at 4:20 in the morning the valley exploded American soldiers at a newly built outpost near the village of Wanet woke to the sound of machine guns echoing off the mountains tracer rounds cut through the darkness rocket propelled grenades slammed into sandbags that had been stacked only hours before some of the soldiers had been in the valley for just three days their base sat at the bottom of a steep bowl of forested mountains in eastern Afghanistan surrounded by ridgelines that rose hundreds of meters above them

from those heights unseen fighters were already firing down into the compound within minutes the small American force realized something chilling this was not a probing attack nearly 300 Taliban fighters were closing in from multiple directions and one of the most remote outposts in Afghanistan was about to be overrun how that happened is the story of Wanat Nuristan sits in the far eastern corner of Afghanistan pressed against the mountainous border with Pakistan it is a land of steep ridgelines narrow valleys and forests

so dense that entire villages can disappear beneath the canopy for centuries armies have entered these mountains with confidence and left with something closer to humility in 2008 this remote province had already earned a reputation among American soldiers as one of the most dangerous regions in the entire war The Waygal Valley where the battle of Wanet would unfold cuts like a long scar through those mountains it is narrow twisting and dominated on both sides by towering slopes that rise 3 to 500 meters above the valley floor

every movement on the ground can be seen from the high ground above every vehicle on the road can be tracked from miles away for an insurgent force familiar with the terrain it was the perfect battlefield but for NATO commanders in 2007 and 2008 the valley represented something else entirely it was a corridor a strategic gateway running from the tribal areas of Pakistan into Afghanistan’s interior fighters weapons and supplies flowed through these mountains with alarming ease Taliban groups used the forests and villages as staging areas

slipping across the border before coalition forces could respond and this is where the story begins to tighten by this point in the war the United States had shifted toward a counterinsurgency strategy known as coin the idea behind coin was simple in theory but extraordinarily difficult in practice instead of controlling territory only through large bases and patrols coalition forces would move closer to the local population small combat outposts would be established near villages allowing soldiers to build relationships with local communities

while denying insurgents the freedom to operate the goal was not just to hunt fighters it was to control the environment in which those fighters operated but there was a problem implementing that strategy in a place like Nuristan meant putting small groups of soldiers into some of the most hostile terrain in the world and sometimes into positions that were dangerously exposed in early July of 2008 American forces began establishing a new position near the village of Wanat the base would be called Combat Outpost Kaylor

its purpose was to secure the valley disrupt insurgent movement and extend government influence into an area that had largely remained outside coalition control the soldiers assigned to this mission came from Charlie Company 2nd Battalion 503rd Infantry Regiment of the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team they were paratroopers experienced disciplined and accustomed to operating in difficult environments but even among seasoned units Nuristan had a reputation that made commanders uneasy because these mountains did not forgive mistakes

the force at Wanet was small roughly 48 American soldiers occupied the new outpost during its first days of construction nearby a smaller observation position known as op Top Side was established on a slope overlooking part of the valley about nine soldiers manned that position responsible for scanning the surrounding terrain and providing early warning if insurgents approached on paper the layout seemed logical the outpost would anchor coalition presence in the village the observation point would extend surveillance outward

into the surrounding hills but the terrain told a different story the entire defensive position sat low in the valley above it the mountains formed a ring of natural firing positions that dominated the battlefield anyone standing on those ridgelines could look directly down into the American compound and anyone with a rifle or machine gun could fire into it but that wasn’t the real problem when the paratroopers arrived at Wanat the outpost was still under construction defensive barriers were incomplete sandbags had not yet been fully stacked

fighting positions were still being dug into the earth some heavy weapons had limited overhead Protection and some had none at all construction crews worked long hours trying to reinforce the perimeter hauling supplies stacking barriers and building the skeletal structure of what would eventually become a fortified base but construction in a combat zone takes time time that the soldiers at Wanat did not have because the enemy had been watching Taliban fighters in the region were not disorganized bands of guerrillas

wandering randomly through the mountains many of them had operated in these valleys for years they knew the terrain the villages the footpaths that cut through the forests they also understood patience for weeks before the attack insurgent observers monitored the American presence in the valley they watched patrol patterns they studied the layout of the new outpost they observed the routines of the soldiers working to build their defenses from the surrounding slopes and village buildings they could see almost everything

