagging to the infantry.

 Until that point, the Special Landing Force Alpha Battalion, known as Battalion Landing Team 1/3, had been attached to the 9inth Marines at the A3 position. At the end of December, the third battalion, third marines with three companies moved from the Cam Low sector to A3. They relieved the special landing force battalion which was set to join the first marines at Kangtree.

Although the CBS had left, the third battalion third marines faced a significant workload at A3. The December rains resulted in only sticky mud being available for sandbags. A3 still required defensive wire and about 30,000 mines to be laid. With support from engineers, the battalion dug fourman fighting holes.

 The Marines and engineers utilized mechanical ditch diggers to trench around the entire position. By January 12th, the third battalion had constructed an observation tower and was nearly finished with the project. Colonel Smith remarked that the A3 strong point was a model for such installations. It was the only one in the area with an initial plan.

 The others developed under various commanders. Despite the threat of enemy artillery, the third battalion experienced very few casualties at the A3 strong point due to the shelling by the North Vietnamese army. Company M of the battalion had the mission of safeguarding the American gun positions south of Golin. On January 9th, they faced enemy mortar fire that resulted in three deaths and two injuries.

This was more than what Lieutenant Colonel Nem’s other companies experienced from enemy actions during the entire month. In January, the third battalion, third marines encountered unexpected hostilities. Lieutenant Colonel Nem, the battalion commander, reported that friendly artillery rounds struck or landed close to the inner perimeter of A3 and Hill 28 on 13 occasions, totaling 54 rounds.

 For example, on January 5th, a white phosphorous shell fell within the third battalion’s area. The 9inth Marines and the second battalion, 12th Marines, looked into this event, resulting in the relief of the battery commander from duty. 6 days later, the battalion received six rounds of 105mm artillery fire within their wire, followed by another 24 rounds on January 13th.

 There was also a misfire on Hill 28 which claimed the lives of two Marines and left six injured. Other incidents involving friendly fire occurred on January 15th and 19th. The second battalion, 12th Marines, the artillery battalion did not include these incidents in its report. However, they did note significant problems with computer hotlines to the firing batteries due to unreliable radio communication.

The report further stated that staff visits to liaison officers and forward observers had improved communication about fire support. Years later, Lieutenant Colonel Needam, a former artillery officer, remembered that when he told the 9inth Marines he would not accept any more support from the 12th Marines, the situation quickly received attention from higher command and was resolved.

 In his report, he remarked that corrective actions had been set in motion, leading to noticeable improvements by the end of the month. Just north of the third battalion, Third Marines, Lieutenant Colonel Lee Bendle’s third battalion, Fourth Marines, secured the routes leading to the A3 strong point. On December 26th and 27th, Bendel’s battalion moved from C2 to take over from the first battalion, Fourth Marines on Hill 28, a small rise situated about 600 meters north of A3.

Bendel expanded his battalion’s perimeter and repositioned his forces. Companies moved down from the top of the hill to new positions lower down. Marine engineers cleared the trees and vegetation to the west. This provided the battalion with a better view of the landscape and improved their fields of fire.

 Low rolling hills with secondary scrub and dense brush mixed with flat wet rice patties located 75 to 150 m to the north and east. Wide rice patties also blended with the woods to the west. To the south, the Marines had a clear line of sight to the A3 strong point and the boundary marking the battalion’s southern edge.

 The northern boundary reached the southern edge of the demilitarized zone, which lay less than 1,000 m from Hill 28. With the demilitarized zone close by and elements of the 90th North Vietnamese Army regiment suspected in the area, Lieutenant Colonel Bendel stressed the importance of vigilance. He organized his battalion into a three company perimeter with one company held in reserve.

 Bendel used the reserve company for night ambushes and listening posts after dark as well as a reaction force during the day. The battalion commander noted that he maintained four to six ambushes and listening posts on any night. Throughout the day, the battalion conducted constant patrols with as many as two companies deployed at a time.

Lieutenant Colonel Bendel strengthened the infantry companies with four 106 mm recoilless rifles, 250 caliber machine guns, and six of the battalion’s 81 mm mortars. He left the remaining two mortars at the base camp so that extra personnel from the 81 mm mortar platoon could carry additional ammunition if needed.

