As 1968 started, the Third Marine Amphibious Force anticipated a renewed initiative from the enemy in the north. Marine intelligence reported that nine North Vietnamese regiments from three different divisions were present at or just below the demilitarized zone. These regiments either operated under their respective divisions or directly under the demilitarized zone front headquarters.

 The North Vietnamese had established this new command in 1967, distinct from the Trian Hugh military region to coordinate operations in and just south of the demilitarized zone. In total, the front commanded around 21,000 troops, including divisions, regiments, battalions, and companies. In its annual report, the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam noted that the creation of the North Vietnamese DMZ front headquarters was a significant strategic maneuver by the enemy.

 They had effectively tied down a large Allied force near the border and were poised to launch a major offensive in northern Quang Tri province. In its December 1967 enemy order of battle, the Third Marine Amphibious Force identified three regiments from the 324B North Vietnamese Army Division, the 812th, the 8003rd, and the 90th, as well as two regiments from the 325C North Vietnamese Army Division, the 29th and the 95th, operating south of the demilitarized zone.

 The Marines assessed that the headquarters for the 325C division and the 95th regiment were located 5 to 10 miles northwest of Kesan. The 29th North Vietnamese Army regimental headquarters and two battalions remained in the southern sector of the demilitarized zone about 20 mi north of Kesan with one battalion, the eighth position just 5 mi north of the Marine base.

 In the eastern area of the demilitarized zone, intelligence officers from the Fleet Marine Force Pacific indicated that the headquarters of the 324B division was 5 mi north of the Benghai River. The 812th North Vietnamese Army Regiment with all three of its battalions was located in the southern demilitarized zone below the river about 5 mi north of Camp Carroll.

Both the 8003rd and 90th regimental headquarters were said to be positioned just above the Benh High River. According to the Fleet Marine Force, Pacific Order of Battle, which varied in some aspects from the Third Marine Amphibious Force, the 8003rd had only one battalion with its regimental headquarters.

 Contrary to the information from the third marine amphibious force which suggested the other two battalions operated above the demilitarized zone fleet marine force Pacific reported that the first and third battalions operated inside South Vietnam. The first battalion was north of Conthen and the third battalion was near the flat coastal area east of Giolin despite the lack of cover and concealment in that region.

 The 90th North Vietnamese Army Regiment created difficulties for Marine intelligence. In its December summary, the Fleet Marine Force Pacific noted all three battalions 7th, 8th, and 9th along with the regimental headquarters located above the Benhai River in the demilitarized zone north of Concen.

 However, the third marine amphibious force had evidence that two battalions of the 90th had left their regimental area using elephants as pack animals. They moved west into Laos. These enemy units then entered South Vietnam, south of Kisan, and traveled northeast. Following the Mi, also known as the road to the west, which in this instance led east, one battalion of about 600 soldiers ended up roughly 5 mi southwest of Quang Try City.

 Agent reports indicated the other battalion, consisting of around 400 men, infiltrated south into Thuan Province. To complicate matters further, the intelligence suggested that the 90th was now under the operational control of the 312th North Vietnamese Army Division instead of the 324B division.

 This seemed unlikely since the 312 had not been in the demilitarized zone since 1966, and no other reports mentioned this division. In addition to the 324B and 325 C divisions, Fleet Marine Force Pacific Intelligence Officers identified another division, the 341st North Vietnamese Army, situated in the Vinllin district of southern North Vietnam.

 This division was clearly poised to reinforce enemy forces in the demilitarized zone and Quang Tri province. Fleet Marine Force Pacific’s order of battle also indicated 5,000 enemy troops in southern Quang Try who could be deployed to support forces in the demilitarized zone. These troops included the fifth and 9th North Vietnamese regiments along with elements from the sixth and 27th independent battalions.

 While the North Vietnamese gathered their infantry strength in the demilitarized zone, they also maintained a significant artillery threat to Allied forces in the north. With about 100 artillery pieces, rockets, and mortars, ranging from 60 mm mortars to 152 mm field guns, they could target all major marine bases in the central and eastern demilitarized zone.

 Their Soviet built 130 mm field guns capable of reaching over 27,000 m could easily hit Dong Ha, located around 15 km south of the Benhai River. However, due to their basic supply system, the enemy struggled to maintain a high rate of fire, rarely exceeding 1,000 rounds per day. From April through December 1967, they used Americanmade 105 millimeter howitzers and 81 millimeter and 82 mm mortars.

Mortars made up the largest portion of enemy artillery used. Over 13,000 mortar shells and just over 5,000 rounds of 105 mm shells struck near American defensive positions, especially around Conthine and Giolin. These two Allied bases were the only ones within range of the 5 mm artillery.

 Major General Raymond Liri Murray, the deputy commander of the Third Marine Amphibious Force, noted that the enemy’s 130 mm field guns were more of a nuisance than a true threat. He stated that they did not cause many casualties, nor did they result in loss of territory, but they were a constant irritation.

 From April to December, the North Vietnamese fired fewer than 500 rounds from these large guns at Allied targets in the South. Brigadier General Lewis Mezer, who was an artillery officer and the assistant division commander for the Third Marine Division, mentioned that the enemy’s artillery followed predictable patterns. Bombardments typically happened around 6:00 in the morning at noon and at 5:00 in the evening with very little activity at night.

 Whenever the enemy reduced their fire from the bigger guns, they increased their use of mortars. Meeter generally rated the North Vietnamese gunners as only fair. While they used forward observers, their readjustments on American positions were often offtarget. However, Mezer acknowledged that the enemy could accurately hit Donggha when they chose to, even with the North Vietnamese artillery units working on a limited logistical margin.

Marine commanders could not afford to underestimate the threat they posed to American defenses in the demilitarized zone. Mortars and artillery accounted for over 70% of allied casualties in the north. For instance, between December 3rd and 10th from Mr. Officials and December 3 and 10th, enemy shelling led to 124 marine casualties caused by 727 rounds that landed in or near Marine defenses.

 Although artillery fire from the north tapered off toward the month’s end, the North Vietnamese army could increase their attacks at will. The North Vietnamese artillery was concentrated into two main groups. Their artillery coverage stretched westward about 15 km from the coastal region of Caplay to an area near the Benghai River.

 This zone contained roughly 130 interconnected artillery sites, each capable of holding significant firepower. The North Vietnamese reinforced their artillery with significant anti-aircraft defenses. This included nine surfaceto-air missile sites, heavy machine guns, and anti-aircraft guns up to 57 mm. This setup made it challenging for American air strikes to target the artillery positions and complicated aerial observation needed for effective counter action.

 Both generals William West Mland and William Mezer admitted at various points that American commanders did not have accurate detailed information on the damage inflicted by United States air and artillery on enemy defenses in the demilitarized zone. Years later, General Meza noted that American estimates of enemy guns in the demilitarized zone came from the third marine amphibious forces enemy order of battle.

 According to Meza, the order of battle officer simply took all identified enemy units in a specific area and multiplied the known weapons in those battalions, regiments, and divisions. The actual numbers could be much higher or lower than this estimate. Meza explained that the North Vietnamese moved their artillery regularly, making it difficult for American intelligence, gunners, and aviators to track them.

 As a result, the North Vietnamese offered only brief opportunities as targets for US forces. On January 6th, the 9th Marines reported that the North Vietnamese army had built three new artillery positions north of the demilitarized zone. Each position had two guns and was supported by an anti-aircraft unit.

 While bolstering their infantry and combat arms in the north, the North Vetine also enhanced their logistics and combat support capabilities. Marine Intelligence Assessment stated that the North Vietnamese demonstrated remarkable ingenuity in thwarting American air efforts to disrupt their supply lines. They quickly repaired damaged roads and constructed pontoon or cable bridges to replace those hit by American bombs.

Major roads remained open for truck traffic, but delays occurred due to numerous detours, fords, and ferry crossings caused by the bombing. As a result, the North Vietnamese often resorted to bicycles and porters instead of trucks for transport. A man on a bicycle could carry about£500, while porters managed around 50 to 60.

Additionally, the North Vietnamese army utilized mules, horses, and even elephants to support their movement. A horse or mule could carry between 150 and 300 lb. In contrast, an elephant could transport around 1,000 lb. An animal-drawn bull cart had the capacity for up to 1,500 pounds. These alternative transportation methods were slower but offered more maneuverability compared to motor vehicles.

 However, whenever possible, the North Vietnamese still used trucks and shipping to deliver supplies into the demilitarized zone. The enemy’s lines of communication in the North Vietnamese panhandle stretched from Dong Hoy south to the demilitarized zone. This network comprised 16 interconnecting roads, five waterways, the National Railroad, and a wide range of trails.