and slowly quietly they began preparing something far more dangerous than a typical insurgent ambush this would not be a small attack designed to harass a patrol it would be a coordinated assault insurgent groups from across the region began assembling fighters and weapons rocket propelled grenades PKM machine guns mortars assault rifles estimates later suggested that between 200 and 300 fighters gathered for the operation their plan was brutally simple strike before dawn hit the outpost from multiple directions at once

overwhelm the defenders before American air support could arrive and this is where the situation at Wanat becomes even more unsettling because while the American soldiers were building their defenses in the valley the enemy was building something else entirely a battlefield designed specifically to destroy them the plan to place a combat outpost at Wanat had been made for reasons that seemed logical at the time commanders wanted to push coalition presence deeper into the Waygal Valley for years the area had functioned as a corridor

for insurgent movement between Pakistan and Afghanistan fighters crossed the border through hidden mountain passes moved down the valley and dispersed into surrounding districts before coalition patrols could intercept them every intelligence report pointed to the same conclusion if the valley could be controlled a major infiltration route would be disrupted and so the decision was made to establish Combat Outpost Kaylor near the village of Wanet but almost immediately the reality on the ground began to reveal a dangerous contradiction

the new outpost was supposed to control the valley instead the valley controlled the outpost from the moment construction began American soldiers could feel it patrols moving through the area reported being watched from the tree lines local villagers were cautious distant sometimes openly hostile fighters were known to operate in the surrounding forests yet they rarely appeared directly they simply observed but that wasn’t the real problem the deeper issue was the terrain itself in conventional military thinking

the side that holds the high ground holds the advantage high ground provides observation fields of fire and the ability to dictate movement below it is one of the oldest principles of warfare understood by armies since long before gunpowder existed at Wanet that principle had been reversed the Americans occupied the lowest ground in the entire area the ridgeline surrounding the valley formed natural firing platforms hundreds of meters above the outpost from those heights anyone with a rifle could look down directly into the base

machine guns positioned along the slopes could fire plunging rounds into fighting positions that were still under construction even worse the village itself sat dangerously close to the American perimeter buildings walls and narrow alleys created dozens of concealed firing positions only a short distance from the outpost fighters moving through those structures could approach without immediately revealing themselves in effect the Americans had established a base surrounded by potential cover for an attacking force

but the risks were not fully understood yet in theory the outpost would become more secure over time defensive barriers would be completed patrols would expand outward into the valley local engagement with villagers might reduce insurgent activity the plan depended on time but time was exactly what the enemy refused to allow by July 2008 Taliban commanders in the region had begun coordinating something unusual insurgent groups that normally operated independently were communicating with each other fighters were moving quietly

through the surrounding mountains weapons were being distributed among multiple units this was not typical guerrilla behavior small insurgent attacks were common in Afghanistan a roadside bomb here a short ambush there perhaps a few mortar rounds fired into a distant base these operations were designed to harass coalition forces while avoiding decisive engagement what was forming near Wanet was different the scale alone was alarming later intelligence estimates suggested that between 200 and 300 insurgent fighters

were involved in planning the attack some were local militants familiar with the terrain others traveled in from nearby valleys to participate they gathered weapons that could deliver heavy firepower in a short period of time RPG launchers capable of destroying defensive positions PKM machine guns that could sustain long bursts of suppressive fire mortars to strike the interior of the outpost most importantly they coordinated their positions carefully firing points were established along multiple ridgelines fighters moved into buildings within the village

others positioned themselves along the slopes leading down into the valley each group had a role some would pin the Americans inside the outpost with heavy fire others would close in from the village and attempt to breach the perimeter a separate element would attack the smaller observation position known as op top side isolating it from the main base the objective was clear destroy the observation post then overwhelm the outpost itself because if the defenders lost their ability to observe the surrounding terrain