 The second battalion, 12th Marines, provided direct artillery support, while the first marine aircraft wing offered close air support. The battalion referred to itself as the Thundering Third and was well acquainted with the conflict in the demilitarized zone. It was present at Conthean from July to early September 1967, experiencing some of the heaviest fighting and bombardment in that area.

Lieutenant Colonel Bendel, who took command in July, recalled how the battalion actively patrolled the surrounding region that summer. They assisted in establishing strong points at C2, C3, Camelow Bridge, and the wash out and deployed a detachment to Geolin. Shortly after the third battalion, fourth Marines arrived on Hill 28.

 They were soon engaged with the enemy again. On the morning of December 30th, Company M, led by Captain Raymond W. Comm Jr. was on patrol. They discovered six empty North Vietnamese Army bunkers to the southwest of the battalion perimeter. These bunkers were facing east and were about 2,000 m from Hill 28. After destroying the enemy bunkers, the company moved northwest.

Around 1:30 in the afternoon, near a small stream about 1,500 m west of Hill 28, the Marines encountered an enemy rear guard of 4 to 10 men. In the ensuing gunfire, Company M suffered one fatality and four injuries. Captain Calm then called for artillery and 81 millimeter mortar strikes. Following the skirmish, the Marines found the body of one North Vietnamese soldier.

 The next morning, Lieutenant Colonel Bendel sent Captain John L. Pritchard’s Company 1’s to a similar area where Company M had encountered the North Vietnamese Army. Pritchard’s company set out from Hill 28 in platoon columns. Bendelle believed this formation helped to keep the troops together and allowed the company commander to deploy firepower quickly.

Staff Sergeant CL Ki followed a trail near the destroyed village of Schwanhai, located about 1,800 meters northwest of Hill 28. He spotted four to five North Vietnamese troops ahead. The company commander ordered two platoon to advance to a slight rise in the terrain and placed the third platoon behind the command post for protection.

Initially, the North Vietnamese had the advantage in this exchange, but the Marine Company soon turned the tide. Pritchard and his officers moved quickly along the Marine line, rallying their troops, and India Company soon gained fire superiority. Around noon, the Marines noticed a second group of North Vietnamese Army troops moving to reinforce the first.

The company engaged the reinforcements with 60 mm mortar and small arms fire, forcing the enemy to take cover. About 30 minutes later, the Marines came under heavy bombardment from 82 mm mortars coming from their right flank, generally in the northeast direction. It became clear that the enemy held strong bunkered positions across the front and to the right front of India Company.

Despite difficult flying conditions with cloud ceilings between 500 and 1,000 ft and limited visibility, an aerial observer reached the area. He identified himself as Smitty Tango and made radio contact. Pritchard coordinated with the company’s mortars to initiate countermortar fire. The Marine mortars successfully disabled one enemy tube, prompting the others to stop firing.

After this success, the air observer withdrew and the company called for an artillery mission to target enemy positions with rounds of different calibers. The Marine artillery fire resulted in enemy bodies being thrown into the air as India Company directed 155 mm fire toward friendly lines. The Marine Company sustained four injuries and came under fire from the right front.

 One of the wounded was a sniper who had advanced too far, becoming exposed. A courseman attempted to help him, but was also hit and had to fall back. With his gunnery sergeant providing suppressive fire, Captain Pritchard hurried forward to recover the seriously injured Marine and brought him back to the company’s position. A helicopter from Marine Helicopter Squadron 163 conducted a medical evacuation, transporting the wounded man from an improvised landing zone located just behind the company’s area in a safe section. Although the enemy tried to

disrupt Marine radio communications, Smitty Tango kept in touch with Captain Pritchard and Second Lieutenant Albert B. Doyle, the forward artillery observer for the company. At 1:35 in the afternoon, the aerial observer evaluated the artillery fire and requested two Marine Huey gunships from Marine Observation Squadron 6, which had earlier supported the evacuation helicopter landing.