 In Don Hoy, North Vietnamese workers unloaded cargo from seagoing vessels for transfer to rivercrafts or trucks for transport south. The enemy repurposed ships of 800 tons or less and fishing boats to navigate deeper waters and occasionally venture into open seas. They also utilized small shallow draft boats called pyrogues equipped with outboard motors on restricted inland waterways like the Ben High and Benz rivers.

Although the railroad was out of service, its railed served as a path for foot and bicycle traffic. Key North South routes, including routes 101,102, 103, and connected the three primary North Vietnamese base areas in and above the demilitarized zone to one another and to infiltration corridors further south.

 The northernmost base area, known as base area 510, was located 40 km southeast of Dong Hoy, and contained about 19 installations. These included general storage areas, a warehouse, a facility for petroleum, oils, and lubricants, and an ordinance depot positioned at the meeting point of route 101 and 103, which head southeast and southwest toward the demilitarized zone.

This jungle covered base offered a relatively secure location for troops and supplies heading south. The largest base area base area 5 and 11 spanned approximately 100 km and was only 10 km southeast of base area 510 extending to the northern edge of the demilitarized zone. Within its confines were three bivwac areas, six troop staging zones and logistical storage depots situated at the crossroad of routes 101 and IIA.

This base area acted as a gateway for North Vietnamese units advancing south to attack positions in the eastern demilitarized zone. Troops from base areas of 510 and 512 moved to the westernmost base area 512. This area is located in the demilitarized zone where North Vietnam, South Vietnam, and Laos meet.

 The base included a large staging complex with underground shelters and surface structures. Additionally, route 103 ran through its lower section. This made base area 512 a key transshipment point for both personnel and equipment before they infiltrated into the southern region. As the year 1967 came to a close, the third marine amphibious force received troubling intelligence.

North Vietnamese Army units were using the Santa Fe Trail, the eastern part of the Hoki min trail in Laos to enter the Kand sector. They had previously avoided this area. Activity was observed on both the eastern and western sides of the demilitarized zone. At the end of the year, American commanders and intelligence officers worked to understand the enemy’s plans.

 Even though the North Vietnamese army had faced significant losses in the demilitarized zone with around 10,000 dead, according to Marine sources, they remained a powerful opponent. General West Mand noted the advantages this situation gave the enemy. He later mentioned that the closeness of IOR to North Vietnam was always a source of concern for him, even more so than for Lieutenant General Robert E.

 Kushman, the commander of the Third Marine Amphibious Force. Marine commanders and their staffs had similar worries. At the start of the year, the Fleet Marine Force Pacific headquarters in Hawaii prepared a 92page report titled Estimate of the Enemy Situation, DMZ Area, Vietnam, January 1st, 1968. This comprehensive study detailed the North Vietnamese Army’s strengths and weaknesses.

 It also outlined possible options and likely maneuvers of their commanders. The intelligence staff at Fleet Marine Force Pacific described the North Vietnamese Army as one of the best military forces in Southeast Asia. They adapted effectively to the circumstances in the demilitarized zone, familiar with both the American positions and the terrain.

 Although they primarily moved on foot, this limitation actually provided the North Vietnamese soldier with unique advantages. As noted in the Marine Report, certainly a slow process, but due to these circumstances, the North Vietnamese Army soldier is limited only to areas that are nearly impossible for foot movement, recognizing the relatively high morale and dedication of the North Vietnamese army.

 The FMFP pack staff writers noted that one of the enemy’s key traits was his perception of the current conflict. He viewed it as one that has spanned two generations. He has no significant hopes for a swift resolution. So his actions are marked by patience. The enemy clearly had vulnerabilities. However, their troops lacked technical and mechanical training as well as experience.

 North Vietnam relied on an outdated logistical support system which depended on a vast pool of manpower. The North Vietnamese army consistently showed an inability to take advantage of tactical opportunities that required quick deployment of units and resources. Additionally, the absence of modern communication often hindered senior North Vietnamese commanders from making impactful decisions at critical moments once battles began.

 They struggled to coordinate and control their units effectively in rapidly changing circumstances. Interrogations of prisoners also indicated that the morale of the North Vietnamese Army soldier declined the longer he remained south of the Benhai River. In weighing the strengths and weaknesses of the North Vietnamese Army forces in the North, the FMFP staff officers assessed the most likely strategies the enemy would take in the demilitarized zone sector.

 According to the marine analysis, the North Vietnamese had several viable options. The most probable ones being a division-sized attack into northeastern Quang Try to seize temporary control of selected areas. Conduct multi-battalion or regimental sized attacks against numerous allied targets between Highway 9 and the demilitarized zone using forces positioned in eastern Quangry and near Ki San potentially seeking to hold Kan at least for a while due to its isolated location.

 continue the current approach of harassing friendly forces with hitand-run tactics and disrupt communication lines using battalion-sized forces. Maintain the current tactics while also fortifying areas and ambush sites in Quang Try to trap friendly forces, aiming to undermine our efforts and inflict heavy personnel casualties and equipment losses on them.

 Withdraw all forces north of the Benghai and reinforce defenses. Based on the available options, the FMF pack report concluded that the North Vietnamese would likely choose a mix of options one and two. At the same time, they would harass friendly forces through hitand-run attacks, mining, and interfering with lines of communication.

 Even with the recent setbacks faced by the North Vietnamese army in the demilitarized zone, FMF PA staff members believed that the leadership in North Vietnam, driven by a dinebenu mentality, aimed to deliver a series of tactical defeats and heavy casualties to United States forces. This strategy was intended to demoralize the American public and make continued participation in the war politically unfeasible.

 On January 13th, General Kushman, the commander of the Third Marine Amphibious Force, communicated by radio with General West Mand. He warned that an immediate enemy threat to Third Marine Amphibious Force forces was gathering west of Kuran. He also indicated additional heavy enemy concentrations in the Aha Valley and in north of the demilitarized zone.

 At this moment, both the military assistance command Vietnam and the Marine Command saw Northern Ior as the most likely location for a significant enemy attack. In the demilitarized zone, much of the warfare looked similar to the previous year. Work on the barrier continued and the same politically motivated rules of engagement were still in effect.

United States ground forces could not cross the Benhigh River, but could operate in the demilitarized zone south of the line and return fire across it. Artillery, naval gunfire, and air missions were permitted against legitimate targets in North Vietnam. However, military assistance command Vietnam required that the Marine Command report every action taken against the North Vietnamese according to these guidelines.

 Marine units remained in the same sectors with their designated operational names as they had occupied in December. In the demilitarized zone, the third Marine division managed three distinct tactical areas identified by operational code names, Napoleon, Kentucky, and Lancaster. Lieutenant Colonel Edward R. Toner’s first amphibian tractor battalion was in charge of the Napoleon area of operations.

 This area extended three miles above and two miles below the Kuviet waterway and two miles inland from the coast. The battalion’s mission was to protect the crucial Quviet port facility, the accompanying logistic support facility and secure the river supply route to Donggha. The establishment of a landing ship tank ramp at the mouth of the Kuviet occurred in March.

 In 1967, ships could unload their cargos onto landing craft utility and landing craft mechanized for the journey up river to Dong Ha. As marine forces and facilities grew in northern Quang Try, the Kua Viet supply channel became even more vital to the Marine Command. By the end of the year, the Navy Ka Viet port facility could handle two landing ship tanks, three landing craft utilities, and three landing craft mechanized.

 mechanized mechanized mechanized mechanized mechanized conference moving 940 short tons daily to Dong Ha. The first amphibian tractor battalion transferred from the Danang tactical area of responsibility to its new command post at the Kurviet port facility at the end of April 1967. This change aimed to provide general support for the third marine division.

 The commanding officer of the amphibian tractor battalion also became the Kua Viet installation coordinator in charge of both defense and administration of the Kua Viet area. In November, the Third Marine Division broke down Operation Kingfisher, the campaign’s code name in the eastern sector of the demilitarized zone into three separate operations, Lancaster, Kentucky, and Napoleon.

 In operation Napoleon, Lieutenant Colonel Toner continued to oversee roughly the same area where the Amtrakers had been operating. The battalion also had the task of constructing the C4 combat operating base located about 2,000 m north of the Kuviet. They assisted the neighboring army of the Republic of Vietnam’s second regiment in building the A1 strong point another 3,000 m to the northwest.

 The A1 and C4 positions marked the eastern end of the barrier. While working on the barrier in December, Toner’s Marines engaged in some of the fiercest fighting of the month on the 11th in the sand dunes and scrub pine near the fishing village of Halo toy just north of C4. The battalion battled throughout the day, killing 54 enemy soldiers while suffering 20 wounded Marines.