the attackers could move freely down the slopes and into the compound and this is where the situation becomes even more dangerous the American soldiers at Wanat were not expecting a battle of this scale they understood that insurgents operated in the region patrols had already experienced occasional contact but nothing suggested that hundreds of fighters were preparing a coordinated assault against a newly established position from the perspective of the soldiers on the ground the valley was tense but quiet

construction continued patrols moved through the village observation teams scan the surrounding ridgelines but beyond those ridgelines something far larger was assembling the insurgents had chosen their moment carefully they would strike before sunrise at the hour when soldiers are most exhausted when darkness still covers the valley and when the first light of dawn begins to reveal silhouettes against the mountains because in a battle like this surprise is not just an advantage it is the difference between a firefight and a massacre

the first reports that something unusual was happening around Wanet did not come from satellites or intelligence intercepts they came from the soldiers themselves in the days after Charlie Company arrived in the valley patrols moving through the nearby village began noticing subtle changes in behavior some villagers avoided eye contact others disappeared entirely when American patrols approached a few homes that had seemed active days earlier were suddenly empty at first these signs were easy to dismiss villages in Nuristan

had always been cautious around foreign soldiers suspicion and distance were normal but over time the pattern began to feel different the quiet was too complete and this is where the mystery begins because the Americans were not blind to the possibility of an attack observation post topside had been established precisely to watch the surrounding terrain from that small position on the Hillside soldiers could observe sections of the valley and parts of the nearby ridgelines nine men held that position their job was simple and critical

see the enemy before the enemy could reach the outpost but the terrain around Wanet did not cooperate the forests were thick the slopes were steep small footpaths twisted through the mountains disappearing into tree cover where even careful observation could miss movement in this environment fighters did not need to move quickly they only needed to move carefully and slowly piece by piece the insurgents assembled the attack weapons were carried through the forest at night fighters moved along ridgelines that could not easily be seen

from the American positions below others filtered into the village itself blending into the same narrow streets that coalition patrols had walked through only days earlier but what happened next puzzled many analysts after the battle because by the time the attack began the insurgents were positioned with an extraordinary level of coordination firing positions have been established in multiple directions RPG teams were placed where they could strike the outpost directly machine gun crews occupied Vantage points on the slopes above the valley

mortar teams were prepared to fire into the compound and several groups had advanced dangerously close to the American perimeter some were positioned inside buildings in the village of Wanet itself this raised a troubling question how had such a large force assembled so close to an American outpost without triggering an earlier warning part of the answer lies in the nature of insurgent warfare in Afghanistan Talebans fighters did not operate like conventional armies they did not march in columns or assemble openly in large formations

instead they moved in small groups sometimes just two or three men at a time blending into the landscape and the population around them a man carrying a rifle could disappear into a house another could move along a tree line another could simply wait individually none of these movements looked unusual together they formed a trap but there was another factor the insurgents had studied the Americans carefully they knew the outpost was still under construction they knew the defenders were limited in number they understood where the observation positions

were located and which ridgelines could not easily be watched this was not a spontaneous attack it was planned and planned with patience in the weeks before July 13th fighters observed the routines of the American soldiers working at the base they watched patrols move through the village they noted where weapons were positioned and where defenses were still incomplete they also understood something about timing the most vulnerable moment for any military position often occurs during its earliest days before defenses are fully built

before patrol routes are firmly established before the soldiers inside the perimeter truly understand the ground around them and Wanet was still in those early days the paratroopers of Charlie Company had arrived only three days earlier three days to build a base three days to understand a valley that insurgents had known their entire lives and somewhere in the surrounding mountains dozens of fighters were already in position but the most dangerous element of the plan had not yet revealed itself because the first target of the attack

was not the outpost it was the small observation position on the Hillside observation post topside nine soldiers surrounded by mountains and soon by hundreds of enemy fighters long before the first shots were fired at Wanat the principles that would decide the battle had already been written into the landscape itself every military force enters combat carrying a doctrine a set of ideas about how war is supposed to work these doctrines shape where units are placed how they move and how they defend themselves

at Wanat the doctrine guiding American operations in eastern Afghanistan was counterinsurgency counterinsurgency warfare is fundamentally different from conventional war instead of concentrating forces in large fortified bases soldiers disperse into smaller outposts closer to civilian populations the goal is not simply to destroy enemy fighters it is to control terrain by building relationships with local communities disrupting insurgent networks and denying the enemy safe havens in theory this approach forces insurgents into the open