 The gunships launched multiple attacks on enemy mortar positions which were situated in open bomb craters near Marine lines. When the air support arrived, several North Vietnamese soldiers were spotted standing in their positions. just 100 to 150 meters away from India company firing at both the air observer and the helicopters during their attacks.

 As the lead Huey flown by Major Curtis D. Mcrainey made its first approach, its guns jammed. Major David L. Steel Mcrainey’s co-pilot observed that one of the North Vietnamese likely noticed their malfunction. This enemy stepped out of cover and began firing during their next pass. This proved to be a serious mistake.

 As Steel shared, during later passes, they bombarded the crater area with rockets and machine gun fire. This resulted in most of the enemy being killed. The air observer reported seeing North Vietnamese soldiers dragging eight bodies into a tunnel. After these air strikes, Lieutenant Colonel Bendell, who was monitoring the radio traffic, decided to pull India Company back to Hill 28.

 By this time, the North Vietnamese had brought in additional reinforcements. Bendel believed it was unnecessary to attack the enemy position. He thought marine artillery and gunships would significantly impact the enemy. As Company 1 withdrew and lost contact, the troops spotted a large North Vietnamese unit, which appeared to be wearing Marine uniforms.

 The Huey gunships laid down extensive covering fire before the artillery took over. By 3:30 in the afternoon, the company had safely made it back to Hill 28. Colonel Smith, the commander of the 9inth Marines, personally greeted the men of Hungary and praised them with a well-deserved well done. The company sustained only four wounded while accounting for 27 enemy deaths.

This number did not cover the eight North Vietnamese eliminated by helicopters or the unknown number killed by artillery. Lieutenant Colonel Bendel recommended Captain Pritchard for the Navy Cross and he was awarded the Silver Star. In the following days, the Third Battalion Fourth Marines experienced a relatively peaceful time in their forward position.

 However, in the early hours of January 6th, a listening post detected movement just beyond the battalion’s perimeter. The Marines opened fire with their small arms and M79 grenade launchers. One defender noticed something fall, but when they went to investigate, they drew enemy fire. During daylight, the Marines found no evidence of enemy bodies.

 It was evident to the battalion that their quiet period had come to an end. The next day, January 7th, the Marines on Hill 28 began taking sniper fire from an enemy held rgeline located about 800 meters in front of them, just south of the demilitarized zone. Lieutenant Colonel Bendel instructed Captain John D.

 Captain Carr, the leader of Company L, aimed to flush out the sniper who had already injured one Marine. That morning, Carr sent two teams of six men from his first platoon. They approached the enemy from both sides and then joined together to form a squad-sized patrol. As the squad crossed the ridge line, they came under attack from enemy AK-47s and machine guns.

The enemy was well protected by defensive positions built around several Americanmade bomb craters in the area. On that ridge, North Vietnamese Army gunners killed one Marine and injured another. Unable to move forward or retreat, the Marines took cover wherever they could and returned fire. Captain Carr stayed in touch with the squad through radio communications.

 He understood their predicament and ordered the rest of the first platoon to assist the trapped Marines. When the platoon arrived around 3:30 in the afternoon, they also found themselves in a tough spot. The North Vietnamese could see them clearly and had brought in reinforcements. The first platoon fought back with M79 grenade launchers, hand grenades, and rifles, all while requesting additional help.

Captain Carr then led the rest of Company L to the base of the ridge to flank the enemy. They could not connect with the first platoon on the front slope, but the company provided covering fire. Carr called for artillery strikes to stop the enemy from bringing in more reinforcements. Despite some rain and low clouds, Carr established radio contact with an aerial observer who adjusted the supporting fire, including the company’s 60 mm mortars.

 With this extra fire support, the first platoon managed to hold their ground, but the situation remained serious as evening drew near. At this point, Lieutenant Colonel Bendel instructed Captain Carr to have the first platoon disengage and fall back over the Rgeline. To aid the platoon’s withdrawal, the aerial observer called in air strikes and artillery within 100 meters of the Marines.

The battalion commander also dispatched two platoon from company K to a high ground position about 1,000 meters west of company L. Despite these protective measures, the enemy inflicted heavy casualties on the first platoon as they pulled back to regroup with the rest of the company.