 5 days later, the Kurviet facility was hit by artillery and rocket attacks, resulting in five Marines killed and 31 wounded. By the end of 1967, Marine statistics indicated that Operation Napoleon led to 87 enemy deaths and two captured prisoners with a loss of 10 Marines killed and 48 wounded and evacuated.

 In January 1968, Lieutenant Colonel Toner’s battalion included his headquarters and support company, Company A and B, and an additional infantry company, Company C, from the first battalion, Third Marines. A platoon of six LVTH6s from the first armored amphibian company attached to the second battalion 12th Marines provided artillery support.

 A mortar section with 34.2 mortars from the 12th marines reinforced the howitzers. The Napoleon area of operations with its flat sandy coastal plane and the Ka Viet waterway was ideal for toner’s battalion. The battalion commander had available 64 troop carrying LVTP5s, six command and control tractors, four LVTs for mine clearing, and two LVTR1s for repairs.

 These lightly armored amphibian tractors allowed movement on both land and water. In minutes, the Marines could reinforce any trouble spot within the tactical area of responsibility. Early January was a quiet time for the Amtrak Marines. They engaged in civic action in the nearby fishing village of Giah High. They worked on C4 and built revetments for the tractors.

 Marine Sergeant Ron Asher with the attached company C third Third Marines at C4 wrote to his mother in December 1967. He shared that he spent most of his downtime from patrols filling sandbags and digging in the Amtraks and tanks. During a visit on Christmas Day, General West Mand expressed concern about the lack of protection for the amphibian vehicles.

 In sharing this with Lieutenant Colonel Toner, General Tomkins, the third division commander, suggested using steel revetments along with oil drums and ammunition boxes filled with sand to safeguard the LVTs. It was not until mid January that the North Vietnamese made a serious attempt to test the marine positions in Napoleon.

 On January 14th, a marine patrol about 2,500 meters south of the Kuviet near the coast found a design in the sand. It featured four circles with a large arrow pointing northwest towards the battalion command post, concluding that this was a crude aiming stake for enemy mortars. The Marines altered the direction of the arrow, ensuring that any rounds fired from that spot would land in the sea.

 That same night, approximately 1,000 m to the southwest, a Marine squad from Company B, First Marines set up an ambush. The Amphibian Tractor Battalion located just outside the village of Tuong Vanong spotted nearly 50 enemy troops advancing toward them from the southeast. The Marine Squad leader quickly requested artillery support.

 Within 2 minutes, the 105 mm artillery on the LVTH6 fired more than 100 rounds at the approaching enemy. The North Vietnamese Army soldiers regrouped twice, but each time they retreated under fire. A marine observing through his Starlight scope noted several enemy troops falling. However, when two reinforced Marine platoon from Company B surveyed the area the next morning, they found no bodies.

 Throughout the demilitarized zone sector, the enemy seemed to try again to infiltrate into and behind Allied positions. Along both sides of Route One, the Second Army of the Republic of Vietnam Regiment, filled the gap between the Napoleon and Kentucky areas of operations. This regiment, part of the well- reggarded first army of the Republic of Vietnam division, occupied both the A1 and A2 strong points and the C1 base area.

 In December, Major Vu Vanier, the regimental commander, was described by the Marines as an impressive officer with a solid command of English. He set up his command post at C1 just west of the railroad and route 1 about 6,000 m south of Golin. GI stationed one battalion at the C1 base and deployed two battalions forward, one at A1 near the destroyed fishing village of Anmi about 2,000 m below the demilitarized zone and the other at a two just above Golin.

 On January 3rd, GI moved his reserve battalion, the second battalion of the second army of the Republic of Vietnam from below Giolin to new positions north of the Ku Viet near Dong Ha. This relocation led to a boundary adjustment between the regiment and the ninth marines involved in operation Kentucky. The A2 stronghold at Golin was manned by the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, but remained within the 9inth Marines tactical area of operations.

According to the barrier plan, the army of the Republic of Vietnam was eventually set to take control of the A3 strong point, which is situated halfway between Jolin and Comine once it was completed. Until that transition occurred, the defense and construction of the barrier remained the responsibility of the 9inth Marines in Kentucky. covering Leatherneck Square.

The area measured approximately 6×8 mi, bordered by Golin and Dong Ha to the east and Kong The Cam Lo to the west. This operational area included three of the five strong points of the trace. The combat operating bases of the barrier were C2 and C3. The terrain in Kentucky ranged from low-lying hills with woods and rice patties in the northern area to the cultivated Camlo River Valley in the south stretching from Camllo to Dong Ha.

Route 1 connected Giolin to Dong Ha while route 561 ran from Conthine to Camllo. In the north, route 605 linked the strong points together and route 9 located south of the Camllo River ran from Donggha into Laos. Most of these communication routes, except for route one, needed extensive engineering work such as paving, widening, and resurfacing to support the logistical demands of the barrier effort.

 Operation Kentucky started officially on November 1st, 1967. The 9inth Marines were familiar with their operational area. The regiment was in charge of the same ground and positions it held during the earlier operation kingfisher. Essentially, the change in designation served as a convenient way to track progress in the demilitarized zone campaign through body counts.

 The operational plan remained the same. The 9inth Marines were tasked with securing Leatherneck Square, protecting Dong Ha, building the barrier, and repelling any North Vietnamese forces trying to infiltrate into the coastal plane of IOR. In January 1968, Colonel Richard BBB Smith, who had taken command of the regiment the previous September, oversaw four infantry battalions and part of another from his command post at Dong Ha.

 With the exception of two companies from the second battalion, all other battalions were administratively part of the first, third, and fourth marines. The second battalion, first marines, defended the A4 strong point at Confien. The third battalion, third marines, worked on the fortifications of the A3 strong point with three companies. The third battalion, fourth marines, secured A3 from positions on hill 28 north of the trace.

 The first battalion, fourth marines, occupied the C2 and C2A combat operating bases along Route 561. Further south, the two companies of the 9inth Marines safeguarded the Camllo Bridge where Route 561 crossed the Camllo River and the second battalion. 12th Marines artillery positions on Camllo Hill which served as the C3 combat operating base.

 The remaining rifle company of the 9inth Marines was also part of this effort. The third battalion, Third Marines Company Mike, was attached to the 12th Marines. They were tasked with guarding the provisional Marine artillery battalion at the Geolin Fire Support Base located south of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam in the A2 Strong Point.

 Colonel Smith, a seagoing Marine during World War II and an infantry company commander during the Korean War, had clear ideas about the war in the demilitarized zone. He noted that the Marines were sitting in defensive positions playing strictly defensive combat. Smith felt that the troops needed training in defensive warfare.

 He recognized this was not a popular viewpoint as Marines are always supposed to be in an assault over a beach. But this just isn’t the name of the game out there. The focus was on establishing good defensive positions and ensuring clear lines of fire. With the commands focus on the barrier at the start of the year, the strong points and combat operating bases in the ninth marine sector became even more significant.

 The A4 strong pointed Conthen anchored the western segment of the cleared trace and played a critical role in the regiment’s defensive strategy. Positioned less than 2 mi south of the demilitarized zone, Conine, although less than 160 m high, held dominance over the surrounding terrain. Colonel Smith remarked that if the enemy had occupied the position, he would be looking down our throats at Dong Ha.

Lieutenant Colonel Evan L. Evan L. Evan L. Evan Parker Junior’s second battalion first marines assumed responsibility for the defense of Confienne in mid December. As a unit of the first marine division, the battalion quickly adapted to the differences between the demilitarized zone conflict and the pacification campaign further south.

Unlike the lightly armed and elusive Vietkong guerillas in the south, the North Vietnamese in this area often held their ground, backed by heavy machine guns, mortars, and artillery. By the time the battalion took over Confine, it had adjusted to the unique demands of the demilitarized zone environment. In December, the Marines of the second battalion worked vigorously on strengthening the defenses of the A4 Strong Point.

 During the Christmas Truce period, the battalion constructed 11 bunkers and dug a new trench along the forward slope. They reinforced the bunkers with sandbags and added a burster layer to the roofs, typically made from airfield matting, to absorb delayed fuse rounds. The positions were then covered with rubberized tarps to prevent water intrusion.

 By year’s end, all of the defenses were complete. New bunkers were reinforced with sandbags and enclosed with sharp Germanstyle barbed wire. Protected by a minefield in front and surrounded by wire, the second battalion felt relatively safe in their defenses at the exposed Confen outpost. As the new year began, the Marines at Confien enjoyed a brief break from the fighting.

 Both sides generally respected the fragile terms of the holiday truce. Although there was a minor enemy probe against a Marine listening post on the perimeter on New Year’s Day, a Marine forward artillery observer at Confine used binoculars to look at enemy positions across the Benh High River. He suddenly noticed a large North Vietnamese Army flag prominently displaying its single star on a bright red background waving in the wind at top a makeshift flag pole.