but in places like Nuristan theory collided with geography the counterinsurgency strategy required American soldiers to move into valleys and villages where insurgent fighters had operated for years small combat outposts like Kayler were intended to anchor security in these areas acting as permanent positions from which patrols could dominate the surrounding ground but there was a flaw hidden inside the concept the doctrine assumed that small units could hold their ground long enough for reinforcements and air support to arrive

if they were attacked that Assumption depended on something critical time and time is exactly what the Taliban plan to deny the insurgents preparing for the attack at Wanat were not simply gathering fighters they were applying their own form of tactical doctrine one built from decades of guerrilla warfare in Afghanistan their method was simple brutal and extremely effective strike hard strike fast and strike from everywhere at once in conventional battles attacking forces often mass in a single direction concentrating firepower at one point

in the defensive line but insurgent commanders at Wanat understood that the American outpost could call for artillery and air support within minutes of an attack beginning if they attacked from one direction those reinforcements could focus on that single access so instead they chose a different method a multi directional assault the fighters surrounding Wanet divided into separate elements each assigned a different firing position across the valley some occupied buildings inside the village itself others moved into tree lines along the slopes

machine gun teams climb the ridgelines where they could fire downward into the outpost mortar crews position themselves further back ready to strike the interior of the compound once the attack began the goal was not simply to attack it was to overwhelm when the battle started dozens of firing positions would erupt at the same time machine guns rifles RPG launchers and mortars would strike the base simultaneously from multiple angles from the perspective of the defenders the entire valley would appear to explode at once

but there was another crucial element to the insurgent plan observation post topside the Americans had placed that small observation position on a slope overlooking the valley because it provided early warning from there soldiers could watch the surrounding terrain and detect enemy movement for the Taliban commanders planning the assault that observation post represented a problem as long as those nine soldiers remained in position they could direct fire onto approaching fighters and relay warnings to the main outpost below

so the insurgents made a decision that would shape the entire battle observation post topside would be attacked first several assault groups moved quietly toward the Hillside position during the night their task was simple but dangerous close the distance to the observation post and eliminate it before the defenders could react if they succeeded the main outpost would lose its eyes on the surrounding terrain and without those eyes the defenders at Combat Outpost Kaylor would be fighting blind meanwhile other insurgent groups prepared to strike the outpost

itself RPG teams rehearsed firing angles that would hit key defensive positions machine gun crews positioned themselves where they could suppress American soldiers attempting to man their weapons some fighters moved into buildings only a short distance from the perimeter from those windows they would be able to fire directly into the compound but there was still one final element to the insurgent doctrine timing the attack would begin before dawn at roughly 4:20 in the morning that moment was chosen with precision

in military bases around the world the hour just before sunrise is often when fatigue is highest soldiers finishing night watch rotations are preparing to hand over duties others are waking for the day visibility is poor but shapes are beginning to emerge in the early light in that brief window between darkness and dawn confusion can spread quickly and confusion is a weapon because if the defenders could be shocked overwhelmed and pinned down within the first minutes of the attack the insurgents believed they could do something

extraordinarily rare in modern warfare they could overrun an American base but there was one problem with their plan inside that unfinished outpost in the valley were 48 American paratroopers who had spent years training for moments exactly like this and when the valley erupted in gunfire before sunrise on July 13th, 2008 those soldiers would be forced to prove whether a small force surrounded and outnumbered could survive a battle that almost no one expected the attack began in darkness at approximately 4:20 in the morning on July 13th, 2008

the stillness of the Waygal Valley shattered with the sudden roar of gunfire machine guns open first their tracers slicing down from the mountains above a moment later the deeper thump of rocket propelled grenades echoed across the valley as explosions tore into the unfinished defenses of Combat Outpost Kaylor for the soldiers inside the compound the effect was immediate and violent rounds slammed into sandbags dirt sprayed into the air as bullets struck the ground around fighting positions the first explosions