 Since the first engagement with the enemy, Company L had lost six soldiers and had 36 injured with 28 requiring evacuation. Captain Carr requested a medevac helicopter for the most critically wounded. As the Marines waited, a CH46D Boeing Vertol C knight helicopter from Marine Medium helicopter squadron 164 took off from Fubai for the evacuation.

Captain Richard G. Susa piloted the helicopter. Due to rain and strong winds, Souza flew close to the ground as he approached the makeshift landing zone. The Marines of Company L fired illumination flares to assist the pilot in navigating the darkness. Tracer rounds from North Vietnamese Army machine guns added to the tense and hazardous situation.

When the helicopter landed, the enlisted crew quickly exited to help load the injured Marines onto the aircraft. The helicopter took off again while still under fire, unable to use its M60 machine guns because the enemy was too close. With most of the wounded safely evacuated and support from other units, Company L reached the forward positions of Company K without further casualties.

Lieutenant Colonel Bendel explained his decision to position Company K’s two platoon on the high ground. This was a tactical move that also aimed to boost troop morale. He remarked that if soldiers could pass through friendly lines on their way back, it greatly improved morale and helped protect the rear as forces returned to the battalion perimeter.

Bendel praised Captain Carr for managing a difficult situation effectively. He pointed out that they deployed their forces early, allowing the company commander to move swiftly and utilize supporting fire effectively. Bendel believed that without this strategy, the platoon might have become isolated and faced destruction.

 In the chaos of evacuating the dead and injured, they unfortunately left behind a marine from the first platoon on the ridge line. The following day, Lieutenant Colonel Bendel ordered Company L to retrieve the missing Marine. He instructed Captain Carr to delay the mission until noon due to ongoing rain and limited visibility.

Bendel wanted an aerial observer to monitor the operation. As Company L returned to their previous position, the aerial observer located the Marine’s body along with about 12 North Vietnamese soldiers nearby. The enemy had pulled the Marine body into the demilitarized zone. Fearing it was bait for a trap, Lieutenant Colonel Bendel called his Marine Company back to Hill 28.

 He requested artillery and air support to saturate the area. Lieutenant Colonel Bendel then planned a new strategy. He and his team outlined a three company operation with air and artillery support to recover the body from the demilitarized zone. Instead of a direct attack, one company would block possible enemy routes. The battalion positioned itself on high ground northwest of Hill 28, south of the demilitarized zone.

 The other two companies first moved northeast, then turned north into the demilitarized zone. They advanced southwest to approach the enemy from behind and from the sides. After an artillery bombardment and ground controlled air strikes along the eastern front to hide their movement, the battalion began its operation at 500 on January 11th.

 Lieutenant Colonel Bendel emphasized the need for strict radio silence. As planned, Captain Carr’s company L took control of the Rgel line to the northwest. Under the cover of darkness and fog, the two attack companies, companies K and M, moved northeast toward the demilitarized zone. Company K led the way with Bendel’s command group positioned between them.

 After traveling about 1500 meters, the battalion turned north and entered the southern half of the militarized zone. Inside, the two companies followed parallel paths southwest, separated by a fow rice patty. Company M along with the battalion command group lingered behind Company K, providing protection for the battalion’s rear and left flank.

Around 900, as the morning haze lifted, the first of three aerial observers from the Third Marine Division arrived above. Shortly after, Captain Edward O. Leroyy’s Company K discovered the first of several North Vietnamese Army bunkers near the largely destroyed village of Ansa.

 With artillery and air support, the company quickly handled the scattered enemy resistance. At one point, Captain K, the commander of Company M, noticed what looked like three bushes. They turned out to be well camouflaged North Vietnamese soldiers moving behind his company. He directed machine gun fire toward them and called for artillery support.

 The three soldiers were soon seen running over the hill behind them. For the next 3 hours, the two marine companies operated in the demilitarized zone near Ansa. Company K destroyed about 25 bunkers and seized around 10 weapons. This included a machine gun, a rocket propelled grenade launcher, several AK-47s and other rifles.