 Other Marines, mainly young infantrymen, gathered around to catch a glimpse of what was for many their first real symbol of the enemy. Confident that the Marines would honor the ceasefire, the North Vietnamese army deliberately provoked the American troops. Impatiently, the Marine gunners waited for the false peace to come to an end.

 As the truce approached its conclusion, the guns at Conine opened fire on the routes leading to their perimeter. The defenders then plotted a mission to target the flag. Just minutes before the artillerymen fired their first round, the North Vietnamese army took down their colors. This incident reflected the frustrations common among the Marines in the demilitarized zone.

 The young men around 19 years old who manned the defenses at Conine along with their leaders struggled to comprehend the purpose of demilitarized zones that were not truly demilitarized and ceasefires that seemed to benefit only the enemy. The conflict soon resumed for the second battalion at Contheine.

 Although the fighting was not as intense as it had been in September and October, the North Vietnamese continued to probe and occasionally bombard the Marine outpost, the incoming rounds from mortars, artillery, and recoilless rifles soon matched the level experienced by the previous defenders. According to the battalion’s monthly report, the incoming fire was more of a nuisance than truly destructive.

 On January 5th, the North Vietnamese Army morted Contheine in groups of three to five bursts. Between 945 and 10:15, a total of 37 artillery rounds struck the marine positions. This barrage included five 120 mm shells and hit the battalion command post directly. As a result, one Marine was killed and eight others were wounded, including Lieutenant Colonel Parker, the battalion commander.

 Marine air and artillery units targeted the suspected enemy firing positions. However, the Marine Command could not determine how effective these attacks were. After Lieutenant Colonel Parker was medically evacuated, Major James T. Harold III assumed the role of acting commander of the battalion. On January 9th, Lieutenant Colonel Billy R.

 Billy R. Duncan officially replaced Lieutenant Colonel Parker as battalion commander, allowing Harold to return to his duties as executive officer. Enemy shelling at Confien continued sporadically, averaging around 30 rounds on the days the North Vietnamese army chose to fire. On the ground, the North Vietnamese took advantage of the holiday truce to bring in fresh troops and maintained pressure on the Marine outpost.

 The 8003rd North Vietnamese Army Regiment replaced the 90th North Vietnamese Army Regiment in positions facing Confen. Almost every day, small patrols from the 8003rd tested the Marine defenses. For instance, on January 10th, Company H reported in the early morning that they spotted three individuals moving westward with a Starlight scope.

 The Marines fired three M79 grenade rounds and later checked the area, but found nothing. Later that night, around 9:00 p.m., a Marine squad from Company F on the northeastern perimeter detected enemy movement on their radar. They called in a mortar mission. A Marine platoon patrol went to investigate the results.

 Unfortunately, they accidentally entered a friendly minefield, resulting in three casualties, one dead and two wounded. A few days later, on the night of January 14th, Marines at Conthian heard an explosion in the minefield to the north of their defenses. They fired illumination rounds and discovered a wounded North Vietnamese soldier lying in the minefield as well as other North Vietnamese troops withdrawing.

 A Marine squad with a Starlight scope attempted to recover the injured individual. However, by the time they reached the area, no one was there. Shortly afterward, a Marine outpost spotted four to five North Vietnamese entering the battalion’s perimeter, seemingly to retrieve their injured comrade. Another mine detonated.

 Lieutenant Colonel Duncan dispatched a platoon to investigate possible enemy casualties. Around 1:20 in the morning on the 15th, the Marine Patrol approached the minefield and noticed whistling and considerable noise indicating a significant enemy presence nearby. Both sides retreated while providing cover fire.

 The North Vietnamese army employed recoilless rifles, small arms, and 60 mm mortars to aid their withdrawal while Marine artillery targeted their escape routes. Two Marines sustained minor injuries. Later that morning, around 10:00 in the morning, another Marine patrol returned to the last known enemy location. They discovered a pick, a wrench, and a poncho that had fragmentation holes and large blood stains.

 For the Marines of the Second Battalion, First Marines in January, their time at Confine was known as their time in the barrel. Lieutenant Colonel Duncan later reflected that the North Vietnamese artillery had destroyed a large section of the Northwest minefield which protected the Marine outpost along with the forward trenches and bunkers in the vicinity.

 Casualties were increasing and the hospital bunkers were overcrowded with wounded Marines on stretches. The battalion commander recalled that one of the chaplain succumbed to the stress and attempted suicide. Route 561, which ran north and south was crucial for Conthen. to maintain access. General Meza noted that marine engineers rectified the road in 1967.

 They cut a jog through an abandoned village, making the path shorter and enhancing its security. However, new challenges emerged. When the heavy rains hit, the water eroded the road, and it took a long time for engineers to gather enough rock to establish a proper roaded capable of supporting heavy traffic. Additionally, the Marines set up two combat operating bases, C2 and C2A, to secure Route 561.

Located about 2,000 meters southeast of Conthean, the C2A base overlooked a bridge crossing a stream along the road. The Marines dubbed this area the wash out because heavy rainstorms would flood the low ground. Another base, C2, was situated 3,000 m further southeast and housed both artillery and infantry positions.

 The terrain along route 561 between Confine and Camllo featured low rolling hills, many gullies, and brush reaching waist height. From the C2A and C2 bases, Marine patrols set out to keep the North Vietnamese Army off the roads. In January 1968, Lieutenant Colonel Edwin AF Depula’s first battalion, Fourth Marines, took over both C2 and C2A, following the third battalion, Fourth Marines in that area.

 Lieutenant Colonel Depula established his command post at C2 with companies A and B. His executive officer, Major John I Hopkins, formed a second command group with companies C and D at C2A. During the first weeks of January, the battalion conducted numerous combat patrols ranging from squad to platoon size. These patrols extended about 1,500 m from both C2 and C2A as well as from Route 561.

 The most significant action in the battalion’s area came from another unit. On January 10th, January 10th, a small patrol from the Third Reconnaissance Battalion encountered three North Vietnamese Army soldiers in a palmcoed harbor site approximately 3,000 m east of C2. The reconnaissance Marines killed two of the enemy, took one prisoner, and seized all three of their weapons.

 In early January, the primary objective at C2 was completing the bunker defenses as part of the barrier system. Several support units, including engineers, artillery, and tank units, worked alongside the first battalion, fourth marines in the base area. The engineers conducted daily mine sweeps along Route 561 to Concin to keep the road accessible.

 They along with all other units contributed to the construction efforts. On January 10th, a Diamarker team visited the C2 site to inspect the defenses. According to the first battalion’s monthly record, none of the bunkers were considered complete. Maximum efforts later focused on completing the bunkers in line with the tactical situation.

 Colonel Smith, the regimental commander, later discussed some challenges faced by the marine units in finishing the barrier construction. Few units had back hoes to help dig fox holes or bunker foundations. He noted that these machines could accomplish in 2 hours what an entire battalion needed 2 days to complete.

 Despite the lack of equipment, Smith also attributed part of the issue to marine training. He felt that the troops were not adequately taught proper sandbagging techniques. He compared sandbagging to laying bricks with headers and stretchers. He noted that he saw more wasted effort with the sandbags.

 The man doesn’t know what he is doing, and the non-commissioned officer supervising him is just as clueless. As a result, the wall ends up six feet high and then collapses. There goes three days of work down the drain. Despite their inexperience in building bunkers and not having heavy earthmoving equipment, the first battalion, Fourth Marines, managed to finish 47 of the 81 planned bunkers at the C2 base site by the end of the month.

 To the south of Depula’s first battalion in Kentucky, there was a small command group and two companies of Lieutenant Colonel William M. Cryan’s second battalion, 9inth Marines. In December, just before Christmas, the second battalion moved from locations north of A3 in Operation Kentucky to Camp Carroll, which was part of the Third Marines Lancaster area of operations.

 A few days later, Lieutenant Colonel Cryan detached companies F and G, placing them under his executive officer, Major Dennis J. Murphy. While Cryan and the rest of the battalion stayed at Camp Carroll, Murphy and his command returned to the Kentucky area of operations. They relieved the third battalion, third marines at Camp Low. Company F took over the C3 Camp Low artillery position located 1,000 m above the Cam Low River on Route 561.

Meanwhile, Company G secured the Camllo bridge C3A on route 9 at the river in the Camllo sector, the second battalion. 9inth Marines patrolled route 561 to keep the primary supply route open to Conthen and the farming villages above the river. At the C3 base, Company F along with supporting artillery and engineers focused on improving the Diamarker defenses.