ripped through areas that had only recently been fortified many of the paratroopers had been asleep minutes earlier some rushed to their weapons without full body armor others grabbed rifles and ran straight toward defensive positions as the attack intensified but the most dangerous fighting was not happening inside the outpost it was happening uphill observation post topside the small American position overlooking part of the valley was the first target of the insurgent assault nine soldiers manned that position

within seconds of the first gunshots in the valley insurgent fighters surged toward the hill from multiple directions machine gun fire ripped through the thin defenses RPG rounds exploded against the fighting positions the attackers were close far closer than the defenders expected in the dim light before dawn shapes appeared moving through the rocks and trees dozens of them the soldiers at top side immediately returned fire M4 rifles and machine guns hammered into the slopes below as the defenders tried to stop the assault

before it reached their perimeter but the attackers kept advancing what happened next surprised even experienced soldiers the insurgents were not stopping to fire from distance they were closing in some fighters reached positions only meters away from the observation post firing from behind rocks and trees others use the terrain to crawl forward under the cover of suppressive fire from machine guns positioned higher on the ridges within minutes the small American position was nearly surrounded and this is where the battle became extraordinary

despite being outnumbered many times over the defenders at topside held their ground machine gunners fired continuous bursts into the advancing fighters riflemen moved between fighting positions firing at targets appearing through the smoke and dust of exploding RPG’s but the volume of enemy fire was overwhelming rounds tore through sandbags explosions ripped apart sections of the defensive perimeter several American soldiers were hit within the first minutes of the assault still the defenders kept fighting and below them in the valley

the main outpost was now under full attack from every direction around Combat Outpost Keiler Taliban fighters opened fire simultaneously machine guns raked the perimeter RPG struck defensive positions and supply areas mortars began landing inside the compound itself the defenders quickly realized something terrifying the enemy was not just firing from distant ridges some fighters were already inside the village only a short distance from the base from windows rooftops and alleyways insurgents fired directly into the outpost

several RPG rounds struck key defensive positions destroying cover and forcing soldiers to relocate under fire for the 48 paratroopers defending the base the battlefield felt like it had erupted in every direction at once but that wasn’t the real danger the real danger was the distance between the attackers and the perimeter because some insurgent fighters were now so close that they could attempt to breach the outpost itself American machine gunners responded immediately M TWO FORTY and M TWO FORTY NINE machine guns roared to life

pouring fire into the village and along the slope surrounding the compound grenade launchers sent explosive rounds into buildings where enemy fighters were firing from windows rifle teams moved between fighting positions reinforcing weak points in the perimeter the volume of fire from the defenders began to slow the assault but the attackers kept pushing several groups advanced to within meters of the outer defenses firing RPG’s directly into the compound one explosion blasted apart part of the defensive barrier

opening a gap in the perimeter for a brief moment insurgent fighters surged forward and this is where one of the most remarkable moments of the battle unfolded staff Sergeant Ryan Pits was Manning a machine gun position that had already taken heavy fire during the opening minutes of the attack he had been seriously wounded by shrapnel from an RPG explosion despite the injuries he refused to abandon his weapon instead he kept firing from his exposed position Pitts directed machine gun fire into enemy fighters

advancing toward the perimeter each burst forced them to take cover buying precious seconds for other soldiers to reinforce the defenses but the situation was still deteriorating at Observation Post topside the defenders were now in desperate combat at extremely close range several soldiers had been killed or wounded the attackers had moved so close that grenades and rifle fire were exchanged across distances of only a few meters the small position was on the verge of being overrun and back at the main outpost

commanders realized that if topside fell completely the attackers would gain a direct route down the slope into the heart of the American base which meant the battle was entering its most dangerous phase because the defenders had only one remaining advantage they could call for help and somewhere far beyond the mountains surrounding Wanet American aircraft and artillery crews were already preparing to answer that call to understand how the soldiers at Wanat survived the opening hours of the battle it is necessary to slow the fight down

and examine what actually happened in those first chaotic minutes because on paper the situation should have ended very differently nearly 50 American soldiers were defending an unfinished outpost at the bottom of a valley around them between 200 and 300 insurgent fighters were attacking from high ground buildings and tree lines heavy weapons were firing from multiple directions the observation post protecting the flank was collapsing under close range assault by every conventional measure the defenders were in a losing position