 The Marines also confiscated or destroyed cooking utensils, pieces of uniforms and equipment, food supplies, and documents that identified their enemies. The North Vietnamese unit in the area was the second company of the seventh battalion of the 90th North Vietnamese Army regiment. In their haste, the North Vietnamese soldiers left cooked rice in a pot still warm.

Further south, Company M defended Company K’s southern flank and safely recovered the body of the missing Marine from Company L. By the afternoon of the 11th, both companies had moved past the blocking positions of company L and returned to the battalion command post on Hill 28. The Marines sustained only two injuries, both from wounds, and only one required evacuation.

Reports from the Marines indicated they killed at least 15 North Vietnamese Army troops and likely caused even more casualties through artillery and air support. Lieutenant Colonel Bendell stated that by achieving surprise and moving at night, he and his operations officer, Major Richard K.

 Young, saw the sweep of the southern demilitarized zone as a successful effort in coordination between the infantry and supporting forces. On two occasions, aerial observers called for air strikes on North Vietnamese Army troops trying to flank the Marine Companies. Young, who stayed at the battalion combat operations center on Hill 28, noted that they managed to have artillery ready 30 seconds before the aircraft arrived.

This timing allowed them to coordinate both air strikes and artillery fire. They maintained continuous fire throughout the operation. Young remembered several times when artillery was slow to arrive. In those situations, the company commander would contact him using a tactical radio to request immediate support.

 Young would then arrange for 81 mm fire to fill the gap or coordinate with his artillery liaison officer or forward air controller to ensure ongoing fire while the troops advanced on the bunker complex. Shortly after the battalion returned, Lieutenant Colonel Bendel briefed the staff of the Third Marine Division and General Leonard F. Chapman Jr.

 during his visit to Vietnam. This meeting took place at the Dong Ha headquarters. Bendel discussed the successful completion of their operation. With the end of the demilitarized zone sweep, the presence of the third battalion, fourth Marines on Hill 28 was nearing its conclusion. Completing the A3 strong point reduced the need for a forward battalion to guard the approaches.

On January 12th, Bendel’s battalion began moving to a new location near the abandoned village of Enfu. This position was closer to Conthian. For the ninth Marines involved in Operation Kentucky, the strong point system was close to being finished. However, several years later, Lieutenant Colonel Bendell noted signs of a North Vietnamese Army buildup throughout the demilitarized zone sector.

 The supply route to Kaloo remained unstable. Since November 1967, Colonel Joseph Elo Preday’s third Marines had been carrying out Operation Lancaster. This operation aimed to secure the western flank of the 9inth Marines in Kentucky. The Lancaster operational area included key marine bases like Camp Carroll and important artillery position, the Rock Pile, and Kaloo.

 The rock pile reaching 700 ft dominated the surrounding landscape. From its peak, marine observers could easily monitor the most likely routes into the Camllo River Valley and track movements along Route 9. This route was one of the two most essential east-west paths in the demilitarized zone sector. About 12,000 meters below the rock pile lay, effectively the southern end point of Route 9.

 The North Vietnamese army had cut off the road connecting Ku to Kan, which was around 20,000 meters to the west. Kaloo served as a crucial way station for any relief efforts heading to Kesan. Located at the junction of the Kuangtree River and Route 9, it provided the Marines with an outpost to detect enemy movement from the west, southwest, and the Balong Valley to the southeast.

Like much of the terrain in the demilitarized zone, the Lancaster operational zone featured rolling hills that rose into jungle covered mountains standing 700 to 800 ft tall with tree canopies reaching heights of 20 to 60 ft. The presence of 15t elephant grass and thick brush made movement difficult even in the lower areas.

Colonel L Prey was closely connected to his base areas. Just like Colonel Smith with the 9inth Marines, he had only two infantry battalions, one consisting of just two companies. This left the commander of the Third Marines facing challenges with limited resources and manpower. LRA set his command post at Camp Carroll where Lieutenant Colonel William M.

Cryan’s second battalion, 9inth Marines, was also located. Cryan was in charge of companies E and H. He stationed company H at Carol while managing operations. Company E was about 3,000 m southeast of Camp Carroll and had the mission of protecting a main supply route. LRA tasked Lieutenant Colonel Gordon C.