 By January 15th, the Marines at C3 finished the bunker requirements on time. During this period, Marine patrols faced very few enemy troops. In fact, during the first two or three weeks of the month, enemy activity was minimal. They were limited to a mining incident on Route 561 on January 2nd and to infiltrating hamlets above the Cam Low River at night.

 During these nighttime visits, Vietkong guerillas would recruit or kidnap villagers and demand food and other supplies. In the first two weeks of January, a popular force unit west of the hamlet of Anmire ambushed Vietkong troops trying to enter the village on three different occasions, killing at least three of them.

 By the end of the month, the situation continued to develop. During the third week, the second battalion reported a significant amount of movement in and out of the villages, especially to the east. While patrolling the hilly brush terrain in the camel northern area, the second battalion marines encountered more and more North Vietnamese regulars by mid January.

 To the northeast, Lieutenant Colonel Robert C. Lieutenant Colonel Robert C. Needam’s third battalion, third Marines focused on completing the last of the strong points along the trace known as A3 within the ninth marine sector. In November, marine engineers supported later by a CB battalion began work on the strong point.

 A three was designed according to Army of the Republic of Vietnam specifications. It was planned to include 30 bunkers, each measuring 18 by 32 feet. These bunkers were heavily timbered and sandbagged covered with dirt and could accommodate up to 18 Army of the Republic of Vietnam troops on three- tiered wooden bunks. By Christmas, the CBS and engineers had finished raising the timbers for the bunkers and left the sandbagging to the infantry.

 Up to that point, the Special Landing Force Alpha Battalion, Battalion Landing Team 1/3, had been attached to the 9inth Marines and assigned to the A3 position. At the end of December, the third battalion, third marines with three companies, moved from the Cam Low sector to the A3 position and relieved the Special Landing Force Battalion, which was to join the First Marines at Quang Try.

 Although the CBS had departed, the third battalion, third marines, faced a considerable workload at A3. The rains in December left only sticky mud available for sandbags. A three still needed defensive wire and approximately 30,000 mines to be laid. Supported by engineers, the battalion dug fourman fighting holes. The Marines and engineers used mechanical ditch diggers to trench around the entire position.

 By January 12th, the third battalion had erected an observation tower and nearly completed the project. Colonel Smith noted that the A3 Strong Point was a model for this sort of installation. This is the only one in the area of operations that had a plan to begin with. The others just grew under half a dozen different commanders. Despite being subjected to enemy artillery, the third battalion suffered very few casualties at the A3 strong point due to the North Vietnamese Army shelling.

 The battalion’s company M was tasked with protecting the American gun positions south of Golin and suffered three fatalities and two injuries on January 9th due to enemy mortifier. These losses exceeded what Lieutenant Colonel Needam’s remaining companies endured from enemy actions throughout the entire month. In January, the third battalion, third marines, faced unexpected fire.

 Lieutenant Colonel Needam, the battalion commander, noted that friendly artillery rounds were fired into or near the inner perimeter of A3 and Hill 28 on 13 occasions, totaling 54 rounds. For instance, on January 5th, a white phosphorus shell landed within the third battalion’s perimeter. The 9inth Marines and the Second Battalion, 12th Marines, investigated this incident, which led to the battery commander being relieved of duty.

 6 days later, the battalion experienced six rounds of 105 mm artillery fire within its wire, followed by another 24 rounds on January 13th. Additionally, a misfire occurred on Hill 28, resulting in two Marines killed and six wounded. Other friendly fire incidents took place on January 15th and 19th. The artillery battalion, the second battalion, 12th Marines, did not mention these mishaps in its report.

However, it highlighted the considerable issues with computer hotlines to the firing batteries due to unreliable radio relay. The report also stated that staff visits to liaison officers and forward observers had improved communication regarding fire nets. Lieutenant Colonel Neidmam Needam, a former artillery officer, recalled years later that when he informed the 9inth Marines that he would not accept any further support from the 12th Marines, the situation received highlevel attention and was quickly resolved. In his report, he

noted that corrective actions seemed to have been initiated, leading to noticeable improvements by the month’s end. Just north of the third battalion, Third Marines, Lieutenant Colonel Lee R. Bendel’s third battalion, Fourth Marines, secured the approaches to the A3 strong point. On December 26th and 27th, Bendel’s battalion moved from C2 to relieve the first battalion, Fourth Marines, on Hill 28.

 A slight rise located about 600 m north of A3. Bendel expanded his battalion’s perimeter and repositioned his forces. Companies moved down from the top of the hill to new positions lower down. Marine engineers cleared the growth and trees to the west. This gave the battalion a better view of the surrounding landscape and improved their fields of fire.

 Low rolling hills with secondary scrub and dense brush were interspersed with flat wet rice patties ranging from 75 to 150 m to the north and east. There were also wide rice patties mixed with the woods to the west. To the south, the Marines had a clear line of sight to the A3 strong point and a boundary marking the battalion’s southern edge.

 The northern boundary reached the southern edge of the demilitarized zone, which was less than 1,000 m from Hill 28. With the demilitarized zone nearby, and elements of the 90th North Vietnamese Army Regiment, believed to be in his area, Lieutenant Colonel Bendel emphasized the need for alertness. He arranged his battalion into a three company perimeter, keeping one company in reserve.

 Bendel utilized the reserve company for night ambushes and listening posts during the night and as a reaction force during the day. The battalion commander stated that he maintained four to six ambushes and listening posts on any given night. Throughout the day, the battalion kept up constant patrols with as many as two companies out at a time.

Lieutenant Colonel Bendelle reinforced the infantry companies with four 106 mm recoilless rifles, 2.5 caliber machine guns, and six of the battalion’s 81 mm mortars. He left the two remaining mortars back at the base camp so that the extra personnel from the 81 mm mortar platoon could carry additional ammunition if they needed to move out.

The second battalion 12th Marines provided direct artillery support and the first marine aircraft wing offered close air support. The thundering third as the battalion called itself was familiar with the demilitarized zone conflict. It had been present at Confine from July to early September 1967 during some of the heaviest fighting and bombardment around that area.

 Lieutenant Colonel Bendel, who took command that July, recalled how the battalion actively patrolled the surrounding region that summer. They helped establish strong points at C2, C3, Camel Bridge, and the wash out and also deployed a detachment to Giolin. Shortly after the third battalion, fourth Marines arrived on Hill 28.

 They found themselves again engaged with the enemy. On the morning of December 30th, Company M, led by Captain Raymond W. Helm Jr. was on patrol. To the southwest of the battalion perimeter, six empty North Vietnamese Army bunkers were discovered. They were facing east, approximately 2,000 m from Hill 28.

 After the Marines destroyed the enemy bunkers, the company moved northwest. Around 1:30 in the afternoon, near a small stream about 1500 m west of Hill 28, the Marines encountered an enemy rear guard consisting of four to 10 men. In the ensuing gunfire, Company M suffered one fatality and four injuries. Captain K then called for artillery and 81 mm mortar strikes.

 After the skirmish, the Marines found the body of one North Vietnamese soldier. The next morning, Lieutenant Colonel Bendel dispatched Captain John L. Desp Captain John L. Conference. Pritchard’s company eye into a similar area where company M had encountered the North Vietnamese Army. Prard’s company set out from hill 28 in platoon columns.

 Pendel noted that this formation helped prevent the troops from spreading out and allowed the company commander to deploy firepower promptly following a trail near the destroyed village of Shanghai located about 1,800 m northwest of Hill 28. Staff Sergeant CL Collie spotted four to five North Vietnamese troops ahead. The company commander ordered two platoon to advance to a slight rise in the terrain and positioned his third platoon behind the command post group for protection.

Initially, the North Vietnamese had the upper hand in the exchange, but the Marine Company quickly turned the tide. Pritchard and his officers moved swiftly along the Marine line, rallying their troops, and India company soon gained fire superiority. Around noon, the Marines spotted a second group of North Vietnamese Army troops moving to reinforce the first.

 The company engaged the reinforcements with 60 millimeter mortar and small arms fire, forcing the enemy to take cover. About 30 minutes later, but about 30 minutes later, the Marines themselves came under heavy bombardment from 82 mm mortars coming from their right flank, generally in the northeast direction. It became clear that the enemy occupied strong bunkered positions across the front and to the right front of India company.

 Despite challenging flying conditions caused by cloud ceilings of 500 to 1,000 ft and limited visibility, an aerial observer arrived at the scene. Identifying himself with the call sign, Smitty Tango, the aerial observer made radio contact. Pritchard coordinated with the company’s mortars to conduct counter mortar fire.