but battles are not decided by numbers alone they are decided by moments and at Wanat several critical decisions in those moments prevented the outpost from being overrun the first factor was positioning although Combat Outpost Kaylor had been built in a dangerous location the defenders had still established multiple fighting positions around the perimeter these positions were manned by machine gun teams whose job was to control specific sectors of fire when the attack began those machine guns became the backbone of the defense

weapons like the M TWO FORTY and M TWO FORTY NINE were capable of firing sustained bursts that could suppress large areas of ground even when insurgent fighters attempted to advance in groups these guns forced them to dive for cover before reaching the perimeter every time attackers tried to close the distance they ran into walls of automatic fire but that alone was not enough the insurgents had already positioned themselves extremely close to the base especially inside the village from those buildings they could fire directly into American positions

this is where timing became critical instead of remaining fixed in a single defensive line American soldiers began shifting between positions under fire when a machine gun was disabled by an RPG strike another team moved in to replace it when one sector became overwhelmed riflemen reinforced the area the defence became fluid small groups of soldiers moved through the compound carrying ammunition reinforcing weak points and evacuating wounded men while the firefight continued around them but that wasn’t the most important factor

the most important factor was communication despite the chaos of the attack radio operators inside the outpost were able to establish contact with higher headquarters within minutes of the first shots calls for fire support began moving through the chain of command artillery units positioned miles away prepared their guns air support crews began scrambling aircraft and this is where the nature of modern warfare began to shift the balance of the battle because the insurgent plan depended on speed their entire strategy revolved

around overwhelming the outpost before outside support could arrive the longer the defenders held their positions the more dangerous the battlefield would become for the attackers and the defenders were holding meanwhile at Observation Post topside the situation had reached the brink of collapse the small American team had already suffered severe casualties several soldiers were wounded others had been killed during the close range fighting that erupted as insurgents pushed toward the perimeter yet even there

the defenders managed to delay the attackers long enough to prevent them from immediately descending into the outpost below every minute mattered and those minutes began to add up approximately 40 to 50 minutes after the battle began the first American aircraft arrived over the valley attack helicopters and strike aircraft began orbiting above the battlefield searching for insurgent firing positions using radio guidance from the soldiers below pilots started engaging targets along the ridgelines and inside the village

rocket strikes and cannon fire ripped through areas where insurgents had massed at the same time artillery units began firing into enemy positions around the valley the effect was immediate insurgent fighters who had been advancing aggressively toward the base were suddenly caught between the defenders machine guns and air delivered firepower striking from above their attack began to stall this is one of the most important tactical lessons from Wanet guerrilla forces can achieve local superiority by concentrating fighters at a specific moment

but that advantage is temporary once conventional firepower enters the fight artillery aircraft precision strikes the battlefield changes rapidly and the insurgents at Wanat were now facing exactly that shift positions that had seemed safe along the ridgelines were suddenly exposed to air attack fighters who had moved into the village found themselves targeted by helicopters firing rockets into buildings the momentum of the assault began to fade but even as the attack weakened the battle was far from over because

by the time the first aircraft arrived over Wanet the outpost had already suffered devastating losses nine American soldiers would die in the battle 27 more would be wounded Observation Post topside had been nearly destroyed and yet against overwhelming odds the defenders had held their ground long enough for the battlefield to change the Taliban assault had come closer to overrunning an American position than almost any other battle of the Afghan war but it had failed and the reasons why would become one of the most studied

tactical lessons of the entire conflict the battle at Wanat quickly became more than a single firefight in a remote Afghan valley within the US military it became a case study a moment examined in classrooms planning rooms and tactical reviews across the armed forces because what happened there revealed something uncomfortable about modern warfare the soldiers at Combat Outpost Kaylor had fought with extraordinary courage small groups of paratroopers held their ground against an enemy force several times their size