Cook’s third battalion, 9inth Marines, with defending both Kalloo and the rockpile area. Cook along with three of his companies remained in the Thawn Son Lamb sector below the rockpile. He placed company L at Kalloo. An article in the battalion newsletter noted that the sector was relatively quiet except for sporadic ambushes between there and the company-sized outpost at Kaloo.

 Artillery and tanks were available to reinforce the infantry in Lancaster. Three batteries of 105mm howitzers and one battery of 155 mm howitzers all under the first battalion 12th marines at Carol provided direct support to the infantry battalions. An ad hoc unit known as battery W from the first battalion 12th marines was stationed with company L at Kaloo.

Company B from the third tank battalion operated two platoon of M48 medium guns and one heavy section of M67A2 flame tanks at Carroll. These tanks generally strengthened the defenses at Camp Carroll and offered protection for convoys traveling to Kaou. An attached United States Army artillery unit Battery C from the first battalion 44th artillery enhanced the firepower of the Marines.

 The Army’s M42s, also known as dusters, were equipped with twin 40mm anti-aircraft guns. These served as machine guns, providing extra security for Marine convoys and their fixed defenses. The Marines were especially worried about their exposed position at Kaloo. The isolated garrison included approximately 625 personnel from the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps, including the Marine Infantry Company.

 Navy CBS and Marine Engineers were close to finishing the permanent facilities for the Diamarker project. Although the North Vietnamese did not directly attack the Marine outpost, they occasionally mined Route 9 in December and ambushed a Marine convoy returning from Kaloo to the Rock Pile. While the first two weeks of January were relatively calm, Marine intelligence indicated that North Vietnamese forces were mobilizing.

 A division reconnaissance team called Stingray operating near the Ku base quickly confirmed enemy troop presence. On January 12th at around 2:15 p.m., reconnaissance team 2C3, cenamed Blue, reported their findings. The Marines, known as Blue Plate, were in the mountains about 4,000 meters southwest of Kaloo near the Kuangtree River.

 They reported five North Vietnamese soldiers dressed in black pajamas and armed with automatic weapons were tracking them. The Marines fired at the enemy, but did not hit. After a brief quiet period, about 2 hours later, they reported being surrounded by around 30 North Vietnamese troops armed with AK-47s. Marine gunships arrived overhead, providing support, while another helicopter evacuated the unit.

 The reconnaissance team suffered only one casualty with one Marine injured. The events on the 12th hinted at what was to come. The next day, the North Vietnamese ambushed an engineer convoy transporting diearker supplies and equipment to Kaloo. Under cloudy skies with a light drizzle, their 20 vehicle convoy left the rockpile area around 11:20 in the morning on the 13th.

 Marine artillery had previously conducted 15minute preparation fires at suspected ambush sites. The convoy was led by two tanks followed by 10 6×6 trucks, two more tanks in the center, four lowboy tractor trailers, and two army dusters at the back. In total, the vehicles carried about 200 personnel, including engineers, drivers, M42 crews, support staff, and members from Company 1, Third Battalion, 9inth Marines.

 At around 11:50, enemy gunners opened fire on the convoy from about 3,000 meters above Kaloo. They used rocket propelled grenades, small arms fire, and mortar rounds. At the same time, North Vietnamese forces detonated a command mine. This ignited two trucks, one being a lowboy and the other carrying 81 mm mortar ammunition.

 The explosion from the mortar truck caused the rear section of the convoy to come to a complete stop. Soldiers from Company 1 quickly got out of their vehicles to engage the enemy. However, many of them triggered hidden firing devices and mines along the road. Lieutenant Colonel Cook later remembered that before the convoy left, he and his sergeant major went to a lookout point on a hill west of Route 9.

From there, he kept radio communication with his command post and the convoy while monitoring the vehicles heading south toward Kaloo. When he saw the convoy stop after the initial gunfire, he directed the lead element to continue to Kaloo and return with reinforcements. After that, he joined the stranded troops.