 The marine mortars successfully disabled one enemy tube, causing the others to halt fire. With this achievement, the air observer withdrew, and the company called for an artillery mission, targeting enemy positions with rounds of varying caliber. The Marine artillery fire resulted in enemy bodies being thrown into the air as India Company directed 155 mm fire toward friendly lines.

 The Marine Company experienced four injuries and began receiving fire from the right front. One of the wounded was a sniper who had moved too far forward, becoming exposed to enemy fire. A corman tried to assist him, but was hit himself and forced to fall back. With his gunnery sergeant providing suppressive fire, Captain Pritchard rushed forward to retrieve the seriously injured Marine, returning him to the company’s position.

A helicopter from Marine Helicopter Squadron 163 carried out a medical evacuation mission, transporting the wounded man from an improvised landing zone just behind the company’s location in a protected area. Despite enemy efforts to interrupt the Marine radio communications, Smitty Tango maintained contact with Captain Pritchard and Second Lieutenant Albert B.

 Doyle, the forward artillery observer assigned to the company. At 1:35 in the afternoon, the air observer assessed the artillery fire and pulled for two Marine Huey gunships from Marine Observation Squadron 6, which had previously supported the landing of the evacuation helicopter. The gunships carried out multiple attacks on the enemy mortar positions located in open bomb craters near Marine lines.

 When the air support arrived, several North Vietnamese soldiers were seen standing in their holes only 100 to 150 m away from India Company, firing at both the air observer and the helicopters during their strikes. As the lead Huey, piloted by Major Curtis D. Mccrainy, approached for its first run, its guns jammed. Major David L. Steel.

 McCraine’s co-pilot noted that one of the North Vietnamese likely noticed the malfunction and stepped out of cover, firing at them during their next pass. This was a grave error. As Steel recounted, during subsequent passes, they were able to bombard the crater area with rockets and machine gun fire, resulting in the deaths of most of the enemy.

 The Air Observer reported witnessing North Vietnamese soldiers dragging eight bodies into a tunnel. After the air strikes, Lieutenant Colonel Bendell, who had been listening to the radio traffic, made the decision to pull India company back to Hill 28. By this time, the North Vietnamese had sent in additional reinforcements.

 Bendel felt there was no need to attack the enemy position. He believed that marine artillery and gunships would have a significant impact on the enemy. As Company I withdrew and lost contact, the troops spotted a large North Vietnamese unit, seemingly dressed in marine uniforms, closing in. The Huey gunships provided extensive covering fire before the artillery took over.

 By 3 in the afternoon, the company had safely returned to Hill 28. Colonel Smith, the commander of the 9inth Marines, Minik Speakation by Branics of Doubles, personally welcomed the men of Hungary I with a well-deserved well done. The company had suffered only four wounded while accounting for 27 enemy dead.

 This count did not include the eight North Vietnamese taken out by helicopters or the unknown number killed by artillery. Lieutenant Colonel Bendel recommended Captain Pritchard for the Navy Cross and he received the Silver Star. In the following days, the third battalion fourth marines experienced a relatively quiet time in their forward position.

 However, in the early hours of January 6th, a listening post detected movement just outside the battalion’s perimeter. The Marines fired their small arms and M79 grenade launchers. One defender noticed something fall, but when they attempted to investigate, they drew enemy fire. During the daylight, the Marines found no evidence of enemy bodies.

 It was clear to the battalion that their quiet period had ended. The next day, January 7th, January 7th, the Marines on Hill 28 began receiving sniper fire from an enemy held ridge line about 800 m in front of them just south of the demilitarized zone. Lieutenant Colonel Bendel instructed Captain John D. Carr, the commanding officer of Company L, to flush out the sniper who had already wounded one Marine.

 That morning, Carr dispatched two six-man teams from his first platoon. The teams approached the enemy position from both flanks and then linked up to form a squad-siz patrol. As the squad moved over the ridge line, they came under fire from enemy AK-47s and machine guns. The enemy was well entrenched in defenses created from numerous Americanmade bomb craters in the area.

 On the side of the ridge, North Vietnamese army gunners killed one marine and wounded another. The Marines were unable to advance or withdraw, so they took whatever cover they could find and returned fire. Captain Carr, in radio contact with the squad and aware of their situation, ordered the rest of the first platoon to reinforce the trapped Marines.

 When the platoon arrived at around 3:30 in the afternoon, they too found themselves in a difficult position. The North Vietnamese had clear lines of sight and had brought in reinforcements. The first platoon fought back using M79 grenade launchers, hand grenades, and rifles while also calling for more assistance.

 Captain Carr then led the remainder of Company L to the base of the ridge to flank the enemy. Although they could not connect with the first platoon on the forward slope, the company provided covering fire. Carr called in artillery strikes to prevent the enemy from sending in more reinforcements. Despite some rain and low clouds and despite some rain and low clouds, the company commander established radio contact with an aerial observer who adjusted the supporting fire, including the company’s 60 mm mortars. With this increased fire

support, the first platoon was able to hold their ground. But the situation was still serious as evening approached. At this juncture, Lieutenant Colonel Bendel directed Captain Carr to have the first platoon break contact and fall back across the ridge line. To support the platoon’s withdrawal, the aerial observer called in air strikes and artillery within 100 m of the Marines.

The battalion commander also sent two platoon of Company K to a high ground location about 1,000 m west of Company L. Despite these protective measures, the enemy inflicted heavy casualties on the marines of the first platoon as they disengaged and returned to the rest of the company.

 Since the initial contact with the enemy, company L had suffered six dead and 36 wounded with 28 of those needing evacuation. Captain Carr requested a medevac helicopter to evacuate the most seriously injured. As the Marines waited, a CH46D Boeing Vertol C knight helicopter from Marine Medium helicopter squadron 164 piloted by Captain Richard G.

 Susa took off from Fuai for the evacuation mission. Due to the rain and strong winds, Susa flew low to the ground as the helicopter neared the improvised landing zone. The Marines of Company L fired illumination flares to help the pilot navigate through the dark. Tracer rounds from North Vietnamese Army machine guns created a tense and dangerous atmosphere.

 Once the aircraft landed, the enlisted crew quickly jumped out to assist the infantry in loading their wounded onto the helicopter. After that, the helicopter took off again, still under fire, unable to use its M60 machine guns since the enemy was too close to the Marine Company. Thanks to the safe evacuation of most of the wounded and support from other units, Company L managed to reach the forward positions of Company K without incurring further casualties.

 Lieutenant Colonel Bendelle explained his decision to place Company K’s two platoon on the high ground. This was not only a tactical move, but also intended to boost morale. He stated, “If you can pass through friendly lines when you are halfway back, it’s a big morale boost to the troops and helps cover the rear of the force returning to the battalion perimeter.

” Overall, Bendel commended Captain Carr for effectively handling a challenging situation. He noted that they committed their forces early and the company commander was able to move quickly and use supporting arms effectively. Bendel believed that without this approach, the platoon would have been isolated and likely destroyed. In the chaos of evacuating the dead and wounded, however, they left behind the body of a marine from the first platoon on the ridge line.

 The next day, Lieutenant Colonel Bendel ordered Company L to recover the missing Marine. He directed Captain Carr to postpone the mission until noon due to the persistent rain and low visibility. Bendel wanted an aerial observer to oversee the operation. As Company L moved back to their previous position, the aerial observer spotted the Marines body and about 12 North Vietnamese soldiers nearby.

 The enemy had dragged the Marines body into the demilitarized zone. Concerned that the body was being used as bait for a trap, Bendel recalled the Marine Company to Hill 28 and ordered artillery and air support to saturate the area. Lieutenant Colonel Bendell then devised a new strategy. He and his staff created plans for a three- company operation with air and artillery support to recover the body from the demilitarized zone.

 Instead of a direct approach to the objective, one company would be left to block potential enemy routes. The battalion took positions on high ground to the northwest of Hill 28, south of the demilitarized zone. The other two companies moved northeast first, then turned north into the demilitarized zone. They advanced in a southwesterly direction to approach the enemy from behind and from the sides.

After an artillery bombardment and ground controlled air strikes along the eastern front to conceal their route, the battalion set out at 500 on January 11th. Lieutenant Colonel Bendel noted that they maintained strict radio silence. As planned, Captain Car’s company L took control of the ridge line to the northwest.

 Under the cover of darkness and fog, the two attack companies, companies K and M, moved northeast towards the demilitarized zone with company K at the forefront and Bendel’s command group positioned between them. After about 1,500 m, the battalion turned north and entered the southern half of the demilitarized zone. Once inside, the two companies followed parallel paths in a southwesterly direction, separated by a fellow rice patty.

 Company M along with the battalion command group lagged behind Company K, ensuring protection for the battalion’s rear and left flank as the morning haze lifted around 900. The first of three aerial observers from the third marine division arrived above. Soon after, Captain Edward O Leroyy’s company K encountered the first of several North Vietnamese Army bunkers near the largely destroyed village of Anjha.