wounded men continued firing weapons machine gun teams fought from exposed positions while rockets exploded around them but bravery alone was never supposed to be the deciding factor modern military planning is designed to prevent soldiers from being placed in positions where survival depends purely on heroism and one at forced commanders to confront a difficult truth several critical assumptions behind the outpost had been flawed the first and most obvious lesson was terrain in military strategy terrain dominance

determines which side controls the battlefield at Wanat the Taliban had dominated the high ground surrounding the outpost from those ridge lines they could observe the base coordinate their attack and fire downward into American positions the defenders were placed at the lowest point in the valley that decision did not guarantee defeat the battle proved that but it handed the attackers an enormous tactical advantage from the very beginning future planners studying Wanet returned again and again to this single point

never surrender the high ground unless you are absolutely certain you can control it the second lesson involved construction and preparation Combat Outpost Kaylor was still incomplete when the attack began defensive barriers were unfinished fighting positions lacked full Protection some key weapon systems were exposed to direct fire from surrounding terrain outposts in counterinsurgency warfare are meant to evolve over time becoming stronger as defenses are built and patrols extend outward but one it demonstrated the danger of that early phase

the moment a base appears on the battlefield it becomes a target and insurgent forces may attack before those defenses are ready the third lesson involved the enemy itself for years insurgent groups in Afghanistan have been portrayed as loosely organized fighters relying mainly on ambushes and roadside bombs the assault on Wanat showed something different the Taliban had demonstrated coordinated planning hundreds of fighters had moved into position without detection firing points had been selected carefully

assault elements targeted key positions like Observation Post Topside first attempting to blind the defenders before the main assault this was not a chaotic attack it was a deliberate operation and this is where the story becomes even more revealing because the battle also showed the limits of insurgent warfare despite their careful planning and numerical advantage the attackers could not finish the fight quickly enough once American air support and artillery entered the battle the balance of power shifted rapidly

the Taliban’s window of opportunity closed their assault had nearly succeeded but nearly was not enough and that leads to the final lesson small units matter the 48 soldiers at Wanat did not defeat the attackers alone they relied on artillery crews miles away pilots flying overhead and commanders coordinating reinforcements beyond the mountains but none of that support would have mattered if the defenders had collapsed in the first hour they did not small groups of soldiers held key positions under overwhelming fire

machine gunners kept advancing fighters pinned down wounded men continued to fight long enough for the battlefield to change in military terms they bought time and time is often the most valuable resource in war the battle of Wanat became one of the most analyzed engagements of the Afghanistan conflict precisely because it contained both failure and resilience a flawed position a powerful enemy attack and a defense that refused to break when the firing finally stopped in the Waygal Valley the mountains fell silent again

smoke drifted above the shattered defenses of Combat Outpost Kaylor sandbags had been torn open by explosions sections of the perimeter were scarred by rocket strikes spent ammunition covered the ground where soldiers had fired thousands of rounds during the fight the battle had lasted only a few hours but for the men inside that outpost it had felt like an entire lifetime compressed into a single morning nine American soldiers were dead 27 more were wounded Observation Post topside had been nearly destroyed its small defensive position

overwhelmed by the ferocity of the opening assault around the valley the fighters who had attempted to overrun the base had begun to disappear back into the forests and mountain trails they knew so well somewhere between 60 and 100 insurgents were believed to have been killed during the battle but the numbers alone do not explain the meaning of Wanet because what remained in that valley was something far more complicated than victory or defeat the soldiers of Charlie Company had held their ground under conditions

that could easily have turned into catastrophe outnumbered surrounded by higher terrain and caught in an unfinished defensive position they fought long enough for the larger machinery of modern warfare to arrive artillery aircraft reinforcements but Wanat also became a reminder of how fragile small outposts can be in the mountains of Afghanistan in the months and years that followed commanders would study the battle in detail reports would analyze the terrain the decisions that placed the outpost where it stood

and the extraordinary coordination of the insurgent assault training programs would dissect every minute of the fight searching for lessons that could prevent another battle like it yet for the men who were there the memory was simpler it was the memory of a valley before sunrise of machine guns echoing across the mountains of wounded soldiers refusing to leave their positions and of a small group of paratroopers who for a few brutal hours in July 2008 stood alone at the bottom of a valley and refused to surrender the ground beneath their feet