 Cook stated that from the ambush site he coordinated artillery fire through his combat operations center. This targeted enemy escape and support routes west and east of route 9. Meanwhile, company L of the third battalion of the 9inth Marines boarded the lead trucks at Kaloo to support the engaged column. By around 12:15, an aerial observer known by the call sign American Beauty arrived overhead to assist in calling in support fire.

 The overcast skies made it impossible for Marine fixedwing jets to assist, but two helicopter gunships took aim at the enemy firing positions. Marine artillery fired over 700 rounds, including 54 shells from 155mm howitzers to support the convoy after the first contact. With Company L’s arrival and the ongoing artillery barrage, the Marines were able to disengage while occasionally facing enemy sniper fire.

 They completed their journey to Kaloo, arriving around 3:10 in the afternoon. The convoy returned to the Rockpile area later that day without any incidents. However, the losses were significant. The American forces reported 19 killed and over 70 wounded. Most casualties were from Company 1 during the beginning of the ambush.

 The Marines confirmed 10 enemy deaths and captured one prisoner. Marine intelligence officers believed that a North Vietnamese company took part in the attack. After the ambush, the third Marines directed their attention back to the north and east. This area was between Camp Carroll and the Rock Pile above Route 9.

 Early in the morning on January 16th, a team from the Third Reconnaissance Battalion known as Stingray found itself surrounded by about 40 North Vietnamese forces. They were situated on high ground roughly 2,000 meters north of the Camllo River. The team reported that these were clearly North Vietnamese Army regulars. They wore green uniforms and helmets marked with a yellow lightning bolt design.

 The enemy was armed with AK-47 rifles and two machine guns. In response, the third Marines sent a reaction platoon from company H, Second Battalion, 9inth Marines, to aid the surrounded team. They were transported by helicopter to a landing zone approximately 1,000 meters east of the reconnaissance team. As they arrived, the reaction platoon faced heavy machine gun fire.

 They returned fire while calling for air and artillery support. After artillery and air strikes weakened the enemy forces, the infantry platoon connected with the reconnaissance team. By this time, the North Vietnamese soldiers had disappeared, leaving six dead behind. At 1:40 p.m. that afternoon, Marine helicopters evacuated both units to Camp Carroll.

 The Marines experienced one Navy Corpsman killed and four Marines wounded. It was evident that the enemy’s activity had increased along Route 9 and throughout the demilitarized zone. A few days of calm passed before conflict erupted again in the western Kentucky sector of the demilitarized zone.

 After leaving Hill 28 and finding an enemy base area, Lieutenant Colonel Bendel’s third battalion, Fourth Marines set up new positions at Andin. This location was between A3 and Kanten as they looked into recent incursions at the latter base. The battalion quickly began patrols in their area of operations. On the 17th, Bendel planned to send out a two company patrol the following morning near an abandoned hamlet just north of the trace about two miles northeast of Kthan.

 Company M would serve as the blocking force while company L would be the sweeping force. On the evening of the 17th, Captain John D. Carr, the commander of Company L, held a meeting with his platoon leaders. Second Lieutenant Kenneth L. Christy, who led the third platoon, remembered that Carr briefed them about the patrol plan for the next day.

 Christy noted that their route went through a destroyed village they called the meat market. This area had a reputation for enemy activity. Frequently, when they entered it, someone got hurt. Although Christy’s platoon had patrolled that area recently, they found no sign of the enemy. This suggested that either the enemy was not engaging or had moved away.

 Captain Carr decided to assign the point position to his first platoon. Lieutenant Christy reasonably argued that his platoon knew the area well and should take point. However, Captain Carr insisted that the third platoon needed a break. He wanted to give another platoon the chance to gain experience in that role.

 With the first platoon in the lead, followed by the second platoon in the command group, the third platoon brought up the rear. As Company L advanced, the battalion left Andian before dawn. Then at about 9:45 in the morning, North Vietnamese Army forces ambushed them from concealed positions near the meat market.

 The first platoon leading the operation initially thought they were facing another North Vietnamese Army platoon. They quickly found themselves divided into smaller groups with the forward unit cut off from the rest of the company. Captain Carr moved the second platoon and his command group to the rear of the first platoon, seeking shelter in a large B-52 bomb crater.