 With the help of artillery and air support, the company swiftly dealt with scattered enemy resistance. At one point, Captain the commander of Company M, spotted what appeared to be three bushes. They turned out to be well camouflaged North Vietnamese soldiers moving to the back of his company. He directed machine gun fire in their direction and called for artillery support.

 The three soldiers were soon seen fleeing over the hill behind them. For the following three hours, the two marine companies operated in the demilitarized zone in the vicinity of Anjar. Company K destroyed about 25 bunkers and seized around 10 weapons, including a machine gun, a rocket propelled grenade launcher, several AK-47s and other rifles.

 The Marines also confiscated or destroyed cooking utensils, pieces of uniforms and equipment, food supplies, and documents that identified their adversaries. The North Vietnamese unit in the area was the second company, 7th Battalion, 90th NVA Regiment. In their rush, the NVA soldiers left cooked rice in the pot, still warm.

 Further south, company M defended Company K’s southern flank and safely recovered the body of the missing Marine from Company L. By the afternoon of the 11th, both companies had moved past Company L’s blocking positions and returned to the battalion command post on Hill 28. The Marines suffered only two injuries, both of which were wounds, and only one required evacuation.

 Marine reports indicated they killed at least 15 North Vietnamese Army troops and likely caused more casualties through artillery and air support. Lieutenant Colonel Bendel stated that by achieving surprise and moving during the night, he and his operations officer, Major Richard K. Young viewed the sweep of the southern demilitarized zone as a successful example of coordination between the infantry and supporting forces.

 On two occasions, aerial observers called for air strikes on North Vietnamese army troops who were trying to flank the marine companies. Young, who remained at the battalion combat operations center on Hill 28, remarked that they managed to have artillery ready 30 seconds before aircraft arrived, allowing them to coordinate both air strikes and artillery fire.

 This continuous fire was maintained throughout the operation. Young recalled several instances when artillery was slow to arrive. In those cases, the company commander would contact him via tactical radio to request immediate support. Young would then arrange for 81 mm fire to fill the gap or coordinate with his artillery liaison officer or forward air controller to ensure ongoing fire while the prospect.

 Troops advanced on the bunker complex. Shortly after the battalion returned, Lieutenant Colonel Bendel briefed the Third Marine Division staff and the commandant of the Marine Corps, General Leonard F. Tanti40, Chapman Jr. during his visit to Vietnam at the Donga headquarters regarding the successful completion of the operation. With the end of the demilitarized zone sweep, the presence of the third battalion, Fourth Marines on Hill 28 was coming to an end.

 The completion of the A3 strong point decreased the necessity for a forward battalion to guard the approaches. On January 12th, Bendel’s battalion started moving to a new position near the abandoned village of Anfu. This location was closer to Conthine. For the 9inth Marines involved in Operation Kentucky, the strong point system was nearly complete.

 However, several years later, Lieutenant Colonel Bendel noted that there were signs of a North Vietnamese army buildup throughout the demilitarized zone sector. The supply route to Kolu remained fragile. Since November 1967, Colonel Joseph ESA Lrete’s third Marines had been conducting Operation Lancaster. This operation aimed to protect the western flank of the 9inth Marines in Kentucky.

The Lancaster operational area included key marine bases such as Camp Carroll which served as an important artillery position, the Rock Pile and Carloo. The Rock Pile rising 700 ft dominated the surrounding terrain. From its summit, marine observers could easily monitor the most likely routes into the Camlo River Valley and track movements along Route 9.

 This route was one of the two most critical east-west paths in the demilitarized zone sector. About 12,000 meters below the rock pile lay, effectively the southern end point of Route 9. The North Vietnamese army had severed the road connecting Caou to Kan, which was around 20,000 m to the west. Caru served as a vital way station for any relief efforts headed to Kam.

Situated at the junction of the Quangtry River and Route 9, it also provided the Marines with an outpost to detect enemy infiltration from the west, southwest, and the Bar Long Valley to the southeast. Like much of the terrain in the demilitarized zone area, the Lancaster operational zone featured rolling hills that ascended into jungle covered mountains standing 700 to 800 ft tall with tree canopies towering between 20 to 60 ft.

 The presence of 15 ft elephant grass and thick brush impeded movement even in the relatively lower areas. Similar to Colonel Smith and the 9inth Marines, Colonel L Prete was closely linked to his base areas. With only two infantry battalions, one of which had just two companies. The commander of the third marines faced challenges due to limited resources and manpower.

 Late maintained his command post at Camp Carroll, which was also home to Lieutenant Colonel William M. Cryan’s second battalion, 9inth Marines. Cryan, overseeing companies E and H, stationed company H at Carol while managing operations. Company E was located about 3,000 m southeast of Camp Carroll. Their mission was to protect a main supply route.

 Lite assigned Lieutenant Colonel Gorton CC Cook’s third battalion, 9inth Marines, to defend both Caru and the Rockpile area. Cook and three of his companies stayed in the Thon Sunlam sector just below the rockpile. He placed company L at Caru. An article in the battalion newsletter at that time stated that the sector was pretty quiet now except for some sporadic ambushes between here and our company-sized outpost at Ka Lou.

Artillery and tanks provided reinforcements for the infantry in Lancaster. Three batteries of 105 mm howitzers and 155 mm howitzer battery all under the first battalion 12th marines at Carol supported the infantry battalions directly. An ad hoc battery known as battery W from the first battalion 12th marines was stationed with company L at Kaou.

 Company B from the third tank battalion operated two platoon of M48 medium guns and one heavy section of M67 A2 flame tanks at Carol. Generally, these tanks helped strengthen the defenses at Camp Carroll and offered protection for convoys traveling to Caru, an attached US and attached USUS. Army artillery unit Battery C from the first battalion 44th artillery enhanced the firepower of the Marines.

 The Army’s M42s, also called dusters, were equipped with twin 40mm anti-aircraft guns. They served as machine guns, providing extra security for marine convoys and the marine fixed defenses. The Marines were particularly concerned about their relatively exposed position at Caou. The isolated garrison included roughly 625 personnel from the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps, which also comprised the Marine Infantry Company.

 Navy CBS and marine engineers nearly completed the permanent facilities needed for the Diamarker project. While the North Vietnamese did not directly attack the Marine outpost, they occasionally mined Route 9 in December and ambushed a Marine convoy returning from convoy returning from Koo to the Rockpile. Despite a relative calm during the first two weeks of January, Marine intelligence suggested that North Vietnamese forces were mobilizing.

 A division reconnaissance team known as Stingray operating in the vicinity of the Caru base soon confirmed the presence of enemy troops. On January 12th around 2:15 p.m. Reconnaissance Team 2C3 using the code name blue reported their findings. The Marines operating under the designation Blue Plate were in the mountains approximately 4,000 m southwest of Caou near the Quangry River.

 They reported that five North Vietnamese soldiers dressed in black pajamas and armed with automatic weapons were tracking them. The Marines fired at the enemy but did not hit their targets. For a short while, everything was quiet as they continued their journey. Then, about 2 hours later, they communicated that they were encircled by around 30 North Vietnamese troops wielding AK-47s.

Marine gunships arrived overhead, providing supporting fire, while another helicopter evacuated the Marine unit. The reconnaissance team experienced only one casualty with one Marine sustaining injuries. The event on the 12th foreshadowed what was about to happen next. The following day, the North Vietnamese launched an ambush against an engineer convoy transporting Diamarker supplies and equipment to Caru.

 Under an overcast sky and a light drizzle, their 20 vehicle convoy left the rockpile area around 11:20 in the morning on the 13th. Marine artillery had already conducted 15-minute preparation fires at suspected ambush locations. The convoy was led by two tanks followed by 10 6×6 trucks, two more tanks in the center, four low boy tractor trailers, and two army dusters at the rear.

In total, the vehicles carried about 200 personnel, including engineers, drivers, M42 crews, support staff, and members from Company I, Third Battalion, 9inth Marines. Around 11:50, approximately 3,000 m above Caru, enemy gunners opened fire on the convoy with rocket propelled grenades, small arms fire, and mortar rounds.

 Simultaneously, the North Vietnamese ambushers detonated a command mine that ignited two trucks, one low boy and another transporting 81 mm mortar ammunition. The explosion of the mortar truck compelled the rear section of the convoy to stop completely. Soldiers from company I quickly dismounted from their vehicles to confront the enemy, but many triggered hidden firing devices and mines concealed alongside the road.

 Lieutenant Colonel Cook later recalled that before the convoy set out, he and his sergeant major had moved to a lookout point on a hill just west of Route 9. From that vantage point, he maintained radio communication with both his command post and the convoy while observing the vehicles as they traveled south toward Caou.

 Upon seeing the convoy halt after the initial gunfire, he instructed the lead element to proceed to Caou and come back with reinforcements. He then joined the stranded troops. According to Cook, from the ambush location, he called and directed artillery fire through his combat operations center on enemy escape and support routes both east and west of Route 9.

 Meanwhile, Company L third battalion 9th Marines boarded the lead trucks at Caru to relieve the engaged column. At the ambush site around 12:15, an aerial observer known by the call sign American Beauty arrived overhead to help call in support fire. The overcast skies prevented the use of marine fixedwing jets, but two helicopter gunships targeted the enemy firing positions.

 Marine artillery fired over 700 rounds, including 54 shells from 155 mm howitzers in support of the convoy after the first contact. With the arrival of company L and the ongoing artillery barrage, the Marines disengaged while facing occasional enemy sniper fire. They completed their journey to Caou, arriving at around 3:10 in the afternoon.

 The convoy made the return trip to the Rockpile area later that afternoon without any incidents. However, the toll had been significant. American losses included 19 killed and over 70 wounded. Most of the casualties were incurred by company I during the initial moments of the ambush. The Marines confirmed 10 enemy dead and captured one prisoner.

 Marine intelligence officers estimated that a North Vietnamese company was involved in the attack. For a while after the ambush, the focus of the Third Marines shifted back to the north and east in the area between Camp Carroll and the Rock Pile above Route 9. Shortly after 8:00 on the morning of January 16th, a Third Reconnaissance Battalion Stingray team found itself surrounded by around 40 North Vietnamese on high ground about 2,000 m north of the Camllo River.

 The team reported that the enemy were clearly North Vietnamese Army regulars dressed in green utilities and wearing helmets marked with a yellow lightning bolt design. They were armed with AK-47 rifles and two machine guns. The Third Marines promptly dispatched a reaction platoon from Company H, Second Battalion, 9inth Marines to support the encircled team.

 They were lifted into a helicopter landing zone about 1,000 m east of the reconnaissance team. The reaction platoon came under heavy machine gun fire. They returned fire and called for air and artillery support. Once the artillery and air strikes subdued the enemy forces, the infantry platoon linked up with the reconnaissance team.

 By this time, the North Vietnamese troops had vanished, leaving behind six dead. At 1:40 p.m. that afternoon, Marine helicopters evacuated both groups of Marines to Camp Carroll. The unit suffered one Navy corman killed and four Marines wounded. It was clear that the enemy had become more aggressive along Route 9 and the demilitarized zone in general.

 After a few short quiet days, the conflict in the western Kentucky sector of the demilitarized zone reignited after departing Hill 28 and discovering an enemy base area. Lieutenant Colonel Bendel’s third battalion, fourth marines, established new positions at And located between A3 and Confe to investigate recent incursions at the latter base.

 The battalion quickly began patrolling its area of operations. On the 17th, Bendel planned to send out a two company patrol the next morning near an abandoned hamlet just north of the trace about 2 mi northeast of Conthine. Company M was designated as the blocking force while Company L would act as the sweeping force.

 On the evening of the 17th, Captain John D. Carr, the Company L commander, convened a meeting with his platoon commanders. Christy, who led the third platoon, recalled that Carr briefed them on the following day’s planned patrol. Christy observed that the route they would take led them through a bombedout village they commonly referred to as the meat market due to its association with enemy activity, noting that almost every time they entered that area, someone got hurt.

 Christy’s platoon had recently patrolled that area but detected no signs of enemy presence, suggesting that the enemy either did not engage or had moved away. Captain Carr assigned the point position to his first platoon. Lieutenant Christy argued within reason that his platoon was familiar with the area and should take point. However, Captain Carr maintained that the third platoon needed a break and wanted to provide another platoon the chance to gain point experience.

 As planned with the first platoon at point followed by the second platoon and the command group, the third platoon brought up the rear company L advanced. The battalion left Andine before dawn. Suddenly, around 9:45 a.m., North Vietnamese Army forces launched an ambush from well-hidden bunkers and spider holes near the meat market.

 The first platoon leading the way thought they were facing a North Vietnamese Army platoon. They quickly found themselves split into different groups with the forward unit cut off from the rest of the company. Captain Carr moved the second platoon and his command group to the rear of the first platoon, taking shelter in a large B-52 bomb crater.

 In the rear, Lieutenant Christy remembered how the ambush began. It started with just a few sporadic gunshots before chaos erupted. His men dropped to the ground, facing outward as usual. Christy sought cover in a 105 mm shell crater with his platoon sergeant and radio operator. At that moment, Captain Carr instructed the third platoon commander to join him approximately 180 m ahead.

Despite heavy automatic gunfire, the third platoon rushed forward, finding safety in shell holes and bomb craters along the way. Miraculously, they completed the movement without suffering any casualties. Christy noted that they secured the rear of the company’s perimeter. As Company L began to stabilize its position, the North Vietnamese maintained their assault.

They continued firing automatic weapons from all sides along with mortars and heavy artillery. More critically, the enemy was using the isolated squad from the first platoon approximately 100 meters in front of the main company as bait in a deadly area. Lieutenant Christy recalled Captain Carr telling him that there were dead and wounded up front and that they needed the third platoon to retrieve them to facilitate medical evacuation.

 By this time, enemy fire had somewhat lessened. Captain Carr along with forward artillery observer Sergeant Michael J. Madden pulled in supporting artillery from the United States. Sergeant Madden also connected with an air observer in a Huey helicopter, bringing in gunships for protection. With this support, Lieutenant Christy and one of his squads, accompanied by Captain Carr, moved forward to reach the first platoon.

 Christy assigned his men and cautiously crawled ahead. Sergeant Madden was at another crater. Despite being wounded, he continued to call in artillery strikes. Four other men were injured alongside him. Christy recalled Captain Carr covering for him with a shotgun as he moved forward to reach some marine bodies. This included the body of the first platoon commander located about 50 m ahead.

 With the support of artillery fire, the third platoon squad managed to bring back the wounded and dead from the first platoon. Lieutenant Christy noted that he urged some of his men to stop being so gentle. He reminded them that the bodies were not going to be harmed. He said, “Let’s get these people gathered up and leave before Charlie starts firing at us again.

” Meanwhile, after learning about the situation with Company L, Lieutenant Colonel Bendell, the battalion commander, replaced Company M with another unit in the blocking position. He then went with a small command group to relieve company L. After they linked up, the two companies took out at least three enemy mortar positions along with several machine guns and individual fighting holes.

 With ongoing support from helicopter gunships and covering artillery, marine helicopters evacuated the most seriously wounded. Later that afternoon, the two companies crossed the trace in good order while carrying their remaining casualties. In this action, they suffered nine deaths and 22 injuries, including Captain Carr, who was evacuated by helicopter.

 According to the 9inth Marines, the enemy incurred over 100 casualties. By January 20th, a new phase of the war was about to start. Colonel Lratee and his staff from the Third Marines were preparing to conclude the Lancaster operation and take over the Oyola area in the Kuang Tri sector from the first Marines.

 The First Marines were then set to relieve the fourth Marines in the Camp Evans sector. Colonel William Dick, the commander of the fourth Marines, would assume control of the units in Lancaster. Overall, this phase of Operation Checkers involved some reassignments, but had little impact on the battalions in their respective areas.

 Both the third battalion, 9inth Marines, and the two companies from the second battalion, 9inth Marines, would stay in Lancaster, now referred to as Operation Lancaster 2. According to the typical body count reports from the war, the third Marines in Operation Lancaster I recorded 46 enemy deaths while at the cost of 22 Marines killed and 140 wounded.

 During the same time frame, the 9inth Marines in Operation Kentucky faced heavy losses, reporting 90 soldiers killed and over 800 wounded. They managed to kill nearly 700 enemy combatants. However, the signs pointed to the North Vietnamese increasing their efforts in the demilitarized zone, including Kan near the coast.

 On January 20th, enemy gunners targeted two navy vessels on the Kuviet River. This attack led the naval support activity Quviet to temporarily shut down this crucial waterway, which served as the main supply route to the Marine base at Dong Ha. Meanwhile, the Third Marines noticed a large enemy force, likely the 29th North Vietnamese Army Regiment, had moved into the area north of the Quang Tri River and west of Caru.

 Adding to the situation, another regiment replaced the 90th North Vietnamese Army Regiment in the Lancaster Northern Operational Area. The 90th North Vietnamese Army then shifted southwest, possibly entering the KAM area of operations. It seemed that a major enemy offensive in the north was about to commence.