 In the rear, Lieutenant Christy remembered how the ambush started. It began with a few scattered gunshots before allout chaos erupted. His men dropped to the ground, oriented outward as they had been trained. Christy sought cover in a 105mm shell crater alongside his platoon sergeant and radio operator. At that critical moment, Captain Carr called the third platoon commander to join him about 180 m ahead.

Despite the heavy automatic gunfire, the third platoon rushed forward, finding safety in shell holes and bomb craters along the way. Remarkably, they managed to move without any casualties. Christy observed that they secured the rear of the company’s perimeter. As Company L began to stabilize their position, the North Vietnamese continued their assault.

 They kept firing automatic weapons from all directions along with mortars and heavy artillery. The enemy was using an isolated squad from the first platoon as bait in a dangerous area. Lieutenant Christy remembered Captain Carr mentioning that there were dead and wounded ahead. They needed the third platoon to help bring them back for medical evacuation.

 At this point, enemy fire had eased a little. Captain Carr, alongside forward artillery observer Sergeant Michael J. Madden, called for artillery support from the United States. Sergeant Madden also reached out to an air observer in a Huey helicopter to bring in gunships for cover. With this support in place, Lieutenant Christy and one of his squads along with Captain Carr advanced to reach the first platoon.

 Christy assigned tasks to his men and crawled forward carefully. Sergeant Madden stayed at another crater. Even while wounded, he continued to call for artillery strikes and four other men sustained injuries alongside him. Christy recalled Captain Carr providing cover with a shotgun as he moved closer to the bodies of the Marines, including the first platoon commander, who was about 50 m ahead.

Supported by artillery fire, the third platoon successfully brought back the wounded and dead. Lieutenant Christy encouraged his men to be more decisive. He reminded them that the bodies were safely removed. He said, “Let’s gather these people and move out before the enemy starts firing at us again.” Meanwhile, Lieutenant Colonel Bendel, the battalion commander, replaced Company M with another unit in the blocking position after learning about Company L’s situation.

He then led a small command group to assist Company L. Once they joined forces, the two companies eliminated at least three enemy mortar positions along with several machine guns and individual fighting holes. With continued support from helicopter gunships and accompanying artillery, Marine helicopters evacuated the most seriously wounded.

Later that afternoon, the two companies crossed the line in good order while carrying their remaining casualties. They faced nine deaths and 22 injuries in this operation, including Captain Carr, who was evacuated by helicopter. The 9inth Marines reported that the enemy sustained over 100 casualties. By January 20th, a new phase of the war was on the horizon.

 Colonel L Prede and his team from the Third Marines were getting ready to wrap up the Lancaster operation. They were set to take over the Oyola area in the Quang Tree sector from the First Marines. The First Marines would then relieve the fourth Marines in the Camp Evans sector. Colonel William Dick, who led the fourth Marines, would take command of the units in Lancaster.

This phase of Operation Checkers involved some troop reassignments, but it did not significantly impact the battalions in their areas. The third battalion, 9inth Marines, along with two companies from the second battalion, 9inth Marines, would remain in Lancaster, now known as Operation Lancaster 2.

 Typical body count reports indicated that the third Marines in Operation Lancaster First recorded 46 enemy deaths. In turn, they suffered 22 Marines killed and 140 wounded. During the same period, the 9inth Marines in Operation Kentucky faced high casualties, reporting 90 soldiers killed and over 800 wounded. They successfully killed nearly 700 enemy combatants.

However, signs showed that the North Vietnamese were intensifying their efforts in the demilitarized zone, including K-N. On January 20th, enemy gunners targeted two Navy vessels on the Quaviet River. This attack forced the naval support activity, Quaveette, to temporarily close this vital waterway, which was the main supply route to the Marine base at Dong Ha.

 Meanwhile, the Third Marines observed a large enemy force, likely the 29th North Vietnamese Army Regiment, moving north of the Kuangtree River and west of Kaloo. Additionally, another regiment took the place of the 90th North Vietnamese Army Regiment in the northern operational area of Lancaster. The 90th North Vietnamese Army then shifted southwest, possibly entering the K-N operational area.

 It appeared that a major enemy offensive in the north was about to